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FOREWORD
. This history of how brave men fought and won has been compiled
from all ~vailable sources. Testimony of many members of the Regiment, oflicial reports, personal observations of the several contributors to this story, and personnel and award files are the most important of these sources.
The history is a narrative of several thousands of men who were
brought together in a common cause. It is an attempt to tell where
these men went, what they did, and how they lived. It does not attempt to gloss over failures nor to exaggerate the many successful
actions. To the best of our knowledge, it is a simple, straightforward
story of what actually occurred, with no coloring, padding, nor superlative. '"fhe history was written for the most part during combat.
Its greatest fa~lure is obviously that it does not mention many, many
men who fought with courage and distinction through all or most of
the campaigns. We have suffered in knowing that we could not speak
of every man who contributed to the record of the I 20th Infantry.
This record is outstanding. The gegiment never lost a key point.
It never failed to capture an assigned objective. During the ebb and
How of battle, several units occasionally were driven backward, but
never was a battalion position lost. At times, companies and battalions failed to capture positions on the first attempt, but ultimately
all Regimental objectives were reachc?. Few organizations that
fought as many days as did the I 20th Infantry Hegiment have claim
to such a record. We are indebted to those men who achieved this
record and to those who helped in recording it.
We hope that this work in some measure may recall the rugged
but heroic days, the rough but ready comradeship, of the memorable
months when the Regiment was in combat in the European Theater
of Operations.
If tht=- purpose of this book were to tell the history of the I 20th Infantry in detail from its origin, one might devote the entire volume,
and many more besides, dealing with the fascinating story of its part
in the Revolutionary, the l\1exican, and the First World Wars. But
since this work is of limited scope, the story of the I 20th must deal
almost entirely with its combat record in World War II.

viii

HISTORY OF THE

120TH

INFANTRY REGIMENT

BACKGROUND
The l 20th Infantry Regiment has a distinguished
past and a colorful tradition. From the clay-red soil of
North Carolina, throughout the broad area extending
from its woods covered mountains to its sloping
beaches, sprang its different units. The towns which
produced the various companies are as follows:
lst Battalion Headquarters Company .... Oxford

Company "A" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bur1.mgton
Company "B" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W arrenton
Company "C" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H end erson
Company "D" ...................... Durham
2d Battalion Headquarters Company .. Albemarle
Company "E" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Concord
Company "F" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Charlotte
Company "G" ................ Winston-Salem
Company "I-I" .................. Waynesville
3d Battalion Headquarters Company ... Asheboro
.
Company "I" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . w·1
1 mmgton
Company "K" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shelby
Company "L" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Parkton
Company "M" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . w·11 son
Regimental f leadquarters . . . . . . . . . . . Reidsville
Medical Detachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Graham
Service Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Raleigh
As early as the Revolutionary <lays, some of these
companies were making military history. Some historians believe Company "L" to be the oldest company in the United States Army. Another of the oldest of the group was Company "F," originally called
the Mecklenburg County Minute Men. During the
historic Battle of King's Mountain, this group so consistently and effectively dismayed the forces of Lord
Cornwallis, that the British General was heard to refer
to the resistance offered by this unit as "a veritable
hornets' nest." Today, on the Regimental colors, the
acute observer will note a stalk of goldenrod, the
North Carolina state Hower, near a swarm of hornets
and their nest. A recent opponent paid a like compliment when he called men of the H.egiment President
Roosevelt's Storm T mopers. The other companies
were all organized during the nineteenth century, hut
they were not formed into a regiment until 1916 when,
as the North Carolina Infantry, they served on the
Mexican Border.
In September, 1917, the Hegiment was first assigned to the Division vvith which it has served in
two great wars-the 30th (Old Hickory) Division
which was comprised also of units from South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee.

The l 20th Infantry first landed in France in June,
1918, twenty-six years and a day before the Great Invasion of Normandy. Its members were among the
first American troops to enter Belgium, although they
did not enter fighting as in this war, being used to replace other troops which occupied the stabilized defense line in the sector of the British Second Army.
In September the Regiment was assigned first to the
British Third and shortly thereafter to the British
Fourth Army. It was as part of the latter unit that
on the 29th of September 1918, the I 20th made
the celebrated assault upon the formidable Hindenburg Linc, near Bellicourt, between Cambrai
and St. Quentin. The drive was successful in smashing the German defenses, and precipitated the end of
the war. A month later the Regiment moved to a rest
area, and there its men received news of the Armistice.
After six months overseas, the outfit had gained an
enviable reputation for having never retreated, and
had earned three streamers for the Hcgimental colors:
France, the Ypres-Lys Campaign, and the Somme
Offensive. From the Portuguese government the Regiment was honored with the order of T orre-e-Espada
(Tower and Sword Cavalier). The l20th returned
to the States in April, 1919.
Following World War I, the Regiment was inactivated for two years. In 1921 it was reorganized, again
on a National Guard basis, and received Federal recognition. For eighteen years it trained faithfully in
regular weekly sessions and yearly practice problems
and bivouacs.
WORLD WAR II
In 1940, a year after the outbreak of the war in
Europe, when the first mild warnings against military
unpreparedness were being voiced to an unwilling
public, the I 20th was ordered to Fort Jackson, S. C.,
where it was inducted into active service for what was
scheduled to be a year. The response to the call to
duty by the "Tar Heel" volunteers was so great that
many of the North Carolina companies came to camp
overstrength, and the excess men of the Regiment
were later turned over to other units which needed
personnel.
In February, 1937, the command of the Regiment
was given to Colonel John H. Manning, who had been
executive officer under the previous commander, Colonel Don E. Scott. It was Colonel Manning who
brought the Regiment to Jackson, and in his charge
was the extensive course of training which the Regi-

Major General (formerly Colonel) John H. Manning

Generals Eisenhower, Hobbs and Bradley inspect

ment was to take there. It had become clear that Colonel Manning had not only the ability to build a strong,
well-knit unit, but also the capacity to make men extraordinarily fond of him. Under him, the traditional,
informal title applied to any regimental commander,
"The Old Man," became a term of endearment and
profound respect. Under him, the Regiment was
readily molded into an efficient organization, ready for
battle whenever it was needed.
When the appointed year of training at Fort Jackson was completed, during which the I 20th had participated in maneuvers in Tennessee and the Carolinas, the outrage at Pearl Harbor shook the nation.
The men of the Regiment, preparing to return to
civilian life as scheduled, learned that all discharges
were canceled and that they were in uniform to stay.
lhe I 20th was alerted as one of the, units capable of
moving into instant action should the homeland be
imperiled by the enemy at that time.
With the year 1942 came a rejuvenated and ambitious program of reorganization and modernization
within the United States Army. The 120th Infantry, still stationed at Fort Jackson, was subjected to a
multiplicity of changes, which included the addition
of Cannon and Antitank Companies within the Regiment. The Division organization was changed from
the sc1uare, or four-regiment, type to the triangular of
three regiments. Intensive training made exemplary

show troops of the I 20th Infantry, and it was reviewed by leading dignitaries of many nations. But
in the fall of 1942 the first real change in personnel of
the I 20th took place. Because of the demand for com-

Field Marshal Montgomery learns about the Hornets" Nest

Brigadier General (formerly Colonel) Hammond D. Birks

but not always successfully

Motors were waterproofed

marched thirty-six miles in pouring rain and maintained contact with the "enemy" throughout that
night, while on the same day the other two battalions
marched thirty miles and waged mock battle, all with
a maximum of coordination.

petent leaders so pressingly needed elsewhere in that
crucial year, Colonel Manning' was taken from the
Regiment. Furthermore, the 120th Infantry was called
upon to supply officers and men for the I 18th Infantry which was given an overseas mission; it gave men
and officers to activate a new brother regiment, the
I 19th Infantry; and it sent more personnel to the
I 17th Infantry on assignment as school troops at Fort
l3cnning, Georgia. In addition, other commissioned
and enlisted cadres were drawn from the I 20th to help
activate new divisions.

OVERSEAS MOVEMENT
In November 1943, following the completion of
maneuvers, the 30th Division moved to Camp Atterburv, Indiana, where for four months the men of the
Regiment trained in preparation for overseas movement. Then, with complete equipment and in full
strength, the !20th moved to the staging area, Camp
Myles Standish, Mass., where for a week the men
were given final processing. On the 12th of February,
the Regiment sailed from Boston on the SS Argentina, headed for England and for a long, hazardous trip
through Europe which was to last eighteen eventful

BASIC AT BLANDING
The I 20th received replacements and once again
began the arduous work of training. Under a new,
energetic Regimental commander, Colonel Hammond
Davis Birks, the I 20th moved to Camp Blanding, near
Gainesville, Florida, in October, 1942. Blanding was
the cradle of the highly efficient unit which distinguished itself consistently during its days of training, and was later to prove itself magnificent in combat. After seven months of rigid training, emphasizing
particularly marksmanship and physical fitness, the
Regiment moved to a tent city on the outskirts of
Camp Forrest, Tennessee, and for three months underwent 30th Division maneuvers, closely followed in
September, 1943, by Second Army maneuvers. In
the latter, where the 30th maneuvered with and
against the 9-lth and the 98th Infantry Divisions and
the 12th Armored Division, the I 20th Hegiment established a remarkably outstanding record. One battalion
. 'Throughout this h i•tory, the inrlil·aterl r nnkA are the r a nk• at

t1m.- of thE" narrative, nnd not nece~sa rily the highest grade attained .

th~

Training to knock out pillboxes
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Top: Demonstration of German uniforms and equipment. Bottom: Field Marshal Montgomery tells us we have been chosen

to help do the big job.

BACKGROUND
months. Carrying all the units which comprised the
120th Regimental Combat Team, including the 230th
Field Artillery Battalion, Company "C" of the 105th
Engineer Battalion, and Company "C" of the 105th
Medical Battalion, the ship was part of one of the largest convoys in history.
In twelve days the troops were debarking at Gourock, near Glasgow, Scotland, which became the
established point for troop arrival in the European
Theater of Operations until many months after the
invasion of the Continent. Trains carried the units of
the Division the length of England to the southern
coasts where, at the seaside resort of Bognar Regis,
between Portsmouth and Southampton, the 120th
Infantry established its headc1uarters. Then followed
more training, including one week of tank-infantry
problems near Warminster. As the gigantic D-Day
approached, however, orders came that all coastal
towns must be evacuated to allow room for supplies
and troops about to assail the enemy in Normandy. On
the 3d of April the Regiment moved north to the
vicinity of Woodland Park, Buckinghamshire, where
the battalions were assigned to separate areas. Both
Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and General
Dwight Eisenhower inspected the Regiment during
its training there.
LEADERS
About to enter combat, the officers of the l 20th Infantry worked hard to shape their units into effective,
fast-driving teams. The former Regimental Executive,
Lt Col Garvin B. Farris, had become ill shortly after
arriving in England, and his place had been taken by
Lt Col Peter 0. Ward, formerly 3d Battalion commander. Lt Col Henry C. Crumley, who commanded
the 2d Battalion during most of the training period,
was also evacuated to a hospital.
Just prior to entering combat, the battalion commanders of the 120th were: Lt Col Hugh I. Mainord,
1st Battalion; Lt Col William S. Bradford, 2d Battalion: and Lt Col Paul W. McCollum, 3d Battalion. The
staff included Lt John J. Eberhardt, S-1; Capt Ezekiel
L. Glazier, S-2; Maj Leland L. Lambe, S-3; and Maj
James J. Bynum, S-4.
CWO James B. Lyles exemplified the spirit of the

7

General Eisenhower talks with a member of the Regiment

I 20th during his long service as Regimental Sergeant
Major and later as Assistant Adjutant.
On the lst of June, 1944, speaking to his men about
what lay ahead for the I 20th, Colonel Birks said:
'This is a great athletic contest. We are supposed to
be the greatest athletes in the world. We must live
up to our reputation . .. With all our minor troubles
we have been successful in everything that we have
done. We are the outstanding, and most trusted, infantry regiment in this Division . . . For the future,
I ask God to bless you . . . that you come through the
ordeal ahead, safe and sound, with your head high in
the pride of victory. For myself, I don't ask God for
any special favor to protect me from death or wounds,
for instance, . . . but I do ask Him, with my whole
heart and soul, to give me the moral, physical and
mental courage and strength to do my duty to the
utmost."

JUNE
"We don't know when we'll leave; it may be tomor- stances that they were at the wrong beaches and had to
row, or the next day, or a month from now. But when embark again and be landed a second time. The
we do, it will be for the most important task this appointed spot was Omaha Beach, located on the
Division has ever faced." The speaker was Major coast of northern France approximately a mile to the
General Leland S. Hobbs, commander of the 30th east of Pointe ct Hez de la Percce. During the crossDivision. I-le was talking to the men of the 120th ing, some boats drew close to a beach still being
Infantry, a battalion at a time, in their areas around shelled, and some drif tcd from one point to another,
Great l\ 1issenden, England, on the 5th of June, 1944. so that a portion of the Regiment stayed at sea as long
The fact that Rome had fallen to the Allies a few days as two days and hnd their first taste of combat when at
before didn't seem very important. Wresting France night German planes strafed their vessels. At this
from the Germans was much more momentous to the period the Germans were regular as clockwork about
men of the 120th. "You will remember this day," he their night air operations; Gls passed on the warning
said. No one knew then that it was the day originally with a wry smile: "I Jere comes Bed Check Charlie."
planned as D -Day, the day before the actual invasion
Members of the I 20th pushed their way from the
took place.
beaches up the steep slopes into the rich but devasIt seemed hardly possible that after the pleasant tated Normandy country. They found the battle
three months in England this was at last the moment had left memorable and fresh marks. It was the first
of action, the moment to which all the training had time the men had seen the real horror of war, and thev
been directed, the moment when the Division would were green and incredulous. Some sought to rationalbecome in reality a "combat outfit." But events ize the stark fact of the vast (1uantity of American
proved the correctness of the General's words. Two corpses with the remark, "These Jcrrics arc trying to
days after D -Day, word was received at Regimental scare us putting wax dummies all over the place." The
Headquarters in a mansion at Great Missendcn that Hegimcnt stopped in an area near the coast where
the 120th Infantry was to move immediately to a waterproofing was removed from the vehicles. It then
proceeded directly to the front.
marshalling area some ten miles north of South
ampton. The men packed excitedly, and by the
Thus, on the night of June 13th, 1944, some units
next morning were speeding in convoy over the of the I 20th Infantry moved into positions on the front
route toward the coast, toward the ships that were to lines. The units comprised the principal element of
carry them to the beaches of France, to Normandy, a Combat T cam which also included the 230th Field
scene of the bloody battle upon which the attention Artillery Battalion, Company "C" of the 105th Engineer Battalion, and Company "C'' of the 105th Mediof the world was then fixed.
cal Battalion. In doing so, it replaced the 327th InAfter arriving at the marshalling area, the Hegiment fantry (IO I st Airborne Division ) and readied itself
moved to the port of Southampton, where it embarked immediately to regain ground from which both the
l 75th Infantry (29th Division ) and the 327th Infanfor France, some elements leaving on the 9th of June
while others sailed on the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th. try had been evicted by enemy action. The Hcgiment
Our men and equipment were carried on Liberty was arrayed on a line extending parallel to and north
ships, British troopships, American LCI's' (Landing of the railroad which runs between Carentan and
Craft Infantry), and American LCT's ( Landing Airel, being bounded by the flooded low ground on
each Aank, and being directly south of the small town
Craft Tank).
of St. Pellerin. The Regimental Command Post, in
OMAHA BEACI I, NORMANDY
its first combat operation of the war, was established
The passage to France was in each instance made in an orchard and later moved to the chatcau of M.
in convoys of considerable size. Like most military Pnul Fremont. For the first week, headquarters peroperations of the enormity of the D -Day invasion, sonnel had operated in trenches dug by Germans for
there was, for the doughboy, a period of high con
their artillery horses. After that, Lt Col Ward, the
fusion. The boats were misguided during the passage Hegimcntal Executive, decided to move the Command
Post to the mansion.
across the English Channel, and it was not until after
they had landed that the troops found in some inThe route taken hy the vehicles in moving from the
waterproofing
area was west along the main Carentan•Abbreviations are defined on paKe 2fHI.
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Off Omaha Beach

Bayeux highway, which was entered at the town of
Surrain. Proceeding west along this highway, the
Begiment passed through lsigny, which at this time
was still on fire as a result of fierce fighting which
had taken place only a short time before. When the
Regiment reached a point immediately below Katz,
it turned south and proceeded to the front in the
neighborhood of St. Pellerin.
Meanwhile, Service Company, which h:ic been
landed by mistake on LI tah Beach, rejoined the Regiment near Jsigny. Capt Layton C. Tyner, commander
of Service Company, told how he had brought the
kitchen train through Carentan from the beach to
lsigny. Carcntan was for from cleared when the company rode through it; the Germans were then being
driven from it a second time. But neither he nor his
men were frightened or perturbed by the ping of
snipers' shots or the crash of artillery directed at
them; they were simply unaware of its existence. The
confusion was too great to permit them to do anything
hut keep on the appointed route. Where ignorance is
bliss, they say, 'tis folly to be wise.
Cannon Company, in command of Capt Eugene F.
Krueger, was also landed on the wrong beach and
had to make the mad dash through the town of Carentan.
By the evening of June 14th, the battalions had
been disposed for combat, and orders were hurriedly
issued for an attack upon the enemy in the morning.

ENTRY INTO COMBAT
On the 15th of June, the Regimental Combat Team
attacked the enemy for the first time in this war. At
0800 the Regiment began to push forward, four companies abreast in the assault echelon. To give the 3d
Battalion heavy-weapon support, Company "D" left
its parent battalion and became attached to the 3d.
Company "M" which arrived later was attached to the
1st Battalion. The attack was preceded by a bombardment of the enemy positions by ships of the United
States Navy, followed closely by a strong aerial attack.
\i\Tith the 58th and l 79th Field Artillery Battalions in
support, and a company of the 743d Tank Battalion
attached to each infantry battalion, the Regiment drove
the enemy back across the Canal de Vire et Taute. In
doing so, it moved forward approximately two and a
half miles (the extreme distance between the canal
and the railroad), liberating the towns of Montmartinen-Graignes and la Compte. The Regiment took
a position on the high ground immediately north of
the canal, being on a frontage of approximately 5000
yards.
In the first attack of World War II, the Regimental
formation took a T-shape, with the 2d and 3d Battalions leading, the 2d on the left, and 3d on the right.
The I st Battalion, whose riAe companies had landed
only a couple of hours before the attack, was in reserve.
As the advance started under the heavy blanket of
9

Normandy

JUNE

11

artillery, fighter-bombers, and naval guns, some one
remarked that it was just like a problem at Fort Ben-

n mg.
But the resistance met by the 2d Battalion, with

. "E" an d "F" 1eac1·mg, was not o f the train.
Compames
ing variety. The snap of the bullets and blast of shells
told the men that this was the proverbial "It." The 2d
Battalion reached a point a few hundred yards north
of Montmartin-en-Graignes by 1145, and at 1235,
still against determined resistance, it entered the town.
Meanwhile the 3d Battalion with Company "L" on
the right and Company "I" on the left had started
the attack at the same time. It was remarkably quiet
at first, and during the first 500 yards an observer
could hear olib remarks like, "I thought this was supposed to beo combat, not Tennessee maneuvers.I"
Shortly thereafter began an unmistakable real-life
exchange of fire-riAe and artillery. Though Company
"I" advanced rapidly, Company "L" was held up in a
heavy close-range fire fight, and Lt Col Paul W. McCollum, 3d Battalion commander, committed his
Company "K" on the battalion right Hank. Company
"L" was thus enveloped into the center of the formation, and with strong support on either side, it surged
forward till it was abreast of Company "I." Late in
the morning, with companies abreast, the battalion
reached the hamlet of la Compte. There as they dug
in, the men realized that they were no longer experiencing a second "maneuvers." The artillery taking a
heavv toll made them realize it. The land mines which
were' killing men and disabling tanks brought the fact
home forcefully too. And then there were many
other things, like the atmosphere, the nervous tension,
and the way men talked hurriedly, breathlessly together.
At l l 45 Company "E" made contact with Company "I" and the two battalions tied into a line. The
fight continued until around 1530. It had no sooner
died down than the l 20th carried forward the attack
again, driving onto the assigned objective by l 730.
The battalion "buttoned up" for the night.
During the course of the afternoon, two platoons of
Company "A" with a platoon of tanks from the 743d
Tank Battalion had moved to the west of the town of
Deville, endeavoring to outAank la Compte. But
tanks found the roads hard to maneuver over; the 3d
Battalion was not too materially aided in the effort.
Before the fall of Montmartin, the lst Battalion was
committed between the 2d and the 3d, and it s\v1..mg
to the southeast, pinching out the 2d Battalion and
threatening the town of la Raye.

Tankers of the 743d Tank Battalion were good fighting men

The orders for this sudden commitment were issued
hurriedly. It was a situation which demanded the utmost in speed. Lt Col Hugh I. Mainord attempted
to dra"". his troops together to push off rapidly.
But he found two platoons of Company "A" were separated I 000 yards from the remainder of the battalion
while attempting to clear out an assembly area to
which the battalion had prepared to move. Company
"C" had begun its march, turned off the main route,
and was moving into the new assembly area. There
was not time to regroup all these elements before the
jump-off.
Company "B" was rushed into the attack at once,
and plans were made for the other companies to follow. The men were so hastily snatched to go into action that they became bewildered and were only half
sure of their mission. In the confusion, the men of
the lst Battalion ran into part of the 2d Battalion,
and at the distance mistaking friend for enemy, elements of both began firing against each other. The
2d Battalion commander, Lt Col William S. Bradford, rushed forward of his troops to stop the firing,
and met Capt Ellis W. Williamson, 1st Battalion S-3,
who had also moved forward to help correct the error.
In short order, the firing among friendly units ceased.
The 1st Battalion pushed on, and by nightfall had
pinched out the 2d.
On the 16th of June, the 1st Battalion continued
the attack at dawn, and cleared the enemy from the
southeast corner of the Regimental zone of action
north of the canal, thereby enabling Company "F" to
take the town of la Raye. During the assault numerous snipers were by-passed by the forward elements.
The Battalion Command Group following behind had
a real taste of combat excitement and some narrow
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escapes when che German snipers pecked at some
of its members. The S-2 and the S-3 seized the chance
to practice riHe marksmanship, and each is said to
have bagged a sniper before the group continued forward.
Meanwhile the 3d Battalion dispatched a patrol to
the vicinity of a small bridge located on our extreme
right Hank, which learned that the enemy was still re
sisting in the vicinity of Deville. Therefore the 2d
Battalion was moved by truck to an assembly area in
the vicinity oF the railroad bridge to the north. It then
attacked south, clearing the enemy out oF the area.
The Regiment, as a result, was situated on a line extending from the Vire River on the cast to Taute River
on the west, occupying the high ground immediately
north of the canal. On the Regiment's right flank and
on the far side oF the Hooded low ground, the 501 st
Infantry ( 101st Airborne Division) held the line beginning at a point south of Carentan and extending to
the west. To the cast oF the low ground on the Begi
ment's left bank, and in the vicinity of Aire!, a bat
talion of the I 17th Infantrv was located. The rest of
that regiment was in Corps 'Reserve.
FIRST NIGHT COUNTERATTACK
\Vithout having had much fighting previously, the
3d Battalion had an active <lay on the 16th of June.
After a restless night, Company "K" had been
ordered to help drive the enemy from the north banks
of the canal, and pushed ahead 2000 yards to seize
and dig in positions on the Regimental right flank by
midafternoon. Company "I" was ordered to relieve
Company "K" and at 2100 that night had moved into
the line in place of Company "K." It was here that
the Germans launched their first night attack against
members of the I 20th Infantry, men of Company "I."
It began at 2300, when a force of what Capt Chris
McCullough, then Company ''I's" commander, estimated as two platoons of infantry, started to scramble
across the canal, while an overwhelming artillery con
centration was fired uron the Company "I" line. The
3d Platoon of Company "I" was so battered and
groggy from this initial barrage that it was no longer
a unit; its casualties were immense.
When the artillery barrage stopped the Germans
began to heave hand grenades in order to keep the
Company "I" men glued in their holes. But as a trick
it did not work. Capt McCullough tells this story of
the heroic action.
"These grenades were picked up by the fighting
men of Company 'I' and thrown back at the enemy.

A hand -to-hand fight started on the hanks of the Vire
Canal. I called Battalion I lcadquarters and reported
the situation. Artillery fire was called to help repel
the attack. This was a difficult problem. The enemy
artillery preparation had knocked out 'I' Company's
telephone line and had damaged its 300 radio. After
about ten minutes working on the 300 radio, it was
repaired. In the meantime Company 'I' men were
fighting the Germans on the north banks of the canal.
"We were finally given the familiar 'On the way'
from our artillery." Capt McCullough then gave the
order for all his men to get in their holes, to seek cover
from the shelling he had called down upon the area.
"The first rounds were about seventy-five yards from
our front lines," he said. "The men called back to
me to bring the artillery in closer. The adjustment
was given, 'Deflection correct, 50 yards over.' The
next concentration landed about twenty-five yards to
the front of 'I' Company's front lines and on the south
bank of the canal. The men shouted, 'Perfect. Give
us all you can.' For fifteen minutes the artillery
fired for 'I' Company. Its accuracy was amazing. Only
three rounds fell short. These rounds landed on 'I'
Company's left Hank where its 3d Platoon used to be."
Fifteen minutes of the artillery sent the Germans
scurrying to their own lines, whimpering and licking
their wounds. After the deadly concentrations, all
was (]Uiet. Company "I" had suffered heavy casualties,
however, and the men in the platoons wondered how
many the enemy in their turn had sustained. In order
to ascertain exactly how many of the Germans had
been killed, Capt McCullough led a patrol across
the canal the morning of the 17th. I le and his
men returned with the rcpart that they had discovered
five enemy dead on the north hank of the canal, and
on the south hank, twenty-three.

TI IE LINE, CANAL DE VIHE ET TAUTE
On the 17th of June, an attempt was made to secure
the high ground immediately south of the canal on
the Regiment's extreme right front. The attempted
crossing of the canal by two platoons of the 2d Batta!
ion was unsuccessful. It was not until the end of this
day that the ground north of the canal was totall)
cleared of enemy troops with the exception of snipers
who actively continued to harass our men for a con
siderable period thereafter.
A boat contact patrol was set up to meet a patrol
from the l 0 I st Airborne Division on our right. 'I he
I 17th Infantry, on our left Aank, also established a pa
trol which made contact with us in the vicinity of

Briefing today for the fight tomorrow

la Haye. These patrols met at least three times during
each 24-hour period.
Up to and including July 6th, 1944, the Regiment
held the canal line. lt patrolled enemy-held territory
south of the canal extensively each night. While the
majority of these patrols were sent on missions of reconnaissance, a few were combat patrols, and all
of them accounted for many enemy dead. They were
able to supply the Hegiment with much valuable
enemy information, including strength, disposition,
location of strongpoints, types of weapons in use, etc.
They were forced to operate in extremely difficult
Lcrrain. The territory covered was an extensive, inundated marshland. To penetrate enemy-held ground
required crossing the canal. ln many places, the
approach to the canal was ::>ver knee-deep with
water and the canal itself was found to Le steeply
banked , with water seven feet deep in many points.
The enemy had the whole area to their front well
covered with machine-gun and mortar fire. It is be-

licved that the extensive patrolling conducted by this
Hegiment in a large measure led the enemy to think
that a much larger force was to his front, and that a
Further attack was imminent, thus placing him solely
on the defensive. In reality, the I 20th Infantry was
holding a line greater than 5000 yards in length,
which would normally represent a divisional sector,
and there were no combat troops stationed between
its Front-line positions north to the beaches to its immediate rear.
Our accomplishment in throwing the enemy back
across the canal materially improved the American
positions south of the beachhead, and deprived the
Germans of a valuable bridgehead from which to attack during this critical period. The holding of this
line enabled the all-important debarkation of troops
and supplies on the beaches and the successful occupation of the Cotentin Peninsula by American troops.
It also provided space for construction of one of the
first large airfields on the beachhead. Furthermore,
13
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. . . and then through the blasted hole

our successful attack completely opened the on!)
road connecting the two beachheads, Omaha and
Utah. The Germans, fighting hard to maintain observation on this road, had successfully resisted two
previous attempts to drive them out. One attempt
had been made by a battalion of the lOlst Airborne
Division and the other by a task force from the 29th
Infantry Division. Proof of the difficulty of our accomplishment was found near la Raye; there in a
single field lay 68 unburied dead of the 29th Infantry
Division, victims of the stubborn German defense.
During this period effective artillery fire kept the
enemy off balance, caused him many casualties,
and increased his problem of supply and communication. Initially he was very active with his patrols, and
much activity was noticed within his lines. But, after
the first week, this activity ceased, due in large measure to the accuracy of our mortar, artillery and sniper
fire, together with the aggressiveness of our patrols.
Prisoners taken were. identified as belonging to the
984th Infantry Battalion, the 352d Reconnaissance
Battalion, and the 38th Regiment of 17th S.S. Division (G. v. B.). For the most part, these prisoners
were of Germanic origin, and only a few were believed to be over twenty years of age.
The Regiment buried I I I German dead who were
found north of the canal in our sector.
The fields of Normandy, surrounded for the most
part by high, thick hedgerows, offered difficult terrain
over which to maneuver, and called for the use of new
tactics in the attack. For example, in order that the
tank-infantry team might work closely in support of
each other, it was quickly learned that it was necessary

to blast avenues of approach through the hedgerow!'>
for the tanks. In some situations, it was found expedient to cause the infantry to precede the tanks.
In order to continue to progress, we quickly learned
that the attacking clements must by-pass snipers and
small isolated strongpoints; these were taken care
of bv "mopping-up groups" in the rear. While holding the canal line, we evolved a plan of infantry-tank
assault tactics and, one by one, pulled each of our platoons to the vicinity of the Hegimental reserve line for
training. The results of our planning were consolidated and forwarded to higher headquarters, being
recommended for consideration as a solution to the
problems created by this type of warfare.
As a result of the highly successful action which
cleared the enemy from the ground north of the canal,
and as a direct result of his brave and inspired leadership on the field of battle, Colonel I Iammond D.
Birks, commanding officer of this Regiment, was
awarded the Silver Star, being the first man in the
Division to receive a battlefield decoration in World
War II.
PERSONALITIES
Many heroic deeds were made by our men in taking
the canal line and subsequently holding it. While it
is not possible to record all of them here, a few may be
mentioned which are of interest.
One day S/Sgt John J. Gilson, Sgt William E. Stevenson, Sgt Oliver C. Trantham, Jr., Cpl Joseph R.
Dillman, T /5 Irving Stiber, T /5 Joseph B. Alexander, Pfc Rolf Laerm, Pfc Frank M. Thompson, Pvt
Jack G. McCanless, Pvt I Iowarcl E. Peterson, Pvt
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Ralph W. Estevez, Pvt Paul J. Fontaine, Pvt Dorrance
C. Tennyson, Pvt James]. Anderson, and Pvt Glenn
W. Davenport, under the command of Lt Edwin J.
Franklin, reconnoitered the banks of the canal which
were under continuous enemy observation. The terrain was swampy and inundated, the going exhausting. Along flats totally devoid of cover and concealment, these men worked their way for three miles.
Despite the fact that S/Sgt Gilson was killed and Cpl
Dillman was wounded by machine-gun fire, the patrol
successfully accomplished its mission of investigating
possible crossing sites, and contributed information of
vital importance to the planning of future operations.
During the battle of June 15th, Lt Franklin, Sgt
Trantham, Pfc Laerm, and Pvts Fontaine, Estevez,
McCanless and Tennyson, together with Pfc Ray E.
Depue and Pvt Walter S. Bruce, were given the patrol
mission of protecting the right Hank of the Regiment
and were ordered to guide tanks to the scene of battle
by riding on the tanks and walking ahead oF them
when they were buttoned up. Through a misunderstanding of the order, these men continued in an effort
to complete what they believed to be their mission. Although two platoons, a rifle and weapons platoon of
Company "A," were on their way to join the tankinfantry combat group in the protection of the Regimental right flank, these men went a long distance
alone, forcing their way through towns where the
heaviest fighting of the day occurred, working never
more than fifteen yards behind the heavily armored
tanks, and frequently in front of them.
A Company "G" patrol under Lt Robert A. Tyler
was sent on a combat mission to secure prisoners for
interrogation. While carrying out their mission they
entered an enemy strongpoint and despite fire from
enemy machine guns and grenades, rifles and machine
pistols, proceeded against superior forces to try to <livide the enemy and surround and capture individuals.
Despite injury to other patrol members, Lt Tyler with
S/Sgt Gossett and Pvt Vingate pressed on to handgrenade a strongly fortified house held by the enemy.
Since this action took place at night, the enemy sent
up many flares which made the completion of the
mission most difficult and enabled the enemy to bring
down accurate mortar fire. Finally forced to retire, the
patrol evacuated six. wounded members, a great accomplishment in itself because these men had to be
brought across low and swampy terrain and across the
canal before reentering our lines.
S/ Sgt Furney M. Rivers of Company "B" is the
type of fighting man we all would like to have with
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Lieutenant Colonel Hugh I. Mainord

us when the going is hot. On June 22d, S/Sgt Rivers
of Company "B," with Lt Foster S. Pease and Pvt
Lawrence L. Elkins, crossed the canal on a special
mission. Noticing a soldier immediately to his front
and believing him to be American, Rivers called him.
But when the soldier turned about he proved to be
German-and a second German immediately appeared. S / Sgt Rivers opened fire at once, killing them
both. However, before he succeeded in killing the
second German, the latter fired a riRe grenade which
killed Lt Pease. This was the signal for heavy enemy
tire to be directed against S/ Sgt Rivers from his right
Hank which forced him to return to the canal bank,
but not before he had secured both rifles belonging to
the dead Germans. Then, in the face of continued
enemy fire, S/ Sgt Rivers made his way to Lt Pease,
ascertained he was dead, and returned to our lines.
Some men are just naturally heroes. Take Pfc William Lazenby of Company "H" for instance. On his
first day of battle, his platoon met very strong sniper
fire east of the town of Montmartin. Knowing the

First award ceremony: General Hobbs decorates Captain Howard Greer, Technical Sergeant Robert Bondurant, Staff Sergeant Jomes Duggans, Private Elbert Freeze, and Private Cosmo Riozzi

Gerth oF Company "F." While advancing with his
platoon in the vicinity of Montmartin on the 15th of
June, his men suddenly received fire from machine
guns which he thought came lrom friendly tanks to
his left Front. Disregnrding his own pcrsonnl snfety
in favor oF his men, he crossed open ground which
was henvily covered by enemy mnchine-gun fire in
order to inform his company commander of the
friendly tank fire. Although he was successful in delivering the messnge, he was killed bv enemy fire.
During the afternoon of the 15th of June, n plntoon
of the I st Battalion was pinned down by fire from an
enemy skirmish line. On his own initiative Capt Ellis
W. Williamson, who at that time wns the Battalion
S-3, led two volunteers across an open field and killed
three of the enemy, enabling the platoon to continue
its attack. I le then led three more platoons in the same
manner. 11 is action materially assisted the battalion to
accomplish its mission on that day.
J\nd then there was 2d Lt Myron G. Wood of Company "L" who displayed outstanding leadership and
courage when, with thirty-five men and a section of
machine guns, he wiped out an enemy machine gun
strongpoint and killed twenty five of the enemy on the
15th of June. Lt Wood's mission was to secure a

general vicinity of the snipers, he stood in the open
and directed fire, enabling his platoon to eliminate the enemy and continue their advance successfulJy. I le himself killed one of these snipers. Of the
same fiber is Pfc James MacCune, of Company "E,"
who on the following day personally charged an
enemy machine-gun nest which was holding back his
platoon and knocked it out of action with hand grenades. Later he exposed himself to another machinegun nest and sniper to determine their exact positions
as targets for our men.
Pvt Arthur Krueck oF Company "F" almost spent
the remainder oF the war in Germany. On the night
of the 27th-28th of June, while on pntrol in enemy
territory with Lt Spitzer, oF Company "I I," he attempted to climb over a hedgerow in order to gnin
the objective. Lt Spitzer, who led the way, emerged
on the far side of the hedgerow to find himself in the
arms of a four-man patrol. They immediately took him
prisoner and one of the Germans remarked that if
there was one American, there must be more. Krueck
successfully evaded discovery and returned to our lines
with valuable information which had been obtained
that night.
The old men will all remember 2d Lt i\1arshall B.
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bridge, which he found in the hands of the enemy.
For a considerable distance he and his men waded
through water five feet deep in order to force the
enemy to withdraw. Seeing that one of his men was
severely wounded, and that he was lying in an open
field which was covered by enemy fire, he crawled
forward seventy yards and administered first aid. He
then returned to his platoon and continued the attack.
There were others, many others, who could be mentioned as contributing greatly to our cause during this
period. Among those others who successfully maintained our patrol activity in enemy-held territory were
Lt Matthew M. Lutzkivich, S/Sgt Silas L. Baird, Cpl
Alva L. Brown, Pfc Ralph E. Kirkpatrick and Pfc
Clarence J. Cote of Company "A"; Sgt Earl Burry,
Pfc Glenn F. f lelvie and Pfc Ernest F. Overhoff of
Company "L"; Sgt Roy T. Westmoreland, Pfc Donald
Currie and Pfc James Robinson of Company "G";
S/ Sgt Roy E. Rummage, Pfc Elmer Johnson, Pvt
Willis M. True, and Pvt Earl Stalling of Company
"E"; also Sgt William R. Overman and Pvt Lucien
l Iuard, Lt William P. Shanks and the lst Platoon
o f Company "C"
.
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Certainly, the fine work of Lt Carl C. l larnden of
Company "K" should be mentioned. On several occasions he successfully led patrols behind the enemy
lines and obtained very valuable information. Two
of these patrols spent thirty-six hours in German-held
territory. On the night of the 19th of June, for example, with S/ Sgt Lester G. Dickens and Pfc Willy
Schoen, he went behind the enemy lines to a depth
of two miles and remained there for thirty-six hours
watching enemy movements, checking the location of
emplacements and installations, and watching the
effect of our bombing on an enemy-held town. This
patrol located several gun positions and enemy bivouac
areas, an enemy command post and many entrenchments. It killed two Germans and secured identification of enemy units confronting us. It returned with
information that affected the actions of a large number
of troops. The men moved behind enemy lines in
daylight and at night, making excellent use of cover
and concealment and staying alert throughout with
little food and water. Artillery fire placed at locations
indicated by this patrol resulted in numerous enemy
casualties.
•

JULY
On the 6th of July, 1944, final arrangements were
made for an attack calculated to carry us across the
Canal de Vire et Taute, through the enemy-held territory to the far side of St. Jean de Daye to the south.
If successful, this would mean a major advance toward
the key city of St. Lo which was being used by the
Germans as the main control point for all of their
operations against the American effort in Normandy.
This was a particularly difficult undertaking. With
the canal and the flooded lowland to our front and
a river on each flank, the enemy occupied high
ground which commanded these formidable natural
barriers. The enemy knew that there were but two
feasible avenues of approach into their position. One
of these was through the narrow corridor which included 200 yards of land on each side of the main
Carentan-St. Lo road at a point where it crossed
the canal. The other approach was some 2h miles
to the west, being a very narrow peninsula which
stretched down from enemy territory in the vicinity
of Graignes. At each of these points, the bridge had
long since been blown and the enemy had enjoyed
ample time in which to set up strongpoints cover
ing the approaches with automatic fire. The enemy
also had the distinct advantage of fighting on familiar
terrain, which had been amply sown with mines of all
types. It was decided, after much study of the situation, that the only point for crossing the canal which
offered any chance of success, was through the Carentan-St. Lo road corridor.
The plan called for placing the 2d Battalion in
Corps reserve. Occupying the right flank of the Regiment's main line of resistance, it had the primary mission of checking any attempt which might be made
by the enemy to cross the canal into our positions, and
at the same time, it offered as distinct threat to the
enemy a possible crossing on our part at this point.
At 1300, on July 7th, the !20th Infantry launched
its attack. 1
Making use of hastily placed footbridges and by
fording the canal at many places, the 3d Battalion (on
the right) and the 1st Battalion (on the left), with
the main highway as the boundary between the battalions, stormed across the canal. Our men met de
termined resistance. The enemy made the canal line
a veritable hell by placing heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire at the crossing point. Machine
guns swept the level ground to their front from strong•In support were the 230th Field Artillery ; Compau)' '. 'C", 105th ~n ·
gineer• · 246th Engineer Battalion: 531st A.A .A. Battalion: 58th ~·1e . d
Artille,.Y Battalion: and three platoon• of the 743<1 Tank Battalion .
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points within the enemy lines, making it extremely
difficult to progress beyond the far hank of the canal.
Despite heavy casualties, our men successfully pushed
forward, gained the solid ground to the south, and
hurled the enemy back beyond St. Jean de Daye.
One company lost all its officers but one, and yet
it was the first to enter the town. By nightfall, they
held a line south of the town and were preparing to
meet any counterattack the enemy might see flt to
throw at them.
Many brave deeds were executed on the 6th ol'
July; most never were recorded because of the fury of
the battle. An example of bravery shown that day
was the exploit of Sgt Jonathan G. Mullinex, squad
leader of Company "A." I le and the men in his company were pinned down by enemy machine-gun fire
which suddenly opened up on them from their front.
Two men were killed. Seeing this, Sergeant Mullinex
immediately exposed himself by flring a rifle grenade
in the direction of the enemy machine-gun nest.
Realizing that the first grenade was ineffective, he
rolled over on his back to attach another grenade and,
at this time, was hit in the nose and foot by the enemy
fire. Despite the pain of his wounds and the fact that
enemy bullets were tearing the equipment from his
back, he rose on one knee to fire two more rifle grenades at the enemy emplacement. I le knocked it out,
and thereby enabled Company "A" to advance upon
its objective.
Under the original plan, this regiment was not expected to attack until the I 17th Infantry on our left
had taken the high ground to the cast of St. Jean de
Daye, and thereby commanded the enemy positions
to our front . Meeting considerable resistance, that
regiment was unable to follow the required time schedule, which meant that the I 20th Infantry met much
greater resistance than was expected, ncc~ssitating the
release of the 2d Battalion to the Hegimcnt at 1400.
By 2200 our line was 6500 yards south of the canal.
During this eminently successful attack it was neces
sary not only to fight the enemy to our front, but to
combat considerable opposition on each Aank due to
the inability of friendly forces to move forward.
While all of our units performed in a masterly
fashion this day, mention should be made of the fine
job done by Company "A" of the 246th Engineer Bat
talion, which succeeded in building a treadway bridge
for vehicles across the canal at the old bridge site. Com
pany "A" built its bridge while under intense artillery
and mortar fire.
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Mention, too, should be made of the excellent courage of Lt Edward M. Hill, assistant Regimental S-3,
and of Lt Robert McClain, Service Company executive officer, who controlled the priority of motor traffic
across the canal. Lt Hill made sure of dispersal and
order among the vehicles as they approached to cross
the bridge while Lt McClain at the field phone called
to the motor assembly area in the rear when the time
came for the next scheduled serial or vehicle. The men
took up their positions before the attack was launched
and were, therefore, subjected to most of the heavy
fire directed by the enemy upon the crossing site.
Lt Col Hugh I. Mainord, who led the 1st Battalion
at this time, related afterwards that he insisted that
each man, down to and including the privates, know
what the plan was, where he was going, how he would
get there, and just exactly what he was going to do
after he got there. 1 le also made sure that each man
knew what his immediate superior's jobs were so that
when casualties occurred these men were able to take
the place of the fallen.
He also relates an episode which illustrates the spirit
of our men and their determined attitude to be successful in this great enterprise. A few days before we
jumped off, Lt Col Mainord sent word to all of the
men in his command that those wishing passes to St.
Jean de Daye (the objective) should send in their requests to him. He was overwhelmed with requests,
and a later tally disclosed that every man under his
command had taken advantage of the offer.
Lt George M. Tuttle, liaison officer, relates that
while he was with Col Birks at the Regimental Observation Post, five generals at one time or another
dropped in to determine how things were going and
to offer advice.
The men in the CP at the time can recall Major
General Walker and Lt Gen George S. Patton. General Patton made a Rashy but nonchalant appearance
in a brilliant shellacked helmet. During the early days
of combat Gen Courtney I I. Hodges spent many hours
observing the Regiment. I !is calm, quiet and assured
manner always had a heartening effect upon all with
whom he came in contact.
Colonel Birks never let his attention veer from the
problems at hand. After the attack had gained the far
side of the canal, Lt Tuttle accompanied Colonel Birks
to the foremost of our elements and relates that Colonel Birks was one of the first of our men to enter the
town of St. Jean de Daye.
Lt Tuttle states that he never thought that Colonel

It's safer underground

Birks was addicted to strenuous calisthenics before that
day. When they reached the far side of the canal, thev
found that enemy artillery shells were landing in clos~
proximity to their persons. These shells landed at intervals of approximately thirtv seconds, which meant
that he and Colonel Birks, for a short period, were
forced to hit the ground many times. They would no
sooner rise than another shell would fall, forcing them
to seek safety by falling to the ground.
With St. Jean de Daye securely in our hands, at
2200, the I 13th Cavalry Troop crossed the canal, then
turned west in an attempt to push the enemy from the
canal, on the western side of the St. Jean Peninsula,
and thus secure our immediate right Aank. They met
with only limited success and as a result, when our attack was launched at 0530 on the morning of the
8th of July, we advanced slowly. The 2d Battalion, in
the lead, had both Aanks exposed, since the I 17th Infantry on the left was about 600 yards to its rear.
Stopped by stiff resistance, the Regiment was counterattacked with armor and infantrv three times and
each time it repelled the enemy su~cessfully. In the
meantime the I 17th Infantry was forced back farther
leaving our troops in an even more exposed position.
The enemy then launched his heaviest counterattack
from three sides, his main effort coming from the
southwest. It was estimated that the enemy strength
was one reinforced regiment strongly supported by
armor. This counterattack succeeded in penetrating
to some extent the position held by the 2d Battalion,
and some of its elements broke under the pressure.
But with the lst Battalion, and with fine support from
the 230th Field Artillery and the 7 4 3d Tank Battalion,
the enemy was thrown back.
Lt Col Hugh I. Mainord, lst Battalion commander, stated that the German attack was made with
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Lieutenant Colonel William S. Bradford

tanks and self-propelled guns accompanied by infan-

try. The enemy succeeded in breaking into our lines
and disorganized the 2d Battalion. Lt Col William
S. Bradford, commanding officer, was wounded and
so was the executive officer, Maj Garner M. Simes, as
well as many of the key officers and noncommissioned
officers of the rifle companies. Major Simes, although
painfully wounded, refused to leave until the counterattack was halted. Capt Walter A. Bunch, Jr., one of
our old-timers from the days at Fort Jackson, was
killed while in command of Company "G." Lt Henry
A. Ouncan also gave his life while directing fire for
Cannon Company.
Six of our supporting tanks were almost immediately destroyed. With so many leaders either killed or
wounded, some platoons broke under the strain and
fell back in confusion on the 1st Battalion which, be
ing in support, was directly in rear of the 2d. Ammuni
tion having been expended freely, vehicles moved rap
idly to the rear for replenishment. Word of the destruc
tion of our leading tanks and the considerable use of

German armor against us spread like wildfire from
front to rear. The fast rearward movement of our ammunition vehicles along the main supply road caused
green supporting troops who had just come off the
boat to believe there had been a breakthrough. In a
short space of time a near-panic ensued, with the result that the main supply road became clogged with
vehicles and men on foot streaming to the rear. Some
vehicles were abandoned. The I st and 2d Battalions
clamored for ammunition which could not be carried
forward because of" the traflic jam. The Hegimental
Commander knew from previous combat experience,
not only in this war hut in World \Var I, how easily
a panic can start among green troops. Therefore,
he rushed Lt Col Peter 0. Ward, the Hegimental
Executive Officer, with a group from I lca<lquarters
Company, to the crossroads at St. Jean de Oaye to stop
all rearward movement of" men and vehicles, if neces
sary at the point of a gun. I his diflicult mission was
ably handled by Lt Col \Varel and his detachment.
Order was restored in a short time, the road was
cleared. and the much needed ammunition was delivered to Lt Col Mainord, who had been placed temporarily in command of" both battalions. By the end
of the day, the counterattack had been repulsed and
al_l parts of the position re-established. Only ten men
of the 2d Battalion were picked up at the Division
straggler line. Vehicles from I lcadquarters Company
and Company "I I" were found in rear of the old Command Post of the day before. I lowever, upon investigation, it was learned that these vehicles had been
sent back upon order, as a safety precaution.
In the meantime, Lt Col Mainord's battalion stuck
at its positions, as did one company of the regiment on
his left. Lt Col Mainord relates that he and his officers
stopped what men they could from the 2d Battalion
and sent them back into the fight. I !is own tank support attempted to leave at th is critical point, saying
that they had been ordered to the rear. Lt Col Mainord firmly told them they were attached to him and
would stay and fight regardless of what happened.
LI nder his supervision, the counterattack was stopped
in our sector and the enemy was thrown hack.
Lt Col Eads G. I lardaway took command of" the
remnants of the 2d Battalion which had joined the
1st Battalion, and with the valuable aid of Capt Ernest
W. Bell, 2d Battalion S-3, did a fine job of reorgan
izing them and placing them upon the line, filling a
small gap which existed between the 1st Battalion and
a battalion of the regiment on the left. I le accomplished this without the aid of" vehicles or radio. It is

All who were able moved forward
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The enemy, identified as the SS Das Reich, made use
of prepared positions to such advantage that it was
found necessary to commit the 3d Battalion in the
zone of action prescribed for the unit on our left Hank.
Our advance was further complicated by the fact
that the 9th Division, on our right, had not taken the
town of le Desert, which caused our right Hank to be
wide open for approximately two miles from front to
rear.
3n BATTALION MOVES ITS CP

Lieutenant Colonel Eads J. Hardaway

Lt Col Mainord's belief that artillery support saved the
day. Our positions were boxed in by the fire from
eighteen battalions of artillery and one battalion of
4.2 mortars, as well as by the tanks firing as artillery
from rear positions.
This experience of near panic was a definite and
conclusive lesson to the men of the l20th Infantry,
from which they profoed later. It is true that the 2d
Battalion suffered considerable losses but nearly all of
these casualties occurred among the men who ran from
their defensive positions. The platoons that held their
ground had comparatively few losses even though the
enemy tanks overran them. During training, com
manders had tried to impress upon all men that safety
lay in holding ground, but here was a concrete example that was certain to make a lasting impression on
every soldier who knew about it. Later, at Mortain, the
2d Battalion reinforced would not give the enemy
an inch of ground even though it was surrounded for
five and a half days.
The lst and 3d Battalions in column jumped off
in the attack at 0700, the 9th of July, the 2d Battalion
temporarily remaining in position. Progress was slow.

It is difficult to tell all of the dav-hv-dav excitement
of the July fighting. Each man i1ad a thousand adventures and thought nothing of it, except to be glad
he was alive. All the battalions went through fire and
brimstone, each grinding its way "like a buzz saw," as
Colonel Birks used to say, toward its next objective.
The following account of the 3d Battalion is not so
unusual as it may sound. All the battalions did almost
similar fighting. But the following account tells to
some extent of the constant movement which the
men experienced. But if it is slightly out of focus, it
is not once exaggerated. Its heroes arc real heroes.
It was on the afternoon of the l 0th when the 3d
Battalion, following behind the lst, was alerted to go
into the attack. The unit on the left Aank had not
kept pace with the I 20th, and in order to close the
gap on the east side, Lt Col McCollum's men were
to seize the ground around Le Rocher, some 500 yards
to the south.
In a column of companies the battalion pushed
ahead, and against opposition secured the objective
by 2200. The companies took up what were to be
temporary positions, consolidating a defense which
was admittedly not strong. In the first place, the battalion was unable to tic in with the remainder of the
Regiment. It was extended on its objective, and neither
tanks nor tank destroyers could come to supplement
the positions. The companies, with "I" and "K" facing
south, were drawn into a tight perimeter defense; the
roads were covered by automatic we-Jpons.
At 2300 the 3d Battalion rear CP was ready to move
forward to the new position. The order came from
Maj Joseph Adams, the executive officer; Capt Raymond J. Payne, Headquarters Company commander,
gave the signal to move out. There were two clements,
the foot and the motor.
In the hedgerow days particularly, it was easy for
the enemy to be by-passed and left for extended
periods, unnoticed until they chose to make their presence known. One of these enemy groups heard the
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approach of the foot elements of the 3d Battalion CP.
The night was black; it was easy for the enemy to effect an ambush and in no time the Germans had
pounced upon the group and dispersed the men,
wounding some, including Capt Payne. Most of the
men scattered and headed back to the old CP location. One man never made it that night. That man
was T / 5 Louis Gallic, whose story follows later.
The motorized section was having its difficulty, too,
struggling over a supposedly reconnoitered route. The
blackness of the night forced the vehicles to creep,
and an overhanging fog made it impossible to see the
vehicle in front. It became necessary, at last, to have
one man walk ahead of each vehicle dangling some
white paper or cloth, or even the luminous dial of a
GI watch, so that the drivers, straining forward, could
know where to follow. It was slow work, and T /Sgt
~Jarry R. Peters, Battalion Sergeant Major, who was
guiding the artillery liaison jeep, said afterwards that
he found himself knee-deep in the water and mud of
shell holes several times. After three hours and
many angry undertones among the men, it was discovered that the guide had taken a wrong turn. With
If we couldn't go through, we went around
a queer, uneasy feeling in their stomachs, the men
realized they were in German territory. Quickly and
with hushed nervousness, a roadbank was partially Capt Payne \Vas leading the foot elements of the
cut away and a fence was Aattened to allow the ve- Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, from the rear
CP to the new forward location.
hicles to turn around and backtrack.
"We were lucky," said one man who was there.
Since Gallic had been in this area in the afternoon,
" 'Jerry' was either asleep or thought the commotion he was selected to lead the group forward. Apparently
was being caused by his own vehicles. We escaped the group proceeded beyond their front lines. In the
without a shot being fired and with every vehicle in darkness, Gallic could see someone standing beside the
the convoy intact."
road a short distance in front of him. Believing this
In the early morning the convoy arrived at the as- man to be an American, Gallic demanded the name
signed area. No foot elements had reached the spot, of his outfit. He received no answer and, recognizing
of course; most had returned to the old site and were the camouAaged raincoat usually worn by the Gerto stay there for the best part of the next day. The mans in this area, Gallic, who could speak German,
members of the CP in the convoy descended, and half- told him to put his hands up. When the German
stupid with fatigue, started to put up the CP tent. reached for his hand grenades, Gallic shot him four
The sergeant major had to keep priming the men to times and saw him fall beside a wall as he attempted
make them work. It was a lot of wet canvas, this CP to run away. At this point, another German came out
tent, for rain the day before had caused the tent to through a gate in the wall and onto the road and
be triple its normal weight. It was one of those times shouted something, probably in Polish, which Gallic
when a man would give half his life for a few minutes did not understand. The man was unarmed and withsleep. But there was to he no sleep for the 3d Bat- out a helmet. Thinking that this man wished to surtalion that day or night.
render, Gallic told him to put his hands up, whereAll of us will take home with us one personal story, upon the man ran back into the area behind the wall
at least, which will be foremost in our memories. T / 5 before he could be shot.
Receiving instructions from Capt Payne to go back,
Louis Gallic has his alreadv, and we will let the reader
judge as to whether or not he will ever have a better the party had gone about fifty yards when the enemy
one. [t seems that on the night of the 10th of July, opened fire on them with machine pistols from be-
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hind the fence. Gallic was hit by five in each leg. He
rolled into the ditch alongside the road, while the
others in the party escaped. Gallic hoped that the Germans would withdraw and that our men would return
and pick him up. However, the Germans commenced
to lay antitank mines in front of a gate near by and
when they had finished this job one of them discovered Gallic in the ditch. One of them touched his
legs and remarked that he was still warm.
Gallic then relates: "They shot two rounds pointblank at my head. I thought I was finished. I felt
the blood spurting from my neck and I was surprised
that I didn't lose consciousness. I was lying there
motionless, with blood Rowing slowly out of many
wounds and with only one thought . . . to get away
from this spot. I pulled my raincoat off and crawled
to the other side of the road. The Germans were only
two yards away from me. I couldn't by-pass the gate.
The only place for me to go was a field opposite it
which was also occupied by the enemy. In great pain,
I scaled the hedgerow and let myself fall down in the
field. There I found a few German grenades of the
egg-shaped type. I unscrewed one and tossed it in the
direction of the Germans, only six yards away. Then
I started crawling in the direction I thought our area
was. I crossed three fields thinly occupied by Germans. They were lying on the bare ground fast asleep.
I crawled painfully, hiding behind their sleeping
forms while their Hare pistols lit up . . . "
When daylight came, Gallic had worked his way
into some low ground which was apparently no-man's
land. At about 0900 he heard some of our machine
guns firing. He crawled in that direction where he was
discovered and sent to the hospital. By September,
however, he was doing fine and scheduled to be soon
on his feet.
As one GI remarked, "Some guys is sure lucky."
COUNTERATTACK AT LE ROCHER
The 3d Battalion CP was settling down at 0230.
Sentries had been posted, Sergeant Major Peters was
straightening out his papers, and the staff was going
over plans for the next day's attack. Lts James L. Ashmore and Leroy I-I. Steelman, of Cannon and Antitank Companies, respectively, had arrived, received
instructions, and were out bringing up their guns to
go into action. Word had come from higher headquarters that friendly tanks and tank destroyers were
farther forward in an area to the battalion's front.
About this time, Cpl Marvin Hayes entered the
tent; he had been on guard. f le said that some tracked

vehicles had passed his post, and he was afraid they
were enemy. Of course, that meant that the enemy
had passed close to the CP, and I Jayes was barraged
with excited questions. Lt C-01 McCollum urged
everyone to take it easy, since the tanks were in all
probability some friendly reconnaissance unit, or
American TDs. f Iayes then explained that he had
thought so too; he had called T /5 I Iarry Schmeyer
when the tanks first approached, and they had decided
that the Germans on the vehicles were prisoners.
But when he heard the tankers talking German as
if making plans among themselves, I Jayes had decided
not to delay notifying the CP. Almost simultaneous
with this revelation, a telephone call came from Company "K," saying that a German armored vehicle had
been discovered on a road in their area, and was firing
at the doughboys and at a tank from the 3d Armored
Division.
Possibly the enemy sensed how precariously the 3d
Battalion was situated, and chose just that time for a
strong push headed at St. Jean de Daye. In any case,
the men at the CP c1uickly realized that the route
which the enemy had chosen led north into Le Rocher
along a road which, though covered hy a Company
"I" roadblock, came close by the Battalion CP and
curved slightly into the Hank of Company "K's" line.
Obviously the enemy vehicles had slipped by the Company "I" roadblock and the CP, and some were already
reaching Company "K." Germans were no doubt infiltrating past the headquarters that very moment.
There was no time to lose; Peters called all the companies to alert them, and called for all bazooka teams
available. Men picked up their weapons hastily and
left the tent, headed for the road. The night was still
quiet, but at the road there was the rumble of armored
vehicles. Not far from the CP hy a hedgerow was
a wire jeep with a mounted .30 caliber machine gun.
Into this jeep slipped Lt Charles E. Pritchard,
Communications Officer, of I Jeadc1uarters Company;
his hands clasped his weapon in readiness.
At that moment a German tank had slipped up a few
yards from the Battalion CP. Two others were spaced
behind, farther down the road, following the first as
it crept forward, apparently unaware that it was on
top of an American installation. "ieveral hundred yards
from the CP, men of the Company "I" roadblock still
thought the parade of tanks was friendly. One of their
number was on his way to the CP to explain the dubious situation, hut he never arrived. "Joo many things
happened first.
Fifteen feet in front of his jeep, Lt Pritchard
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could make out a German, probably an officer,
standing in the turret of the tank trying to deliver
a radio message. He thought he heard the click
of a belt being fed into an automatic weapon, and he
squeezed his trigger. There was a vicious clatter from
different guns, several times. A few seconds later, the
enemy's gun was silent; Lt Pritchard's gun was still
rattling in the night.
There had been much hushed activity in the area
meanwhile. Lt Col McCollum speedily organized
his men for defense of the immediate area. Maj
Adams, executive of the battalion, was moving about
to make sure the men were in best positions.
Pfc George F. Talarico was hugging a ba!-ooka
at a crossroad close to the CP, when "Major
Adams told me to follow him. We both duckwalked
towards one of the tanks that had stopped on the road
beside the CP. As we were creeping up the Major
stepped on a twig and one of the tankers challenged."
At this moment Lt Pritchard had heard the click of
the enemy weapon, and even as he fired, Talarico was
loading a bazooka round, and within the minute he
had fired squarely into the tank's turret. From inside
voices screamed and moaned and men shouted unintelligibly. From then on the night was loud with
small arms and voices, and hard fighting. The hedgerows rustled with movement; here and there men
scurried for cover. Peters had meanwhile made his
way to a roadblock manned by Company "D," then
attached to the battalion, and had procured from it
a bazooka team, which was creeping up on the other
side of the tank from Talarico and Maj Adams. Two
explosions lit up for split seconds the same tank,
and then there was no doubt that it had been destroyed. The moans from it faded. Lt Arnold Snyder,
who with T / Sgt Peters had led his Company "D"
bazooka team forward, saw that Pfc Omer W. Franklin, who had fired the bazooka and thereby knocked
out the tank, was burned by the backAash and sent
him to the rear.
By this time, the company commanders of both
Companies "I" and "D" were on the scene, since the
enemy had struck their area. Capt McCullough, of
Company "I," reached the roadblock hastily and ordered the men to stay in their holes, lest in the confusion of the night men begin shooting their own comrades. I le also ordered that the road be so covered
with fire that no more tanks could either penetrate or
withdraw from the position. With two enlisted men,
he headed for the still active tanks.
Capt Shaeffer had just ordered Talarico to assault

Hebecrevon was torn to pieces

the second tank with him, but Talarico had first gone
to procure more bazooka ammunition. He was coming back when he found Captains Shaeffer and McCullough about to rush the tank. "Capt McCullough
of Company 'I' came over," Talarico told later, "and
said, 'Good shot. Let's get the other bastard!' I went
down to the hedgerow along with another bazooka
man from Company 'I.' We both fired at the tank. I
fired my carbine between bazooka blasts. Col McColl um was beside me and he directed some of my
shots." Still on the other side of the road, Lt Snyder
had a bazooka man, this time S/Sgt Albert Hutman
of Company "D," who fired a shot at the same time
as Talarico. The tank was on fire.
By a prearranged plan, coordinated so as to be most
effective, the two captains meanwhile fired antitank
grenades at the tank, and finally rushed it. Capt
McCullough was wounded in the leg by fragments
of one of the grenades, but he swung himself onto
the tank and threw fragmentation and phosphorous
grenades into the hatch. In the fury of the moment,
he even pulled out his pistol and bashed it down upon
the tank commander's head. It slipped out of his hand
and fell into the tank. With Capt Schaeffer he struggled to pull the enemy from the turret; the German
had already lost his left leg, however, and he dropped
limply back into the hatch.
Small-arms and automatic fire was still whirring
through the air from every direction, and Capt Shaeffer in a hurry to quit the tank dropped inaccurately
and caught his hind parts on the bayonet of a riAeman
standing close to the tank. The two enlisted men
with Capt McCullough also had been wounded in
the fast fight at the tank.

26

I IISTORY OF Tl IE l2C!rn INFANTRY REGIMEN"I

We pause at a hedgerow before taking the next

turned about to make a return trip. They advanced
past the CP with guns clattering, and the lead vehicle, the half track, was spraying flame from four nozzles, lighting up frightened faces in brilliant orange
billows about fifty feet long. Capt McCullough hit
the ground hard, and when the Harne swept close to
him, he had to roll into a ditch to avoid the searing
fire. Meanwhile some Company "D" men, who had
established a roadblock some distance away, turned
their .50-caliber machine gun upon the halftrack and
Pfc Sigmund Wisnewski fired about a hundred rounds
into it. It burst into Harne, its nozzles ceased functioning, and the billows rose skyward rather than earthward. The .SO-caliber then turned its aim upon the
two vehicles behind, and shortly both were destroyed.
There was great turmoil while the German infantrymen endeavored to escape and ran wild in the area
around the CP. Still very much alive in spite of his
wound, Capt McCullough got to his feet, went to a
light machine gun near by, and in I Iollywood style,
threw the ammunition helt over his shoulder. Then,
still furious because of the vicious flame which had so
nearly scared him, he strode down the road toward
his company's roadblock, shooting at the ditches and
the hushes which might have held cowering Germans.
I {e reached the roadblcx:k again and checked the positions. They were almost intact. I ie returned to the
battalion CP again, and turned himself over to the
medics.
It was becoming quiet, but a small fire fight continued through the night until approximately 0615.
Nobody had much sleep that night. Cpl I layes must
have been happy, though, that he hadn't slept when
the first tank passed his position. I le would sleep better now.

There was still a third tank to take care of, and it
was firing its utmost. S/Sgt I lutman dodged to a position close by and fired a round which damaged it.
Capt McCullough also slipped up and fired some antitank grenades at it, but it was not destroyed for at
last it rumbled aside to the shelter of a building and
later escaped.
It had become apparent by now that there were approximately one hundred infantrymen following behind and attempting to protect the tanks. They had
fired consistently throughout the desperate battle, hut
they had been slowly driven back. When the third
tank limped off, the Germans on foot abandoned the
cause; they withdrew into the night, leaving dead and
The enemy had used armor and infantry to make a
wounded behind.
Capt McCullough was heading hack to the Bat- concerted attempt to penetrate with the apparent intalion CP for medical aid, and after he had called his tention of breaking through to St. Jean de Daye and
recovering all the ground he had lost south of the
executive officer, Lt Burton K. Fox, he was admin
Canal
de Vire ct "I aute. I !is final objective was the
istered sulfa pills and bandaged by the omnipresent
Talarico, until a medic arrived. When Lt Fox arrived, town of lsigny on the coast, as revealed by captured
he and Capt McCullough stepped outside the tent, orders and maps. In his report for the 12th of July, the
and the captain must have been explaining briefly Hegimcntal S 2, Capt Ezekiel L. Glazier, listed eleven
enemy tanks and one armored halftrack knocked out.
what had happened.
It was about this time that a loud commotion was By 1030, the I Ith of July, the enemy had been thro\\n
hack with great loss and had given up any attempt to
heard in the rear of the Company "I" lines. Apparent
ly the vehicles, discovered to be a halftrack and two continue his attack.
The morning of the 11th of July found the men of
scout cars with infantry, which had pierced the lines
the 3d Battalion sleepy and tired. But food and water
before the tanks and reached the Company "K" posi
tions, realized they could not go farther and had had to he brought forward, and T / Sgt Peters picked
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a detail to bring up the supplies. When he returned late in the morning to the CP, he found twentytwo Germans lined up in the area. They had been
brought in by Pfc l lenry A. Snotherly, a machine
gunner of Cannon Company, who had ridden with
Lts Ashmore and Steelman when they were trying to
put their guns in position the night before. His story
was full of action :
It seems that when the three tanks had approached
within fifteen feet of the CP the night before, Snotherly had seen the form of the German in the turret,
and had helped fire on him with his carbine. The
hatch dropped abruptly and no further orders came
from this tank that night. A moment later, a bazooka
team which had arrived from one of the companies
opened fire and knocked out the tank, then another,
and finally a third. With daylight approaching, Snotherly and the four men with him (the two lieutenants,
driver Pfc Clayton Moore, and radio operator Pvt Paul
It Kannan) started back to their position in a jeep.
In the distance, they saw what they believed to be a
friendly vehicle beside the road. When they got within ten feet of this car, three machine guns opened up
on them, wounding Snotherly in the hand, killing
the two enlisted men, and wounding one officer in the
leg. There were about fifty Germans at the armored
car.
Another jeep was heard approaching down the road,
and when it had come within close range, the enemy
fired upon it, killing two men, Lt Frederick A. Schlemmer, Company "D" platoon leader, and Pvt Kenneth L. Cross, while two others, Sgt Francis P. Riley
and Sgt Cecil N. Blankenship, were wounded. They
had all been sent from 3d Battalion CP to procure
ammunition. The Germans then placed Snotherly behind the armored car, together with the other prisoners they had taken, and then moved up the road to
within 300 yards of the 3d Battalion CP. Our bazooka
team, which was lying in wait, opened up and made
a direct hit.
Snotherly then related: ''l\1achine guns were firing
and in the confusion I crawled over the bank on our
left. I tried to crawl to our CP to let our men know
what was down ~here and what to expect. I got out
in the middle of the orchard about fifty yards from
our CP. It was then light enough to see, but I still
could not make out whether the troops which were
coming across in front of me were ours or German.
r raised my head to get a better view to see whether
they were ours or not. They were Germans and one of
them saw me. l le came over and hit me with a ma -

On guard

chine gun, kicked me a couple of times and made me
get up. They were the same ones who captured me
before. They took me over to a little trail that led off
down the road from the CP. We dispersed into ditches
on each side of the trail beside the hedgerows and lay
there until daylight. From that time until 1030 our
tanks were maneuvering all around us in the area.
"I was looking for the tanks to come down the trail
most any time and the Germans were too. I was the
only prisoner they had at that time. Every time I
would attempt to raise my head, the German guarding me would tap me on the head with a machine gun
to make me keep my head down. About this time one
of our men shot a German who was up in the front
of me in a hole. When this German was shot, the two
immediately behind him raised up and surrendered.
"I nudged the German behind me and nodded in the
direction of the two men who had surrendered. When
he looked up, I grabbed his machine pistol, which he
was holding down close to my right leg, jumped out
of the ditch, and covered him. The GI threw his gun
on me when he saw me jump out of the ditch, but
he saw I was an American and did not fire. He came
on up to me, making the Germans come out of the
ditch in Front oF me. 'Nhile l \-vas covering those behind me with the machine pistol, a German jumped
up and started to run away. I tried to shoot him, but
didn't know how to fire the weapan. I was pulling on
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the magazine, thinking it was a trigger. However, he
turned around and came back in with the rest of the
prisoners I had in the rear of me.
"We took the Germans up to the 3d Battalion CP
and turned them over. There were twenty-two of them
when they were counted and searched.",
ATTACK AND COUNTERATTACK
The fight in the hedgerow days was made up of
many, many small-scale attacks, all driving ahead,
forging yard by yard to gain more and more footholds
in German territory. It was hard consistent going, but
each day gained a little ground; each day meant more
supplies and troops arriving on the beaches; each day
led to the time when all Normandy, all France, would
be in American hands; and many could sec peace in
only a short time after the enemy had been evicted
from Normandy. So the men struggled on, hoping
that each day would be the one before VE Day, hoping beyond hope that this sleepless day would he the
last. There was a long, rough road ahead.
On the 11th of July the 3d Battalion attacked again.
No one had slept a minute the night before, but when
the attack orders came down around 0900, plans were
made and the men were readied to push off at I 000.
There was some delay, however, and the attack did
not take place till 1100. The command group had al ready moved forward on reconnaissance. The Batta!
ion Executive, Maj Adams, had left to contact the
leader of the tank force which was to support the battalion that day. Company "I" was in the lead when
at last the riAemen pushed forward . Shortly thereafter
word reached the CP that the going was slow and
rugged. Already the casualty list was mounting.
Shortly after the jump-off the air became heavy
with shells when an artillery concentration saturated the area. German artillery was zeroing in
from the Line of Departure back to the Battalion CP.
Perhaps more than any other time, the CP suffered
that day. Many of the personnel were wounded in
the deadly concentrations. Two radio operators were
hit badly, and a third lost his senses and hcgan to yell
incoherently at odd intervals. There were no runners
available, since they had been in the ambushed group
of the night before. The 610 radio was ruined by
shrapnel and all lines to Regiment were cut. Only the
300 radio maintained contact with the Battalion CP,
and over it came the discouraging news that the com
panics were held up by the heavy artillery fire, and
that the enemy was preparing a counterattack.
On the 300 radio was T / Sgt Peters, standing, as

Pfc Talarico says, "with the radio receiver in one hand
and the telephone receiver in the other trying to keep
contact with the companies. The CP trailer was on
fire and he was attempting to put that out also. All
this time shells were bursting around him, but somehow he was unscratched." Two jeeps were also on
fire, and the small-arms ammunition in the vehicles
was popping everywhere. Then came some of the riAemen singly and in small groups, infiltrating to the rear,
and thoroughly shaken hy the unnerving activity.
Many of them were ordered to return to their company, and they moved off to take up the fight. Tanks
had been requested, and they arrived finally at the CP.
But they drew more disaster than they gave help, for
enemy 88mm guns fired intermittently into the area
and the tanks were stopped.
Lt Frank \V. Towers, liaison officer from the Bat
talion to Hcgimcnt, made his way through the intense
fire to report at the CP that he had been unable to
find Lt Col McCollum. Another newcomer reached
the CP, a lieutenant who was to distinguish himself
in brilliant achievement throughout his combat career: Ralph E. Kerley, then a platoon leader of Com·
pany "E." At that time the counterattack suffered by
the 3d Battalion had brought it to a halt, hut the
enemy was infiltrating through to the CP and beyond. Senl to help relieve the situation, Lt Kerley decided to commit his platoon on the right flank, where
the counterattack ha<l struck. As his men moved out
to take up the line there the enemy, apparently unaware of how far they had come and how great an
advantage they had, withdrew.
Brig Gen \Villiam K. I larrison's face was familiar
to the doughboys, for he came often to the l 20th lines
during combat. At this time he sent fifty men to
bolster the lines men who had left their positions
for the rear. ')gt Peters dispatched them to the left
flank, "some of them," as ')gt Peters said later, "to return no more."
Artillery and mortars were still pounding the area
late in the afternoon. Lt Towers started for the front
again down a hedgerow, hut at the end of it, an 88mm
shell landed within a few feet of him, and when he
staggered to his feet he was half conscious and so
seriously shaken that he was laid up for close to six
weeks thereafter. Finally an armored ambulance was
sent to the Battalion CP, where six men had been
lying seriously wounded for many hours. l\ la j Adams
never returned from his contact mission; he was captured during the counterattack.
It was dark \\hen finally the line became stabilized
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and the artillery died down. The battalion had gained
a few hundred yards. It had been a hard day. T /Sgt
Peters back at the CP would remember it well:
"Finally quiet reigns. The fight is over. What is
left of the battalion is dug-in and buttoned-up for the
night. Lt Col McCollum returns to the CP all alone,
a weary but unbeaten man. He takes a last long look
at the burning vehicles and parts of bodies laying
about, shakes his head and says 'Let's go.' Casualties
were heavy in officers, men and materiel. The battalion is hurting, and needs replacements badly. Not one
company commander survived the day."
Captains McCullough and Shaeffer were wounded
the night before. Capt f lerbcrt Wier, of Company
"L" and Capt Marvin 1\1. Smith, of Company "K,"
were wounded during the counterattack on the 11th.
Lt Leroy f I. Steelman of Cannon Company was killed.
PRELUDE TO THE BREAKTHROUGH
On the 12th of July, the I 17th Infantry passed
through our lines and together with the I 19th Infantry, continued the attack to the south while the
120th Infantry protected the open right Hank in their
rear and attempted reorganization. This was still frontline duty since we were holding an open Hank and
subject not only to enemy mortar and artillery fire,
hut also to enemy patrol activity and constant smallarms fire. Indeed, on the 13th of July, the enemy
attacked our positions with armor, which the 1st Battalion successfully repulsed.
During the 14th and 15th of July, our men were
taken from the front lines a platoon at a time and
transported to the vicinity of Airel where they were
given showers. This was the first opportunity for the
men to bathe in over a month.
At 2400, July 15th, the 30th Division was transferred from the XIX Corps to the VII Corps.
The 117th Infantry and the I 19th Infantry having
advanced only some 1000 yards on the 16th of July,
at 1000 the I 20th Infantry passed through their lines
with the 1st and 2d Battalions in the attack. Stiff
enemy resistance was met, but by 1150 on the 17th
of July our line was roughly 2600 yards south of Hts.
Vcsnes astride the main road leading to St. Gilles. During this engagement, Company "C" lost three company commanders in four hours. It was found that
the enemy tanks which were immobilized for lack of
fuel had been dug in and used as pillboxes. Eight of
these tanks were destroyed . Intelligence revealed that
on this day we almost wiped out entirely the 1st and
3d Battalions of the 14th Parachute Regiment.
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The Normandy villages were badly beaten up

The German paratroopers were full of the extreme
fanaticism of which Hitlerism always boasted. It was
the first time the Regiment encountered screaming
terrorism ; the paratroopers carried their arms at high
port and yelled at the top of their voices. They leapt
over the fields and through the hedgerows, blaring
their triumphant war chant at a dead run. But they
fell right and left, and their repeated attempts to throw
the battalions back failed each time.
The continued advance by our men demanded the
highest in leadership. Company "C's" original commander, Capt Robert f lobgoocl, was as energetic as
the wildest German paratrooper that clay. When the
enemy drove at his company's lines, he moved rapidly from man to man, urging continuous firing, inspiring the troops with steady orders and stout words.
At one time he had to call clown artillery fire as close
as twenty-five yards from his own men, but the artillery did the trick, and Capt Hobgood's men did
not budge. Shortly thereafter, Capt I lobgood was
killed in the heat of battle. By nightfall of the 17th,
only three riAe and heavy weapons company commanders of' those who had crossed the Canal de Vire
et Taute were left in the Regiment. None of the
original officers of Company "C" were left.
Sgt Henry Comancho, of Company "A," the gunner of the bazooka team, stood up in the open and
faced withering enemy fire including that from 88mm
guns, disabling one tank and forcing two others to
Hee. The tanks were spearheading a German battalion
attack, and when Comancho succeeded in stopping
the tanks, the German infantry lost their zeal for battle and our men successfully routed them. Sgt Coman-

Occasionally a rifleman got a good shot at a German

escape detection, the t\\'o men turned their attention
upon th.e tank to the north aml, at a range of 60
yards, S/ Sgt Callaway fired one round at it, knocking
it out. Later, discovering another enemy tank, they
again advanced under cover of the hedgerows to within 75 yards of it. Still assisted hy S '-;gt I larris, Calla
way knocked out the tank with two rounds. With
four tanks destroyed, the enemy resistance was weak
ened, and the advance continued. It is sad to relate
that S/ Sgt Call<may was later killed while fighting
in Germany on the 24th of November, 1944.
Capt i\1~rry S. Pulver was a lieutenant command
ing a Company "B" platmn on the 16th of July. I le
had a full day, displaying great courage as he did in all
of his hatt les. \Vhen enemy resistance stiffened Cap
tain Pulver observed an enemy tank. I le radioed for
artillery to be placed again upon the enemy, repeatedly
fired a bazooka which knocked out two enemy tanks,
fired antitank grenades at the enemy infantry, and

cho fired on the tanks at a range of sixty yards amidst
fire by the heaviest guns carried by tanks. Pvt Ah
bot was his assistant gunner and the team got off
thirty rounds of ammunition.
S/ Sgts Howard E. Callaway and Dewey 11. f larris
of Company "A" both were privates engaged in their
first battle on the 16th of July. They were a bazooka
team. No veteran could have fought more skillfully or
bravely than did the two that day. Seeing enemy tanks
were a threat to our troops, the two set out under in
tense enemy artillery, mortar and small arms fire.
Within a short time, they came upon two tanb. One,
30 yards away to the north was firing upon our troops,
while a second was approaching from the south. Fx
posing himself, S/ Sgt Callaway fired two rounds and
knocked out the tank to the south. Approached hy
another enemy tank to his front, he fired one round,
knocking off one of the tank's treads, eliminating it
from the action. By crawling along the hedgerows to
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rendered 6.rst aid to a wounded man under fire. Capt
Pulver ended his heroic actions hy personally capturing seven prisoners.
Assuming the defensive, the east Rank of the Regimental zone of action was occupied by the I 19th Infantry on the 18th of July, 1944. The I 20th Infantry
took over the protection of the right Rank from the
I 17th Infantry, setting up seven roadblocks and eliminating the enemy from our Regimental sector as far
west as the Division boundary.
The following day, at l l 00, the 3d Battalion attacked the enemy in an attempt to push our lines forward to high ground a short distance to the south.
Again, dug-in tanks and well emplaced infantry were
met. Flanking this resistance, Company "L" was able
to reach the objective. Lt Col Paul W. McCollum,
with his usual disregard for his own safety, personally
led the attack. I le was wounded at the outset but, despite his wound and heavy losses among .his men, he
set the example by leading from the very front. Lt Col
McCollum's bravery and superb leadership inspired
his troops to gain a victory against nearly impossible
odds.
On the 20th of July the remainder of the 3d
Battalion jumped off at 1400 in an attempt to seize
the whole of this line. The attack was unsuccessful,
the total advance being hut 200 yards. lI nquestionahly, our troops were exhausted from constant use
under fierce and protracted battle conditions.
For the twenty days of July, and for the most part
since the 7th of July, the Regiment had suffered l,169
casualties. Twelve officers had been killed, forty-four
were wounded, and two were missing in action. Two
hundred thirty-three men had died, 828 had been
wounded, and fifty were missing in action.
For the fourteen days beginning with the 7th of
July, intelligence information revealed that we had
knocked out and eliminated the following enemy
troops: the Das Reich Engineer Battalion; the 5 l 7th
Battalion, 30th Schnelle Brigade; the 2d Battalion,
902d Infantry; a battalion of the Panzer Lehr Division;
and the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 14th Panzer
Hegiment.
Other enemy clements known to have been decimated hv our troops included: the 275th Infantry, the
275th Fusiliers, the 275th Engineer Battalio~, the
! 30th Artillery Battalion, the Angers Engineer Battalion, the 17th Engineer Battalion , portions of the
90lst Infantry, and portions of the 352d Division.
On the 21st of July, for the first reported time,
enemy aircraft strafed our troops. Three times in sue-

cession, three enemy ME-109's came across our front
from east to west strafing men of the 1st Battalion
until the planes were finally driven off by friendly
aircraft.
On the 22d of July, plans were being made for a
big drive to the south which would carry us eventually
south of St. Lo and to the western banks of the Vire
River. The plan called for the use of aerial bombardment enemy positions and, therefore, was dependent
upon favorable weather conditions. Due to inclement
weather, it was not until the 24th of July that the
plan could be attempted.

or

ABOUT GAS
There is something about the very word "gas" which
sends the cold shivers up and down the spine. We find
ourselves unconsciously on the alert for the enemy
to make use of it and it is unfortunate that certain individuals, whose discernment is not too good, are prone
to accept any strange smell as a gas attack by the
enemy, particularly if this odd aroma is accompanied
by anything resembling smoke.
On the evening of the 21st of July, 1944, the Regiment experienced its first gas scare. In some strange
manner, a report became current that a group of frontline troops were hurriedly returning for their gas masks
in the rear. Assuming that this report was true and
that these men had neglected to take their masks along
with them and were merely returning to pick them
up, by the time the story reached the man in the slit
trench it had these front-line troops already subjected
to gas, suffering casualties and disorganization and,
further, that the lethal stuff was coming in their direction.
This, of course, was entirely false. Lt Edward M.
[ lill, assistant Regimental S-3, was attempting to make
a telephone call when he heard someone break into
the line and shout, at the same time "Gas!" He was
unable to trace the source of this disconcerting news.
At the same time, our men throughout the area commenced to fire their riAes and carbines, placing three
shots into the air, the signal for the presence of gas.
Not knowing the true situation, nearly everyone hurriedly located their masks, and men could be seen
wearing them throughout the vicinity, adding to the
questionable truth of the reports. It was at least an
hour before all of our front-line units were convinced
that no gas existed in the area.
Meantime, the false reports caused such consternation in our rear echelon, which was located approximately fifteen miles from the front lines, that it be-
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came necessary to send a sound truck through the units when they jumped off. To our consternation,
area which advised all personnel that no gas attack however, our troops were bombed by friendly aircraft
was taking place and that none was expected.
at 1150, causing much disorganization and the heaviest
The following night, about 2330, another false casualty figure on a time basis we had suffered to
alarm became current among the troops. It was sug- date. Companies "G" and "H," in particular, took the
gested that a possible cause for this was that the enemy brunt of the shock. The Regimental Command Post
threw smoke shells into our lines which were mis- received a heavy concentration of bombs at 1240. As
taken by troops farther to the rear as being gas. If a result of this bombing, the attack was postponed and
the Germans received word of what went on within we were ordered to occupy the original line which we
our lines during those nights, they were no doubt had evacuated that morning. In doing so, we straightgreatly pleased and immediately wrote it down in their ened this line; the 3d Battalion of the 117th Infantry
book as a possible secret weapon to be used in the (attached) cleaned out one enemy pocket of resistance
future. We can almost hear the order being given: which had stubbornly maintained itself to our right
"Fritz . . . go out to der enemy wire und tap her. front. As a result of the bombing this day, we suffered
Den, all it takes to do is say, 'GAS.' Der troops will fourteen killed and sixty-five wounded.
With "I I-Hour" set for 1100 on July 25, 1944, on
do der rest."
On the evening of the 23d of July at 2135, three that morning we again completed the withdrawal of
enemy planes Rew over the Regimental Command our forward elements to the safety line, and once
Post. We could hear the antiaircraft guns firing for again our own Air Force, appearing in overwhelming
several minutes before they appeared Rying beneath strength, bombed our positions and disorganized our
the clouds and heading north. As we watched them troops. Heavy concentrations hit our area at 0955,
proceed on their way, our fire finally caught one of and at 1012 a particularly heavy bombardment was
them and it began to smoke. As though this was the received in the vicinity of the Regimental and 2d Batsignal for the release of pent-up emotions, thousands talion Command Posts. Our casualties were ten dead
of voices from miles around filled the air with a great and 199 wounded, and again the 2d Battalion bore
cheer which lasted until the enemy plane crashed to the brunt. Capt Ernest W. Bell, 2d Battalion S-3, was
among the men lost this day. He was buried in the
the ground, some distance away.
It is of interest to note that during the period from battalion CP dugout. The loss of this outstanding ofJuly 7th through July 23d, when the Regiment was ficer was a great one for the Regiment to suffer.
Despite these casualties, loss of equipment, and
not attacking the enemy it was committed in defense
of an active Rank, meeting constant enemy pressure, lowered morale, we succeeded in reorganizing. Spearand successfully resisting determined enemy coun- heading to the south, the Regiment jumped off at
terattacks. The men had had little, if any, rest in the 1130 with the 2d Battalion leading the way as planned.
full sense of the word. Indeed, it can be said that Lack of time prevented passing the 1st or 3d Battalion
since June 15th, when the Regiment launched its first through the 2d. It is believed that at no time in hisattack, it had been in the front lines and subjected to tory have men attacked a determined enemy under
all the hardships, both physical and mental, that such more adverse conditions than did the 2d Battalion
on that day. Fearful as was the first bombing, it was not
a position means.
to be the end. Again the men of the 2d Battalion were
BREAKING THE LINE AT ST. LO
struck by our own Air Forces, this time just as they
"H-Hour" was set at 1300 on the 24th of July; by reached the first of the enemy's lines. Despite the fact
1130 all of our front-line troops had been withdrawn to that this magnificent battalion suffered 175 casualties
a location a considerable distance from the Line of De- within a very short period of time, the gallant troops
parture. This was done in order to create a safety zone overcame unexpectedly stiff enemy resistance to make
between the bombing line and our own troops. It was the initial penetration.
with some misgivings that we abandoned land which
Immediately after the 2d Battalion first pierced the
had been so valiantly fought for, but, as events proved, enemy's lines, the 1st Battalion moved around the left
the idea was well taken even though in practice it fail- of the hostile resistance, while the 3d went to the right.
ed to produce the desired results. The Regimental The Regiment finally broke through the enemy lines
Command Post was placed well forward on the reverse at 1800 and advanced to two crossroads farther to the
slope of a hill, in order to keep better contact with our south. In this vicinity, at approximately 2200, we sue-
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The command post at Pont Hebert: Colonel Birks, Lieutenant Colonel Ward, Maior Knaus, Captain Eberhardt, Captain Glazier,
Maior Bynum, Maior Lambe

cessfully met and repelled a last-ditch enemy tank at
"On the morning of the 24th of July, I had heen
tack, which was flung at us in an attempt to plug the sent to the I 19th Infantry CP which was located aphole our troops had made in his line of resistance.
proximately one-fourth mile to the cast of our position.
The accomplishment of our men that day, in the It was there that I witnessed the first aircraft approachface of stiff enemy action and after suffering so heav- ing. These were fighter-bombers and after passing
ily, is certainly an illustration of the fine spirit of the over our front lines in an obvious attempt to determine
American infantryman at its best. It was on this day our location, they then swung to the cast, turned about,
that Lt Gen Lesley J. McNair was killed while with and approached our lines so as to bomb parallel to our
the 2d Battalion.
front. [ remember being pleased to see them do this
The following description of the great aerial bomb- because I felt that they would he able to keep the
ing of July 24th and 25th, as told by Lt George M. bombs in enemy territory more easily in this manner.
They proceeded to fly across what appeared to be
Tuttle, is of interest:
"I guess none of us will forget the 24th and 25th enemy-occupied territory, dropping down and releasdays of July, 1944. There just aren't words in the Eng- ing their bombs at a low altitude, two or three planes
lish language to adequately describe the chaotic terror at a time. I learned later that this initial bombing had
hit some of our troops in the foremost positions.
experienced on those two days. Suzrs und Stripes esti
"While other planes continued to lx>mh the area
mated that 1500 heavy bombers, 500 medium bomb
ers, and 500 fighter-bombers plus escort aircraft were to our front, three aircraft flew back into our lines
used, and when you pack that many airplanes into a and passed over the I 19th Infantry CP. Then to my
comparatively small sector . . . you really have consternation, [ saw them drop down and oomb posi
tions approximately five hedgerows to the north of
something. P-47 fighter-bombers attacked first, fol
lowed by great formations of B-24 Liberators which the CP. I believe that this was a tank park. Men in
Rew at approximately 15,000 feet. It was an awe the locality immediately finxl yellow star shells and
inspiring sight to see the big lx>mbcrs approaching in yellow smoke was set off in the vicinity ( yellow being
tight formation from the north, filling the sky like a the color designation for friendly troops ). I lowcver,
cloud of huge locusts. The roar of their motors became possibly attracted hy the black smoke from burning
louder as they approached, until the roar in our ears vehicles, the area was bomlwd again a few minutes
later.
made speaking difficult.
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"Wishing to determine the situation in regard to
our troops, I returned to the 120th Infantry CP. I had
no sooner reached the vicinity than a heavy bomber
formation began to come over. I was standing outside
of the dugout used by Regimental l Ieadquarters,
watching them approach. As they reached a position
nearly directly overhead, a strange, whistling sound
could be heard above the roar of the motors. I did
not need to be told what it was and, with the other
men near by, dove into the dugout. A second later and
the bombs landed in the area. We could hear and feel
them approaching as bomb after bomb landed. Finally, in perhaps thirty seconds, they reached the vicin ity of the dugout. The ground was shaken as though
rocked by a great earthquake. The concussion, even
underground, felt like someone was beating you with
a club. We could not understand how the dugout
had been missed by a direct hit. It was 'saturation'
bombing, all right. Many men were wounded. The
liaison officer from the 8th Infantry Regiment was
killed a few yards from the Command Post.
"When the bombing was over, I saw General McNair talking with Colonel Birks. So great was the disorganization and confusion that the attack was postponed.
"On the 25th of July, it happened again. The bombs
struck Regimental CP area first at 0955 and continued
to fall intermittently, for over half an hour. I was
again at the I 19th CP which was bombed three times,
once by heavy bombers and twice by fighter-bombers.
Some men, who received direct hits, were blown to
bits and no evidence of their existence remained. I
was told of one man who was indeed lucky. He was
blown out of his deep slit trench into the air, yet suffered only minor injuries. This was most remarkable
because another man occupying the same slit trench
was killed, and the trench was not only deep but covered by a roof consisting of boards covered with earth.
Those vehicles which were not destroyed by direct
hits were apparently set on fire by fragments striking
gasoline tanks. In the immediate vicinity of the I 19th
CP, I counted six jeeps and tracked ammunition carriers knocked out within an area of I 00 yards.
"It was related to me that after the final bombing
had ceased and the occupants of the I 20th Infantry
CP had picked themselves up from the Hoor, a goat
and a dog were found to have been the first to reach
the questionable sanctuary of the dugout. Other men
reported that rabbits, seeking safety, leaped into their
slit trenches, preferring the presence of their old enemy, man, to the unknown terror above ground.

Rifle grenades helped to soften the next obiective

"It was hard to believe that any living thing could
be left alive in front of of our positions after the bombing which had taken place for two days in succession .
However, on moving to enemy-held territory, our men
ran into some determined resistance."
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE BOMBING
A year later, one man present during the fateful
bombings, l\1ajor Reynold C. Erichson, remembered
the disaster so vividly that he sat down and wrote the
following description of it:
"Today is July 25th, 1945; a year after the terrible
experience at St. Lo. We talked of it last night, over
a couple of drinks of cognac. We can talk of it all,
now, but it'll never be relived completely again. As
our stomachs warmed to the effect of the cognac and
our minds turned more to the melancholy, a part of
it came back to us. Not the nerve-racked tiredness
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of our bodies, not the awful tension that we felt that
day, mind you. That can never be felt until you yourself are ready to attack, or have a stick of bombs rattling down toward you, or have been without sleep
for days on end. Things you do remember, however,
are the pictures in your mind. Pictures that will never
be put on canvas.
"It started at midday. Huge Rights of planes in
seemingly endless numbers, coming from beyond your
scope of vision. Moving, seemingly, slowly and ponderously, on toward their target. Wraith-like, they
seemed to thread their way, like huge fish, in and out
of a sea of clouds. Ack-ack goes up towards them, most
of it not reaching quite high enough. Occasionally
however one is caught, and there is a burst of Rame,
and a long trail of smoke. Then, still like a huge fish,
the ship spirals slowly earthward. As you watch, the
death throes of the fish seem to last for hours. Actually it's a matter of seconds.
"Fascinated, we stood and watched this mighty
drama, entranced to such an extent, that all thoughts
of our own role were put into the back of our minds.
Then came that awful rush of wind-that awful sound
like the 'rattling of seeds in a dry gourd,' as Ernie Pyle
said. We were jarred back to reality then.
"It started far in rear of us. Two or three miles or
more, and slowly, fatefully, moved up toward us. Instinct made the more fortunate of us seek foxholes,
folds in the ground, ditches, anything. Instinct made
others forget all reason and logic, and they began running blindly. The terrible waves of concussion swept
them like leaves before a storm, and they were cut
down. The earth trembled and shook. While hedgerows disappeared, and entire platoons were struck,
huge geysers of earth erupted and subsided leaving
gaping craters, <lust, and the acrid smell of burnt
powder. Yellow smoke grenades were thrown in an
attempt to show our airmen that they had erred, but
the smoke only mingled with the dust and smoke of
the bombs and that was in vain. Panels were displayed
everywhere, and airmen, seeing them on vehicles far
to the rear, perhaps thought they were designating
our front lines, and released their bombs, still more
to the rear.
"Between the Rights of bombers, there was sufficient
time to get out of the holes, dig frantically for those
who had been buried alive, put the wounded into
ambulances, and then dive into cover again, from another menacing Right overhead. Ambulances loaded
between Rights, and rushing to the rear, were tom to
pieces. Tanks were burning everywhere. Ammunition

dumps had been hit, and the large shells were booming, and small-arms ammunition crackling in the distance. Men were screaming for aiclmen and medics,
others cursed the planes still coming in endless groups
out of the distance. Finally, after ages, it seemed, the
bombs stopped dropping in our midst, and were hammering clown to our front where the enemy was.
"Hcorganization began. Small-unit leaders tried to
account for their men. Commanders tried to determine how badly shattered their commands were, tried
to learn what subordinate commanders they still had
left to carry out the attack. New leaders were appointed in many cases. Individuals were torn between
the desire to help the nccdl'ul, and duty to straighten
out what was left. Intermingled with all this was the
heroic effort of the medical personnel. Some men had
gone mad, and were forcibly carried to the rear;
others were too badly wounded to move before plasma
was administered. Digging was going on all around
for the buried ones, in an attempt to free them while
they were still alive. I saw them dig one's head out. I le
was still breathing, and a desperate attempt was made
to free the rest of his body, but it was in vain. The
breathing stopped.
"Then the order came to attack, to take advantage
of the condition of the enemy, who must have been
driven senseless by the pounding. Commands, that
earlier in the day numbered three times the battered
groups, moved forward. Communications were gone,
lost, or in the hands of someone wounded or dead.
Commanders gave orders directly to their subordinates
and the attack got under way. Slowly though, for response was slow, because of the dazed condition of
most of us.
"Tanks, spearheading with the point elements of
the infantry, ran into minefields covered by enemy
antitank gun fire, were knocked out and set afire.
Doughboys, forced off the roads by fire, took to the
ditches, and ran into antipersonnel mines. A man a
few yards in front of me stepped on one, and his entire
lower legs were blown off. As I passed by him, he
asked me for help. An aidman was summoned, and
everyone kept moving.
"Now flights of medium bombers started coming
over, and again the action was repeated. Bombs started
far in the rear, and worked up to where you were. You
could sec the lx>mhs actually fall through the air; tiny
little dots at first, growing and growing, as they neared
the earth, and then the dull, dry thump, as they detonated. One particular stick of homhs dropped quite
close to where we were lying in a ditch, and a rock
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near my head, the size of a volleyball, actually bounced
in the air. This bombing lasted only a short while,
and again the attack was resumed.
"After an advance of about three or four hundred
yards, the enemy was encountered. Resistance was
mostly in the form of dug-in tanks offering direct fire,
largely 75-millimeter, but there were a few of the
famed 88s. The Ranks of these dug-in tanks were protected by probably squads of machine gunners, and
maneuver was extremely difficult. Each of these tanks
seemed to cover routes of approach, and the attack was
stalled momentarily. We crawled to within a few yards
of one, and fired a bazooka into its front, but since
vegetation, used for camouAage, was placed around
it, we could get no detonation on the armor plate itself. At this particular time, I had been in a house
very near one of the dug-in tanks. Two of my officers
had been wounded in this house. It was necessary for
me to return to my support platoon to have them maneuver around to the right, and I left the men at the
house and around the tank in charge of my best platoon sergeant. I had recommended him for a battlefield commission to 2d lieutenant, but he never received his bars, although the order came through a
few days later. I found what was left of his body the
next morning. Just his legs and hips were there. One
arm, with the wrist watch still on it, lay near the house.
Another sergeant reported to me that he had to go
back for aid. His entire right leg had been riddled
with machine-gun bullets. Miraculously all of the
slugs must have missed the bones of his leg, and he
was walking. Another man came back holding his jaw.
Part of it was shot away. One man was trying to dig
a hole on the safe side of a hedgerow. His squad leader
told me that he was badly shaken up, and wanted to
know if he should be sent back. I went up to the man,
and tried to talk with him. His face was as yellow as
the dead ones that lay near him, and his eyes seemed to
be on fire. He tried to answer my questions, but his
vocal cords were unl'.ontrollable, and he couldn't utter
a sound. He went on digging. Our attack had carried
us too near the obstacles for us to effectively use artillery, and many of our wounded were lying near the
enemy tanks. Finally, after evacuating the wounded,
we withdrew far enough to adjust our artillery and
threw concentration after concentration on them and
set the tanks on fire. It seemed the defense of the
enemy was finally broken, and our commanders,
realizing this, ordered a renewal of the attack, and we
advanced without resistance except for isolated groups
and a few snipers, until dark.

The fight is over for a while

"The next morning, the code word 'Bobcat' was
given, and the tremendous 'Bobcat' operation started
under way. The 'crust' had been broken, the 'Battle of
the Breakout' was launched. Tanks, tanks, and more
tanks rolled southward, units spreading out like huge
spider webs, west into Brittany, south toward
Avranches, east toward Falaise. We had beaten the
hedgerows, the Campaign of Normandy was finished.
"Words cannot express in definition, the grandeur,
the hope, the suffering, the anxiety, the terribleness
of that day, a year ago. Ask me why one of my lieutenants, wounded in the chest, came to me with tears
in his eyes, and 'alibied' about having to go back for
aid, and reassured me he'd be back as soon as he could.
"I can't tell you, unless you yourself have been
ready to jump off in the attack, or have had bombs
hurtling down toward you, or have been days without
sleep. And if you yourself have had these things, I
won't try to tell you, for you'll know."
Capt Ellis W. Williamson, 1st Battalion S-3, was a
happy man when the bombing was over on that illfated day. At least, he was comparatively happy. He
was watching the bombing from near the 1st Battalion
CP when he saw some "eggs" begin to drop upon the
position where he stood. Startled, he turned to head
for his hole, but suddenly sensing that he could not
possibly reach it before the bomb struck, he dodged
aside to a nearer hole, which happened to belong to
Lt Col James W. Cantey, the battalion commander.
After several loud earthquakes in the area, Capt Williamson dared to look up from the hole. He saw much
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devastation near his own slit trench, and went over to
it to investigate. There he saw all the destruction that
a 500-pound bomb would leave. It had landed directly
in the opening, and none of his clothes or equipment
had survived. "One of these things," someone mumbled on hearing the tale.
BREAKTHROUGH TO Tl IE SOUTH
"Bobcat" came over the radio to the companies on
the morning of the 26th of July. It was a magic word
which meant that after two torturesome days of saturation bombing, a breakthrough had been achieved,
and that the 2d Armored Division was to pass through
the line of the 30th Division and fan out into the interior of France. It was a wonderful word and had
been long awaited.
The tank columns started down the roads at noon.
When two came through the lst Battalion lines, Lt D.
Wilber Williams, of Company "D," and Capt Ellis
\i\l. Williamson each went to the head of one to
guide it forward through the devastation and ruination in front of the lines. The breakthrough was complete, and the Germans were silent as the columns
moved onward. Lt Williams and Capt Williamson led
the tanks for 500 yards and then dispatched them.
The breakthrough was achieved, for the enemy had
been unable to close the gap which the Regiment had
made in his lines.
Previously, the 3d Battalion of the I 17th Infantry
was attached to us as reserve because of the losses we
had sustained. As it developed, we did not use this
battalion. During the day, although we did not attempt to push forward any great distance, we took 188
prisoners who had been cut off by our advance. They
were from the 5th Parachute Division, the Panzer
Lehr Division, the 275th Engineer Battalion, the
275th Fusilier Battalion, and the 275th Artillery Hegi
ment.
At approximately 0245, July 27th, we received word
from Division that we were to continue the attack to
the south. This meant that we would be following the
route of the 2d Armored Division to a point below St.
Gilles and then were to swing southeast in order to
reach the Vire River below St. Lo and seize control
of the bridges spanning the river, including those located at St. Suzanne sur Vire and at Pont de Vire, as
well as wresting the land in the vicinity of Troisgots
from the enemy. The bridge objectives were given to
the 1st and 3d Battalions. The distance between these
objectives was considerable, being some 3h miles. At
0700, in a column of battalions, we crossed the Line of

Departure and struck south in the greatest advance we
had made up to that time since the landing in France.
With the 1st Battalion leading the way followed by
the 3d Battalion, the 2d Battalion and the 1st Battalion, I 17th Infantry, the Hegiment swung to the
east, then south again to by-pass the town of St. Gilles.
Crossing the main St. Lo-St. Gilles road, our column
proceeded south and southeast, passing through the
vicinity of le Pont l lain and on towards our objective.
Although we were unable to reach the vicinity of
T roisgots before it became dark, we had succeeded in
reaching the bridges spanning the Vire River. Road
blocks were established to prevent the enemy from
crossing the river and into our newly won territory.
The enem~ was directly across the river to our cast
as well as to the south of our positions on the west
side of the river. We were located approximately 8000
yards south of St. Lo with the Regimental Command
Post located I000 yards east of the St. Lo-St. Romp
haire and Concle sur Vire- St. Samson de Bon Fosse
road junction.
The men, all of them having traveled on foot a
considerable distance during the day, carrying all of
their weapons and equipment, and fighting when the
occasion demanded, did a magnificent job. Once below the St. Gilles-St. Lo road, scattered resistance wa~
met which was either by-passed or immediately eliminated as our column pressed on. At le Pont I Iain enroute to its ohjective, the lst Battalion met stiff resistance. The enemy had organized the high ground
to the southeast of the bridge and commanded the terrain for over 1000 yards in that area. In the fight that
ensued, an enemy battalion commander, two lieutenants, and approxi~ately thirty enlisted men were captured. After observing the other prisoners as they arrived in our rear, the German commander stated that
we had captured all hut twenty of his men. As our
men arrived in the vicinity of their objective, it was
evident that we had moved so far in such a short time
that the enemy was taken completely by surprise.
We found that this area had only a short time heforc
been occupied hy portions of the 943d Infantry and
the 8th Parachute Regiment. The headquarters of
some companies had been evacuated but a few moments before. Food, only partially eaten, was found on
the tables, personal effects in great profusion were
abandoned and quantities of (iuartermastcr supplies,
including clothing, food, and personal items of every
description were found. I lorses were still hitched to
their loaded ammunition wagons. Seizing an enem}
CP the 3d Battalion captured a complete regimental
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record. A battalion of the 266th Artillery was forced to
destroy its guns in order to prevent them from falling
into our hands. Unused machine guns, bazookas,
mines, etc., were captured in quantity. While inspecting a proposed command post, the Regimental Commander and his driver, Cpl Carl Brooks, captured
some 18 prisoners.
At approximately 2200 on this day, July 27th, word
was received that the 2d Panzer Division was moving
north in our direction, that it was capable of crossing
the Vire River at Tessy to the south of our positions,
and presumably would attack us if they did not engage the 2d Armored Division. During the night, we
made what preparations were possible to meet the
counterattack.
On July 28th, the 2d Battalion jumped ?~ from a
point approximately 1000 yards southeast of St'. P..~m
phaire, being at the time some three and one-half miles
distant from our other two battalions. They advanced
900 yards where they were stopped by heavy automatic
fire and then fiercely counterattacked by elements of
the 2d Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which had succeeded in crossing the Vire presumably during the
night. At 1538, the I st Battalion made contact with
the 35th Division, which was attacking south of St.
Lo on the east side of the Vire River. This allowed
our battalion to attack on to the south at 1800, one column moving towards le Mesnil Raoult, which is located approximately 2000 yards south of Pont de Vire,
and another column moving southwest to aid the 2d
Battalion. One company of the first column entered
the town at dusk but was forced to withdraw far
enough to '.lllow protective fire to be laid down by our
artillery on approaching enemy armor.
By early morning, the town was ours, the enemy
cleared out to the bridge crossing the Vire at Sur le
Mont, and driven to the south. This greatly relieved
the pressure on the 2d Battalion. The 1st Battalion
captured materiel including three armored personnel
carriers, two armored cars, one ammunition truck. two
infantry howitzers with prime movers, two 81 mm
mortars, and a large l 50mm ammunition dump, as
well as many small dumps containing all types of
ammunition . The weapons captured were firing when
the I st Battalion attacked them from the rear and
eliminated their crews.
In the vicinity of le l\1esnil Haoult, the 1st Battalion
lost its second commander, Lt Col Cantey, who was
wounded and had to be evacuated. I le had had the
battalion since early July when Lt Col Mainord had
hccn evacuated. Lt Col Cantey was to return to the

Lieutenant Colonel James W . Cantey

Regiment, and had a long brilliant career ahead. On
the 29th of July, Lt Col Bradford, who had brought
the 2d Battalion into combat, returned after being hospitalized and took command of the 1st Battalion.
At 1315 on the 28th, the Hegiment was notified that
the 30th Division had reverted to the XIX Corps. Unfortunately, at approximately 1545 our 2d Battalion
in its isolated position was again bombed and strafed
three times by friendly aircraft, causing an undetermined number of casualties. During the day the
enemy threw portions of the 2d Panzer Grenadier
Regiment and the !st Battalion of the 304th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment at our positions.
It was indicated that the enemy was determined to
make a stand and once again to fight fiercely for each
yard of ground. Our foot elements were greatly harassed hy automatic weapons and it was noted that
the enemy artillery had increased considerably, while
much flak was being thrown up at our aircraft. A conservative estimate would place the number of prisoners
taken on the 27th and the 28th at 275. Those prisoners were from the follo·wing units: 899th, 943d, 894th,
897th Infantry Regiments, 8th Parachute Regiment.
12th Assault Gun Brigade, and 266th, 343d, 352d,
and 460th Artillery Regiments.
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continued to hold and command the ground to our left
front, the position of the 3d Battalion was not advanced. At the end of the day, the I 17th Infantry
was still to our left rear. Our lst Battalion was holding the River line from Pont de Vire south to a point
100 yards below la Mesnil Haoult.
On this day, at l 520, an American airplane (P-47)
was hit by enemy antiaircraft fire and crashed in the
immediate vicinity of the Hegimental Command Post.
The pilot, Lt Carl Lindstrom, 363d Group, 9th Air
Force, hailed out and landed near hy. It was reported
that he was only slightly injured.
With the enemy offering extremely stubborn resistance, and, in the early hours of the 3 lst of July,
bombing the vicinity ol' Hegimental CP, the 3cl Battalion continued to attack to the south with its movement forward being governed somewhat by the advance of the regiments on each Bank. Since their
zone of action led them down a draw, they were subjected to heavy automatic, mortar and artillery fire
from the enemy on the high ground, who had regisCompany B captured on enemy pilot
tered in with great accuracy. During the day, the
Practically all prisoners had Allied propaganda leaf
enemy used five tanks against us and we set fire to
lets in their possession when taken. Apparently our air three of them by means of 4.2 chemical mortars. By
raids succeeded in greatly lowering their morale, but the end of the day, the 3d Battalion had moved apthe actual casualties inBicted were not high in pro- proximately 600 yards, indicative of the determined
portion to the weight of bombs used.
stand of the enemy. This represented a greater adlt is of interest to note that the enemy expressed vance than was accomplished by the units on each
amazement at the accuracy and quantity of our artil- Bank.
lery fire. Some stated that we actually hit their guns
Early in the morning of the 3 lst, two enemy aircraft
while engaged in counterbattery fire. An indication
were shot clown to the south of our positions and, at
0325, Company "B" captured an enemy pilot.
that the enemy was not sure of the exact disposition
In the early afternoon the lst Battalion had the inof our troops is illustrated by the fact that at approxiteresting experience of aiding some twenty-four men
mately 0130, July 28th, six Germans on bicycles rode
from Company "L" of the l 37th Infantry, who were
directly into our 2d Battalion area; three were killed,
hotly engaged by the enemy on the cast side of the
but three managed to escape.
Commencing at 2230 on the 29th of July, the Luft- Vire River, to cross the river to safety within our lines.
waffe dropped parachute bombs for two hours after This friendly combat patrol had apparently been
dropping Rares over our positions. And again at 0515 trapped by superior enemy forces as they advanced
on the morning of the 30th, enemy aircraft bombed southward. The 1st Battalion laid accurate mortar fire
our area. Casualties resulting from the bombing could into the enemy positions which prevented them from
not be ascertained due to the fact that the enemy was stopping the patrol's attempt to reach our positions.
These men remained overnight. In the meantime, the
throwing heavy artillery and mortar fire into our po
sitions at the time.
lst Battalion sent a patrol of its own back across the
With the 1st Battalion protecting the Division's left river which successfully contacted the commander of
rear, the Regiment attacked the enemy to the south, the 2d Battalion, l 37th Infantry, informed him of
but since the units on our right and left failed to keep the episode, acquainted him with the exact location
abreast we were exposed to very heavy enfilade fire of our units, and returned with the disposition of his
from the enemy positions to our right and left front. troops.
At 1530, a battalion of the I 19th Infantry succeeded
From July 7th through July 3 lst, the l20th Infanin moving up on our right, but because the enemy try had driven into enemy-held territory a distance of
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thirty miles. Until the 27th of July, after the breakthrough of enemy positions was achieved, this advance was comparatively slow. It was fought under
typical Normandy hedgerow-to-hedgerow conditions,
each yard being stubbornly contested by the enemy.
During July, the Regiment buried 304 German dead.
Many killed as a result of action by our units were
buried by other troops because of our rapid progress.
During all of the attacks from the capture of St. Jean
de Daye on the 7th of July to the breakthrough on the
25th, the Regiment was constantly vulnerable to
counterattacks from one or both Ranks. Both were
exposed most of the time, while at least one Bank was
always open. This condition for the most part resulted
from the fact that the gallant soldiers of the 120th
Infantry Regiment went forward faster than units to
their right and left. The enemy sought to take advantage of our vulnerability by launching counterattacks
nearly continuously during this period. However,
Colonel Birks' tactical ability and our troops' fighting
spirit enabled the Regiment to defeat all of these
counterattacks. The I 20th Infantry constantly attacked in column of battalions and, as a result, always
was in position to strike each counterattacking force
on its Rank. Colonel Birks, time and time again, caused
one of our reserve battalions to overrun the counter·
attacking enemy soon after the Krauts had struck our
leading elements.
During the night of the 31st of July, the enemy
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withdrew to our immediate front leaving only "nuisance groups." However, their artillery fire continued
to be accurate and heavy due to excellent observation
from the high ground southwest of Tessy sur Vire and
from the hills east of the Vire. The Germans had
heavily mined all roads and trails leading into Tessy
sur Vire with mushroom, "T" and antipersonnel
mines.

AUGUST
At 0015, German planes ushered in the month of
August by bombing the Regimental area for fifteen
minutes, using a few heavy bombs and many "butterfly" bombs. The "butterfly" type is a small antipersonnel bomb resembling their hand grenade in size
and is capable of high fragmentation. Many duds arc
found among them.
SEIZURE OF TESSY
With the 2d Battalion in reserve, the lst Battalion
jumped off in the attack at 0600 with the 3d Battalion prepared to assist on order. At I025, it passed
through the town of Fervaches. Because our advance had been most rapid, our objective was changed
to include the town of Tessy itself. Since the
35th Division had finally succeeded in reaching la
Rocq, on the east bank of the Vire River, at 1310, our
2d Battalion was moved to an area immediately south
of Brioqueville.
Tl IE "FIRSl -IN-TOWN" BOYS
When it comes to seizing towns and heing first to
kick the enemy out of them, Company "B" held the
foremost position in the Regiment. Two major towns
were taken by our men during the period July 7th
through August 1st, 1944. These were St. Jean de
Daye and Tessy sur Vire, and in each instance it was
Company "B" which led the troops into town.
In the 1st Battalion's zone of action Company "B"
had led the way in the great assault across the Canal de
Vire et Taute on the 7th of July, 1944. As has been
previously related, the enemy put up a fierce resist
ance, covering the approaches to the canal, as well as
the canal itself, with heavy artillery, mortar, and automatic-weapons fire. Company "B" lost thirty-two men
wounded and killed that day, twenty-three during the
crossing of the canal.
Tessy sur Vire was a tough nut to crack. Elements
of the 2d Panzer Division held the town and occu
pied the heights commanding it. In order to cling to
their holdings west of the Vire River the enemy was
desperately striving to stem the tide of Americans who
had broken through their lines six days before. The
town of Tessy is situated on the ground by the river
and is, therefore, at the mercy of whoever holds the
high ground surrounding it, hoth on the east as well
as on the west side of the river.
With the Germans firmly established on this high
ground, the lst Battalion, at 0600 on the lst of August, 1944, jumped off in the attack with the town as
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its objective. Company "B" led the way and after
much hitter fighting, Capt Greer led his men into
the town at 1545.
Occupying the town with Company "A," they
found that the enemy was well zeroed-in with his
artillery, which made their position unenviable. To
add to their problem, at 2050 friendly aircraft (P-47's)
bombed the town, which was more clilficult to understand since our men had been in occupation for more
than four hours and their entry into the town had
l:een reported immediately.
Capt Greer's troops had attacked along a secondary
road leading from the northwest. \Vhen they had
reached a point about a mile from the outskirts, an
incident occurred which should he recorded. Pvt Carlos J. Huiz, who had heen lead scout all that day (and
doing a wonderful job) , was fired on hy a German
machine gun located in the bend of the road about 150
yards from the forward clements of the company.
This gun was covered by about thirty riflemen. With
this machine gun firing upon them and heavy mortar and artillery fire falling in their immediate
vicinity, the forward progress of Company "B" was
stopped. The Germans at the machine-gun position
were able to direct their mortar and artillery fire into
our positions with accuracy by firing pistol Aares. This
established the location of our troops immediately to
their front.
With our mortars firing on the German mortars
which were located behind the machine-gun position
and farther down the road, Pvt Ruiz worked his way
forward along the hedgerows, and when within rang~.
knocked out the machine gun, killing four of the
enemy and wounding one. I le accomplished this in
only a few seconds. Company "B" then advanced
while the Germans retired toward town.
Farther on down the road, the Germans had placed
a large antitank gun which commanded several hun
dred yards to its front, and more important, the crest
of the high ground onto which emerged the sunken
trail used as a route of advance hv C'-0mpany "B."
Mortar shells dropped in and around the sunken trail
giving our troops added incentive for moving forward
to the top of the hill, where the main highway lead
ing south and downhill into T cssv was encountered.
As our troops came to the crest o( the hill, they were
greeted by direct fire from the AT weapon. Further
more, to keep our men on the road where they could
be slaughtered, the Germans posted "hurp" gunners
on each side of the highway. This ruse failed, how-
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<.:ver, when our men dashed to the protection of the
hedgerows and overran and wiped out the enemy defenses there. Pvt Lonnie W. Groves then set out to
take care of the antitank gun. Crawling alongside the
road under the continuing direct fire, he reached a
point only twenty-five yards from the gun, which he
proceeded to knock out with riAe grenades. The Germans stayed just long enough to boobytrap the gun.
With Ruiz leading the way, Company "B" fought
its way into the town, pushed the enemy out to the
south and readied itself to hold what was gained during the day. That town was a hot one to handle, with
all the metal the Germans were pouring into it in an
effort to make it untenable. As if German troubles
were not enough, they were subjected to a bombing
hy Friendly aircraft (P-47's) at 2100. But Company
"B" hung on until friendly troops had driven the Germans from the heights.
The men of Company "B" will long remember the
.;crap they had in taking Tessy sur Vire. They will
remember the mushroom, "l ," and antipersonnel
mines placed along the roads and trails leading to the
town. They will remember the enemy sitting on the
hills across the river and pumping heavy stuff on
them after they got into the town. And they will remember Pvt Francis L. Kimmel who, alone, ran down
a street in the town, under heavy fire, to knock out
a German 88 with his BAR.
Prisoners secured in the taking of Tessy were found
to be from the 38th Panzer Pioneer Battalion, which
was used to cover the withdrawal of the Panzer
Grenadier units retreating to the south. After Company "B" had entered the town, Combat Command
"B" sent four tanks to them to aid in consolidating
the position. The following day, these tanks joined
their unit and moved west. During the night, roadblocks were placed on all approacheS" to the Vire, and
engineers cleared the mines from the main roads leading to the town, enabling traffic to approach by way
of la Butte and Lazerie.
A very unfortunate occurrence was reported at 1540.
As the 3d Battalion CP group was moving forward, an
enemy shell struck a tree near by killing sewnteen of
our men including five officers. Among the latter was
Capt James W. Smith, then 3d Battalion S-3, a man
who had risen from the enlisted ranks with the Regiment and who had distinguished himself consistently
throughout his army career. Also killed was Lt Carl
C. I Iarnden , of Company "E," who had been an aggressive and frequent patro1ler in enemy territory since
the landings in Normandy.
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By 1700 on the 2d of August, it was possible to
withdraw our outposts on the river with the exception of those in the immediate vicinity of Tessy. This
was possible because the 2d Battalion of the 137th
Infantry had advanced to a point almost opposite
Tessy on the east hank of the river.
August 3d and 4th were spent in reorganization
and rest. Our troops practiced tactical maneuvers in
which the lessons learned in recent action against the
enemy were studied on the ground. Regimental personnel were given showers; Red Cross Clubmobiles
visited the battalion areas; and mobile theater entertainment was provided for the men.
On the 5th of August, the 120th Infantry Regiment
set forth on what was to prove one of the most dramatic crucial battles of the present war.
At 2024 on that day, orders were received to move
the Hegiment by motor from the vicinity of Tessy sur
Vire to the town of Percy where it was to be met and
conducted to Mortain. Attached to the Regiment at
this time were the 230th Field Artillery, Company
"C" of the 105th Engineer Battalion, and Company
"A" of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion, plus one
Reconnaissance Platoon.
Arriving at Mortain early in the evening ahead of
the Regiment, Colonel Birks was given to understand
by the 18th Infantry that the town was running full
blast with all normal functions existing. Even the
hotels were open. The I 20th Infantry was scheduled
to relieve the 18th Infantry (1st Division) and, since
things were comparatively quiet in the area, it was decided that this could be done by a physical relief in
daylight.
The Regiment, with the 230th Field Artillery leading, passed the IP at Tessy sur Vire at 0130 on the 6th
of August, with the remainder of the Regimental
column following. They were met at Percy and led
to an assembly area near l\1ortain, closin~ into this
area at 1000. They traveled approximately forty-six
miles from Tessy to Martain.
Subsequent operations are divided into two separate
actions- the Barenton battle of the 3d Battalion, less
Company "K," and the stand at Mortain by the rest
or the Regiment.
3u BATTALION AT BAHENTON
Initially, on the 6th of August, the 3d Battalion, less
Company "K," was placed in reserve on the high
ground west of Martain in the vicinity of the Regimental CP. However, the battalion soon was needed
elsewhere. Task Force "X," consisting of approxi·

It doesn't look it now, buf Tessy sur Vire was a tough nut to crack

mately one company of infantry and a company of
tanks of the 3d Armored Division, was having difficulty in holding the town of Barenton. To assist this
task force, the 3d Battalion, minus Company "K," received orders at 1545 to proceed to Barenton.
As its column moved out at 2200, it was attacked by
nine enemy planes ( FW-l 90's armed with rockets) .
Four 2~-ton trucks were knocked out, and fifty-three
casualties were suffered, including five killed. Passing
on, the battalion traveled some sixteen miles to the
southeast. In this movement, the Regimental I & R
Platoon led the march ahead of the reconnaissance
troops, returning to the Regiment when the vicinity of
Barenton was reached. At this time, it was discovered
that Task Force "X" had been forced out of the town
and was unable to retake it that night.
Company "L" assumed a defensive position on the
north side of the road leading to Barenton, while
Company "I" went into position on the right. At 0300
on the following morning, one platoon of Company
"I" and one platoon of Company "L" advanced on
Barenton. Company "L" severed the road leading
into the town from the north, while Company "I"
accomplished a similar mission at the south edge of
the town. Heavy fighting continued until daylight.
Despite darkness, enemy casualties were severe, although our own losses were slight. The town was
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taken early that morning by the two rillc companies.
In conjunction with Task Force "X" the battalion
set up roadblocks and an all-around defense of the
town. Bv this time the I ask Force had been reduced
to little ~ver a company of infantry and armor. For
the ensuing twenty four hours there was little enemy
action.
On the morning of the 8th of August, an ambulance loaded with wounded was sent from Barenton
toward Martain. 1 he ambulance was halted by the
Germans while en route, and two slightly wounded
men were taken off. The Germans then put two seriously wounded men on the ambulance and sent it
back to Barenton. Upon the return of the ambulance,
the battalion knew that it was cut off from the rest of
the Regiment.
Personnel of 3d Battalion J lead,1uarters as well as
kitchen and ammunition dump personnel then dug in
to protect the rear of the battalion. On the following
day, tanks of the 3d Armored Division Combat Command "B" were sighted toward the battalion rear. The
battalion was attached to Combat Command "B."
Roadblocks were reinforced, and plans were made to
seize the high ground south of Barenton.
On the 9th of August, the 3d Battalion moved forward to seize the high ground three miles south of
Barenton, to provide a springboard for the 3d Armored

but it was not so tough o day or two later. In the cart ore Corporal Eugene Joglowiski and Corporal Carrol Bryla.

Division. The Battalion CP was <lisplaced forward
two miles south of the town. The hattalion was moving
into an assembly area in preparation for the attack during the late afternoon, when plans were changed and
an order was given to attack west to cut and seize the
road leading southwest from Barenton .
A night attack was carried out, with Company "L"
leading. The enemy was driven from his roadblocks,
the road was cut and positions consolidated. Our
casualties were light. One enemy armored vehicle was
knocked out.
On the following morning orders were received to
move back and seize high ground to the east and south
to protect the right flank of the 3d Armored Division,
but before these could be executed, countermanding
orders were issued to attack north and west of Barenton. The high ground, which was the objective, was
seized within an hour after the attack was initiated.
Orders immediately came down to attack to the
west and seize a ridge line south of Martain. Plans
were made for an air strike and artillery preparations.
Before they could be executed, however, the battalion
was relieved of this mission and sent back to occupy
the ground southeast of Barcnton. A line was established, patrols were organized and roadblocks set up,
and the original mission of protecting the right Aank
of the 3d Armored Division was taken up.
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During this 48-hour period, the Battalion Command Post did not move. The troops of the battalion,
however, attacked in a complete circle around the
Command Post.
Enemy artillery was heavy, and a direct hit on an
ammunition truck set the vehicle on fire. Quick action on the part of the men in the ammunition dump
prevented further losses.
On August 13th, the 3d Battalion, less Company
"K," rejoined the Regiment and learned of the events
at Mortain and Hill 314 during the past week.
MORTAIN
Mortain lies at the base of a hill, in a valley, and is
surrounded by high ground. The highest ground,
Hill 314, was located immediately east and northeast
of the town, and Colonel Birks was advised that it was
the key to the whole area. Colonel Smith, of the 18th
Infantry, pointed out that in case of an emergency,
this hill would have to be held at all cost.
East-west roads lie to both the north and south of
Hill 314. These roads lead to the sea. With Hill 314
in American hands, the enemy could not use the roads
during daylight which meant that these routes were
virtually denied him because less than five hours of
darkness separated the long summer days.
To the northv, est of Hill 314 and nearly due north
1
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of the town of i\lortain is found the hamlet of Abbaye
Blanche, where five roads converge. Another important terrain feature, Hill 285, is west of Abbaye
Blanche. This hill overlooks the ground northwest and
west of Martain.
A less important hill is due south of Hill 285. The
Regimental CP was installed on the western slope of
this hill.
Shortly after the I st Battalion arrived in the as
sembly area during the morning of the 6th of August,
it moved to occupy f I ill 285. Relief of elements of the
18th Infantry, lst Infantry Division, was carried out
during the day. Since the southward movement of the
3d Battalion had left the Hegiment's left flank unprotected, Company "C" was moved to the 3d Battalion's
former positions near the Regimental CP. The lst Bat
talion, less this one company, continued to improve its
defensive positions on the hill.
Key Hill 314, due east of l\1ortain, \',,as assigned to
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the 2d Battalion, plus Company "K," under the command of Lt Col Eads G. I lardaway. Two platoons of
tank destroyers and a platoon of the Hegimental Antitank Company were placed in support. The battalion
CP was installed in a hotel in the town of l\1ortain.
These troops spent the rest of the day of August 6 in
relieving the elements of the ~8th Infantry which
had been garrisoning the hill. A reinforced platoon
from Company "G" installed a roadblock to the south
of I I ill 314, while a larger block was placed in the
vicinity of Abhaye Blanche. The units assigned to the
Ahhaye Blanche position were :
lst Platoon, Company "F" (I t Tom F. 11. An
drew)
1st Platoon, Company "A," 823d T.D. Battalion
( Lt Thomas Springfield )
One platoon from AT Company ( Lt Sidnc~
Eichen )
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One mortar and one machine-gun section, Company "F . "
During the afternoon, friendly aircraft bombed our
troops in the town of Mortain.
On August 7th, at 0125, word was received at Regimental Headquarters from the 2d Battalion that smallarms fire could be heard to the east of its CP. Five
minutes later a heavy enemy attack struck Mortain,
penetrating the south and southeast sector. Using infiltration methods, the enemy had succeeded in moving into our positions on the hill and getting troops
well into town. In so doing, they had by-passed and
surrounded the roadblock which had been established
south of Hill 314. The Germans soon overran this
roadblock. Six men escaped and ultimately rejoined the
Hegiment by way of the 35th Division CP at Bion.
Sgt Crowe, Antitank Company, who was with this
roadblock, was wounded in the leg when the troops
were overrun. I le was found alive five days later. He
lost his leg because gangrene had set in. The only persons whom he had seen were two German soldiers and
a doctor whom the soldiers had brought to him. The
doctor took one look at the leg, grunted, and walked
away.
Since Lt Col I lardaway's troops were strongly engaged in defending their positions, Colonel Birks sent
Company "C" at 0250 to the town with the mission
of contacting the 2d Battalion CP, driving the enemy
out of the town, and establishing another roadblock
astride the route of the enemy approach. Although
they succeeded in getting into Mortain, it developed
that they were unable to fulfill all of their mission.
Lt Col I lardaway kept one platoon with him and sent
the remainder of the company to the southern roadhlock. This latter group was never able to establish
itself.
At approximately 0200, word was received that

Hill 314, east of Martain, as seen from the southwest

another enemy attack was coming from the north, converging on the roadblock guarding the entrance to
that route into the town. Fierce fighting was taking
place there, with some of the enemy succeeding in
by-passing the block and getting some troops into
Mortain. At 0345, Lt Col Hardaway reported that the
Germans had taken part of the key hill to the east.
Colonel Birks told him to send Company "G" to drive
them off.
,
At dawn Lt Col Hardaway informed the Regimental CP that tanks and armored vehicles, with infantry,-were entering Mortain in strength. At the time
he had one platoon of Company "C" with him and he
was advised to hold on with what he had for there was
nothing more to send him at the moment. The enemy
had by this time infiltrated between the 2d Battalion
CP in the town and the troops on the hill to the east.
In the meantime the Regimental I & R Platoon had
been sent to the town of Romagny located to the south
on the Regiment's right Hank. Its mission was to investigate the high ground in the vicinity. It was also
to locate a supply route from the south for both the
2d and 3d Battalions. When it reached Romagny, it
was ambushed and only two vehicles and a few men
succeeded in getting out. However, although surrounded, the platoon succeeded in holding the enemy
off for two hours. The radio operator continued to
relay information and later succeeded in escaping.
Some time after 0700 Lt Col I Iardaway informed
Colonel Birks that it was necessary for him to get out
of J\ 1ortain. He was advised that help was coming
from a battalion of the I 17th Infantry, less one company, which was at the time some two miles away, and
that he should attempt to join his troops up on the hill.
A few hours later, Lt Col Hardawav radioed back that
he had been unable to join his m~n on the hill, but
that he was in hidino and couldn't sav, where he was.
At this time, he had with him J\faj Simes, his Execu/")

The Germans also tried to slip through
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At the end of the day, many of our units were sepative, together with Capt Anthony, his S-2, Lt Pike,
his S-3, Lt Irby, his S-1, Lt Hagen, his Communica- rated into small groups. Communication and control
tions Officer, and ten or 15 men from the Battalion were exceedingly difficult. Not only was the 2d BatHeadquarters Company. He was completely out of talion cut off by the enemy but, during the day, the
touch with men on the hill and was forced to use his 3d Battalion had found itself in the same circumradio sparingly because his batteries were low.
stances near Barenton. However, Company "K",
. "F" an d "G ,"
The 2d Battalion of the I 17th Infantry, less Com- C,ompany "E ," ancI part o f C,ompames
pany "G," finally reached the vicinity of the Regi- together with elements oF Company "I I," still held
mental CP late in the day. At the time of their arrival, all of the key hill with the exception of one wooded
the enemy was attacking and penetrating the south knob on the southwest slope. They had arranged comAank of the Regiment, as well as occupying the town munication with each other and organized their posiof Martain. Although the need for support on our tions, and although the enemy pressure brought
right Aank was great, Colonel Birks decided to send against them was great, they were defending stoutly.
· "F" an cl "G"
th.is batta 1·10n, Iess Compames
, to M orBy this time it was known that the Germans were
tain in relief of the 2d Battalion. Since eight tanks mounting a big drive to the sea by way of Avranches.
had arrived to aid us in throwing back the enemy, four The focal point of their effort was Mortain and it was
were attached to this group under the command of their intention to split the American- forces located in
Lt Col Lockett, and they were committed at 2300.
Normandy From those in Brittany.
To be successful, they had but eighteen miles to go
Company "F' of the l I 7th Infantry was given the
other four tanks and sent out on our right Aank with in order to reach Avranches. We were meeting the
the mission of attacking the enemy along the Neuf- best troops the enemy could employ. Among these
bourg-Romagny Road and seizing the town of Ro
were the "Der Fuhrer" Regiment of the Das Reich Dimagny.
vision, SS; the lst Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the
Lt Col Lockett's force was able to get only to the
1st Panzer Division, ( Hitler's Own, LAH); the
outskirts of Martain on the west, but this allowed us 304th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 2d Panzer
to control the supply route to the roadblock at Abbaye Division; and the 273d AAA.
Blanche. This was of vital importance if we were to
On August 8th, at 0130, the enemy fiercely atbe successful in containing the enemy. It was also tacked the I st Battalion in the vicinity of Hill 285,
successful in aiding what was left of the Company using at least eight tanks supported by infantry. At
"C" platoon in Martain together with some men from 0500, word was received that our artillery was hitting
Company "F" to break through the German lines and the enemy solidly in this area, and by 0615 the enemy
join Lt Col Lockett, and thereby enhancing the attack had been brought to a standstill and bis remainstrength of his force. The group which was to take ing tanks were attempting to move back. I Iowever,
the town of Romagny met strong opposition and was at 0815, Company "B" was savagely attacked by tanks
and Aamethrowers. They succeeded in knocking out
unsuccessful in reaching the town.
August 7th was an eventful day, to say the least. several tanks and captured one Aamethrower. Upon inOur area was bombed and strafed approximately ten spection, it was found that the Germans had been in
times by both friendly and enemy aircraft. The whole possession of some American 1\14 tanks, one of which
of our sector was heavily shelled by German artillery was among those destroyed hy Company "B" men.
During the action which took place on I Iill 285, Lt
which, at 1435, was directed by airplane upon our
Roy
Lothner, in command of Company "A," discovRegimental CP location. At 1507, two enemy tanks
ered
his driver, Pfc l\lcCoy, looking at him from the
worked their way to within 250 yards of the Regi
far side of a hedgerow. l.othner called to him several
mental CP. One of these was knocked out with a
times, asking him to come and join him. Each time
bazooka by Pfc Joe 0. Shipley, telephone operator of
,\ 1cCoy would reply, "I can't; I'm captured," whereat
Regimental I leadquarters Company. The lst Batta!
the Gennans would open up on Lothner with maion reported that they had knocked out one Mark VI
chine guns. This is indicative of the close proximity
and six l\lark IV tanks in addition to two halftracks.
\\ith the enem) at \\ hich much of the fighting was
The roadblock at Abbaye Blanche had knocked out
six tanks and thirteen other vehicles and, in addition. coml ucted.
Word was received from Lt Col I lardaway at 0915
five tanks were reported knocked out by our artillery
that he would he able to hold his radio open from only
in front of the I st Battalion position.
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ten minutes to the hour to ten minutes after the hour
because his batteries were getting very low. He was
still located somewhere in Mortain and was still completely cut off from his troops. He was not heard from
again.
At about 1100 the portion of the 2d Battalion on
the hill asked that radio batteries, medical supplies,
food, and ammunition be sent to them. It was also
learned that the enemy was using a few of our jeeps
in the town of Mortain. Fierce fighting continued
with our men holding their positions which, by means
of splendid work hy the artillery observers, prevented
the Germans from organizing armor and troops to
effect an attack of overwhelming strength.
The shelling of the Regimental CP area continued
throughout the day, and by 1730 it had become so intense that the Command Post was forced to move to
another location in order to prevent excessive casualties. The Hegimental S-4, Maj James J. Bynum, was
killed and his successor, Capt Layton C. Tyner, was
wounded within four hours; WO Percy C. Dempsey
took over the duties of Hegimental Supply Officer.
Several enlisted men of the headquarters and kitchen
crew were also wounded. Lt Haymond Welch, among
others, hit the dirt when an incoming shell sounded
as if it had his name on it. I laving landed under an
apple tree, he thought he was hit with many fragments
when the blast showered him with fruit.
During the night of August 8th-9th, the enemy succeeded in reaching the 2d Battalion Aid Station and
captured all of its personnel together with Chaplain
Gunnar Teilmann and a squad and a half of Company "C" of the l05th Engineers. In the morning, it
was found that the enemy had made no attempt to
destroy the equipment and vehicles located in the station, and it is believed that he was forced to withdraw
with the prisoners when one of our patrols suddenly
came upon his left Aank and rear during the night. A
dead German was found behind the wheel of one of
the jeeps where he had apparently been killed while
attempting to drive the vehicle away.
By 1400 on August 9th, l I ill 285 was entirely in the
hands of (',ompany "A." During the engagement, the
1st Battalion reported that they had observed several
of the enemy wearing US Army uniforms.
At about 1820 on this day, a dramatic episode took
place. A German ofiicer, accompanied by an enlisted
man bearing a white flag, approached our positions on
the hill near the location of Company "E." In his most
military and formal manner, he spoke to Lt Elmer
C. Hohmiller ( Company "E" ) and to Sgt Wingate

49

Communications and control were difficult to maintain

(Company "G"). He stated that he was an officer of
the SS and was in a position to offer the Americans on
the hill honorable surrender. He carefully pointed out
that the Germans knew they had the 2d Battalion,
120th Infantry, of the 30th Division, entirely cut off
and surrounded, that he had a Lt Pike and a "one star"
officer among many prisoners, and that the position of
the Americans was hopeless. Furthermore, he said
that if our men did not surrender before 2000 the
Germans would "blow them to bits." The reques~ was
immediately refused on the spot; however, it was also
forwarded to Lt Ralph Kerley, commanding Company
"E. " In turn, Lt Kerley sent word that his men would
not surrender until his last round of ammunition had
been fired and his last bayonet had been broken in
a German belly.
That night the enemy assaulted the positions held
by Company "E" with tanks whose machine guns were
used to spray the whole area in front of their advance.
As they reached our foremost positions, the Germans
shouted, "Surrender! Surrender!" This was, of course,
ignored, and after a stiff fight, the enemy was hurled
back.
In the meantime the 1st Battalion was having difficulty on Ilill 285. By 1100 on August 10th, having
been pushed back, it was still attempting to complete
the occupation of the entire hill.
On this day, American aircraft (C-47's), accompanied by fighters, Aew over the hill held by the 2d
Battalion and dropped food. At least half of it dropped
in enemy-held territory, but almost half was recovered
by our men. This meant that each man on the hill
received two meals of K-ration.
Later, at 2240, our artillery fired medical supplies
into the position. Carefully the smoke content of the
shells had been extracted and in its place the much-
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needed medical bottles and dry goods were inserted.
None of the plasma got through intact, but bandages,
tape and some morphine were salvaged, although the
amount received by our medics did not prove sufficient
adequately to take care of the wounded men.
An attempt to drop food on Friday, August 11th,
failed. All of it fell in enemy-held territory.
By Friday night it was known that the 35th Division was nearing our pasitions on the right Rank.
Three days before, the 1st Battalion (less one company) of the l l 9th Infantry had been assigned to us.
It was given the mission of attacking the enemy by
way of Romagny in an effort to reach Mortain. By
Friday night, it had succeeded in reaching the outskirts of Romagny. That was very heartening news
indeed.
On Saturday, August 12th, the 320th Infantry
finally broke through and made contact with Company "G." They immediately took care of the wounded, evacuated them, and took steps to get supplies to
our men. Relief of the position by the 1st Battalion
of the I 19th Infantry was accomplished at 1300.
TRADITION OF Tl IE REGIMENT
The historically proved Regimental tradition of
never failing to capture an assigned objective and
never giving up ground to the enemy was perfectly
illustrated at Mortain. There, as in other battles, our
troops reached the absolute ultimate of courage. Surrounded, short of food and ammunition, without sufficient water, having few medical supplies for the
many wounded, constantly attacked by the enemy,
these brave soldiers never considered abandoning their
positions. They whipped the best troops of the German army, inflicting far more casualties than they
themselves suffered despite the fact the Germans, being on the offensive, outnumbered our men at each
point of contact.
Information gained from captured Germans clearly
indicated that the enemy's goal for his massive, all-out
counterattack of early August, I 944, was the sea at
Avranches-his mission was the isolation of General
Patton's Third Army by cutting the one supply line.
A brief study of the map shows that control of the
road net in the vicinity of Mortain was essential for
the enemy's success. Control of the roads depended
upon who held II ill 314. As long as our troops held
this hill, artillery directed by observers from the high
ground prevented the enemy from seizing and using
these roads. Our successful stand was one of the war's
great surprises to the Germans. Questioning of Coler

nel General JoJl and Field Marshals Keitel and Kesselring following their surrender disclosed that the
Germans were amazed by the failure of their attempt
to destroy the American corridor, or pathway, out of
Normandy in the vicinity of Avranches.
It is unfortunate indeed that so little of the storv
can be told. The accounts of many actions died wtih
those who had performed magnificent deeds. Many
men who were contacted for their stories remember
little other than that they fought during many days
which seemed never-ending. Events came so rapidly,
there was so much to be done, with the result that fe\\
entries were made in the Hegimental diary. Therefore,
we have records of only a few of the many courageous
actions and interesting details which occurred during
those six eventful days.
In the opinion of Colonel Birks, the major factor
which stopped the enemy drive, aside from the refusal of our men to abandon their positions or surrender, was the very effective use of artillery. This
was possible because artillery observers were with the
units on the hill and were in a position to see almost
every move the Germans made. Any attempt on the
part of the enemy to attack in great force was met with
instantaneous fire from our guns. Radio communication with Regimental Headquarters was kept open by
Lt Joe Reaser, commanding C'-0mpany "K," and Lt
Ralph Kerley, commanding Company "E." Communication was made each I 0 minutes to the hour
each day and night, as well as when an urgent fire
mission for the artillery was necessary. Lt Reaser him
self did a fine job in ad justing artillery fire missions
through Capt Ezekiel Glazier, Regimental S-2, who,
in tum, supplied the necessary information to the
artillery. Cannon Company also helped materially in
stopping the enemy through the excellent work of its
observer on the hill.
The roadblock at Ahbaye Blanche also was a major
factor toward our success. The troops originally assigned there were reinforced by brave men who had
been cut off but who fought their way to the block.
Altogether some 150 men occupied it. Lt Andrew,
who was in charge, estimated that at least sixty vehicles were knocked out by his group. Many were put
out of action by the TD guns attached to him.
Five roads converged on this position, one from the
northwest, one from the northeast, one from the east,
one from the southeast, and one from the south, the
latter being the main supply route into the position.
In covering all these approaches, the roadblock was
extended for approximatelv 200 yards. The enemy ap-
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proached in greatest strength from the northeast and
northwest. On one of these roads twenty-four enemy
vehicles of all types were knocked out, indicating that
the men at the roadblock manned their position with
tenacity and caused the enemy to be brought to a dead
stop. \Vhen the action was all over, these twenty-four
vehicles were there hub-to-hub and in the same location where they were destroyed. This was true of most
of the other vehicles which were knocked out on the
other approaches, although the Germans had been
able to get some of the partially disabled vehicles out
at night.
An example of the heroic deeds required to hold the
block is shown by the exploits of Pfc Robert P. Vollmer, Antitank Company. On the 8th of August, he
and five riflemen were selected to man a position
which covered the principal road leading into Abbaye
Blanche. He occupied an abandoned machine-gun
emplacement which afforded him excellent observation of the road and of the field to the right. Early in
the morning, an enemy machine gun opened fire on
him from a position on the edge of a patch of woods
about 150 yards away. Pfc Vollmer returned bazooka
fire at the machine-gun position and succeeded in
silencing the enemy gun, although he did not destroy
it at this time. To accomplish this, it was necessary for
him to load and fire his weapon alone because the
other men had taken positions in holes too distant to
he of any assistance. While he was firing on the machine gun, heavy concentrations of artillery and
mortars fell into the area. At 0900, he saw an enemy
armored car moving along the road toward him. He
hit it with a round from his bazooka, knocking it out,
and forcing its crew to seek the cover of a nearby
house. This house was about 200 yards from Pfc Vollmer's position on the hill and was held by a small
group of German infantrymen who, throughout the
day, emerged from the building from time to time to
fire at him. About a half hour after the armored car
was destroyed, an enemy motorcycle came down the
same road. When it reached a point about 30 yards behind the armored car, Pfc Vollmer demolished it with
his bazooka. Meanwhile, enemy artillery and mortar
fire was still falling in the area, and some shells were
digging holes within 15 and 20 yards of his position.
Nevertheless, Pfc Vollmer would not leave. A short
time after he knocked out the motorcycle, another
armored car approached. The driver attempted to pass
hy the first armored car. Pfc Vollmer opened fire on
this second car and set it ablaze. Only one member of
the crew was able to escape from the burning vehicle,
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and he was so badly burned that he soon dropped
dead. The enemy machine gunner again opened fire on
Pfc Vollmer during the early afternoon. Determined
to knock it out and disregarding bullets kicking up
dirt around the edges of his hole, he took careful aim
with his bazooka and fired two rounds at the enemy
position, destroying the machine gun and killing two
enemy gunners. At 1400, an enemy gas9line truck approached. Pfc Vollmer set it on fire. On this day the
enemy was probing for weak spots throughout the area
and this roadblock covered a weak point in our lines.
Pfc Vollmer's courage caused the enemy to believe the
position to be much more strongly held. Such courage
was needed that day.
With what information is available, an attempt will
be made to piece together the story of what happened
to the 2d Battalion Headquarters group.
Capt Reynold C. Erichson, commanding Company
"F," relates that when the battalion moved into position on August 6th, his company was split up to form
three roadblocks in the area. By 0300, his wire communication with these blocks had been severed due
to the fire which w~ raging in Mortain and which
had been caused by the aerial bombing on the previous
day. After sending his executive officer to the roadblocks located south of the town, he reported to the
battalion commander for instructions. He states that
since the Germans seemed to be penetrating from the
south, Lt Col Hardaway sent Company "C," minus
one platoon, to aid in throwing them back. The other
platoon he gave to Capt Erichson and ordered him to
go up the hill and furnish contact between Companies
"E" and "K."
It was a very misty and dark morning and after
gaining the heights, Capt Erichson turned north along
a trail leading to the Company "K" position. He
states: "We walked right up on thirty Germans before
we could see them. My scouts were so near to the
enemy they could have shaken hands with them. The
Germans cut loose with machine pistols, and I jumped
over a hedgerow and managed to set the platoon up in
a hasty defense." Capt Erichson then worked his way
to Company "G's" Command Post, where he called
the battalion commander and told him the situation.
I Ie was advised to pull back into the town and proceed
north where the Germans were also coming through
in strength.
With great difficulty Capt Erichson was able to get
hack into the town and, under machine-gun fire from
the enemy, reached Lt Col Hardaway, who then told
him to take the platoon and attempt to link up with
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the rest of Company "C." As he proceeded on this
mission, the Germans in the town surrounded his men
on three sides so that the only avenue of escape was to
the east. This meant that they would be forced to
climb the hill a~ain in order to reach the Company
"G" position. They finally succeeded in slipping
through the enemy and joined Company "G" on the
heights. This position became untenable because ol
very heavy direct fire from German artillery pieces.
The \\<hole group then moved north and finally made
contact with Company "K" which was occupying a
good defensive position. A perimeter defense was set
up with Company "K" holding the nose of the north
and Company "G " that on the south, with the re
mainder of Company "G" holding positions east and
west of a trail which connected the two.
Lt Irby and Lt I lagen, both members of the 2d Bat
talion staff, stated that by 0600 on l\londay morning
the Germans were occupying the town in strength.
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The Germans started to move in on the building housing the CP at about 0900. When this became evident,
the group started out in an attempt to join the men
up on the hill. They had gone only some 400 yards
when heavy enemy fire forced them to take refuge,
unnoticed, in a house where approximately twentynine men stayed for "two days and three nights." On
the third morning, the Crl?rmans discovered them,
knocked down the front door, and took one man prisoner while the rest escaped out the back way and made
another attempt to join the troops upon the hill.
J lowever, the enemy was in complete control of all
the ground between the top of the hill and the town.
The Germans surrounded our men, who put up strong
resistance for a time, hut most of the group were finally
captured, including Lt Col I lardaway, Maj Simes,
Capt Anthony, Lt Pike, and Lt Lee of the 230th Field
Artillery.
Lts Irby and I lagen, T / 5 l\lartin l\1urphy, T Sgt
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I lodges and two 1 D men slipped down an embankment and escaped. They stayed in a wheat field for
one day and then, at night, worked their way through
the enemy into a loft over a stable located near to the
hospital. A few minutes later, the enemy, suspecting
their presence, took all the patients out of the hospital
and s~archcd the building thoroughly. Finding no
Amencans, they also searched the lower Hoor of their
builc~ing, in which our men were hiding. During their
stay m town, the fugitives were able to gather a few
carrots and radishes from a garden near by. By Friday,
they had become very hungry, and they decided to
trust a Frenchman who was working on the lower
floor of their building. I le brought them water, but
was unable to get them any food.
The shelling had been incessant in the neighborhood oF the hospital, but it was not hit until Saturday
morning, when a white phosphorus shell set fire to
it, causing it to burn down to the first floor. Our men
then decided to take a chanc~, t? enter the hospital
and obtain some food. On their first attempt they got
two jars oF jam, and on the second attempt they got a
raw ·ham, six loaves of' bread, six bars of candy and
four more jars ol' jam. On that day, at 1100, they saw
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an advance guard oF friendly troops approaching the
hospital. When they emerged from their retreat, the
first person they met from the I 20th Infantry was
Colonel Birks, who was with the foremost elements
pushing into the town.
As has been related, the Hegimental I&R Platoon
was ambushed in the town of Romagny. lst Lt Edwin
J. Franklin, platoon leader, called for a volunteer to
take the wounded to the rear and to notify the Regimental commander of the ambush. While the platoon
was attempting to fight off the Germans, Pvt Halph
W. Estevez volunteered for the hazardous mission.
Loading the wounded on a jeep, he started on hi~
way. Immediately he was wounded by a hand grenade. Showing the great courage found so of ten among
members of the Hegiment, Pvt Estevez insisted on
continuing to carry out his mission. His bravery cost
him his life. In this way, another brave man went
to his Maker.
LEADERS
l\1cn fight no better than do their leaders. The five
company commanders on Hill 314 were of the bestno one could have done more than did each of these
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five. To 1st Lt Ralph A Kerley, Company "E," Capt
Reynold C. Erichson, Company "F," 1st Lt Rona! E.
Woody, Jr, Company "G," Capt Delmont K. Byrn,
Company "H," and 1st Lt Joseph C. Reaser, Company
"K," is given the major credit for the reinforced battalion's superb and heroic stand.
Company "E" was in position on the southeast nose
of Hill 314. The enemy infiltrated through our lines
during their first attack and cut off all avenues of approach to such an extent that contact was lost even
between the companies stationed on the hill. During
the period that the reinforced 2d Battalion was sur
rounded, Lt Kerley directed the actions of his company
almost continuously day and night. Many efforts were
made by the enemy, using armor, artillery and combat patrols, to penetrate our positions. Every night
from the 6th to the 12th, when visibility was poor,
the enemy infiltrated into the area held by Company
"E." During each day, our men were subjected to
heavy artillery and small-arms fire, and enemy and
friendly bombing and strafing. Lt Kerley's great cour
age was instrumental in repulsing these efforts. l le
directed the laying of artillery and Cannon Company
fires into enemy positions when they formed for the
many attacks. His superb leadership gave confidence
and determination to his men to hold out against this
constant pressure imposed by the enemy, even though
there was dire need of medical supplies, water and
food. On two occasions during this time, Lt Kerley
was offered by the enemy the opportunity for honorable surrender with the assurance his men would be
well cared for. He adamantly refused these offers. During all of the long days and nights, Lt Kerley fearlessly
exposed himself while leading his men. The soldiers
of Company "E" fought magnificently as did their
leader.
Capt Erichson, commanding officer of Company
"F," took command of the battalion after Lt Col f lardaway was captured. I le organized patrols, maintained
communication, and directed operations during the
six davs in which thev were cut off. l lc checked the
securi~v and defenses 'on the units on the hill, manv
times being exposed to direct fire and constantly undc'r
pressure by the enemy. f le refused the enemy's offer
to surrender and maintained control of the situation
at all times regardless of the shortage of ammunition,
equipment, medical supplies, water, food and men.
He kept contact with Regimental headc1uarters hy
radio, and by this means directed artillery fire upon
enemy concentrations. There were times when the
situation seemed almost hopeless. Our own planes

bombed and strafed our positions, thereby adding to
the possible demoralization of the men and the problem of leadership. Nevertheless, disregarding the apparent hopelessness of the situation, Capt Erichson
never wavered in his determination to hold out against
any odds until the enemy had been successfully repulsed. I I is heroic actions in the face of tremendous
odds, his inspiring leadership and courage, gave confidence to his men and dispelled any glimmer of doubt
they may have entertained.
Company "G," commanded by Lt Woody, was dug
in on a wooded knoll near the center of the hill. At
night the enemy would infiltrate into the position area
under cover of darkness and fog when visibility was
poor and attack these positions in an effort to force
their surrender. Lt Woody kept constant vigil and
contact with the enemy in an effort to be prepared for
whatever they brought against him. He organized
patrols and directed artillery fire, at one time bringing
it to within 20 yards of his company's position in order
to knock out a heavy enemy attack by tanks and infantry. f I is company was subjected to bombing and
strafing by both enemy and friendly airplanes. Food,
ammunition, and medical supplies were sorely needed.
Water for drinking purposes and medical use was also
short. The Germans counterattacked at night unde1
cover of darkness and during the day saturated their
positions with artillery and rocket bombs or "scream
ing meemies." J leavy casualties were suffered by the
company during the time they were cut off. When
the situation seemed almost hopeless for his men to be
reached and relieved by friendly troops, Lt Woody ref used the demands of the Germans to surrender. He
continued to defend his position regardless of the
many difficulties. Lt Woody, a brave man, never
thought of himself or of his personal safety. Hegardless of the danger, he always went where he was most
needed. f Iis company responded gallantly.
When the enemy struck shortly after midnight of
August 5-6, Capt Byrn was at the battalion CP. I le
guickly realized that he was being cut off. With no
map or guidance other than his sense of direction. he
led his company command group about five miles
through German lines to his kitchen area west of
Mortain. On the following day, he boldly detennined
to return through the enemv lines in an effort to establish contact with the hattali(m CP. Swiftly and quietly,
he made his way along, carcf ully avoiding any contact
with enemy patrols. Upon arriving at the location of
the command post, he discovered that it had been
overrun hy the enemy. J Jc slipped forward unnoticed

AUGUST
and joined elements of Company "H" on Hill 314
where, with Company "E," they were isolated from
· the remainder of the battalion. Realizing the necessity
for making contact with the other companies, on the
following morning, the 9th of August, he gallantly
led a patrol to locate the other companies on the hill.
While leading this patrol, Capt Byrn constantly exposed himself to heavy artillery, mortar and small-arms
fires and covered about five miles of enemy-infested
territory. The route he established in contacting the
other companies was used during the three remaining days of the battle as a communications lane. By the
morning of the 10th of August, the stubborn defenders of Hill 314 were sorely in need of food, medical supplies and ammunition. No supplies had been
received during the previous four days, and it was
apparent that unless at least ammunition was received
the position would become completely untenable. At
about 1500 on that day, friendly aircraft dropped food
and ammunition by parachute, but these supplies
landed in enemy territory about 800 yards from the
company's positions. Capt Byrn immediately organized and personally led a group of men into the
enemy's lines to retrieve ammunition for his machinegun and mortar crews. Moving out through heavy
enemy artillery and mortar fire, and even direct fire
from a 20mm antiaircraft gun, they made their way
over 800 yards of open terrain, in clear view of the
enemy. The area into which the supplies had fallen
was open and under enemy observation. Because the
bundles contained all types of ammunition and the
carrying capacity of his men was limited, Capt Byrn
directed his men to open each bundle in order to retrieve only that ammunition which was most needed.
Enemy fire was so intense it was necessary for the men
to crawl to the bundles and drag them to cover before
examining the contents. Capt Byrn constantly exposed
himself to enemy fire while directing and assisting the
men in this essential operation. As the result of his
able direction and encouragement, all of the most
needed ammunition was recovered. Burdened bv the
weig~t of ammunition he helped to carry, Capt -Byrn
led. his gro:1p back through continuous enemy fire to
their machme-gun and mortar positions on the forward
slope of the hill. 1-Ie then proceeded to plan and direct
his fires efficiently against the enemy, inflicting great
damage. There are few men so brave as to slip through
enemy lines in order to join surrounded troops. Capt
Delmont K. Byrn is one of the few.
Lt Reaser, commanding Company "K," constantly
checked his defenses, organized patrols, administered
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After the battle of Mortain: Lieutenant Willie Irby, Captain
Delmont Byrn, Captain Reynold Erichson, Lieutenant Guy
Hagen, Sergeant Forrest Hodges

aid to the wounded, secured food, repelled enemy attacks, directed artillery fire, and maintained communication with adjacent units. He was subjected to
tremendous enemy pressure all of the time his company was isolated on the hill. I le refused the demands of the enemy to surrender, even though he
knew that the battalion commander and most of his
staff had been captured and that there was seemingly
little hope for his company to hold out. He continued
Lo hold the position regardless of difficulties or cost.
Failure would have allowed the enemy to occupy
commanding ground which would have resulted in
the positions of the other companies becoming untenable. Lt Reaser at all times placed his duties above
safety-he completely disregarded extreme personal
danger in order to help his company hold its position.
It is miraculous that all five of these exceptionally
brave officers survived the war because it is a sad fact
that the bravest all too often died. Capt Erichson and
Lt Kerley became majors and, together with Capt
Byrn, remained unwounded. Lts Woody and Reaser
were promoted to the grade of captain. Capt Woody
was severely wounded during the second day of the
Hegiment's drive from the Siegfried Line to the Roer
River but, according to last accounts, was well on the
road to recovery. Capt Heaser was wounded twice
during the Battle of the Bulge but fortunately was not
hurt badly.

t 10\V TI IEY LIVED-AND DIED
The Germans, making an all-out attack, used practically every weapon with which their army was
equipped-artillery, tanks, self-propelled guns, arm-
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ored cars, Harne throwers, 75mm and 88mm high velocity guns, rocket dischargers, mortars ( including the
rare multiple-tube type) , hand grenades, riHes, pistols
and machine guns. The krauts made many large-scale,
organized attacks. When these attacks were not in
progress, they constantly harassed our troops with combat patrols which endeavored to infiltrate to within ,
and to the rear of, our lines. Heavy fires of all types
fell nearly continuously upon our positions.
The constant enemy pressure kept our troops on
Hill 314 surrounded for six days. Furthermore, the
enemy's penetrations at times completely isolated each
of the riAe companies from each other. Even under
the best of conditions, contact between companies
could be maintained only by patrols which were forced
to sneak over enemy-held ground.
The men occupying Hill 314 dug themselves in as
much as possible in order to protect themselves from
intense enemy artillery and mortar fire. They also
made use of natural cover, taking up positions behind
large boulders, declivities in the rock, and in dense
undergrowth. They held the enemy with riHes, hand
grenades, bazookas and machine guns, supported by
the artillery, whose guns were located to the west of
Mortain. Communication with Regimental Headquarters was entirely by radio.
The many attacks, constant enemy fires, and frequent patrols gave our men little rest and required
them to hold their positions in relays, i.e., one
man would hold a position for several hours after
which he would be relieved by another man.
Deep slit trenches were dug for the wounded in a
central location. These men, many seriously wounded,
endured the greatest of privation and pain without
complaint. There were no doctors on the hill and
scarcely any medical supplies. The aid men performed
miracles in pulling the wounded through and, although some died, most were safely evacuated when
relief arrived on the 12th.
During their stay on the hill, the men lived off the
land as best they could. Some potatoes, cabbages and
even chickens were secured and eaten. A Frenchman
who lived on the heights gave them a little milk, but
what food they were able to procure was hardly suffi·
cient to sustain the wounded.
At the time of the relief, the following approximate
numbers of men remained unwounded on the hill :
Company "C"
Company "E"
Company "F"

24
100

8

Company "G " .. . ............... . 103
Company "H" . ................. . 18
Company "K" .............. . . .. . 100
Antitank Company ............. . .
4
Cannon Company .. . ......... ... .
5
823d Tank Destroyer Battalion .... .
8
230th Field Artillery Battalion ... . . .
6
Total ....... . ........... . .. . 376
The men of Company "C" are those who were surrounded in the vicinity of Mortain and who fought
their way to Hill 314. The other four riAe companies
( "E," "F," "G," an d "K") were each of the approxi-·
mate strength of 200 prior to the battle, while Company "H" had about 150 men. There was a detachment from Antitank Company, a platoon of tank destroyers, and there were forward observer parties from
Cannon Company and the 230th Field Artillery Battalion. These 376 brave men were still holding at bay
a vastly superior force of the best the enemy had to
offer when relief came af tcr six days of fearfully intense fighting.
Thus ends the story of Mortain , a crucial battle of
the war, a battle where the Germans, had they been
successful, would have seriously crippled and retarded
the onward rush of our armies. But because of those
who held the hill at Mortain, those who fought and
lived, those who fought and died, the Germans failed
in their largest counterattack in France.
ON TO DOMFRONT
On August 12th, the 3d Battalion was released
from the Armored Command and attached to the
I 19th Infantry. The following day was spent in reorganization and rest, with the Regiment reverting to
the XIX Corps at 0900. We received word to be prepared to move on the 14th to the vicinity of Domfront,
and on that day, with the I 25th Cavalry as advance
guard, the lst Battalion cleared the IP at Neufbourg
at 0932. In a column of companies, the Regiment
proceeded to Romagny, Notre Dame, Ste. Patrice,
le Teilleul, la Charpenterie, and thence to the outskirts of Domfront, where the column swung north
to St. Bomer-Jes Forges and Chatelier.
At 1240 the 3d Battalion was released from the
1 l 9th Infantry to the 120th Infantry. At 1410 the
Cavalry reported its men were engaged in light streetfighting in the town of Dom front. f laving swung to
the north , the 1st Battalion met concentrated resistance at Pignon Blanc at 1545, while the 2d Battalion
pushed into the town of Domfront. The 1st Battalion
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took 103 prisoners in one group and twenty-four in
another. These were all evacuated to the rear by the
2d Armored Division. At the end of the day, the
enemy was putting up stiff resistance against the
1st Battalion on Hill 201.
On the morning of the 15th, at 0800, the 3d Battalion in a well-chosen maneuver speedily by-passed
the l st Battalion and took the high ground to the
east, thereby enabling the 1st Battalion to push on to
les Forges. The resistance of the enemy had increased. f le employed mortars and artillery up to
l 50mm in support of his ground troops together with
some Nebelwerfer fire and tanks. Two of the tanks
were knocked out during the morning, one by the 1st
Battalion at les Forges and one, which the enemy
abandoned with its motor still running, by the 3d
Battalion.
The enemy placed very heavy mortar fire in the vicinity of Jes Forges in an attempt to stem the advance
of our troops. During this action, the 2d Battalion
was holding the town of Domfront and covering the
approaches leading to our sector from the south. At
2230, we discontinued the attack, placed antitankmine defenses on all likely enemy approaches to our
p<>sitions, and made preparations to continue the attack in the morning. The Germans, during the morning, met the 1st Battalion with one of their old tricks.
They set up a defense on the reverse slope of a hill
and placed tanks on the Ranks. It didn't work. At
1853, the 3d Battalion recaptured one of our ~-ton
trucks which was recognized as belonging to the Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, Lt Col Hardaway, who had been captured during the action at
Mortain. It was in fair condition but boobytrapped.
During the night, the enemy apparently withdrew
in small groups to the northeast, and the 1st and 2d
Battalions jumped off in pursuit at 0700, August 16th.
In doing so they by-passed the 3d Battalion. Our objective was high ground 1500 yards to the northeast,
which was captured with little resistance from the
enemy. The position was immediately consolidated
and prepared for defense. Prisoners taken during the
last two days were from the 17th Labor Battalion and
from the 21st SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment.
On the 17th of August, the town of le Chatelier
was found by one of our patrols to be clear of the
enemy, and another patrol, at 1630, made contact
with elements of the King's Own Scottish Battalion,
3d Division, Second British Army, at a point 1200
yards west of Fiers. The British had been driving
from the northwest, and this meeting was one more
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The Germans retreat. The photo was taken by a French
civilian.

indication that the German Seventh Army had been
badly broken up and pocketed. During this day, and
the one following, all men who were not familiar with
the rifle grenade and rocket-launcher were given an
opportunity to fire them. The remainder of the time
was spent in rest, reorganization and bathing. Onethird of the men were given baths and clean clothes.
On the 18th General Hobos spoke to the 3d Battalion
and commended them on their past successes, pointing out to them that we must continue to fight hard
and destroy the enemy now.
That the German is a great believer in the use of
mines and will go to great pains to plant them is illustrated in a report received from the 105th Engineer
Battalion, which was operating in our zone of action
on August 17th. Company "C" of the battalion
erected a temporary bridge spanning a river where the
old bridge had been blown up by the enemy. A search
revealed no mines in the vicinity. However, two days
later, a unit from the 247th Engineers discovered six
Teller mines beneath the surface. Six others were
found on the far approaches, placed two feet beneath
the surface of the road.
After blowing the bridge, the Germans had removed the road surface, placed the mines two feet
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apart, covered them with earth and then placed a final
cover of asphalt on top to resemble the original "blacktop" road material. The Engineers stated that mines
buried in this manner would carry traffic for a number
of days before finally detonating, and that at this
depth they were impossible to locate with mine detectors.
TRIUMPHAL PROCESSION
On the 19th of August, the Regiment set forth on
the first of several great advances which were to carry
us through France, Belgium and the Netherlands into
Germanv.
On this day, the 120th Infantry Combat T earn
plus one company of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion and one company of the 743d Tank Battalion
moved 118 miles by motor from the vicinity of Domfront to an area near Brezolles, arriving at the latter
place at approximately 2100. Passing the IP at a crossroad east of Domfront, the Regiment and attachments
passed through Juvigny, Pre-en-Pail, Alencon, Chassy,
La Fresnaye, Pouilly, Bleves, Bellevilliers, Eperais,
Belleme, Mauves, Courigeon, Boissy, Longny, Neuilly sur Eure, Senonches, Mesnil Thomas, and Brezolles.
This great move was certainly a triumphal procession. Frenchmen from outlying districts practically
lined the route of our advance, in the country as well
as in the towns. They were wild with joy and happiness. They threw flowers and fruit into our vehicles
whenever a slight pause was made and offered wine
and Calvados. As we passed through one small settlement, two small boys were struggling to hold aloft a
huge sign which read "Welcome to our Liberators."
Another read, "Vive I'Amerique." One old man had
apparently stood by the side of the road all day in
order to shout the only words of English he knew.
Very slowly and with great emphasis he cried,
"Heeeeep! Heeeeep! Whoooo-ray!" With traditional
French exuberance, men as well as women seized our
soldiers and kissed them roundly on the cheeks when
the opportunity allowed.
In the vicinity of Brezolles, we came in contact with
the 47th Jaeger Regiment, 17th GAF Division, which
set up strongpoints along the main routes of advance.
On the 20th of August, the enemy was in greatest
force at Nonancourt in our zone of action with outposts at St. Lubin des Jonchertes and at Vrisseuil. I le
blew up all bridges across the Aire River, but defended the banks only lightly, so that our troops were
able to advance to the left and rear of the city. Be-

tween Verneil and Nonancourt, the Aire River is five
to eight meters wide and two to three meters deep.
The enemy placed heavy artillery fire on all bridge
sites in Nonancourt, and constructed log obstacles
which they covered with machine gun Ere and antitank guns.
It was at 1421 on the 20th when, following some
patrols from Company "G" which had been dispatched earlier, the 2d Battalion attacked across the
Aire River. "One of the few times a mortar platoon
ever led the riflemen," said Lt Robert S. Warnick,
then with Company "I I," "was· that day when my
mortars went forward to a place near the river and
dropped 'beaucoup' shells on the German troops who
had just blown the bridge. Then the rifle troops went
through us, and they made fast time crossing the river,
even capturing some of the enemy of the party which
had demolished the bridge." The entire battalion had
crossed the Aire in the late afternoon and had taken
the town of Lersey hy nightfall. There were pockets
of determined resistance, but the 2d Battalion was
successful finally in helping to seal off the larger town
of Nonancourt.
In darkness and with men from the French underground army (Forces Francaises d'lnterieure ) as
guides, the 1st Battalion took Vrisseuil and then St.
Lubin des Jonchertes. With the 1st Battalion holding
the Regimental right Hank, the 3d Battalion moved
to the right where the 2d Battalion had crossed, surged
across the river, and thus cut off the town of Nonancourt.
During the night, roadblocks were set up and patrols from the lst and 3d Battalions were sent to determine the enemy strength and dispositions in the town.
At 0415 on August 21st, the roadblock which had
been set up by Company "K" captured forty prisoners. f Iowever, an immediate counterattack accompanied by heavy artillery fire enabled all but eight of
these prisoners to escape in the darkness. By 0600 patrols from the 1st Battalion reported that they had succeeded in entering Nonancourt and that the enemy
was apparently withdrawing in small groups to the
east. The battalion immediately attacked, and at 0942,
it had entered and reached the far side of the town,
pressing the enemy closely. At 1341, the 3d Battalion
entered Pincon.
The Regiment struck the main part of the German
defense line in front of the 30th Division . The enemy
was attempting to defend a large airfield. However,
we continued to push him back, taking thirty-five prisoners during the day and capturing Nonancourt, la

Triumph
~ladcleinc de Nonancourt, la 1\1ormiere, Burav, La

4 7th Regiment delayed along the river, then withdrew through the 34th, which defended in small
groups of company-strength or less, confining their effort to main roads and towns. 1 lowever, the enemy's
knowledge of our situation was very poor. We took
him by surprise in appearing so quickly and gave him
no opportunity to set up anything resembling a main
line of resistance. Prisoners stated that much confusion existed because their communication line had

i\ laladrie, la Coudrelle, l'Eveque, La Bremie, L~ Val
Leger, Gratcruil, Lignerolles, Faverolles, La l lerouderie, Beaufort, Coudrcs, T ricrnon, Ferriers and St.
Andre-de-L'Eure. The latter place was reached bv the
1st Battalion at 2200.
·
This was accomplished in the face of delaying action by the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 34th Regiment, 17th GAF Division. Originally elements of the
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been broken up by our bombing and armored attacks.
It was brought to the attention of our men that we
were now operating in different country than that of
Normandy. No longer did we have the roads and
fields surrounded by hedgerows and, therefore, it
would be suicidal to confine all action and movement
to the roads.
On the 22d of August, the Regiment jumped off at
0900. From captured enemy maps we knew we were
attacking the German MLH. The 2d Battalion
reached Val David at 1500, and by 2230 all battalions
had reached their assigned objectives. In doing so,
the Regiment captured 159 prisoners and seized the
towns and communes oF Batigny, Quessigny, Foret du
Pare, Buisson-Crosson, Cornier, Orgeville, Ceirrey,
Val David, Jarancieres, l\tiserey, and Boncourt. The
enemy sought to impede our advance with small-arms,
mortar, and light-artillery fire. Among much enemy
equipment we captured an antitank gun, four 80mm
mortars, a great amount of ammunition and the regi mental aid station equipment of the 62lst Field Artillery Regiment.
In this war the artillery has played a major role in
all of our successes. We think our Combat Team had
the best artillery outfit in the Army. At least, they did
a whale of a job, and their accomplishments were not
limited to their specialized field of endeavor as illustrated by the following incident. On the 22d of August, the 230th Field Artillery Battalion was leapfrogging northward in two echelons, one consisting of
one-half of the CP personnel together with Batteries
"A" and "B," and the other echelon consisting of the
remaining half of the CP personnel and Battery "C"
and the 743d Armored Battery. They occupied p0Sitions successively at St. Andre-de-L'Eure, Garanceries,
and Val David, bivouacking for the night in the village
of Val David. Batteries "A" and "B" occupied positions
at Froisy and Buisson Crossin, finally reaching the advanced position on an abandoned airfield near Gauciel, a village some two or three miles to the east of
Evreux. The CP was set up in the basement of a once
substantial house; Batteries "A" and "B" were re
ported ready to fire, and the battalion posted security
and settled down for the night.
About 2400, guards heard horse-drawn vehicles
moving west on the road just south of the CP area,
and Sgt Strozier reported this to l\laj Clement. Lt
Col Vieman, Maj Clement and Sgt Strozier then went
to the nearest outpost. The sound of wagons continued, and voices could be heard, but it was not pos
sible to determine whether French or German was

being spoken. Several men were placed at intervals
covering the approach of the wagons, and as the head
of the approaching column reached the guard post at
the crossroad southeast of the CP, it was challenged.
I he challenge was answered by enemy fire which was
returned by members of the guard post, killing one
German and causing the enemy column to withdraw
and disperse in the fields east and southwest of the
CP. The enemy movement continued intermittently
and about 0300 shouts of "Kamerad" were heard, and
one German approached the guard post again. When
he was ordered to halt he turned a Aashlight on the
challengers and then ran to his rear. I le was fired
upon and is believed to have been wounded.
It was then decided to try to induce the surrender
of the Germans. After investigation, Lt Col Vieman
discovered that no one at the forward CP had sufficient knowledge of the German language. Thereupon
a call to the rear was initiated and Lt Bear taught
Cpl Schultz to say, "Do you want to surrender?""I low many of you are there?"- "Come forward
singly." With this information, Lt Col Vieman and
Cpl Schultz called to the enemy from one of our outposts, but there was no answer, and they returned
with only one German team and wagon which was
found near the outpost.
Orders were then issued for an attack at daylight as
follows: Battery "A" from its position southwest of
the CP to attack with forty men to a point 300 yards
east of the road running north and south through
Gauciel and then to continue the attack to the north
in order to take the enemy in Rank and rear, as it was
thought that he would try to move past the troops
manning the CP. Battery "B" was to attack on the
right of Battery "A" and therefore would be echeloned
to the right rear. "B" was to take with it one howitzer
for direct laying.
About 0540 Sgt Grant awakened the battalion commander with the information that enemy activity was
increasing, and a few minutes thereafter, the enemy
attacked the outpost and CP with fire from mortars,
rifle grenades, 20mm machine guns, and other small
arms, and began moving southwest. Batteries "A" and
"B" were ordered to attack at once, and enemy fire
was returned hy members of l Ieadguarters Battery
and Battery "D," 53 lst AAA Battalion. Capt San
dager of the latter unit was ordered to attack with a
squad of hastily gathered men southeast from the C'P
in the gap between the outpost and Battery "A."
Capt Coltrin, acting on orders from Lt Col Vic
man, radioed the rear C'P that the forward CP was

Top: Easy marching, and (bottom) not so easy-seventy miles on foot in three days

being attacked by a group estimated to be between
a platoon and a company of enemy infantry, who
were employing mortars, machine guns and small
arms. This transmission was made possible through
the gallantry of Sgt Pruette, who despite mortar fire
falling twenty feet from his radio, maintained communications throughout. In the meantime, Lt Col
Vieman had established an OP in the attic of the forward CP and decided that fire from Battery "C"
could be employed against the enemy.
A warning to Batteries "A" and "B" not to cross the
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road was issued and elements that had already penetrated across the road withdrew so that artillery could
be used. Wire communications were established between the CP and the attic to direct fire. An attempt
had been made during the night to establish wire
communications between the forward and rear CPs.
It was impossible to make contact; so it was assumed
that the Germans had cut the line soon after wire
trucks had passed them.
Lt Col Vieman, with Sgt Grant acting as telephone operator, started adjustment of fire on the
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enemy, and soon after a white flag was shown by one
group of Germans. The artillery fire was stopped.
Prisoners later testified that it was the artillery fire
which caused them to surrender.
In the meantime Battery "A," led by Capt McCauley and 1st Sgt Russel, had been attacking vigorously in the face of intense fire from all enemy weapons; they also saw the white flag, and Capt McCauley
accepted the surrender of that particular group. At
the same time, Maj Clement moved from the CP in
an armored halftrack commandeered from near-by TO
troops. It was fired upon by another group of enemy
who may not have known of the surrender of part of
their force, and returned to the CP after firing effectively on the enemy. Maj Clement suggested to Lt
Col Vieman that it was possible that the halftrack
might have frightened the Germans, and that he and
Lt Col Vieman approach on foot. Upon advancing, it was discovered that the remaining German soldiers had already surrendered to Capt McCauley of
Battery "A"
.
Total enemy casualties: ninety-six enlisted men,
including six wounded, and three officers taken prisoner; five dead. Enemy equipment, aside from horses,
included nine loaded wagons, one truck, one 20mm
antiaircraft gun, and a large quantity of small arms
together with several machine guns and burp guns.
Casualties sustained by the 230th Field Artillery
were: five dead enlisted men from Battery "A" and
one enlisted man wounded; two enlisted men
wounded from Battery "B" when a burning ammunition wagon exploded after the fight was over.
Casualties sustained by Battery "D," 53Ist AAA
Battalion: one enlisted man killed, five wounded, four
of whom were wounded in the explosion of the ammunition wagon.
While this action was going on, Companies "A,"
"B" and "O" of our 1st Battalion were also engaged
with a column of enem} troops, including horsedrawn vehicles which were encountered in a wooded
draw near the Paris-Caen highway. The enemy was
discovered at dusk, and most of the subsequent
fighting took place in the darkness. Enemy machinegun and 20mm ack-ack fire was directed principall)
on the highway and was of such intensity that the
area was known later as "Lightning Boulevard." The
entire action was characterized by confusion caused
by the darkness. The battalion commander was
caught in the front lines with Companies "A" and
"D" and, because of the intense machine-gun fire, was
forced to remain in this position throughout the night.

In the end, the Germans were forced to withdraw,
but not without leaving many dead and wounded
behind. Several hundred prisoners were taken the
next day.
It is of interest to record here that the French who
live in this part of the country were extremely helpful
to our cause and did anything they could to aid in the
defeat of the enemy. As an indication of their attitude
is the treatment they accorded to collaborationists. If
given a free hand, they showed no mercy to the men.
Women who were more than friendly with the Germans were seized and their hair shaved off, after
which swastikas were painted on their foreheads and
they were forced to parade through the streets of the
towns to the jeers and taunts of the populace.
On the 23d, 342 prisoners were taken. The Regiment cleared the following towns of the enemy:
Hardencourt, Cocherel, Vaux-sur-Eure, Jouy-surEure, Croisy-sur-Eure, Fontaine-sous-Jouy, St. Atiuiline de Pacy. Cannon Company seized the battalion
commander of 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry. So far as
the 17th GAF Division is concerned, it is believed
that we completely destroyed its combat efficiency.
On August 24th, the Regiment confined its activity
to the clearing out of small enemy groups trapped in
our area together with the consolidation of our defensive position. In doing so forty-eight more prisoners
were taken.
Being in Corps reserve on the 25th August, the
Regimental Combat Team held a static position and
prepared itself to move on Corps order. There was no
enemy activity except for a few stragglers who were
quickly rounded up. Seven prisoners were taken during the day.
On the 26th, orders were received stating that the
Combat Team, plus Company "B" of the 823d
Tank Destroyer Battalion, would move to an assemblv area located southwest of Mantes Gassicourt the
following day. In compliance, the Regiment moved to
the vicinity of Breval on August 27th, and at 0800,
August 28th, it traveled twelve miles by motor to the
\icinity of Porchevillc. It was necessary to make this
move hy shuttling with our organic vehicles. Passing
through Parncaux, ~oindrcs, Nonganville and l\1antes,
the Hegimcnt crossed the Seine River, thus achieving
a goal which in the not too distant past seemed to be
a great one.
At 1330, on this day, orders were received to attack.
The 3d Battalion plus the 30th Reconnaissance
Troop and one company of medium tanks pushed
the enemy back four and one half miles to the

Have you any eggs?

town of Mculan. At 0800, August 29th, after clearing
the town of Meulan, the 1st and 3d Battalions continued the attack. In the face of determined resistance
from elements of the 6th Parachute Division and the
18th GAF Division, they succeeded in clearing the
towns of Jouy-le-Moutier, Vincourt, Cheverchement,
Triel-sur-Seine, Glatigny, Choisy, Maurecourt, Andresy, Beaulieu, Chanteloup-les-Vignes, Pisefontaine,
Tresiant and Dcnouval. This represented an advance
of 4. 7 miles.
The enemy resisted from a system of strongpoints
located at road junctions, in villages, and at desirable
locations along our routes of approach. They were
found to be well dug-in at Courdemanche, but the
most serious resistance was encountered on the outskirts of Villette, France, where Company "C," although losing heavily in a hard fight with enemy paratroopers, succeeded in holding its ground against repeated enemy counterattacks throughout that afternoon and night.
1st Lt James L. Mosby was largely responsible for
Company "C" being able to hold. The company met

stubborn enemy resistance in the form of heavy artillery, mortar, antitank and small-arms fire. The only
route for evacuating the resulting casualties was covered by an enemy antitank gun. Creeping and crawling for 100 yards under direct fire from this enemy
weapon and ever in danger of discovery, Lt Mosby
managed to get within a few yards of the gun. He then
leaped to his feet and with three well placed grenades,
wiped out the weapon and all of its crew. This done,
he returned to the road, crossed it and located the 3d
Platoon some 300 yards away. The men were badly
harassed and disorganized. Lt Mosby pulled them together and personally helped give first aid to the 18
wounded in the area before having them evacuated
over the route he had secured by destroying the German gun. His reorganization of the hard hit platoon
enabled it to hold valuable ground until relieved.
Lt Col Bradford, and Capt Payne, S-3, of the 1st
Battalion were wounded early in this action, and Company "C" lost two of its platoon leaders. The enemy
employed direct-fire weapons to knock out several of
our tanks and cause havoc among the troops. When
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We had help from the French

two platoons of Company "C" were cut off by the fire
of one of these field pieces, 1st Lt James L. Mosby,
then in command of Company "C," crawled forward
one hundred yards under enemy fire and knocked the
weapon out of action with hand grenades. To relieve
the two platoons which had suffered the heaviest in
casualties, Company "B" sent one platoon under the
leadership of 1st Lt Edward W. I lunn to make contact
and help hold the area against the enemy pressure. He
succeeded in fighting his way through to the beleaguered platoons, and upon finding that their officers
had been wounded, organized a defense which was ex
tremely successful in beating off numerous enemy attempts to Aank our lines with machine-gun teams.
l Ieavy concentrations of artillery in Corps strength
eventually stopped the enemy attack in this sector, and
the Germans withdrew at 0400 on the 30th of August.
In the meantime, the loop of the Seine River south
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of Boisemont was investigated by the Regimental
I & R Platoon and found to be clear of the enemy.
On the 30th of August the enemy withdrew before
our troops, leaving small detachments at road junctions and towns, as previously, in order to force our
troops to deploy. These rear-guard elements were not
informed of the direction or route of withdrawal, and
no arrangements were made for them to rejoin their
units. They were apparently to be sacrificed to secure
the retreat of higher-priority units. We pressed them
closely, and the German withdrawal in force took
place just prior to the arrival of our troops at manv
points.
.
Before we jumped off, a German medic came to our
lines and said there were a number of wounded in the
town of Condecourt, and that since the Germans
were moving out, he asked if we would help the
enemy wounded in the town. If e said they would
guarantee the safety of our men . We agreed, sent
medics into the town who, unmolested, admin istered first aid to the wounded men. The Regiment
attacked at 0800, cleared the towns of Condecourt and
Courdinanche, which had previously held up the advance, and went on to seize the towns of Menucourt,
Boisemont, Jouy-le-Moutier, Geney, Cergy. Pontoise,
Courselles, Epluches, Vaux, Liesse, and Eragny. At
Condecourt, we took forty prisoners, eighteen of them
wounded. Here, Sgt "Red" Johnson, Antitank Company, had two fingers shot off.
Moving out at 0700 on the 3 lst of August, the
Regimental Combat Team met little resistance and
progressed rapidly. In all, twenty-two towns were liberated, including Champagne, Chambley, Persan,
Persan Beaumont, Le Mesnil-en-Thelle, Bernes, Boran, Crouy-en-Thelle, Morangles, Bonqueval, les SabIons, Blaincourt !es Precy, Montceary, Percy-sur-Oise,
Le Ma Tray, Cramoisy, St. Vaast !es Melloy, Barrisseuse and le Columbier. This constituted an advance
of seventeen and one-half miles, the entire distance
being covered by foot.
On the hills north of the town of I lardcourt, the
Regimental commander saw the Eiffel Tower and the
spires of the Church of the Sacred l leart for the first
time since June, 1918.
On this day, a Frenchman who had only one leg
walked the entire distance with our troops, pointing
out good routes of approach and supplying us with
valuable information concerning the terrain. Old
"Peg Leg" marched with us for many days, and was a
constant morale builder to the tired and weary.
The month of August was one of great importance

The French were hungry because the Germans had stripped the country of food

for the 120th Infantry Regiment. It saw our men
meet and defeat the best troops I litler commanded;
it saw our men push the enemy from the vicinity of
l\1ortain in western France back to the Seine. At the
end of this historic month, our troops were driving relentlessly toward the Belgian border. This great drive
was accomplished in seventeen days, and each man
more than did his part to carry us forward victoriously.
During this period, the men of the 120th Infantry
demonstrated unusual perseverance and physical stamina while participating in long marches in pursuit of
the fleeing enemy. Healizing that with every step forward the Germans were being driven back to their own
borders, the men of the Hegiment drove on relentlessly,
sometimes averaging as much as seventy miles in three
days. It was a supreme example of determination and
coordination by all units. Difficult problems of transportation and supply were mastered. The enemy had
ample cause to know that they were being pressed by
our Combat Team.
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During August the Regiment took 722 prisoners.
These Germans were from many different units, chief
among which were the 1st SS Panzer Division (Hitler's Own Division), the 17th G.A.F. Division, the
10th SS Panzer Division, the 18th G.A.F. Division,
the 6th Parachute Division and the 621st Artillery
Battalion. The principal regiments met were the 34th
and 47th Regiments of the 17th G.A.F. A number of
Russian laborers were also seized. The commanding
officer of the 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, was captured. A vast amount of enemy material was either
seized or destroyed.
The contribution of our men to the final victory had
been great. The Germans were hurled back in every
engagement, and their many reverses were an indication of the fighting spirit of the whole Regimental
Combat Team. Since landing on the Nonnandy
beaches we had become seasoned on the field of
battle. We were feeling the confidence born of great
success.
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SEPTEMBER
Early on the morning of the 1st of September, 1944,
orders were received from Division to continue what
was described as a "pursuit" of the enemy. In doing
so, we were to follow the route of the task force
which had previously set forth under the command
of Brigadier General William K. Harrison. This task
force was composed of elements drawn from the 30th
Infantry Division, plus special attached units.
Accordingly, late in the afternoon the 120th Infantry Combat Team 1 left the vicinity of Cramoisy,
France, and traveled the whole of northeastern France
to enter Belgium.
Leaving Cramoisy, we proceeded to Mello, Clermont, St. Dennis, and then to Roye. At 0305 on September 2d we crossed the famous Somme River and
entered Peronne. Traveling west of Bellicourt on
the San Quentin Canal, we passed through Fins and
at 0500 we were forced to halt the column southwest
of Cambrai until 1500 because of enemy action against
the task force to our front. Entering Cambrai, we
pushed on to Anzin, St. Amand· and then to Hollain,
Belgium. This was done in cold, wet weather, accompanied by high winds. We covered the 118 miles by
motor (and three miles by foot) so rapidly that large
groups of enemy were left behind us. It is believed that
ours was the first infantry division of all the Allied
forces to cross the Belgian border. A great many of
these names and other places near by were associated
with action which our division experienced in World
War I. The Regimental coat-of-arms symbolizes the
crossing of the San Quentin Canal by the tunnel appearing thereon.
Our leading elements entered an assembly area near
Bruyelle, Belgium, at 0240 on the 3d of September,
with the whole of the Regiment closing in by 0540.
The highway over which we advanced was liberally
strewn with destroyed vehicles, some tanks, many
vans, plus a large number of dead horses and carts.
TOURNAI
At 0700 we were ordered to release all our trucks
to the l I 7th Infantry so that it could move from
France to Belgium. In the evening, the Regimental
CP moved forward into Tournai where the battalions
were set up in the vicinity. Roadblocks were established at strategic points leading into the town and
preparations made to defend the area from any
enemy who might attempt a counterblow, which was
'120th Infantry Regiment plus: 230th Field Artillery Bn; Co. "C,"
105th Eng. Bn.; Co. " C," 105th Med. Bn.; Co. "B." 82 3d TD Bn.;
I 13th ~'ield Artillery Bn; two batteries, 63 l st AAA Bn.
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unlikely, or who might attempt to break out of the
trap which our forces had created in northern France
and Belgium. The reconnaissance parties of the 2d
and 3d Battalions encountered considerable enemy
fire in the vicinity of their assembly areas. The Regimental CP was located in a girls' school and later
moved across the river to the chateau of Mademoiselle
de Toit.
From the 4th to the 7th of September, the Regiment remained in T oumai and the vicinity. On the
4th, the 2d Battalion received word from Belgian
partisans that forty Germans were in the woods near
Marrbrey. The battalion sent a reinforced platoon to
search the area. The force killed two officers, one a
captain and the other a lieutenant, wounded two enlisted men, and captured a third. During this period
our men continued to train for five hours each day;
one-half hour of close order drill was held each morning and afternoon; radio operators were given further
instruction. The men were highly strung and in a
state of excitement from the constant pressure of the
drive across France. For this reason, the training was
found necessary and beneficial in keeping the troops
occupied and improving matters of discipline and administration.
Each battalion reviewed the use of flamethrowers
in the attack of fortified positions. On the 5th of September the Division Band entertained each battalion,
to the obvious delight of citizenry who lived near by.
It was on that day that reports became current
amongst the Belgians that the Brussels radio had stated
that Germany had quit the war. This, of course, was
entirely untrue.
Early on the morning of the 5th, British armor began its drive toward Brussels. Through the 3d Battalion positions in Antoing, southeast of Tournai, passed
the rumbling columns. About midmorning a German
ammunition truck, towing a 75mm gun, was flushed
from the woods north of town and, rushing past the
British, reached the 3d Battalion lines. There, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, the Germans
set their truck on fire and dispersed into the woods,
where they were later seized. The truck began crackling and exploding, meanwhile, and caused surprise
and anguish to the civilians, who were greeted as
they returned from church by a volcano which spewed
flaming rockets into their homes. In terror and panic,
they made attempts to rescue valuables from the houses
exposed to the fire from the burning truck. Finally,
to insure the safety of the civilians, 1st Lt Edward M.

Chateau Thier
The Route to Belgium

Tournai, Belgium

... where we had three days of rest

I !ill, Battalion S-3, T /Sgt Harry R. Peters, Sergeant
Major, and S/Sgt William P. Veteto, S-2 Sergeant.
stationed themselves on either side of the vehicle and,
dangerously vulnerable to the fire themselves, kept
civilians from dashing foolishly into the houses. The
damage to civilian property was heavy, but when the
fire died down, few of the townspeople had been hit,
and the 75mm gun was intact.
On the 7th of September the Regimental Combat
Team, plus attachments, crossed an IP located at Fontenoy at 0700. Our route carried us through Bourgeon, Wasmes, Baugnies, Braffe, Willaupuis, Tourpes, Ellignies St. Anne, Aubechies, Blicquy, Huissignies, Madeuse, Chievres, Brugelette, Hoves, Rebecq
Rognon, I lennuyeres, Haut lttre, Braine L'Alleud,
and then to an assembly area in the vicinity of Ohain.
Traveling a distance of over seventy miles, our units
closed into the area at 1415. During the day we passed
over the site of the Battle of Waterloo at Mont St.
Jean. It was here that another man who sought to rule
the world, one Bonaparte, met defeat at the hands of
the Duke of Wellington. A temporary CP was located
in the shadow of the statue of the Lion of Waterloo.
The Commanding Officer and his staff had dinner that
evening at the Chateau de flex with the Comte and
Comtesse d' Ausenbourg.
\i\lith the troops moving forward on foot on the
8th of September in order to conserve fuel, all vehicles
advanced by bounds and all motors which were not
absolutely required with the leading elements moved
separately. Leading as advance guard were the 2d Battalion, Cannon Company, one platoon of tank destroyers, one platoon from Antitank Company, and
one platoon from the Engineer Battalion. A patrol to
protect the left Hank was sent out. It operated at a
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distance of one to two miles and consisted of the Reconnaissance Platoon of the Tank Destroyer Battalion,
one section of 81 mm mortars, one section of heavy
machine guns, and one antitank gun. Our men passed
through or near Hixensart, Biergas, Wavre, Le Pres,
Grez Doicean, Jadoigne, Pietrain, and then to an area
south of Tirlemont near Noduwez.
The following morning, at 0800, we continued our
advance to the east, arriving at an area in the vicinity
of Huerne St. Pierre. Some of our elements walked
as far as thirty-one miles and the last of our troops
reached the area at 2000.
EBEN EMAEL AND THE MAAS LOCKS
With the objective of seizing the bridges spanning
the Albert Canal in our zone of action and reducing
any enemy action west of the canal, our troops passed
through the I 13th Cavalry Group at 0800 on the 10th

British en route to Brussels

Main entrance of Fort Eben Emael

of September. The Regimental Command Group followed our troops closely, moving the Command Post
to Millen at noontime and, at 1830, to Sichen Sussen.
Aside from sporadic artillery fire during the day enemy
resistance was negligible.
By 1930, the 3d Battalion ha<l reached and entered a section of Fort Eben Emael and, by the end
of the clay, the famous an<l historic fort had been
taken and the position thoroughly consolidated. Except for considerable artillery and mortar fire, which
came from across the canal, Germany's self-style impregnable bastion, whose capture from the Allies astounded the militarv world in 1940, had fallen without
a shot to Lt Col Pa~! W. McCollum's men . However,
the price was heavy for us since Maj Leland L. Lambe,
commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, was killed and
the Regiment thereby lost one of its most outstanding
officers, an officer who had contributed greatly to the
success of our arms.
The following morning Capt James E. Lott, commander of Company "l\1," was also lost to the Regiment when he was mortally wounded by artillery fire.
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I le died the next day at the clearing station. Affectionately remembered by his associates as an adept
story teller and exceptionally cool commander, this
officer had developed a new system for firing the 81 mm
mortars, a system which was adopted by other heavy
weapons companies throughout the Hegiment and
Division. During the hedgerow fighting, mortar observers used sound-power telephones and 536 radios
for communication, giving orders pretty much according to the methods taught at Fort Benning. Observing
that many casualties resulted from stringing wire,
which was frequently knocked out by enemy shelling;
that the 536 radios did not possess sufficient range to
keep in contact with the guns when the riAe companies moved ahead in the attack; and that too much
time was consumed in getting fire on targets; Capt Lott
instituted a new system, based on principles used by
artillerymen.
The most prominent feature in this system was
firing from map data. Observers were attached to the
rifle companies and moved with the company commander in the attack. Whenever a target for mortar

Major Leland L. Lambe
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Fort Eben Emael-Maastricht-Kerkrade

fire was found the observer simply used the 300 radio
carried by the CO's radio operator. Naming the thrust
line, previously drawn on the maps of the area in question, he could quickly give the range and deflection
from the thrust line. In turn, the Fire Direction Center, referring to its maps, could quickly determine the
location of the target and compute the azimuth by
means of a protractor. In this manner the mortars
could remain in position for a longer time because of
the increased range of communication and thus could
be ready to fire more quickly than if often required
to displace forward. Supporting fires could furthermore be delivered in much less time with greater
initial accuracy.
It was later learned that on the morning of the 10th
of September there were six officers and 300 men in
the fort who had evacuated the position as our troops
approached during the day. Investigation revealed that
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it had apparently been used by the Germans as a machine shop and barracks. Upon seeing the many reinforced concrete pillboxes and subterranean chambers,
it was hard to understand why the Germans did not
put up at least some resistance to hold the position.
It is undoubtedly true that we would have been sue
cessful in seizing the fort in any event, but the enemy
could have made things hot for us had they chosen
to do so. As it was, they did not fire a shot and, with
the exception of artillery which was directed into the
area, our men had no dinlculty in entering and seizing
this great prize.
But the 3d Battalion in the town adjacent to the
fort was not permitted to enjoy the "prize" long without the enemy making his presence known. Lt Jack
W. Gollust, Communications Officer, had no sooner
c;traightcned up a room in the CP when an cnem~·
shell struck the window sill above his heact anu made
shambles of the carefully tidied-up apartment. The

The King Albert Canal

• Ieadquarters Company kitchen literally received a
jolt when a dud landed only five feet from the kitchen
tent. Everyone- including the cooks-were diggingin furiously during the following two days.
The night of the 10th, patrols from the 2d and 3d
Battalions were ordered to cross the Albert Canal during darkness to investigate the terrain between the
canal and the Meuse ( !\1aas) River to the east. Neither
succeeded in getting across because of the violent opposition and because the enemy had ~bservation from
across the canal, being able to see all of the exposed ap
proach even at night. Later, whe~ crossin~s "':'ere successfullv made, the enemy was dnven by fire from the
positio~s which afforded him this excellent observation- fire originating from the high ground held by
our men west of the canal.
On the I I th of September, Company "A" moved
into a position at Vroenhoven to protect the left Aank
of the Division. At 1225, the 2d Battalion was ordered
to cross the Albert Canal opposite the village of Lanaye
in order to take the town and drive all the enemy from
the island on which the town is located. At 1700, mak-

ing use of assault boats, one platoon of Company "E"
succeeded in crossing the canal and by 1930 it was
meeting opposition in Lanaye consisting of smallarms and machine-gun fire. Another platoon was sent
across the canal and the positions in the village held
hy our men were consolidated by 2030.
It was realized that it was imperative to seize the
locks which spanned the Maas ( Meuse) Canal in
order to prevent the enemy from blowing them up.
These locks were of great importance since they controlled the water to the south, preventing it from
Hooding the territory to the north. If the enemy succeeded in destroying them, it would have meant the
inundation of a large area of land, including the city
of Maastricht; this would have bogged down the advance of the Allied troops operating on our left Aank.
The northeast section of Fort Eben Emael rests directly on the Albert Canal at a point where it swings
to the northwest. A branch of the canal, however, continues north at this point and is known as the Maas
Canal. Immediately above this junction are located
the Maas Locks.
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A Belgian electrical engineer, who had connected The enemy who were protecting the locks were taken
the lighting system of Fort Eben Emael a short time by surprise. One officer and four enlisted men were
after our troops had occupied it, showed Lt Col Mc- captured, and it was found that the locks had been preCollum two tunnels originating within the fort. These pared for demolition.
tunnels led to the Albert Canal in close proximity to
In the meantime, the rest of the Company "K" plathe point where it swung to the northwest. One of toon, which had been sent through the Company "E"
these tunnels was built above the other and was of area ( Lanaye) , arrived at the locks. At 0650 on the
such size that men could carry rubber boats through it. 12th of September, this platoon reported that it had
It led to a balcony above the water level at the canal. captured approximately seventy-five prisoners. It was
The other tunnel was drainage and of such small later revealed by the officer in charge of this enemy
size that a man would be forced to crawl a distance group that he was commanding a task force which
of 300 yards. It was too small to carry boats through had been given the mission of counterattacking our
even if they were deflated.
position on the locks. I laving set forth without reThere was a third tunnel which a Belgian engineer connaissance, they had become confused and stumbleci
in charge of the lock system pointed out to us. It was into our position s00nP,r than they had expected. Our
nearly one mile in length and ran on the west side of men allowed the enemy to enter a trap which had
the Albert Canal opposite the town of Lanaye up to been quickly prepared for them. When the Germans
the Maas Locks. The engineer declared that there were entered the position, our men opened up on them
air vents along the Albert Canal which could possibly with machine-gun fire from the front and a BAR from
be used to gain entry into the tunnel. However, be- the rear. Result:
cause of the extreme length and the fact that it was a
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drainage tunnel and offered great difficulty in getting
10 killed
through it, the Regimental commander and Lt Col
6 wounded (taken to rear that night)
McCollum considered it to be impractical to attempt
4 wounded (died during day)
to send men through it except as a last resort.
Colonel Birks had the choice of three passible plans
96 Total.
with which to gain control of the locks. The first plan
was to send men through the lower tunnel in the fort
Not one man escaped. All were accounted for.
to the canal. Here, boats would be dropped down to
them from the upper passage at the paint where both
The ten wounded enemy could not he retrieved durtunnels met the canal. These men would then cross ing daylight, since the enemy commanded the road
to the canal and gain the tip of the island on the far along the bank of the Maas River which ran parallel
side of the Maas Canal. The second plan was to send to and in close proximity to the canal, being some one
a platoon across the Albert Canal at a paint where hundred yards away at this point. They were evacuCompany "E" had crossed earlier in taking Lanaye, ated at nightfall and of the ten, four died during the
and then send them north in an endeavor to seize the daylight hours. In addition to intense enemy fire, the
locks from the south. The third plan was to make use pitiful cries for aid during the day did not make the
occupation of the locks any more pleasant for our
of the long tunnel.
Colonel Birks, after consultation with Lt Col Mc- men.
At 2045 on this day, the 3d Battalion stopped a
Collum and lst Lt Edward M. Hill of the 3d Battalion,
together with the two Belgian engineers, decided to civilian who was trying to get through our lines to
combine the first and second plans. One squad was to Maastricht. I le was released after showing papers
cross the canal in the vicinity of the fort and two signed by our Division commander which stated that
squads were to use the overland route from Lanaye; the city must clean out the Germans or our men would
whichever group arrived at the locks first would be have to take the town.
During the day, a woman operating a German radio
supported bv the arrival of the second group. Thus at
1715 a squad from Company "K," under the command was frequently heard apparently describing our troop
of Lt Grow of the 105th Engineer Battalion, worked movements.
crossed the Albert Canal by boats that were lowered
Our observation posts, located on the heights of
from the upper tunnel. An engineer officer was Fort Eben Emael ( which was reminiscent of the situ
sent because the locks were reported to be mined. ation at Mortain, France) , reported enemy reserves

SEPTEMBER
moving south to meet the attack of the I 17th and I 19th
Infantry Regiments. Artillery fire was directed on
them which totally disorganized one group of 150
enemy. Some were seen to be blown into the air; others
Hed in all directions. Approximately thirty finally succeeded in banding together and retreating to the north
but again our artillery was effective and it was doubtful if many escaped. The enemy artillery withdrew too,
much to the relief of the observers who from the advantageous posts had watched the big German guns,
and had seen green-clad cannoneers come forward to
load 88mm rounds into the breeches. No doubt, too,
the enemy had sensed the presence of Americans on
the heights of the fort and the cliffs close by, for shells
had fallen consistently within 500 yards of the pasts.
Observers were glad to see the 88s leave.
Extensive enemy minefields in the vicinity of the
locks were laid out in regular patterns. This was the
first time we had found minefields of this type and it
indicated that the enemy had been preparing for defense or withdrawal from the area for some time.
The 2d Battalion, having released Company "F" to
the lst Battalion and Company "G" to the 3d Battalion, and having recei'led Company "A" and Company "K" in exchange, remained in position under
Corps control. On the 13th of September, the remainder of the Regiment moved to an assembly area
northeast of Vise.
In doing so, it crossed the Maas River and entered
an assembly area near Mouland by 1054. Late in the
afternoon, we pushed on into Holland, with the Regimental command group crossing the border at 1840
and establishing the Command Post at Reymerstock.
Preparation was immediately made for a further advance to the east. Our Division was the first American
unit to enter Holland.
The I 19th Infantry had crossed into Holland
before the I 20th at a point on the boundary south
of Fort Eben Emael. The I 17th had attacked through
to seize the city of Maastricht from the rear (east), and
was storming across the Maas to the west, the main
section of the city.
The 2d Battalion was attached by Corps to the
111 Sth Engineer Combat Group on the 13th, with
orders to strike the area north of Lanaye and the
Maas Locks, toward the west edge of Maastricht. On
the night of the 13th, the battalion moved north from
Lanaye, passed the area of the locks, where it picked
up the elements of Company "K" which held the
ground there. With Company "E" in the lead, and
still with Companies "A" and "K" attached in the ab-
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sence of Companies "F' and "G," the battalion attacked the steep hill, opposite Fort Eben Emael.
The high knoll at the fork of the canal was strategic,
and the enemy had left troops to defend it. After the
jump-off at 1800, the battalion pushed ahead during
the entire night, which was rainy and pitch black.
Company "E" struggled to the heights, and had established itself on the objective before 0630 on the 14th.
At daylight, Company "E" pushed forward again
to seize by 0825 the sizable town of Canne north of
Eben Emael on the banks of the canal.
In Canne, following the seizure of this bridgehead,
Corps engineers at once set to work on the construction of a bridge. By afternoon it was completed, but its
weak crossbeams gave way, and it is said that just as
General Corlett, Corps commander, went forward to
cross it, the span buckled and caved into the canal. It
was repaired sufficiently to permit the crossing of foot
troops, however.
During this period plans for movement farther
north were being completed, and a patrol had already
been dispatched into the new area. The international
boundary was less than a mile north of Canne, and
the leader of the patrol which crossed it, S/Sgt Frederick W. Woods, of Company "E," was the first man
of the Regiment to cross into Holland.
The following day, the 15th of September, the entire battalion, still with Company "E" in the lead,
drove north at 1030 across the island formed by the
Maas River and the Albert Canal. It surged through
a western tip of Maastricht, and continued through
numerous small villages as far north as Smeernaas,
where the battalion CP was established that night.
The entire island, even farther north and west, had
been cleared by 1330, with only spotty resistance encountered. On the 16th September, the 2d Battalion
was relieved of assignment to Corps, and reverted to
the I 20th Infantry.
A brief review of the accomplishments of the past
was made in a report from Division on this day. Lt
Col Hall, G-2, in his "Notes to Company Commanders," stated:
"In less than one hundred days since the landings in
Normandy which were given nine hours by the Germans to last on the beaches, Allied forces have swept
France clean with the exception of a few isolated
small pockets, have liberated Belgium, have entered
the Duchy of Luxembourg, are threatening the Siegfried Li-ne on a hundred-mile front, have crossed into
Germany at two points, have reduced the German
Army in the west to a fraction of its original strength.

Civilians sometimes helped

This Division for its part played an important role in
holding open the routes between the two beaches,
helped carry the ball on the line-plunge breakthrough
at St. Lo, withheld the counterattack at Mortain destroying an important part of Hitler's armor and four
divisions in the act, helped to keep up the pressure
against the then retreating Germans so that they could
not make a stand at the Seine, then made one of the
longest, fastest dashes in military history up through
France and into Belgium and is now getting ready to
knock at the door of Germany itself. Although it cannot be predicted whether or not the knock will be
answered, the door itself will be opened."
Aggressive patrolling on the 14th of September revealed many enemy dispositions. Contact was made
with friendly reconnaissance troops to the east and
southeast of our positions and on this day, Lt James J.
Butler realized an ambition which many of us have
had. Leading the I and R Platoon with the mission to
make contact with the lst Division on our right, he
crossed the German border at 1730 near Wolfshaag,
Holland, east of Aachen, Germany. He was the first
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individual in the Hegiment to set foot on German soil.
On the 15th of September, active patrolling to the
front and Ranks of the Regiment was carried out and
instruction was given our men in the tactics and
technique of attacking fortified positions. With the
Siegfried Line but a few miles away and already under
observation the men were seriously concerned with the
training.
With the fall of Maastricht, in which action our 2d
Battalion played the important role of clearing the
large island of the enemy, our Regiment again figured
in the news. Prisoners declared that Hitler had ordered
this island held at all cost. The British Broadcasting
Company announced that this was the first large city
of J lolland to be liberated and that when the Germans
took Maastricht early in the war, they did so with
hand-picked troops who had been specially trained
prior to making the assault on this key city.
Little fights which seldom arc recorded in history
often are big battles to the participants. Such an affray
occurred during the 14th ancl 15th of September.
While most of the men of the Regiment were engaged
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in training, patrolling, cleaning of equipment, or relaxation, a small 2d Battalion detachment was guarding the lock of the Albert Canal. The enemy had excellent observation and immediate knowledge of the
terrain in that vicinity and knew what positions our
forces had occupied. During the day of 14 September
19++, strong enemy combat patrols consistantly attacked these positions but were repulsed. At 0400 on
15 September, the enemy made his major effort to retake the locks, using two strong combat patrols. The
key to the defense was held by a machine-gun section
of Company "H,'' led by S/Sgt John Rabreau who, at
the time of the attack, was returning to his gun positions from Fort Eben Emael loaded with hand grenades and other ammunition. As the enemy approached the machine-gun position, the gun crew
opened fire and immediately received the full fury of
the hostile patrol's fire from both riRes and automatic
weapons. The enemy also used hand grenades, some
of which landed within a few yards of the gun. Realizing that the gun position must be maintained if the
locks were to be held, S/ Sgt Rabreau worked his way
through heavy automatic fire to the gun, and shouted
orders to the half-surrounded crew. Then, loaded with
hand grenades, he fearlessly crawled forward in front
of the gun until he was within a few yards of the
enemy. In full view of the Germans, he threw one
urenade after another into the midst of the patrol.
This courageous, daring and effective action routed
the enemy completely, causing them to run pell-mell
in the direct fire of our machine gun. With this accomplished, S/ Sgt Rabreau made his way to his second
uun and directed its fire against the enemy. Under
7his fire, the attack was repulsed, and the fight was
over.
Tl IROUGH HOLLAND TO GERMAN SOIL
From the vicinity of Reymerstock, the Regiment
pushed to the northeast on the 16th of September with
the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on
the right. The 2d Battalion, which had been released
by XIX Corps, arrived at its assigned assembly area
at 1000 and followed the 1st Battalion at 2000
yards. By 1055, our men passed beyond Gulpen
and the Regimental CP was moved to a point
three-quarters of a mile to the west of the town. At
1850, each battalion had reached its objective and was
defending the territory east of Eiis, where the
Regimental CP was moved at 1900. During the day,
we had successfully attacked a dug-in enemy from the
773d Landeschutzen Battalion. They defended their
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position from a continuous trench system comparable
to the type used in World War I.
Faced with this new problem, staff members went
to work, and after acute study of the terrain both
from the ground and from aerial photographs, they
had planned a maneuver destined to roll up the
enemy's flank. Major Ellis W. Williamson, then Regimental S-3, knew that the ground around the trenches
was bare and easily covered by fire from the welllocated enemy positions. Deciding to utilize the folds
and gentle rolls in the ground instead, he explained
how, without being seen, the troops could move close
to the enemy which Capt Glazier, S-2, had accurately
plotted on his map. The troops executed this plan even
better than expected, and so adroitly maneuvered
behind the hills that they were upon the rear of the
Germans' flank before they could be observed. The
enemy crumbled, defeated totally by the surprise of
the maneuver. The 1st and 2d Companies of the 773d
Landeschutzen Battalion were totally annihilated and
the rest disorganized. A total of 251 prisoners was
taken, including five officers; many enemy were killed.
Just before entering the town of Eijs, the leading
tank was stopped by a loyal Dutchman at an underpass. He said that there were two German 88mm
guns lying_ in wait for: our tanks to proceed up the
road after going through the underpass. Colonel Birks
investigated and was able to see one of the gun positions. He therefore held up the tanks and caused machine guns to be maneuvered into position so as to
knock out this threat to our advance. This resulted in
the capture of the enemy crews. The Dutchman also
revealed that a friend of his had ten prisoners in a barn
near by. This also proved to be true and we added
this group to our collection.
At 0800 on the 17th, the 1st Battalion jumped off
in the attack with Company "F," a company of medium tanks, one squad of engineers, and an antitank
platoon attached. The 3d Battalion, in moving towards the vicinity of Bochholtz, took twenty-three
prisoners early in the morning. Meanwhile, the 2d
Battalion went into an assembly area near Simpleveld.
In all seventy-five prisoners were taken during the
day, but the big news came at 1030 when Company
"F" crossed the German frontier and entered the town
of Horbach. This represented the Regiment's entry for the first time into Germany in force. They reported that the civilians had hung out white sheets,
pillow slips, towels, and, some said, toilet paper, to
indicate surrender. When (jUestioned, these people
stated that there were no German soldiers in the town.

•
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However, our men saw three of the enemy Ree on
bicycles up the road to the east.
With the Regimental CP located at Simpleveld,
Holland, the enemy harassed the whole of the Regimental area with artillery fire during the night. Exceptionally heavy shells were used; one shattered every
window of the building in which the CP was located
when it landed fifty yards away. Two landed directly
on near-by houses, demolishing them. Two civilians
were killed and two wounded. An examination of the
shell holes and fragments revealed the shells must
have been fired from guns at least of 8-inch caliber.
On the 18th of September a check was made at
0200 which revealed that all telephones in Simpleveld were working and that these lines went into
German territory. This dangerous condition was immediately corrected and all units of our Combat Team
were instructed to close all switchboards for outgoing
calls from any area occupied. On the other hand, since
the telephone and telegraph lines in German occupied towns still remained in operation, we were able
to receive much information of enemy movements
through messages telephoned to us by members of the
Dutch underground.
It was clear that the enemy intended to hold Kerkrade. The 1st Battalion, while moving in this direction,
became engaged in a stiff fire fight when the Regiment,
minus the 3d Battalion, moved eastward at 1500. West
of Kerkrade we set up an active defense to protect
against possible counterattacks, and extensively patrolled the area. Colonel Birks decided not to enter
Kerkrade at this time because there were better defensive positions west of it. Also, Kerkrade, with its
45,000 people, was so solidly built-up that Colonel
Birks realized it would take a great number of men to
occupy the area safely. This later proved to be a very
good decision because we were compelled by lack of
supplies, over which we had no control, to remain
in a static defensive position for the remainder of the
month. The Regimental CP was moved to the vicinity
of Bautsch at 1630.
On the morning of the 19th of September, at 0730,
the 1st Battalion reported that they had captured a
German officer who had walked through one of their
minefields after getting off his motorcycle in the vicin
ity of Onderspekholz. Ordered to halt, he continued
on, was shot, and evacuated.
During the entire day much trouble was encountered in our front-line units by civilians roaming
around streets where our battalions had some of their
positions. They also came through our lines in droves,

having been sent in our direction by the Germans.
The enemy was apparently evacuating civilians from
the western edge of Kerkrade in order to make use of
the cellars of the houses as a protection for infantry
against our artillery fire. It was determined that the
enemy was digging in between the houses, at road
junctions, and guarding all overpasses and bridges in
the vicinity where our attack might be canalized.
On the night of the 18th and 19th of September,
a heavy-caliber enemy gun, estimated to be 240mm or
larger, continued to be active in our sector. The nature of its fire and the type of fragmentation indicated that it probably was a railway gun which constantly shifted its position. It confined its efforts to
interdictory and harassing fire over a wide area. This
fire was remarkably accurate.
From the 20th through the 30th of September 1944,
the Regiment was engaged in aggressive patrolling
with a view to discovering enemy dispositions and
other pertinent G-2 information. Our troops were instructed in various methods of attack and in the use
of arms against fortified positions. In addition to patrol activity we continually manned our observation
posts, which contributed greatly to the value of the
information obtained, and we improved our positions
so as actively to defend to better advantage. The enemy
during this period defended his positions to the west
of Kerkrade with a series ol' strongpoints worked into
an outpost line along the north-south ridge which
passes through the town. For the first few days the
artillery fire, although not heavy, represented an increase over the amount he had previously made use
of. This artillery fire was interdictory in nature, being
concentrated on road junctions and on high ground
which he believed might be used by our forces for
observation. I le also attempted to place fire into loca·
tions where it was reasonable to suppose our artillery
was located.
A report received from Division on the 23d of September disclosed that so far, in this theater, the First
Army had taken 182,000 prisoners. This figure can
he compared with the 73,000 taken by the British
Second Army, and the 52,000 taken by the Canadian
First Army.
Early in the morning of the 25th of September the
Dutch Underground reported that the Germans were
planning to evacuate all civilians from Kerkrade and
vicinity between 0800 and 1200 on that <lay. The
Dutch civilians were to go through our lines to Spekholzerheide and the German civilians ( so-called) to
ff erzogenrath. It was estimated that about 25,000

The Germans drove 37,000 civilians out of Kerkrode

people would be coming in our direction. At 0720 the 1830, the Hegimental sector had been cleared of this
first civilians began to arrive and from that time until mass of refugees who continued on their way
late in the evening thousands passed through our towards Maastricht. The total estimate of those who
lines. The evacuation of the civilians was expertly passed through our lines was 37,000.
Meanwhile, negotiations had been in progress behandled by our troops, assisted by the Dutch Underground. The people were orderly as they struggled tween a certain priest of Kerkrade and Capt Chris Mcdown the streets of Spekholzerheide with their horse Cullough, executive officer of the 1st Battalion. The
carts, baby carriages, hand carts, etc., laden with what- priest had helped arrange for the evacuation of civilever they could salvage and carry away from their ians, and the same day returned to the Battalion CP
homes. The Dutch Underground men kept them in again to make the request that Kerkrade be spared
line and carefully examined these people, pulling any shelling, since his hospital there contained many sick.
suspected Nazi collaborators or disguised Germans The request could not be granted, but when the building itself was pin-pointed, Capt l\1cCullough said an
out of line and hustling them off to jail.
For their part, the enemy lived up to their unenvi- attempt would be made to avoid hitting it.
Shortly thereafter the priest presented himself at
able reputation. Taking advantage of the situation,
the "supermen" shelled one of the roads which was the CP again. The hospital had been shelled again,
glutted with this civilian traffic, killing sixteen and and now he wanted permission to evacuate the pawounding many more. Personnel of the 3d Battalion tients from his hospital and bring them to Spekholaid station, located close by, came to the rescue of zerheicle. Yes, he said, the German commander had
the seriously hurt and worked tirelessly to assist given permission for them to go, and, in fact, feared
the innocent wounded. Captain Allen C. Neiswan- that they were spying on his installations.
On the 26th, then, at 0900, the exodus began.
der, 3d Battalion surgeon, was hero of the day. By
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Unhappy, frightened and pallid, the patients were
wheeled on their hospital beds through the streets.
By 1500, they had reached Spekholzerheide, where
American ambulances had been ordered to pick them
up. During the evacuation people inside one of the
ambulances suddenly raised a great hue and cry; a
woman with them just at that minute had a baby.
Captain Ezekiel L. Glazier, Regimental S-2, made
the following observations and conclusions in which
he built a picture of the situation confronting us at
the close of the month:
"Our lightning-like advance from France into Belgium and Holland, with penetrations into Germany
itself, caught the enemy with his pants down. Despite
this, because of our supply difficulties and the desperate resistance of a few Nazi units located in critical
sectors, the Germans succeeded in staving off immediate disaster. They suffered from an acute shortage of
troops to adequately man the Siegfried Line, and they
had practically no reserves behind it. Several small
localities, like Kerkrade, which the Allies have not as
yet attacked, were held lightly in a force corresponding to that of an observation line.
"But now, the situation has begun to change. The
last reserves of manpower, produced by total mobilization, are streaming into the western front. The
events at Kerkrade would seem to suggest the manner in which the Germans intended to employ these
last reserves. First of all, they will be used to more
adequately hold the Siegfried Line.
"Next, they can be expected to reoccupy in force
all forward positions not yet taken by us, whether or
not these lie within the boundaries of the Reich. They
will then evacuate these forward positions of all civilians, because it offers them the following advantages :
"( 1) It eliminates espionage on the part of the
Allied sympathizers.
"(2) It gives them more liberty in employing all
natural obstacles, structures, buildings, etc., for defense; in fact, to give additional depth to the front
of the Siegfried Line.

"(3) It enables them to sow additional minefields,
install boobytraps, delayed-action mines, etc., undetected and it creates difficulties for the Allies by obliging them to care for evacuees who clog the roads, require food and refuge, etc.
"On the other hand, the present German troop
movements, concentrating on a peripheric defense,
offer advantages from the Allied point of view. They
create excellent targets for saturation and dive bombing after which a quick breakthrough would bring
our troops deep into enemy territory where little resistance could be expected from the enemy.
"But the above is only a short-range picture. Given
a little time, the Nazis may be able to bring up a
sufficient number of green troops to man the Siegfried Line and its outposts almost exclusively with
them, and so release from the fixed positions a considerable part of their more seasoned troops. Undoubtedly, the Nazis would use these more seasoned
troops to build up a mobile strategic reserve behind
the Siegfried Line to give depth and Rexibility to the
Western Front and give them strong counterattack
forces. If we permit this to happen, our task of defeating Germany will become more difficult than it
is at present."
On the 30th of September, the 1st Battalion of the
I 16th Infantry began a reconnaissance in preparation
to relieve the 125th Cavalry Squadron on our right
Rank and thereby protect the right Rank of the Corps.
When the relief was completed, this battalion together
with one company of tank destroyers, became attached
to the I 20th Infantry Regiment. Plans were being
perfected for a big attack on the Siegfried Line. Our
troops, located in the vicinity of T erwinselen, Hopel,
Spekholzerheide and lmstenraede (all southeast of
Heerlen, Holland), were facing the Germans garrisoning the Siegfried Line and its approaches north of
Aachen in the vicinity of Kerkrade, Holland, Harbach,
Germany and Bocholtz, Holland. We were awaiting
the signal to open the final Rattle of Germany.

OCTOBER
On the 1st of October, the 120th Infantry Regiment was located southeast of Heerlen, Holland, in
the vicinity of T erwinselen, Hopel, Spekholzerheide
and Imstenraede. It was facing the Siegfried Line and
its approaches north of Aachen, Germany. The enemy
line extended through Kerkrade, Holland, to Horbach, Germany, and Bochholtz, Holland.

The 30th Division, with the 29th Division operating on its left and the VII Corps on its right, was in
contact against a major defensive position except in the
southern portion around the city of Kerkrade. The
enemy had had at least two weeks in which to construct field fortifications to supplement the permanent
emplacements of the Siegfried Line, to sow extensive
minefields, to regroup and reorganize his troops, to
bring up and dispose artillery, to establish supply lines,
to inject Schutzstaffeln (SS ) troops in small numbers to
stiffen resistance, and otherwise to strengthen his
positions. Much of this period was one of limited
visibility which permitted the enemy to improve his
positions without observation or interference, and he
took advantage of his opportunities.
All evidence indicated that the Siegfried Line in
our sector was the line to be held at all costs. If it
were to be breached by our forces the protection for
the great industrial cities of the Rhine and Ruhr valleys would be lost, with consequent dire results for
the German cause.
Captured enemy documents indicated that the Germans planned to take refuge inside the pillboxes from
our mortar and artillery fire, but would augment the
observation and fire of the pillboxes by additional observation, automatic fire, and rifle fire from prepared
positions in the vicinity. The enemy intended to place
mortar fire on areas to the front of each pillbox, and
machine guns would lay down final-protective-line
fire, even though blanketed with smoke. Any initial
penetration of the line would be met by a strong
counterattack.
Pursuant to orders received on the 1st of October,
the 120th Infantry Combat Team, less the 3d Battalion and plus the 1st Battalion of the 116th Infantry, prepared itself to protect the right flank of the
Corps. The plan for breaching the Siegfried Line concerned this H.egimcnt as follows:
The 1st Battalion 1 was to stage a feint attack in the

vicinity of Horbach and another toward a section of
Kerkrade, known as Nieuwstraat, on order. Then,
upon order, it was to occupy Nieuwstraat and Kerkrade with a company in each and protect the right
and rear of the remainder of the Regiment as it passed
through the gap in the Siegfried Line created by the
I 17th and the I 19th Infantry Regiments in the vicinity of Rimburg, Holland, and Ubach, Germany. It
was to remain on its objective until relieved.
The 2d Battalion 2 was to be prepared to attack to the
east and seize control of the northern districts of
Kerkrade and, upon order, to follow the 3d Battalion
through the gap in the line.
Company "F"3 was to move at H-hour to the vicinity of Bautsch, Holland, and then rejoin the 2d Battalion as it moved to pass through the gap in the line.
The 3d Battalion, if it was not used as Division reserve, was to revert to Regimental control on order,
pass through the gap in the line behind the I 19th
Infantry Regiment, then turn south and seize the town
of Bardenberg, Germany. When this occurred, it was
to have one antitank platoon and one company of tank
destroyers (less one platoon) attached.
The 1st Battalion of the 1 l6th Infantry Regiment,
attached, was to continue to protect the right flank
of the Corps, along the line Harbach, Orabach and
Harles.
Cannon Company was to support the feint attack
by the I st Battalion and then be prepared to follow
the 3d Battalion through the gap in the Siegfried Line.
Antitank Company, less two platoons, was to protect
the rear of the Regimental zone. The remaining units
of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one company) were also to protect the rear installations of the
Regiment.
That night a patrol from the 2d Battalion succeeded
in reaching the vicinity of Kloosterbosch, Holland,
without contacting the enemy, while a patrol from the
lst Battalion of the I 16th Infantry reached an area
immediately east of Lemiers, Holland, and found individual enemy emplacements unoccupied. At this
time the Regimental Command Post was located in
Bautsch, Holland.
On the morning of October 2d, Company "B" commenced its advance toward Horbach, while Company
"C" advanced toward Kerkrade. These feint attacks
were successfully carried out. The desired effect of
confusing the enemy was accomplished, aiding the

•Attached: one antitank platoon, one company of tank destroyers
(leos one platoon).

•Attached: one antitank platoon, one company of tank destroyers (less
one platoon). Minus: Company "F."
•Attached: one platoon of tank destroyers.
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The Siegfried Line: 2 October to 19 November 1944

Rough fighting began again at the Siegfried Line

friendly troops to the n~rth in their drive which
was to carry them successfully through the Siegfried
Line near Ubach, Germany.
On this day a civilian picked up by the 1st Battalion stated that he wished to visit his mother
who lived in Spekholzerheide, Holland, near by. He
claimed to be a member of the Dutch Resistance
Movement. Investigation by the CIC revealed that
this man was wanted by the local Dutch administrators for second degree murder, and that he had a
brother who was a member of the Nazi SS.
The necessity of exercising extreme care to divulge no military infomrntion to civilians di~ectly or
indirectly is illustrated by an occurrence which took
place that day. In the morning two girls went to the
3d Battalion area to say goodbye to some of our soldiers. Upon interrogation they said that information
of the battalion's expected departure had been given
them by two other girls who were Nazi sympathizers
living in Benzenrade. Investigation by the CIC disclosed that at 0800 a soldier stopped to talk to a
woman in Bcnzenrade. Since the soldier could not
speak Dutch and the woman could not speak English,
he finally said, "Au revoir. We are off to Germany."
From that, and the fact that the woman saw a few
trucks passing near by, she assumed that the Ameri
can soldiers were leaving. She told her daughter,
and the daughter, in turn, spread the word.
An order to attack and seize the northern district
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of Kerkrade and the suburb of Nieuwstraat, received
at 2100 on October 2d, was cancelled on October 3d.
~ lowever, the Hegiment• was to hold itself ready to
attack on two hours' notice.
i\1eanwhile, at 0940 on October 3d, a 60mm mortar section and five riAe squads from Company "C"
had secured both ends of the underpass tunnel located
on the western outskirts of Kerkrade. Here they found
a partially destroyed German machine gun and other
evidence that the enemy had been occupying the position.
At 0305 on October 4th, a platoon from Company
"A" succeeded in reaching a crossroads located approximately one-half mile south of the underpass
which had been seized by elements of Company "C"
and which was located to the north of that point.
In the morning orders were received from Division
to attack at 1300 according to the plan previously devised.
Accordingly, the !st Battalion 5 advanced toward
Nieuwstraat. Ten minutes later they ran into stiff resistance in the form of heavy small-arms fire from the
outskirts of the town to their front.
The 2d Battalion, 6 advancing into Kerkrade, was
'Attached: Company "D," 743d Tank Battalion: 823d T11nk Destroyer Battalion (less one company); 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry
(attached one company of the 821st Tank Destroyer Battalion).
•Attached: one platoon, Antitank Company; Company "B," 823d
Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one platoon); one platoon, Company "C,"
l 05th Engineer Battalion.
•Attached: one platoon, Antitank Company; Company "C," 823d
Tank J>estroyer Battalion (less one platoon); one platoon, Company "D,"
I 05th Engineer Battalion.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. McCollum

OCTOBER
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the entire night to making plans and preparations for
the attack scheduled for the following day. Throughout the night the enemy continued to pound the crossing site with artillery. At 0730 on the 6th of OctoPIERCING THE SIEGFRIED LINE
ber the battalion was counterattacked by a force of
At 1300 on the 5th of October the 3d Battalion approximately a hundred enemy infantrymen. The
was attached to the I 19th Infantry, and given the attack was repulsed, and by 0900 the battalion sucmission of filling the gap between the two assault ceeded in pushing over the open fields west of Herbattalions of that regiment. To do this it was neces- bach to positions close to Merkstein Hofstadt.
Men of the Medical Detachment attached to our
sary for the 3d Battalion to cross the Wurm River
into Germany and clean out the pocket between the Regiment had the highest possible standards of bravery
two units so that contact between them could be es- and attention to duty as exemplified by T /5 Clyde E.
tablished. At 1333 the battalion moved across the Justice, aid man with Company "M." On the northWurm River in the vicinity of Rimburg, Holland. ern outskirts of Herbach, two of our soldiers had been
The crossing was made under heavy enemy artillery struck and were lying in a slit trench which was exfire. Only two bridges, separated by three miles, posed to enemy fire. Another soldier, while attempting
were available in this area, and one was being used to reach these two men, was shot. T /5 Justice deby the l l 7th Infantry. Because these were the only termined to administer first aid. In full view of the
means for crossing the Wurm, and both vehicular and enemy, he crawled 30 yards from his own slit trench
foot traffic was exceedingly heavy, the enemy was well to where the wounded men lay. Although he was
zeroed-in on both of them. A footbridge, located only wearing a Red Cross brassard, heavy enemy smalla few hundred yards from the one used by the 3d arms fire fell all around him. When he reached the
Battalion, had been hit and damaged several times dur- slit trench, he immediately began to administer first
ing the day, so that it ~ould not be ~sed by our troops. aid to the men, lying beside the parapet despite conAfter crossing the nver the battalion advanced east- tinued sniper fire, because it was too crowded in the
ward through the woods. Company "I" contacted the hole itself. He found one critically wounded, and debattalion on the right, and Companies "K" and "L," spite all possible efforts, was unable to save his life.
advancing abreast, proceeded toward the final objec- T / 5 Justice then turned his attention to the other. His
tive. By 1800 contact had_ been established_ wi~h both skilled help enabled this second soldier to live.
battalions of the I 19th Inlantry, and the obJecuve was
Resuming the attack at 0700, on October 5th, the
reached. Three pillboxes had been encountered dur- Regiment quickly seized its assigned objectives. With
ing the drive on t~e objectiv_e, but these had been e_ffec- the 2d Battalion securely in place, at 0830 Company
tively reduced with the aid of tanks, many pnson- "F" was ordered to place a strong roadblock on the
ers being taken. During the late afternoon hours, Lt road junction in the southern outskirts of Eigelshoven,
Col Paul W. McCollum, who had led the 3d Bat- t lolland, in order to protect lines of communication.
talion since its landing in Normandy, crossed the A new Regimental Command Post was opened at 0915
Wurm River from his command post in Rimburg at T erwinselen, near the Staatsmijn Wilhelmina.
At the end of the day the Regiment had occupied
to check the companies' positions and to direct
the movement of supplies and ammunition to the all of Kerkrade and vicinity, organized the ground so
front. After making certain that the battalion's as best to engage targets of opportunity along the Siegposition was secure, he started to return to his fried Line, and had established observation posts. As a
command post. At this time the enemy was still di- result it was able to place harassing fire on the
recting heavy artillery fire on the crossing site and, as enemy and interdict the routes of approach and withLt Col McCollum approached the bridge, a particu- drawal which he might seek to use, thereby assisting
larly heavy concentration fell in the area, killing him the friendly forces which were heavily engaged by
and so stunning the members of his party that his the enemy to the north. These preparations were
death was not immediately known. Late that night greatly expedited by the capture of a German prisoner
several search parties were sent to the area before his by troops of Company "B." The prisoner disclosed
detailed information concerning enemy installations
body could he found.
Maj I Inward W. Greer, the battalion executive of- and fortifications between Kerkrade and Zopp.
The enemy had organized the defense of Kerkrade
ficer, assumed command of the battalion and devoted
subjected to considerable artillery fire. At times, this
fire fell in concentrations of twenty rounds in a period
of two minutes.
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We mauled Merkstein

by a series of strongpoints, making full use of the protection afforded by houses and dug-in emplacements
prepared over a long period of time. The enemy fought
from house to house, necessitating the cleaning up of
each individual building by small detachments. He
had placed a number of Teller mines throughout the
area. I Te used only small-arms fire with moderate artillery and mortar fire until the cessation of the action
taking place on the Division's north flank; then he
was able to concentrate a large amount of artillery
against our men.
In using the houses for defense, the enemy frequently placed his guns on the top floor or the roof,
which afforded him nearly perfect observation and
fields of fire. The most effective means found to meet
this opposition was to place artillery fire on the houses,
which forced the enemy to abandon the top floors and
and enabled our infantry to move in.
Statements made by prisoners indicated that the
enemy morale was low. Some said that they were
forced to fight by Schutzstaffeln troops who threatened to send their families to concentration camps if
they surrendered or retreated.
On October 6th the Regiment was holding a defensive position from Eigelshoven to Nieuwstraat.
Throughout the day observation of the enemy forces
was maintained. As a result, many artillery missions
were placed on enemy forces which were attacking
units of the ll 9th Infantry Regiment, to which this
Hegiment's 3d Battalion had been attached. During
this minor action, Col Hammond D. Birks received
orders to report to the 9th Infantry Division as Assistant Division Commander. Col Branner P. Purdue
succeeded Col Birks.

At 1400 on this day word was received that the
Regiment would be relieved by the I 16th Infantry
and would move to an assembly area in the vicinity
of Waubach, Holland, north of Eigelshoven. A new
Regimental Command Post was established in Waubach at 1830. By 0125, October 7th, the Regiment had
closed into the area, where it remained until late in
the afternoon. Then, at 1700, the Command Post
was moved to Ubach, Germany, and the 1st and 2d
Battalions closed into that vicinity by 1800. Preparations were immediately made for an attack scheduled
for 0700 on October 8th.
S/ Sgt Robert E. Smith and Pfc l lenry F. Price will
long remember Kerkrade, or rather I Iaanrade which
is near by. It seems that their unit was being subjected to sniper fire while attempting to set up a defensive position in Kerkrade. Smith and Price decided
to do something about it. And they found plenty to do
for a two-man patrol armed only with M-ls.
When they reached the town of I Iaanrade, a civilian
approached them and said that he knew a house in
which eight German soldiers were staying. He led
them to the house; then beat a hasty retreat.
S/Sgt Smith posted Pfc Price in a position where
he could cover the front of the house, and then entered the building. He found himself in a hallway
and, seeing a door, he cautiously approached it. When
he was in position he kicked it open quickly. Four
surprised Germans took one look at S/Sgt Smith's M-1
and threw up their hands in surrender.
Placing his prisoners in the hands of Pfc Price,
S/Sgt Smith once again returned to the house and
proceeded down the narrow hallway. Suddenly, at
the far encl of the hall, a G"'1man soldier came charging up from the basement, his hurp gun firing wildly.
There was no time to aim carefully. S/Sgt Smith
killed the Nazi with a shot through the throat, firing
his 1\1- l from the hip. Three more German soldiers
immediately appeared from the basement, and S/ Sgt
Smith, holding his ground and still firing from the
hip, eliminated all three.
Meanwhile, the prisoners outside the house had
heard the noise of firing and decided to take advantage
of the excitement and escape. Pfc Price killed one of
them as he ran down the street. Two others started
to go back into the house and were killed in the cross
fire of the two M -ls. The fourth man, seeing the futility of any escape, threw himself to the ground as
a token of complete surrender.
Gathering all the military papers they could find in
the building, our men started to return to more friend-
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ly territory with their prisoner. While doing so they
were suddenly fired upon by a German machine gun.
By this time their prisoner had really had enough and
quickly told them of a route which would safely bypass the gun. When the group reached our lines the
prisoner was turned over to the IPW team, and the
Regimental S-2 was supplied with information which
proved to be of great value.
It should be noted that in the first part of the operation of attacking the Siegfried Line, this Regiment was
in Division reserve and aided the penetration by making feint attacks and by seizing the populated area
west of the Wurm River ( Kerkrade, etc.), and immediately south of the point of actual penetration.
When the line was finally broken this Regiment followed the path made by the I 17th and I 19th Infantry
Hegiments, pa.ssing through the l!ne in the v.icinity. of
Bimburg, I lol1and, and Ubach, Germany. Alter gomg
through the gap, the Regiment turned south to assist
in rolling up the enemy positions.
On the 7th of October, while still attached to the
J 19th Infantry, the 3d Battalion, with the 1st Battalion, 1I9th Infantry, on its right, jumped off in an attack on the ground between I lerzogenrath and Alsdorf. Company "L" cleaned out 1-Ierbach, and Company "I" overcame enemy resistance in Merkstein
Plitschar<l. This was the first experience the battalion
had with town fighting in Germany, and it was here
that the battalion initiated its policy of burning down
houses used by the enemy as strongpoints.
Before noon the battalion reached Zu Merkstein,
where it was halted briefly by heavy small-arms fire
from one of the slag piles in the area. By 1315 Merkstein itself was reached and, after an air strike on the
area between Merkstein and I lerzogenrath, a drive
was made across 3000 yards of open terrain cast of
Herzogenrath into the settlements of Noppenberg
and Bierstrasse. Although the attack was made while
its left Rank was exposed, the objective was taken by
midafternoon. Later in the day Company "I" cleaned
out the woods farther south and to the east of I Ierzogenrath, and defenses were organized at this position.
On the 7th of October, the day after T / 5 Clyde E.
Justice disregarded heavy enemy fire to save a
wounded soldier, another aid man reached the peak of
courage. Pk Owens L. Kirk, attached to Company
"I," was this brave man. A wounded scout was lying
helpless to the front. An aid man who started toward
the scout was instantly killed. Although he knew he
was facing nearly certain death, Pfc Kirk arose from
his position and, unmindful of the repeated warnings

GI Joe is tougher than the pillbox

given him not to go forward, dashed into the intense
enemy fire which was falling all around him. He
crawled a distance of about 150 yards through the
thickest of this fire to the wounded scout. Reaching
the scout, he began to administer first aid to him while
still on the open field, in direct view of the enemy and
with no possible cover. While dressing the wound, he
himself was severely struck in the stomach. He nevertheless, continued to render aid to the other soldier. He
then remained with the wounded man until nightfall,
still disregarding his own injury. Pfc Kirk died the
next day. Again it can be said, "He gave his life in
order that another might live." No man can have
greater courage than did Pfc Owens L. Kirk.
During the three-day period since the jump-off
across the Wurm River, the 3d Battalion had advanced 6000 yards against heavy artillery, automatic
and small-arms fire, fighting over all types of terrain,
including woods, towns and open ground. Although
casualties were light, the battalion captured 406 prisoners, including a lieutenant colonel and his staff.
In mopping up the enemy's positions to the south, it
was found that the pillboxes and other fixed fortifications in the H.egiment's area did not constitute the main
obstacle in our path, nor did the enemy defense seem
to be based on them.
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The only group of pillboxes encountered was located between Noppenberg and Nordstern. Only light
resistance was encountered from machine guns and
small arms. Pillboxes were used mostly for observation
posts and as a place of refuge from aerial bombardment
and artillery fire. One hundred and fifty prisoners were
taken in this area. Many of these hid in cellars and
were not captured until later in the evening.
There were seven pillboxes for small arms and machine guns. These were placed near the crest of a hill,
on the forward slope. Each pillbox had two compartments with three or more firing holes, one of which,
at least, was for a machine gun. The field of fire from
these apertures was found to be very limited. I Iowever,
the pillboxes were located close to each other, providing interlocking fire.
An antitank ditch, located on high ground, had
been recently dug for protection of the pillboxes.
The thickness of the iron-reinforced cement walls
of the small-arms pillboxes was approximately 3~ feet;
the tops were about 5~ feet thick.
Four additional pillboxes were located on the reverse slope of the hill, all facing west. They permitted traversing of a gun for about 120 degrees,
and were capable of accommodating l05mm howitzers. Periscopes were installed, but the view from
them was extremely limited due to the size of
the hill to the front. In addition to the main gun compartment there were three other compartments in each
pillbox. To the right there was one presumably for ammunition. It was connected by a chute with the main
gun compartment, but it had a separate entrance from
the outside. To the left there were two rooms to accommodate the crew.
The thickness of the cement walls of these larger
pillboxes was approximately four feet, with eight-foot
tops, reinforced with steel bars and plates.
BIRK
With the objective of seizing high ground in the
vicinity of Birk and Euchen, the H.egiment launched
an attack on October 8th. At 0700 the 2d Battalion
crossed the Line of Departure, and at 0825 the lst
Battalion, following the 2d, moved obliquely to its zone
to the right (west) of the 2d Battalion. This maneuver
was made in order to by-pass the woods and low
ground south of Noppenberg. Each battalion had attached one platoon of Antitank Company; one platoon
of light tanks, and one platoon of medium tanks,
743d Tank Battalion. The lst Battalion reported that
the majority of the artillery fire received was in heavy

battery concentrations together with rapid-fire single
shots from 88mm antiaircraft guns.
By 2200 on October 8th the 1st Battalion had
reached a point west of Duffesheide, including the
vicinity of Reifeld. The 2d Battalion was astride the
main highway east of Duffeshcide and between that
town and Ofden.
The enemy 75mm antitank guns were remarkably accurate and powerful. One of these guns
knocked out two of our tanks and placed a direct
hit on a pillbox, all with three shots and at a range
of approximately 1000 meters. An indication of
the effect direct fire of this type has on the occupants of pillboxes is revealed by eight of our men
who were occupying the pillbox at the time it was hit.
Although the projectile did not penetrate into the
fortification, they were injured by flying pieces of con·
crete and they described the concussion as "terrific."
In the vicinity of Heifeld, Company "A" had succeeded in capturing a hill some 400 yards to the west
of the town. The enemy had this hill covered with
heavy small-arms fire, most of which was coming from
machine guns. So well deployed were the Germans
that they were able to place flanking fire on the position as well as frontal fire. This made any movement
by our men extremely hazardous.
Since our troops were unable to advance in the face
of this fire, two Sherman tanks were moved up to the
crest of the hill. The tank men opened up on the
enemy positions with their machine guns and fired a
few rounds of 75mm ammunition in an endeavor to
force the enemy to retire. A few moments later, a
concealed German antitank gun fired upon them. The
first tank was hit squarely and immediately burst into
Hames. The second tank, although it succeeded in
moving below the crest of the hill, also received a
direct hit which knocked the turret hatch cover off.
The crew members of the first tank were in dire
peril. Three were able to get out of the turret, although one of them fell head first from the top of the
tank to the ground and broke his neck. The driver
had been killed when the tank was hit. The assistant
driver could he seen struggling to escape the flaming
death trap, although seriously wounded. I !is clothing
was on fire, and it was obvious that he was unable to
lift himself through the front hatch.
I Iis cries of anguish and pain, heard above the din
of battle, reached the ears of "I / Sgt Thomas W. Fogli,
Cpl Loman 1 lartline and Pfc Michel Mercurio. These
men ran forward through the intense enemy fire,
climbed on top of the tank and succeeded in pulling

Colonel Branner P. Purdue
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the man out. Using a blanket which they had brought
with them, they smothered the fire on the tanker's
clothing. With the injured man begging his rescuers
to shoot him and put him out of his misery, they carried
him back with them almost to safety. Then a shell
struck a pillbox near by and the resulting explosion
threw them to the ground. Fortunately none of the
men was wounded and, under cover of smoke which
had been laid down to conceal their actions, they
finally succeeded in reaching the rear of the pillbox.
Here litter bearers carried the wounded man back to
an aid station. As for T /Sgt Fogli, Cpl I lartline and
Pfc Mercurio ... they went back to the business of
fighting Germans.
Under the cover of fog, the 1st and 2d Battalions
continued their advance to their objectives at 0700 on
October 9th. The enemy was apparently taken by surprise. Our men continued to advance until almost
I I 00, meeting only light artillery and small-arms fire.
By that time the fog had lifted sufficiently to allow
the enemy to observe and determine our positions accurately. The 2d Battalion reached a good defensive position northwest of Euchen, but the 1st
Battalion, moving toward the vicinity of Birk, was
meeting strong resistance from high ground. Without any noticeable artillery preparation, at 1300 the
enemy counterattacked to the northwest with infantry, supported by about ten tanks, approaching
from the vicinity of Euchen. This attack was met with
heavy infantry, artillery and other supporting fires in
front of the 2d Battalion's position. By I 500 this attack had turned and moved against the 1st Battalion
where it was again met by strong artillery and cannon fire. As a result, the enemy tanks were retiring
to Euchen by 1845, leaving seven of their number on
the field of battle.
In the meantime, at I 4 I 0 on the 9th of October,
orders were received from Division to commit the
3d Battalion through the zone of action of the I 17th
Infantry Regiment on our left, and then swing it into
our zone. At 1515 the battalion, less Company "I,"
which had been left to defend the woods east of
I lerzogenrath, moved to Kol-Kellersberg. Company
"L" led, followed by Company "K."
Advancing through Zopp and around the slag pile
south of Alsdorf, the battalion moved on to the high
ground where the residential district was located. Information had been recc:'ived that the town had been
cleared by the I 17th Infantry earlier that day. l lalfway through the town, however, part of the lead company, with Colonel B. P. Purdue, Maj Greer and Capt

l lill, the Battalion S-3, was cut off from the rear elements by an enemy force which inAicted twenty
casualties and knocked out two light tanks. The command group and two platoons organized an all-around
defense and soon succeeded in reestablishing contact
with the I 17th Infantry.
During the ensuing two days the 3d Battalion regrouped and organized defensive positions between
the I 17th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry. While attempting to contact the 2d Battalion, Lt
James Bickley and one platoon of Company "K" were
ordered to proceed to a railroad junction in the vicinity of Euchen to meet elements of the 2d Battalion.
The information that the 2d Battalion had withdrawn
from this area did not reach Lt Bickley before he set
out, with the result that he led his platoon into an
enemy ambush. Although the men were taken entirely by surprise, Lt Bickley succeeded in withdrawing his platoon so skillfully that only one casualty was
suffered.
The 2d Battalion meanwhile had continued to drive
forward always toward Euchen, and in the foggy morning had come to the town outskirts, reaching the railroad tracks which ran along its western edge. There the
assault companies, "E" and "F," met strong machinegun fire and the minute the troops were pinned down,
the Germans drove some tanks along the railroad embankment and from defiladed positions fired round
after round into the lead clements. Mortar fire spread
havoc among the helpless troops. Capt Ralph A Kerley, commanding Company "E," realized that the
tanks had to be silenced if the infantrymen, hugging
the exposed ground, were to be successfully extricated from the precarious position. Daringly he called
for friendly artillery fire upon the railroad tank positions, even though these fires were dangerously close
to his own men. When it began falling there was some
confusion among the enemy troops, and Capt Kerley
directed the withdrawal of the companies to better
defensive ground around Schleihach which they had
been ordered to hold.
Soon after our troops had organized the ground for
defense, halftracks were observed advancing from
Euchen by the frontliners of Companies "E" and
"F." Germans jumped from them and started for the
2d Battalion line, but were fired at, scattered, and withdrew toward Euchen. That night the Germans
tried to wrest hack the ground taken by the 2d Battalion, but Lt John Jacobs, observer from the 230th
Field Artillery Battalion, brought rains of protective
artillery fire around the positions and the Germans
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retreated in turmoil. They were about to lose even
more vital ground yet, had they only known.
Meanwhile the 1st Battalion was unable to advance
south of the vicinity of Esel because of the heavy and
accurate fires coming from the objective, the high
ground at Birk. To complicate the situation, the battalion commander, Major Harold S. Griffith, Jr, suddenly became ill and had to be evacuated. Capt Chris
McCullough, the executive officer, had recently returned to the Regiment after recovering from wounds
and therefore barely knew the oflicers of the battalion.
Faced with the tough situation of having to suddenly
command a battalion, the personnel of which he did
not know well, Capt McCullough immediately demonstrated great bravery and leadership. Seeing that a
continuation of the frontal attack south against Birk
was hopeless, permission was obtained to move through
the zone of the I 19th Infantry Regiment to attack the
objective from the west. Accordingly Companies "A"
and "B," reinforced by elements of Company "D,"
moved to the eastern edge of Bardenberg while Company "C," reinforced, held the ground gained immediately south of Esel. Companies "A" and "B"
launched their attack from Bardenberg to Birk toward
the end of daylight. By a tragic coincidence when the
attack was launched, an enemy armored counterattack
was moving from concealed ground south of Birk on
Bardenbcrg, with the apparent mission of counterattacking part of the I 19th Infantry Regiment. The
enemy armor caught our unprotected troops in open
ground on their right (south) Rank. The surprise and
ferocity of this armored counterattack resulted in our
suffering heavy casualties, particularly in Company
"A." As the result, the members of both companies
were driven in confusion back to the vicinity of Esel.
At about midnight, Co.Jone! Purdue arrived at the
lst Battalion Command Post, having been temporarily
cut off from the Regiment by the enemy counterattack
in the southern edge of Alsdorf. There he learned
for the first time the details of the catastrophe suffered
hy Companies "A" and "B." Officers and men of the
battalion were exhausted and despondent, having
fought hard for two days only to fail in capturing the
all -important objective. Realizing that a continuation
of daylight action probably would again result in failure, Colonel Purdue decided upon a night attack. Because the battalion never had made a night attack in
force, it was necessary for the Regimental Commander
to plan and explain in detail how the attack was to be
executed.
Intermittent artillery fires were placed upon Birk as
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heavily as the availability of ammunition permitted.
These fires fell soon after midnight of October 9-10
until 0430. As was hoped and halfway expected,
nearly all of the enemy garrison at Birk relaxed and
went to sleep soon after the cessatio1i of the artillery
fires. At 0530 on the 10th of October, the 1st Battalion again attacked Birk, this time from a line of
departure between Esel and Bardenberg. The attack
was a sneak without preparatory fires. Advancing
through a before-dawn fog, our troops caught most
of the enemy asleep. Silently taking care of the one
German sentinel encountered, the 1st Battalion quickly
overran Birk. Approximately fifty prisoners were taken
while the remainder of the garrison escaped to the
south. Daylight found the battalion in complete possession of the objective, and only then was Birk's importance realized because the imperfect map failed to
show that the high ground there was the key point of
the entire 4000 meters of front between Bardenberg
and Alsdorf. Thus ended one of the most remarkable
feats of the Regiment's history- the tired, partially defeated lst Battalion refused to quit and, without night
fighting experience, skillfully seized a hill which later
events proved to be a critical defensive position from
which a very large enemy counterattacking force was
defeated.
Several times during the day tanks supported by
infantry advanced toward our lines, but artillery,
cannon, tank-destroyer and machine-gun fire broke
up these reconnaissances-in-force each time. In all,
fourteen enemy tanks were destroyed during the day.
One of these was knocked out by T / Sgt Fogli of Company "A" with a captured German antitank gun fired
at a range of 200 yards. Company "H" mortarmen
threw out a smoke round to facilitate registering in

No welcoming crowds in Bordenberg

upon an advancing tank, and by luck it hit the turret
squarely. The tank withdrew but was later observed
to be enveloped in Aame.
On the night of the 10th the enemy struck again
at the 2d Battalion lines. At approximately 2230 the
area became alive. Patrols were engaged and there
were sharp clashes. When enemy troops were discovered advancing in force, artillery and all other available weapons roared. The enemy was repelled again.
In the meantime, the counterattacking Germans,
which had struck our lst Battalion during the late
afternoon of the 9th, had captured Bardenberg. The
enemy's occupation of this town cut off in Wurselen a
reinforced battalion of the l l 9th Infantry Regiment.
Our 3d Battalion, less Company "K," was ordered to
attack Bardenberg from the north, thereby relieving
the nearly completely surrounded elements of the
l I 9th Infantry. Company "K" was retained in Regi mental reserve while Company "F" occupied Ofden,
the town which the 3d Battalion had been garrisoning.
Company "F" completed this relief of the 3d Battalion
at 0130 on the 11th of October. Weeks later, a member of the 3d Battalion received a clipping from his
home-town paper which told that, "Ofden was the
most-shelled one-street town in Germany." I le could
vouch for the veracity of the statement.
Following a terrific artillery preparation, one of the
largest which had supported the Hegiment up to this
time, the 3d Battalion attacked Bardenbcrg at 0900 on
the 11th. Supported by a company of tanks, the troops
assaulted the town. Immediately after gaining a toehold our men were engaged in fierce house-to-house
fighting.
During the early stages of the attack, Company "I"
was advancing through its sector near the southern
end of the town when it was halted by heavy machine92

gun fire coming from a house located at a road intersection . The enemy machine gunners had excellent
fields of fire and observation on all the approaches
to the house. Moreover, behind the gun were enemy
armored vehicles which were firing on another sector
of the town.
To overcome the machine gun and reach the armored vehicles, Capt Charles H. Shaw, Command-

Technical Sergeant Fogli knocked out a Germon tonk with a
captured gun

Seldom did our men at Birk dare leave their foxholes

ing Officer of Company "I," decided to send one squad
up one road, while another squad diverted the gunner's attention by advancing down another road. As
the two squads approached the enemy gun along
these two avenues of approach, the Germans fired a
hail of bullets which halted both groups.
At this time S/Sgt Jack J. Pendleton, leader of one
of the s(1uads, saw that immediate action was necessary. Telling the other members of his squad to remain where they were, he started to crawl toward the
enemy gun. When he was within approximately fifty
yards 01 it, the enemy gunner turned the fire on
him, wounding him in the leg. Although painfully crippled, S/ Sgt Pendleton continued to crawl

Lieutenant Colonel Howard W. Greer
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toward the gun. While he was doing this, the other
squad, temporarily freed of the machine-gun fire,
started advancing toward the enemy position. While
the gunner continued to fire upon him, S / Sgt
Pendleton slowly crawled toward the gun, firing his
M-1 rifle as he advanced. He was within approximately five yards of the emplacement when he was
hit and killed by a burst of machine-gun fire.
In the meantime, by drawing fire upon himself,
S/ Sgt Pendleton enabled the other squad to move
to a point where it could knock out the enemy
gun. With this resistance overcome, the company was
able to advance through its sector and knock out many
of the armored vehicles which had been protected
by the machine gun.
S/ Sgt Pendleton was a brave man. He gave his life
in order that others might live and, as the result of his
superb courage, he was awarded the Medal of Honor
posthumously.
In the center o[ Bardenberg, the battalion was halted
by enemy tanks. For a fleeting moment it looked as
if the attack would bog down. Acting with great skill
and courage Major Greer, who was personally leading
his troops, opened bazooka fire on two enemy tanks
when they were only about thirty yards from him.
t le succeeded in knocking out the tanks, and his
troops, heartened by the gallant spirit of their commander, surged forward with renewed energy and
rapidly cleared the town.
Just before dark the fighting became sharpest, but
by late evening the entire town was retaken and
cleared of the enemy, and contact was reestablished
with the cut-off battalion of the I 19th Infantry. During the course of the attack, although suffering only
moderate casualties, the battalion took one hundred
prisoners, four tanks and twelve halftracks, and killed
thirty of the enemy. A battalion of the I 19th Infantry
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relieved the 3d Battalion, which withdrew to positions
north of Bardenberg, supporting the defense in depth.
Enemy action against the 1st and 2d Battalions this
day continued to consist of numerous small thrusts at
our lines with infantry and tanks, apparently with the
design of reconnoitering our situation and determining
the best spot at which to attack. All of these attacks were successfully repulsed. That night, the
enemy moved against the 2d Battalion positions with
armor, but was stopped. The attack was turned into
the positions of friendly troops on the left where some
penetrations were made.
In the morning the Regimental Command Post was
moved from Merkstein to Zopp, which is located on
the main highway connecting I Ierzogenrath with
Alsdorf.
On October 12th the Hegimental disposition re
vealed the 1st Battalion holding Birk and the high
ground immediately to the south and the 2d Battalion
located on the high ground northwest of Euchen. On
this day came the enemy's strongest bid for a comeback. Firing a terrific artillery concentration on our
positions, the enemy launched an attack against the
2d Battalion at 0700 and against the lst Battalion
at 0730. During the preparatory fire which the enemy
directed on the !st Battalion, the members of two entire artillery forward observer groups were either
killed or wounded. Capt Michael S. Bouchlas, the
battalion artillery liaison officer, crossed open, fireswept terrain to observe and adjust the fire of friendly
artillery units. Within an hour and a half the enemy's
artillery had inflicted fifty-three casualties upon the
1st Battalion, including five officers, of whom two
were company commanders. Nevertheless, the men
were set and waiting for the enemy when the concentrations were lifted. Fortunately, Capt Bouchlas succeeded in directing the fire of the entire Corps artil
lery quickly and effectively on the attacking Germans.
Unable to reach the 2d Battalion positions because
of the intense fire, the attack swung toward the lst
Battalion, advancing against the right Aank ( Company "C") and against the leFt Aank ( Company "A") .
The 506th Panzer Grenadier Battalion led the attack,
followed by the Panzer Grenadier Battalion of the
108th Panzer Brigade. Tanks did succeed in advanc·
ing to within 150 yards of our positions, and it is
known that one company of fourteen Mark VI tanks
and two companies of mixed Mark IV and V tanks
were involved. By I 030 the attack had been completely repulsed with severe losses to the enemy. It
w~ reported that eight tanks were knocked out. Later

interrogation of prisoners of war revealed that it was
the first case of a Mark VI tank of his unit being
knocked out by gunfire.
In defeating the fierce counterattack which was the
heaviest against the Division during the penetration
of the Siegfried Line and the strongest we met during
the war excepting at Mortain, the troops of the lst
Battalion and of Antitank Company reached the ultimate in courage. The firing of a carefully camouflaged
machine gun or antitank gun caused disclosure of the
gun's position. Disclosure resulted in receiving immediate and fearfully accurate tank fire From close
ranges. Our gun crews were literally blown out of
their holes by the power of the heavy 88mm shells
which tore into the perfectly constructed positions.
Yct guns opened fire as needed, the crews well realizing that disclosure of position meant that they too
faced nearly certain death. Many brave men fought
and died that morning oF October the 12th.
Meanwhile, on the same day, the 3d Battalion, less
Company "K," was again attached to the I 19th Infantry with the mission of attacking southeast of Bardenberg toward the western part of Wurselen. Overcoming heavy artillery and persistent small-arms fire,
Company "I," with Company "L" on its left, reached
the main highway to Alsdorf, where the battalion consolidated and established contact with the lst Battalion, I 20th Infantry, on the left, and the I 19th Infantry on the right.
On the following day the 3d Battalion was relieved
from attachment to the 119th Infantry and was attached to the I 16th Infantry of the 29th Division,
this latter regiment being attached to our Division.
During the ensuing two days, until the 15th of October, the battalion remained in position on the Alsdorf
highway, bounding North Wurselen. The enemy had
excellent observation on the battalion's entire sector
and, launching the heaviest artillery concentrations
encountered by the battalion during its entire period
of combat, the enemy methodically destroyed building after building, forcing the men to remain in their
foxholes. From fifteen to twenty casualties were inflicted each day by this heavy artillery fire.
From October 13th through October 15th, the
Regiment continued to occupy and actively defend
its positions.
The 3<l Battalion received orders to attack Wursclcn
on the 15th of October. This action was part of a
larger attack made by the 116th Infantry Regiment to
which it should be remembered our 3d Battalion was
then attached. The Germans defended Wurselcn with

Wurselen looked like some of the Normandy villages

a strong and stubborn force, taking maximum advantage of the natural strength of houses for defensive
fighting. The attack failed; twelve of our men, including two officers, were killed.
fhe mission of the Division at this time was to close
the Aachen gap, thereby preventing the garrison of
that city from escaping. The main effort to accomplish this mission was being made on the Division's
right. In order to mislead the enemy as to the point of
the main effort our H.egiment, together with the I 17th
Infantry to our left, was directed to make strong and
spectacular feints.
At 0700 on October 16, our artillery placed heavy
concentrations of high explosives and smoke on
Euchen. Company "H" assisted by laying down a

smoke screen east of the town. Company "G" brought
direct fire upon the enemy positions with all of its
weapons. At 0715 Company "G" ceased firing and
Company "l I" took up where they left off, continuing
to fire until 0730. At the conclusion of the firing, the
forward elements of the 2d Battalion suffered what
they described as the most severe artillery and mortar
concentrations they had experienced since landing in
Normandy on June 13th. This heavy enemy fire lasted
until 1100. The enemy, no doubt, believed that they
had been successful in quelling a big attack on our
part.
Prior to the feint, observation posts were alerted to
record the times and impact areas of the enemy's
counterfires. By means of these and subsequent ob95
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servations, accurate information of the enemy's fire
plan was obtained. This information later proved of
great value because, weeks later when we resumed
our large-scale offensive, our troops were able to safely
bypass most of these impact areas. Those that could
not be bypassed were crossed so rapidly that the troops
had cleared before the enemy brought clown his defensive fires.
At 1300 two platoons of Company "K" jumped off
with a company of the I 17th Infantry on their left,
moving toward a railroad located some 300 yards to
their front. The 2d Battalion supported this attack by
fire. After reaching the objective at 1345, they were
ordered to withdraw slowly at 1515 and to occupy
their original positions. This maneuver distracted and
contained the enemy, allowing the l I 9th Infantry,
on the Regiment's right, to attack to the south successfully and come closer to effecting a linkup with elements of the 1st Division which were attacking from
the south.
f folding the line from October 17th through the
3 !st, the Regiment continued in the active defense
of its sector. The enemy continued to place artillery
into our positions which, at times, was unquestionably
heavy. His air activity continued to be limited to a
small number of aircraft, usually one or two which
dropped quantities of small antipersonnel bombs during the hours of darkness. These aircraft usually appeared just as dusk arrived and continued to operate
for an hour or two thereafter. On three occasions the
enemy bombed his own troops in Euchen.
On the 17th of October Company "F" relieved
Company "K" in the front lines at 1907.
Two enemy on motorcycles ran through the outposts
of the 1st Battalion at 1900 and were captured when
their vehicles stalled. They had been out foraging for
food. Good communications from one company to
another kept the entire battalion informed as to the
whereabouts of the motorcycles, thereby making their
capture possible.
On a Sunday morning two Germans, dressed as
priests, were brought to the 1st Battalion Command
Post because they had been observed moving around
behind our lines. After explaining that they were going
to church in Bardenberg they were released. Several
hours later 1st Sgt Ernest F. Sharpe of f leadquarters
Company, 1st Battalion, thought over the incident and
decided to go to Bardenberg to investigate the two
clergymen. Once again they were picked up, and
IPW investigators, upon interrogating them, learned
that one was a German battalion commander and the

other was a company commander of the German garrison in Aachen. Both Germans were taken prisoner.
On October 20th our artillery placed smoke in front
of our positions to identify targets for friendly air
crews. The enemy, in turn, placed a smoke screen
behind the forward elements of our 2d Battalion
in an ineffective attempt to draw clown our own
aerial bombardment on our troops.
On the night of October 20th a patrol from the 1st
Battalion, led by Lt Archie J. Piscitello, was sent southeast of Birk. Armed with German automatic weapons,
it fired at random toward the enemy positions. There
was no immediate result, hut after the patrol had returned to our lines the enemy fired a machine gun and
laid down mortar fire into the area where the patrol
had been. The men reported that they had had trouble operating the German weapons. Frequent stoppages resulted in loss of fire power and time.
Almost every night patrols were dispatched from
the battalions. Even on the brightest evenings groups
of dark figures would make their way through the
draws, or perhaps across the beet fields, toward the
enemy lines around Euchen. Company "B's" Lt Greer
A. Utley led many patrols during this period; he frequently complimented the men he led, and observed
that they were extraordinarily combat-wise, that experience had made them exceptionally proficient in
the life-a nd-death game of scouting enemy defenses.
Meanwhile, from the 16th to the 20th of October,
the 3d Battalion, still attached to the I 16th Infantry,
maintained its defensive positions along the Alsdorf
highway. Throughout the five-day period enemy artillery and mortar fire was consistently heavy, and the
Germans attempted two counterattacks, during which
twelve of our men were killed and forty-two wounded.
These thrusts were stopped by artillery, mortar and
small-arms fire.
Information was received at 1200 on October 22d
that the XIX Corps had been transferred to the Ninth
Army and that, as a result, this Regiment was no longer
a part of the First Army.
At 07 45 on the 21st of October, while attached to
the 116th Infantry on its right, the 3d Battalion staged
an attack on Wursclen, which was intended to divert
enemy reserves from the main effort farther south to
close the so-called Aachen "gap" between the 30th
Division and the 1st Division and thus encircle the
city. Company "K," which was in Regimental reserve, at the same time attacked the town of Euchen
in a sector 3000 yards north from Ofden in another
diversionary mission.
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Company "I" and Company "L" initially made
rapid progress, and both companies entered Wurselen
about 500 yards beyond the Alsdorf highway. The
unit on the right, however, which was to attack at
the same time, was unable to advance so rapidly, and
at 1414 after a 200-round artillery preparation, a counterattacking force of fifty infantry of the 116th Panzer
Division cut off one platoon from the rest of the company. It became obvious that these men would be
unable to prevent the enemy from overrunning their
positions and thereby threaten the whole battalion's
effort. Realizing this, Lt Francis L. f Ierbert, platoon
leader, radioed the commanding officer of Company
"I" and asked that a prearranged artillery concentration be placed on the position, although he knew that
the platoon would be well within range of this fire.
The request was granted, the mission was fired, and
the enemy counterattack was stopped at this point.
Lt Herbert was able to return with fourteen of his
men, although twenty men were lost during the action.
In commenting on the bitter hand-to-hand fighting
in which Company "I" had engaged, Capt Hill, Battalion S-3, who had observed the encounter, remarked,
"This was the first time I saw our troops engaged in
bayonet fighting with the enemy, and it was one of
the hottest fights I ever saw." The men succeeded in
disengaging themselves and withdrew in good order,
once again taking up positions on the Alsdorf highway. The cost of the attack was heavy. The 3d Battalion lost approximately sixty men including killed,
wounded and missing. However, the feint attack had
been a success. In the evening, the announcement was
made of the linkup of the 30th and 1st Divisions, and
the encirclement of Aachen, "City of the Kaisers,"
was completed.
In order to strengthen the defensive positions of
the 3d Battalion, Company "B" of the 99th Infantry
Battalion (Separate) was attached to our battalion. In
a Feat of reorganization accomplished under direct tank
fire and heavy artillery, all three companies were
tightly consolidated by nightfall.
It was reported on this day that a sample poll had
been taken in the recently "liberated" German town
of flerzogenrath to determine how the civilian Jerries
felt about the arrival of our troops. Result: all expressed bitterness towards the SS and SA; out of ninety
persons interrogated, eighty-one welcomed the American occupation-so they said.
Following a policy of giving the men relief from
front-line duty, on the 22d of October Company "A"
replaced Company "B," which was sent to a rear train-
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They were fighting the men of the Regiment an hour before

ing area. On the following day, Company "B" was
again sent into position in place of Company "A,"
while Company "C" replaced Company "K" on the
line. Company "E" was replaced by Company "K"
on October 24th, and the 3d Battalion was relieved
from the control of the I 16th Infantry and for twentyfour hours (October 24th) was attached to the I 19th
Infantry, after which it reverted to Division reserve.
It later (on the 27th of October) moved to a recreation
area in the vicinity of Kerkrade. On the last day of
the month, the 2d Battalion, 406th Infantry, relieved
our 1st Battalion.
Orders having been received for the relief of the
1st Battalion by the 2d Battalion, 402d Infantry Regiment, on October 27th, the latter's staff made a reconnaissance of the 1st Battalion positions in preparation
to relieve our men on the next day. This was accomplished by 1948 on October 28th, with our 1st Battalion going to the rear for rest and reorganization.
On the night of October 29th Lord Haw Haw, the
Nazi news commentator, came up with the exclusive
story of the war. In his most confidential manner,
he said that an American division, known as "Old
Hickory," had been completely wiped out north of
Aachen, and had to be withdrawn and reorganized.
Word was received on October 30th that diphtheria
existed in German-held Wurselen, and all of our men
were cautioned to take care in contacting civilians.
At the end of the month the program of giving our
men as much rest as possible was continuing. For the
first time since landing in France the front-line troops
were given an opportunity to leave their positions
and return to an "honest" rest area, where the likeli-
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hood of existing under combat conditions was remote.
During the period from October 24th through the
31st, eleven officers and 101 enlisted men were sent
to Paris, where they en joyed two days leave. From
October 25th through the 3 !st, eighty enlisted men
were sent to Valkenburg, between I Ieerlen and
Maastricht, l Iolland. Four officers and forty enlisted
men were issued passes and transported to l-Ieerlen
during the two-day period of October 30th and 31st.
When our men were not enjoying the pleasures
of the rest areas or actually in the front lines, they
continued to train. Together with the cleaning of
weapons, the men were instructed in the use of German weapons, map reading, and camouflage discipline. A concerted effort was made to familiarize each
man with every weapon. Orientation lectures were
given and the lessons learned from past combat experiences were brought to the attention of our men.
The month of October saw the I 20th Infantry Regiment actively contribute to the first large victory to
be won on German soil. Although the enemy fanatically defended his Siegfried Line positions in our sector, this desperate resistance did not prevent our men
from sealing off the city of Aachen. As a result, at
the end of the month American troops had punched
a hole in the Siegfried Line and were poised, awaiting
orders to set in motion an attack to the east which
would mean the final capitulation of our foe.
TWO PERSONAL LOSSES
And yet, along with its October victories, the Regiment had taken two great losses. Old men of the Regiment will never forget that during that month Colonel
Hammond D. Birks, Regimental commander, and Lt
Col Paul W. McCollum, Commanding Officer of the
3d Battalion, left the I 20th.
The son of a Chicago businessman, Colonel Birks
had been commissioned in 1917, and as captain had
commanded a 5th Division company on the line in
World War I. He served as a staff officer in the States
till 1928, when he took command of a company in the
35th Infantry in l lawaii. There, being an ardent athlete, he coached basketball. f le returned to the States
in 1932, and after an assignment as staff officer for a
short while again, he became professor of Military
Science and Tactics at the University of Minnesota.
In 1937 he was made battalion commander in the 21st
Infantry, then in I lawaii; here he cooched baseball.
Two years later he organized and commanded for a
year the Reception Center at Fort Custer, Michigan.
After a year as G-3 for the XI Corps he came to the

!20th Regiment at Fort Jackson, in South Carolina.
If Colonel Birks' philosophy could be summed up
in three words, it would certainly be, "Always a Winner." From the beginning it was clear that his regiment was going to be a winning organization. He
had been a successful coach, for he was an enthusiastic believer in athletics. I le made sure that the teams
he coached and the teams of units he commanded,
particularly of the I 20th, were topnotch. Under his
active guidance the Regiment had even in garrison
achieved the reputation of being "Always a Winner."
The championship on the playing fields carried over
into inspections and maneuvers. No untried outfit was
better prepared for combat than the I 20th when it
came overseas in February 1944.
In combat the I 20th was still topnotch, and the
man responsible was still Colonel Birks. In every action, no matter how dangerous or how desperate, the
Regimental CP was close behind the front lines, so
close that once, at Mortain, it had to move to the rear
to avoid excessive casualties.
But Colonel Birks did not stay long in his CP. I le
moved among the men of his outfit; he led them usually in body as well as on paper; and he knew them
each and every one. And most of all, because the !20th
Infantry Hegiment was what he wanted it to be"Always a Winner"-he took pride in it. Great pride.
Few men ever served Colonel Birks as well as he
served his men. When he left the I 20th to become
Assistant Division Commander of the 9th Infantry
Division, his soldiers knew he would do well and
wished him luck. But they would miss him.
Throughout the campaign in France Colonel Birks
had been especially proud of his 3d Battalion; since
it was led by so inspiring and energetic a man as Lt
Col McCollum, it was no wonder.
Lt Col l\1cCollum was a native of Concord, North
Carolina. I le attended North Carolina State College
and received from there his Heserve commission in
1934. After graduation he became in time assistant
superintendent in a Cannon Mills Plant in Concord.
In 1940 he transferred from the Army Hcserve Corps
to the National Guard so that two years later when
the 30th Division mobilized, he was a first lieutenant
in the I 20th's Company "E," made up for the most
part of Concord men. Hising rapidly to company com
mander and then lst Battalion Executive Officer, he
was given command of the 3<l Battalion in May, I 9H.
A classmate at college, and assistant Regimental S-1,
CWO J. B. Liles had to say of him: "Always quiet,
always easygoing and conservative; never ruffied,
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never anything but as a matter of course. When the
going was rough, and things were noisy, there you
found him-looking around."
"Mac was more than a name," said Colonel Birks.
"After going through all the narrow escapes that he
went through, all of us began to think him immune.
If you remember, he was wounded once before and
could have been evacuated, but did not even miss a
day, but carried the lead around in his leg up until
the time he was killed. He was certainly a fine example to all of us in every respect. He had great
courage and was able to think on his feet, calmly and
coolly at all times. And I have heard him speak on the
radio many times directing his companies when I
could hear the fire all around him over the radio.
He always had a smooth working battalion." Lt Col
McCollum was an unAinchingly aggressive fighter
through and through. His death from enemy artillery
on the 5th of October shocked the Regiment and
caused grief to every man who knew him.
Two great men passed from the 120th in October.
But they will not be forgotten. · Because of their good
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work, men will attack harder and defend more stubbornly. Because of their work, the men who knew
and worked under them will take greatest pride in the
I 20th, the Regiment that is "Always a Winner."
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On the 1st of November, 1944, the 120th Infantry
Regiment was in a defensive position which it had
occupied and actively defended since the I 0th of
October. The right boundary of our position was located north of Wurselen on the main highway running from Wurselen to Alsdorf. The left boundary
was located between Ofden and Alsdorf, Germany.
The towns that our forward elements occupied were
Birk, Pfaffenholz and Schleibach. The Regimental
Command Post was located in Zopp. The I 19th Infantry Regiment was occupying a defensive position
on our right while the I 17th Infantry Regiment, also
in a defensive position, was on our left.
During the period from the 1st to the 16th of November there was no action of any great proportion
by our forces or by the enemy. Regimental activity
during this time consisted of constantly improving our
defensive positions. Strict camouRage discipline was
maintained. Foxholes were deepened and greater protection was obtained also by increasing the thickness of
covers. In addition to these acts of a purely defensive
nature, constant patrol activity was maintained to determine the strength of the enemy and to note any
changes that might have taken place in the enemy
front lines.
The 1st and 3d Battalions of our Regiment occupied the forward positions of our line from the I st to
the 3d of November. The enemy continued to harass
our positions with artillery and mortar fire, although
it was not intense. Enemy patrols were also operating
in our area, one being contacted by the 3d Battalion
which it dispersed by killing one man and wounding
another.
RECREATION BEHIND THE LINES
Continuing the active defense of our Regimental
sector the 2d Battalion, which had been in the rear
area for rest and reorganization, relieved the 3d Battalion on the 4th of November. The 3d Battalion was
placed in Division reserve. The enemy continued to
harass our positions with artillery and mortar fire, but
it was sporadic in nature and was not intense. The
lst and 2d Battalions continued to hold their defensive positions for the next two days. While still in a
defensive position, no opportunity for improving our
positions was overlooked. Aggressive patrolling was
continued. During the night of the 6th of Novemher one of our patrols succeeded in gaining information in regard to enemy positions. Information gained
from interrogation of civilians who came through our

lines from enemy territory seemed to indicate that
the enemy line to our front was thinly held, but that
it contained a number of "strongpoints" which covered routes we would be apt to use in attacking.
The 1st Battalion was relieved by the 3d Battalion
on the 6th, the relief being completed at 1915. The
1st Battalion moved to the Division Recreation area
in the vicinity of Kerkrade.
The 2d and 3d Battalions actively defended their
positions in the line from the 7th to the 10th of November. The enemy continued to harass our positions
with artillery, mortar and small-arms fire. Our patrols
were active during this period and succeeded in gaining information relative to the "dug-in" positions of
the enemy to our front. It was found that the holes
were unoccupied during the day, hut that these positions were manned at night.
Our 3d Battalion was relieved hy the 3d Battalion of
the 335th Infantry Regiment on the 10th of November. For this relief this battalion was attached to the
l20th Infantry Regiment but was attached to the
I 19th Infantry Regiment effective at 0300 on the 11th.
The relieving battalion had completed the physical
occupation of our forward line by 1900. This left only
our 2d Battalion in the line at this time. The other
two battalions were placed in the reserve area to enable them to carry out plans and preparations for the
coming operations. The 3d Battalion was in the area
near Merkstein and the 1st Battalion had its company
"C" in Zopp. Companies "A" and "B" were infiltrated
into positions in the 2d Battalion area on the front
lines so that they would be in position for the attack,
which was scheduled originally for the 11th of November, weather permitting.
During the period from the 11th to the 15th of
November the Regiment awaited weather suitable for
the attack. Preparations were improved for the coming
operation by reconnaissances, patrolling and a complete and thorough orientation of all the men. Weather
conditions were such as to keep activity of our forces
and those of the enemy at a minimum.
On the 14th of November the enemy evidently attempted to strengthen his positions to our front as a
group of approximately thirty-five men was observed
digging in during the daylight hours. Artillery fire was
placed on them with good results; about half of the
enemy observed became casualties.
The final days before the attack of the 16th of November found most of the men ready to jump off again,
despite their dread of advancing over open ground
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There wasn't much left of Euchen

against well-prepared defenses. To the veterans of
Normandy, Northern France, Belgium and Holland,
the war in Germany thus far had had a foreboding
aspect. In the first place, it was anticlimactic. The
cheers, the cries of "alles kaput," and the proffered
and accepted handouts as the troops pushed across the
continent were things of the past. The war had seemed
won then, but now they all knew that the enemy had
somehow gained a breather, that he was fighting
desperately to make the most of his final chance, and
that he was still powerful.
This was not like much of the fighting in France

where the enemy conserved his shells. Here, during
the month of static defense, the enemy showed his
wares. For the first time, the Germans seemed to equal
our artillery and mortar concentrations. It was a new
experience, continually to wonder, as you stepped out
of a doorway or a foxhole, if a shell would come in
at that moment. It happened so often that it was wise
to think twice about undertaking even the most common, or essential, errands. More and more men came
to live in basements and learned to appreciate these
solid German structures, even if they were filled with
junk and smelled to heaven. Men in the foxholes on
101
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Start of "The Perfect Infantry Attack"

the front line were forced to stay in their holes all
day, being relieved at night under cover of darkness by
a new crew which held the position until just before
daybreak. As a result sanitary standards hit a new
low. The K-ration box proved its worth time and
again. It not only contained most of the food available during those days, but it heated the coffee (often
made from rain water because cans for fresh water
were not plentiful) and caught the urine of men in
the foxholes who could not get out during the day to
relieve themselves in a normal way.
The mud, rain, and cold added to the miseries of
war, but all of this could have been endured with
little thought if there had been any reason to believe
that the enemy was whipped. But this he certainly
was not. More than one veteran, as he lay in a basement or sweated it out in a foxhole, wondered how
much farther his luck would carry him. It was without question a depressing period for our troops. The
only way out was to attack, to move forward, to drive
even deeper into the unknown fortress of Germany.
THE PERFECT INFANTRY ATTACK
Days of planning, preparation, patrolling, training
and reconnaissance paid big dividends on the 16th of
November and succeeding days. The 30th Division,
with the 29th Division operating on its left and the
VII Corps on its right, jumped off in an attack that
was destined to make tactical military history. The
I 20th Infantry Regiment, reinforced, 1 had the mission
of seizing the town of Euchen, Germany, which was
the enemy strongpoint in our sector. A network of
roads and also a railroad track running through the
town gave the enemy a commanding pasition which
'Attached: Company "B," 743d Tank Battalion; Company "B," 823d
Tank Destroyer Battalion.

seriously hampered our attack to the east. This railroad
track, which ran in a northeasterly direction parallel
to our front line, constituted a serious obstacle since
it was constructed of alternate cuts and fiJls.
The lst Battalion had the mission of attacking at
1300, neutralizing objectives to its front which included its portion of the railroad embankment and
also a commanding position of the Germans on a hill
to our front. The battalion jumped off in the attack
at the appointed time, the troops advancing under
a screen of artillery fire which was laid down by
the 230th Field Artillery Battalion, reinforced. Also
lending volume to the supporting fire were the 60mm
mortars of the 3d Battalion and Company "H's"
8Imms, fired in battery throughout the lst Battalion
advance, then shifted to the right when the attackers
reached Euchen.
The advance was made according to a field-manual
wnter's dream as a constant stream of fire was placed
on the enemy's strongpoint in Euchcn while the in·
fantry was attacking. When our forces reached the
railroad embankment the artillery fire lifted and there
our men were, looking right down the throats of the
Germans.
To say that the enemy was surprised is a master
piece of understatement. Our troops were on their
objective before the first hour was up, and they proceeded to mop up the position. One of the enemy's
strongpoints within the town was a railroad station
which was well fortified, but our troops succeeded in
taking thirty-one prisoners, including one officer, from
this position. An enemy 75mm gun had time to
fire only two shots before its position was overrun. A
total of 164 prisoners was taken from the Euchen defense area. The rapid initial advance of our attacking
elements not only enabled us to seize our objective
quickly but kept the casualty rate to a low figure.
Another indication of the speed of our advance is
the fact that while incoming artillery and mortar fire
was increased during the time of our attack, it fell
for the most part on areas which we had occupied
previous to our jump-off. The chances are that the
Germans were so surprised that the only thing they
could do was to fire on our old positions although our
severe artillery and mortar fire undoubtedly cut their
communications from their forward observers to their
guns.
Coordination was the explanation for the success
of the attack. In turn, this coordination was in large
measure the result of days of planning by the Regimental commander and subordinate leaders. The en-
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tire 1st Battalion had been assembled in the courtyard of the rest" area "monastery" at Kerkrade several
days prior to the attack to hear an orientation talk delivered by Major Williamson, battalion commander.
He likened the terrain over which they were to advance to the flat, tarvia courtyard on which they were
standing. I le then told the men that several fake attacks showed that it took the enemy twelve to fifteen
minutes to react with artillery and mortar fire. The
question was: "Can you advance in a fast walk, not
a run, over that 900 yards of ground within twelve
minutes?" Major Williamson received his answer on
the 16th. They could and did, despite enemy machinegun fire which swept the route of advance.
OF further assistance to the men of the 1st Battalion
in this attack were the tracings from aerial photographs
made by S/ Sgt Joseph Bleier and his operations section. These drawings of the Euchen area were distributed to all leaders including squad leaders. As a result,
the location of each house, orchard, and hedgerow was
memorized before the battalion made the attack.
Company "F" of the 2d Battalion attacked fifteen
minutes later than the 1st Battalion, according to plan,
but when it reached its section of the railroad embankment the two assault platoons were met by withering
fire from enemy automatic weapons. After attacking
all day without taking the objective, it became apparent that this was defended more strongly than Intelligence reports had indicated. Accordingly, it was
decided to by-pass it and attack from the Rank on the
following day. This attack did succeed in drawing
part of the enemy fire that might have been placed
on the 1st Battalion as it advanced.
The Air Forces gave considerable support to our attacking units by well-prepared air strikes which preceded our attack.
Correspondents briefed at higher headquarters after
the attack on the first day were told that the 30th Division had executed the "Perfect Infantry Attack."
One of the reasons our attack on Euchen on the
16th was so successful was due to the aggressive spirit
of the assaulting units. Two of the men who played
a major role in this action were 2d Lt Robert L. Minyard and S/ Sgt Thomas E. Stewart, Jr. Both Lt Minyard and S/Sgt Stewart realized the extreme urgency
of allowing nothing to halt our infantry as they pushed
across the 900 yards of unprotected ground. Lt Minyard' s platoon led across the field with S/ Sgt Stewart's
squad one of two in the vanguard.
The platoon had crossed the railroad track and was
still in open country approaching the objective
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when two enemy machine guns with supporting
riflemen opened fire from a wooded draw about 200
yards to the left running parallel to the line of advance. Grazing fire from the machine guns forced
some of our men to hit the ground. Both Lt Minyard
and S/ Sgt Stewart, who had been exhorting and leading the men forward, knew that to be pinned down
now might give the enemy the time he needed to engage the company with mortar and artillery fire.
Neither of these leaders hesitated in the advance and
continued to urge the men forward. S/Sgt Stewart
was mortally hit by an enemy bullet and fell to the
ground. As he lay dying on the field, his last act was
to continue waving the men forward.
Lt Minyard and the rest of the men continued to
move forward and were able to get on the objective
soon enough to avoid an intense enemy artillery and
mortar barrage. The inspiring leadership of both of
these men played a vital part in making our attack
successful and as a result saved the lives of many of
our men.
Being able to think fast always pays off in combat
and sometimes the ability to talk fast also pays off.
Sgt George J. Baldone and Sgt Walter W. Lippert
found that to be true during the attack on Euchen.
Company "C" was part of the attacking echelon
striking for the right Rank of the town. Pinned down
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into the procession from the positions along the road
so that in the end about thirty of the enemy were
taken and the strongpoint was reduced.
Of all the units which engaged in this day's action,
Lt Thomas Tetreault's platoon of Company "C" was
probably the busiest. After assisting in the attack on
Euchen, this platoon went on a long patrol to the left
Hank of the battalion and then made another attack
to take objective "X-ray," a piece of high wooded
ground about 200 yards southeast of Euchen. All of
these missions were completed within twelve hours.
BRO I CI TWEIDEN
Some of the prisoners were quite young

by extremely heavy automatic small -arms f-ire, some
men of the company took refuge in a near-by farm house. In this farmhouse were some Germans, prisoners who had been captured a few minutes previously. Included in the group was a medic who seemed
concerned about something. Sgt Lippert, who speaks
German, talked to the medic and learned that he was
anxious to return to a wounded man whom he had
left in a house about 300 yards up the street. The
medic offered to induce his comrades to surrender if
Sergeants Baldone and Lippert would accompany him
on the mission.
Although enemy fire continued spasmodically, the
two men boldly elected to take the chance since they
realized that success in thus easily capturing the stubbornly defended area would avoid the cost of many
casualties among our troops. The trio had walked about
twenty-five yards when the German machine gun just
off the street began firing at them. Both Sgt Lippert
and the medic called out in German for the fire to
cease, which it did. Reaching the house, after passing
several buildings and entrenchments in which German
infantrymen were observed, they met a German sublieutenant who was in charge. Pressed to surrender,
he refused vehemently. Sgt Baldone requested Sgt
Lippert to tell him that the Germans were surrounded,
but the sublieutenant asked why he should give up.
Sergeant Lippert then asked the sublieutenant if
he had ever received letters from his friends or relatives in our prison camps. He said he had. Sgt Lippert asked if those letters did _not state that ~hey we~e
being well treated. The subheutenant admitted this,
and apparently convinced, threw his weapon down
and commanded the rest of his men to do likewise.
As they marched the group back, other Germans fell

On the 17th of November the mission of the I 20th
Infantry H.egimcnt 2 was to advance to the southeast
and seize the towns of Linden and Neusen, Germany.
The 2d Battalion was given the mission of taking the
town of Neusen. According to plan it jumped off
at 0700 from a Line of Departure in the vicinity of
Euchen. A primary objective was designated which
was the small town of Broicherhauschen. Our rapid
advance on this position again caught the enemy by
surprise, and our troops quickly captured the hamlet.
After rapid reorganization, the battalion, with Company "E" on the left and Company "G" on the right,
moved forward from Broicherhauschen in the attack
on Neusen and succeeded in taking its objective in a
very short time. After reaching the objective the troops
were subjected to an intense enemy artillery barrage,
but consolidation and reorganization were done
quickly, which made casualties negligible. It had been
noticed in two different actions by this battalion that
the enemy throws five amber Aares at the time our attackers are discovered.
In this same action 1st Sgt Hard J. Woody was acting in the capacity of platoon leader in Company "G."
When the company left the Line of Departure, it immediately encountered a concentrated mortar barrage.
First Sgt Woody led his platoon forward through the
barrage, refusing to let his men become pinned down.
Had 1st Sgt Woody lived, he soon would have been
a lieutenant. Because of 1st Sgt Woody's skill and
bravery, the Regimental Commander had recommended him for battlefield promotion. Nine casualties
were inflicted on his platoon, but advancing rapidly his
unit overran the German mortar positions. In the confusion, the rest of the company <lid not reach these
forward positions, hut 1st Sgt Woody realized that the
attack would have to continue. Personally leading his
'Attached: Company "B," 7'43d Tank Battalion; Company "B," 82Bd
Tank Destroyer Battalion.
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men Woody moved forward in the attack on Neusen.
An enemy machine gun placed a deadly stream of
fire on the men . First Sgt Woody dispersed his platoon
and prepared to attack the gun position, first advancing his men in short rushes, cutting from one side of
the road to the other to get closer to the gun. First Sgt
Woody, with no thought of his own safety, ran up
the road in an effort to reach the foremost elements
of his platoon. It was during this courageous action
that he was mortally wounded in the chest by a burst
from the machine gun which also wounded a man
following him. Though seriously wounded, he insisted the other man be evacuated first. In this gallant
action 1st Sgt Woody denied himself the immediate
medical attention that might have saved his life. He
died before medical aid men returned to evacuate
him, but his aggressive and superb leadership had
taken his platoon forward so rapidly that they overran
the enemy defenses, prevented them from reorganizing, and made possible the advance of the whole
company.
Our other objective for this day's operation was the
town of Linden which was located southwest of Neusen. Both of these towns were on the Weiden-HogenAldenhoven road which the enemy was trying desperately to hold as it was a vital link in their defense.
They moved the 1st Battalion, 8th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment, up from the Wurselen area to defend the
territory around Linden.
Our 3d Battalion which had been in Regimental
reserve up to this point jumped off in the attack
at 0700 and caught the enemy by surprise. In
fact, our advance was so rapid that we were on their
position before they had time to prepare an adequate defense; and their resistance consisted mainly of
small-arms fire from buildings and cellars. Although
we were on the position forty minutes after the jumpoff, it did not mean that the Germans were convinced
that we were there to stay. In fact, so determined were
they to regain this position, they launched a counterattack at 1115 against the town. This attack was made
with seven tanks supported by infantry. The tanks
apparently came from the area of Eschweiler and
turned north to attack our defenses in Linden.
Our forces refused to give up the town and by wellplaced artillery and antitank fires they succeeded in
routing the enemy attack. One of the German tanks
was knocked out with a bazooka and the rest of the
tanks were driven off. The battalion continued to
clean up the town of Linden, and at 1700 it secured
its positions for the night. A total of 326 PWs were
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Artillery forward observers fought with us

taken during the operation and interrogation of the
men that we had captured showed that our operations
during the past two days were a complete surprise to
the enemy.
On November 11th the 3d Battalion resumed the
attack at 0700. It was strictly house-to-house fighting; the enemy resisted the advance doggedly and taking one house was a noteworthy gain. It was necessary
to grab the prisoners out of cellars and buildings. An
indication of the stubborn attitude of the enemy was
the fact that we succeeded in gaining only 500 yards
on this date.
It was very evident that the enemy by now was
ready to meet our further advances, and he used his
mortars to lay in a very heavy barrage of fire on the
attacking battalion. We were successful though in
taking a total of 106 prisoners during our operation
of this date. One of the prisoners taken during this
period was the commanding officer of the 9th Company, 8th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. He said that
the men surrendering with him were the last handful
of men that he had; this company can then be added
to the long list of those destroyed by this Regiment.
Perhaps more would have been added had we not
been very short of artillery ammunition. Observers
were helpless when, on the 18th, they saw enemy
retreating eastward toward Eschweiler in large numbers.
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It was not all town fighting

During this attack Company "I" was held up in its
advance by a machine gun strategically located on the
main street of the town. It was decided to move a tank
up into a position where it could knock out the gun.
The tank could not move · beyond the forward elements, however, because of a series of mines stretched
across the street. Sgt Isidore Eisenberg, quickly sizing
up the situation, took a long pale with a hook on the
end and used it to remove four of the mines. I le did
this by reaching out from the cover of a building and
dragging the mines to him. After he had removed four
mines he realized it would be impossible to reach two
additional mines because his pole was too short. Although he realized that to expose himself would mean
that he would be under direct enemy fire, he stepped
out into the middle of the street and removed one of
the mines. I le then went out into the street a second
time, still in direct view of the gunner, and removed
the other one. Were it not for his action the company
would have suffered heavier casualties in accomplishing its mission.
Also in this same attack Pvt William C. Hobertson
noticed two German soldiers entering a house about
a hundred yards to his front. While exposed to heavy
machine-gun fire, he carefully made his way to the
house, taking advantage of what cover the surrounding buildings offered him. Upan reaching the build-

ing the Germans had entered he fired several shots
through the door with his M -1 riHe and demanded
that the Germans surrender. After several minutes
and without firing another shot, fifty-two Germans
emerged from the house and surrendered to him. Pvt
Hobertson then guarded his prisoners for about half
an hour until assistance arrived.
During the 18th of November the 2d Battalion remained in Neusen stretching its right Hank to maintain
contact with the 3d Battalion as it moved towards
Vorweiden.
On the 17th and 18th, the 1st Battalion remained
in its position in Euchen. During this time, it had
the mission of cleaning up any enemy resistance left
in our area which might have been by-passed by our
rapid advance on Neusen and Linden. A patrol of
fourteen men investigated the wooded area northwest
of Neuscn and picked up two prisoners. Led hy Lt
Archie J. Piscitello, one rifle platoon, reinforced with
a section of light machine guns and a mortar squad,
cleaned out the area north of Euchcn and picked up
a couple of stragglers. Information concerning minefields in that area was obtained.
Continuing our drive toward the town of Vorweiden, the 3d Battalion resumed the attack on the
I 9th of November. Our continuous pressure on the
enemy positions in that sector forced him to with·
draw his Forces during the night of the 18th, and he
left only a skeleton force in Vorweiden to delay our
advance. Because of this action the battalion was able
to advance into Vorweiden with only small-arms fire
to harass its advance. By 1045 on the 19th they were
on the objective and had made contact with the 119th
Infantry Hegiment, which was operating on our right
Hank. Our advance was so rapid that it was unnecessary to fire captured l 2cm mortars which we had
planned to use in this attack.
During this drive toward Vorweiden S/ Sgt Edward
J. Anenen and his squad were ordered to secure a
dugout on the flank of some houses which the company was to take. On the previous day, machinegun fire had been coming from this dugout, preventing the company from advancing on the houses.
S/ Sgt Anenen had led his s(1uad about a hundred
yards along open terrain toward the objective, when
it was pinned down by machine-gun fire coming
from a house about 200 yards away. The men had
no possible cover and could neither advance nor move
back without being hit by the gun. S/Sgt Anenen with
complete disregard for his own personal safety dashed
back about a hundred yards to the jumping-off point
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where he was able to secure supporting fire and cover
the withdrawal of his men. Several minutes after the
squad moved back, the area which it had occupied
was hit directly by mortar fire.
That afternoon the squad, supPorted by two tanks,
again attacked in this area. Advancing a short distance
in front of his squad as scout, S/ Sgt Anenen spotted
a machine gun located in a house about fifty yards
in front of him and had the information sent back to
his platoon. A few minutes later he was lightly
wounded by this gun, but because of the information
he secured concerning its position another squad was
able to knock it out shortly thereafter by approaching
it from another direction.
On the 18th of November, Hegiment was ordered
to support by fire the attack of the I 17th Infantry
Regiment on St. Joris, which was scheduled for dawn
the following day. In order to accomplish this mission
most effectively and with the most surprise to the
enemy, an unusual plan was used. The best positions
for machine-gun supPorting fires lay in an open beet
field to the south of Neusen. During the night two
heavy machine-gun platoons of Company "D," reinforced with two riHe platoons, moved approximately
500 yards south of the town and immediately to the left
(west) Hank of the enemy in St. Joris. By dawn, our
troops were dug in and camouAaged perfectly. In order
to further strengthen the supporting direct fires, tanks
and tank destroyers were sneaked into firing positions
near the east edge of Neusen. For indirect fire, mortars
were set up between Broicherhof and Broich. In addition to our own, use was made of German mortars
and several thousand rounds of ammunition which had
been captured a few days before. At 0800 on the 19th,
St. Joris erupted. Our artillery and mortar concentrations were heavy. The surprise fire from the tanks and
tank destroyers and, above all, from the machine guns
in an apparently unoccupied field was terrific. Elements of the 11 ?th Infantry Regiment, under cover of
these fires, captured St. Joris with very few casualties.
Friends from our sister regiment reported that these
suprorting fires had knocked the Germans groggy.
Thus we were able to repart on the 19th of November that all our assigned missions had been completed.
We had driven to the VII Corps boundary line, destroying all resistance.
On the 20th of November the 3d Battalion was relieved by the 3d Battalion of the 335th Infantry. The
1st Battalion was moved to the vicinity of Warden
while the 2d Battalion occupied its position in Neusen
and the 3d Battalion was withdrawn to Linden. Hot

meals were served to the men and every effort was
made to make their living conditions as comfortable as
possible. On this date plans and preparations were also
made for our continued atttack to the east. Reconnaissances were made in the vicinity of the area of
the next operation. For the first time we had the newest models of the formidable German Mark VI ( Royal
Tiger) tank in our possession and therefore experiments were conducted with the rocket launcher3 to
determine the most vulnerable spot on the Mark VI
tank, and it was found that the rocket would penetrate
the turret at any point except the front part. It would
not penetrate any other part of the tank. This information was passed on to all units.
DRIVE TO THE INDE
On the 21st of November the Regiment 4 began a
series of attacks which was to carry it to the lnde River
deeper in Germany. Plans called for carefully coordinated maneuvering and also good control of supporting fire.
The Regimental Command Post moved to Mariadorf at 0730 on the 21st. The 3d Battalion also moved
into the town to be in readiness for commhment during the prospective drive.
With the 413th Infantry Regiment, l04th Infantry
Division, operating on our right and the l 75th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division on the left, the
2d Battalion opened the attack on the morning of the
21st of November, with the mission of taking Lurken,
Germany. In preparation for this attack the battalion
moved from its position in Neusen to Kinzweiler. This
territory had previously been taken by the I 17th Infantry Regiment which supported our attack by fire.
At 0800, the 2d Battalion started its attack and
closed in quickly on the town after the artillery and
other supporting fires had lifted. Enemy resistance
was not too strong, consisting mainly of small-arms
fire, and we were able to gain control of the town by
0830. Included in this same mission was the commanding ground located just east of the town, because control of this terrain was necessary for future
operations. The battalion succeeded in taking this terrain also. By 0935 we controlled both the town and
this terrain and had begun to consolidate our position.
With this town in our hands, it was then possible
to proceed to the next mission, which was to attack
and seize the towns of Laurensberg, Langweiler and
Obermerz. Accordingly two companies, "A" and "C,"
3 Launcher,

Rocket .Antitank, 2 .36 ", known as th e "bazooka."
'Attached : 743d T unk B attalion and Compa n y "B," 823 d T a n k
De•tr oyer B attalion.
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had moved from their assembly area southwest of
Warden to Kinzweiler, arriving there at 0830. From
this point they moved to Lurken which the 2d Battalion had already seized and consolidated. Elements
of the lst Battalion as they moved up behind the 2d
Battalion encountered some pockets of resistance in
the town, but quickly mopped up and moved through.
While the 1st Battalion Command Group was moving forward to direct the attack, one of its most valuable staff members, Capt D. Wilbur Williams, was
lost when he was seriously wounded by enemy artillery fire. Capt Williams had been with the 1st Battalion since its days at Camp Blanding.
The attack on Laurensberg was scheduled for 0945,
and Company "A" and Company "C" crossed the Line
of Departure on time, despite having had to make their
way through an enemy minefield. Advancing under
an artillery barrage, they were able to reach the town
of Laurensberg without too much difficulty and at
1045 they were on the objective and mopping up.
At the same time these two companies attacked,
Company "B" jumped off to take the town of Langweiler. In order to protect the left Rank of the battalion
in their drive on Laurensberg, this company attacked
from the northeast corner of Warden and succeeded
in taking the town of Langweiler at the same time

that Laurensberg was taken. Resistance in the initial
attack was not too great and most of the time was
spent in mopping operations.
T / Sgt Batiste L. Bayhylle was a platoon sergeant
in Company "B" when it attacked the town of Langwciler. No effective opposition was met until the attacking elements reached the southwestern outskirts
of the town. At this point machine-gun fire was encountered coming down the main street of the town
at about a range of 300 yards. An intense artillery
and mortar barrage also caught the men and as a result of both types of fire, the company sustained fifteen
casualties.
The 3d Platoon, which had in the meantime crossed
the road leading into the town, suffered thirteen casualties including the platoon leader, platoon guide
and one squad leader. T / Sgt Bayhylle of this platoon
was also wounded when flying shrapnel struck him
in the right shoulder. As a veteran of many battles
since landing in France, T / Sgt Bayhylle realized the
importance of maintaining the momentum of the attack. Seeing the disorganization of the platoon and
the lack of a leader, he disregarded the pain of his
wound to rally his men. } le then urged and led them
in an aggressive and successful attack through the
village and to the objective on the opposite outskirts.
Although wounded, he added to the fire power of his
platoon by firing his own weapon although it pained
him greatly to put the weapon to his shoulder. His
superb heroism greatly inspired the badly shaken platoon and enabled it to gain its objective.
After reorganization in Laurensberg, Company "C"
of the 1st Battalion, with tank support, continued the
attack to take Obermerz. With continuous pressure
exerted on the enemy the company was able to drive
into Obermerz an<l consolidate its position by 1330.
The 3<l Battalion had plans completed for the attack on Langendorf which was another one of our objectives for this <lay. After prepared artillery fires, the
battalion jumped off in the attack at 1310 from the
vicinity of Laurcnsberg. By now the enemy had succeeded in regrouping his forces and stiffer resistance
was met. Nevertheless, the battalion continued in its
drive and was successful in getting on its objective by
1500 an<l proceeded to consolidate its position. Despite
the all-destructive artillery concentrations which struck
the battalion before it could dig itself in, comparatively
few casualties were sustained.
When Langendorf was falling it appeared as if our
Regiment had made a breakthrough. Although Langendorf was the last objective scheduled for seizure dur-

-X)(-

.,_

_ - - - +-

Div ision Boundalfes
Attacking Urtit•

Fire Support
Slag Pile
Holding Area

_I

From the Siegfried Line to the Roer River

ing the day, the Regimental Commander decided to
attack Fronhaven immediately in order to exploit our
successes. Accordingly, the 2d Battalion with no prior
warning was ordered to make a forced march across
muddy, plowed fields from Lurken to Langendorf.
After the battalion had reached the near edge of this
latter town and when officers and noncommissioned
officers were reconnoitering in the vicinity of the Line
of Departure on the far ( east) edge, it became apparent that the enemy defenses were in great depth and
that no breakthrough had been made. Fairly intense
machine-gun fire and intermittent artillery concentrations interfered with the reconnaissance. Nevertheless,
plans for the attack were continued.
At about 1350 Company "F" on the right and Company "G" on the left were on the Line of Departure.
Just as the attack was being started, the enemy retaliated with very heavy concentrations of artillery. This
enemy fire broke up the attack before it could be
launched. Immediately a new Line of Departure,
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forward of the old, was designated. Members of Companies "F" and "G" infiltrated through continuing
heavy artillery fires to this new line. At 1650 the attack
. h Compames
· "F" an d "G"
on Fron hoven began wit
attacking abreast. When the battalion attacked, the
enemy increased his fire terrifically, and it seemed as
if we would be unable to advance. It was getting late
in the day and due to the fighting in the morning and
the forced march to the Line of Departure, the men
were tired, very tired, nearly exhausted.
Colonel B. P. Purdue, Commanding Officer of the
Regiment, sensing the situation, personally took charge
of the attack. When the riAe companies moved out,
he saw it would be necessary for the tanks to advance
in support of the advancing troops. These tanks had
been assigned a base-of-fire mission. Under heavy artillery and mortar fire Colonel Purdue went over to the
tank commander, explained the situation hurriedly,
and ordered the tanks to move out, which they did in
almost record time. Colonel Purdue then took charge
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tense small-arms fire. When he reached the edge of
Fronhoven, the other men, inspired by his daring ac~
tion, rose and followed him.
With the capture of Fronhoven, our attacking operations for the day ceased. During the day's operation~
we captured and neutralized a total of six towns. Two
hundred prisoners were taken.
The Regimental Command Post had been moved
to Langweiler.
ERBEHICI I AND LOI IN

One round on the way!

of the leading elements of the attack and the battalion
moved into the town driving the enemy still farther
east. It was getting dark when the attack jumped off,
and when the battalion entered the town it was dark,
but nevertheless the troops continued to mop up on
the position and Colonel Purdue stayed with the men
until he saw that the town was securely in our hands.
Other individual actions led to the capture of Fronhoven. Lt Col James W. Cantey, Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, also led one of the attacking
companies. The commander of Company "G" was
killed at the start of the attack and Lt Col Cantey made
his way to the head of the company. Taking command,
he urged the men forward in the attack. Still under
heavy fire, the company under the Lieutenant Colonel's command moved swiftly across the open ground
and successfully took its assigned objective. First Lt
Robert S. Warnick, acting as mortar observer, realizing that the attack was bogging down, also helped
to keep the momentum of the attack going by personally exhorting the men to drive on in spite of the
heavy incoming fires.
S/Sgt John D. Lewis, forward observer for a 60mm
mortar section, also realized that the attack was bogging down and that if the troops did not advance they
would be subjected to a heavy artillery barrage. f le
worked his way to the front of the attacking column,
firing as he advanced. He then exhorted the men to
follow him and advanced across the field under in-

Orders for operation on the 22d of November called
for the taking of Erberich and Lohn. The I st Battalion started from its area in Laurensberg at 0730
and moved to Langendorf in preparation for the attack on Erberich. At 0800 the battalion jumped
off in the attack with Company "A" on the right and
Company "C" on the left. Small-arms fire and also
artillery and mortar fire were severe, with the enemy
defending tenaciously. Company "A" was able to get
on the southern portion of town, but Company "C"
was held up in trying to take the northeastern part.
Self-propelled guns, placing direct fire on the troops,
forced them to move slowly, but steady pressure on
the enemy forced these guns to withdraw to Pattern.
By 1240 the town had been cleared of the enemy and
Company "B" had been moved up to assist in consolidating the defenses.
First Lt Will B. Wharton was the Commanding
Officer of Company "A" when it attacked Erberich.
The leading platoon of the company had reached the
crest of a slight swell in the ground about 500 yards
from the town when it was pinned down by machinegun fire from the left and direct tank fire from the
right. Realizing that to remain in the open field long
would mean heavy casualties if German mortars and
artillery zeroed in on them, Lt Wharton jumped to
his feet in the face of the direct fire and began to rally
his men for the final push. At this moment a shell
landed a few yards away from him, knocked him
down, and bruised his chest badly. Insisting on
continuing the advance with his men, Lt Wharton,
with the assistance of two of his men, walked as best
he could into the town. There he remained until a
defensive line was established and made secure.
Against his will he was then evacuated to the rear.
In this same action, Sgt Glenn L. Abbott succeeded
in routing enemy tanks by his courage and daring.
When the company became pinned down by direct
fire, Sgt Abbott remained on the alert to determine
where the fire was coming from. Spotting the tank,

Mud, destruction, and-more mud

he fired at it with a bazooka. Although the tank was
in a position which was beyond the effective range of
this weapon, Sgt Abbott forced it to withdraw into the
town.
After the company succeeded in getting into the
town, the tank, which had withdrawn to the opposite
side, continued to fire on the troops. Sgt Abbott with
his remaining rounds of ammunition went to the second story of a house in order to get a better point from
which to fire. Spotting the tank, he proceeded to fire
the two rounds but did not succeed in hitting the
tank. I le then started back to secure more ammunition.
I le no sooner had left the building than the tank fired
six rounds of I IE ammunition into his former position.
After blasting a few more houses and before Sgt
Abbott could get back with the ammunition, the tank
withdrew, thus allowing our men to consolidate their
positions. Before it withdrew, however, it blasted a
small brick house on the northern outskirts of the
town, killing Lt Frederick E. Lambert, veteran Company "C" platoon leader, who was in the building
firing his riAe from one of the windows in an effort
to button up the tank.
The problem of supplying the lst Battalion in
Erberich became acute when it was found that ordinary vehic!es could not traverse the muddy field to the
southeast of the village without getting stuck and,
consequently, becoming prey for direct-fire weapons
in the vicinity of Lohn. T / 5 Philip Dolan, driving
for Lt Col Ellis W . Williamson, lst Battalion commander, attempted to cross the open ground imme111

diately after the town had been taken, but his jeep
mired in the soft ground.
A tank opened fire at him, but luckily the first
round missed. T / 5 Dolan jumped out of the vehicle
just as the second round scored a direct hit, setting
the jeep on fire. Despite the continuing enemy fire
and the blazing vehicle, he succeeded in retrieving
some valuable communications equipment and then
carried it forward to the Battalion CP on foot.
Despite the fact that five vehicles were knocked out
by enemy fire in this field during the next hour, Pfc
Max E. Hambleton, one of Company "D's" drivers,
volunteered to pilot an M-29 Weasel over the treacherous ground to serve the battalion's needs. During the
next thirty-six hours he raced back and forth across
the exposed ground almost continuously, bringing up
supplies and evacuating wounded in his "Weasel."
Although he was fired at many times by enemy artillery he refused relief during this period, insisting upon
assuming the burden alone and foregoing sleep and
food to do so.
Further conception of the intensity and accuracy
of the enemy direct tank fire can be gained from considering the facts that at least two men were killed
by direct hits from the shell-fire of enemy tankers,
and that three out of five light tanks which were supporting Company "A" were knocked out.
Six hours after the lst Battalion Command Post
had been established in a house in Erberich, five Germans were discovered in a hayloft overhead. Digging
them out of the hay one man of the 230th Field Artil-
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Every church steeple blasted, every town wrecked

lery liaison party who discovered them netted three
German pistols in the deal.
The mission of taking Lohn was given to the 3d
Battalion which jumped off from Fronhoven. It was
evident from the start of the attack that the Germans
did not intend to give up this town without a struggle.
Even the elements were on the side of the Germans,
for it was a cold, wet, rainy day.
During the night of the 2lst-22d of November, the
enemy had brought up the 246th Replacement Battalion of 300 men to bolster the garrison at Lohn.
The attack began at 0800 with Companies "I" and
"L" abreast. A withering hail of small-arms fire from
automatic weapons was encountered as soon as the
two companies attacked. In addition, antitank guns
and tanks were in excellent positions with excellent
fields of fire on our advancing troops. Artillery and
mortar fire was extremely heavy. The terrain was
such as to give the enemy an excellent view of our
advance as well as enabling him to place direct fire
on our troops. It was soon discovered that the field
through which the battalion was passing was mined.
Also, the ground was so soft and muddy that it was
impossible to move tanks across it.
Because of these two factors, the riAemen had to
go into the town alone. Company "L" was pinned
down by extremely heavy machine-gun fire and was
unable to advance, but Company "I" was able to get
into the town and continued to fight it out with the
enemy. Company "K" was sent in for reinforcement
and a defense was established with Company "L" on
the right and Company "K" on the left.
A second attempt was made to get tanks and tank

destroyers into the town to aid in knocking out the
tanks that were placing direct fire on our troops, but
after the loss of two medium tanks and one tank destroyer, it was found that it was impossible to move any
of these vehicles forward. This fire came from strong
enemy positions in Pattern and Putzlohn with tanks
firing directly upon the men. With stronger opposition developing in the town, plus the direct tank fire,
and our inability to reinforce the troops with tanks or
antitank weapons, the order was given to infiltrate
back to the 2d Battalion position in Fronhoven. This
order was given at 1600, and the battalion was able
to return to the 2d Battalion position by 2015.
One of the reasons that we received such a terrific
amount of direct fire during our attack against Lohn
was the fact that our right flank was exposed. This
ground, which was in the zone of action of the First
Army, was held by the Germans, thus enabling them
to place Hanking fire on our troops as they advanced.
The strongest fires that we encountered during this
attack came from this locality.
During the course of the day's fighting we were
able to knock out six enemy tanks. Company "A,"
823d Tank Destroyer Battalion, succeeded in destroying four tanks plus two "Beetles" (radio-controlled
tanks). The men of Company "I" also knocked out
two enemy tanks. Total number of prisoners taken
during the day's operation was ninety-eight.
The artillery observers of the 230th Field Artillery
Battalion, which always supported the Regiment,
were real soldiers. 2d Lt Donald V. Mills was one of
these fighting men. Upon reaching Lohn, he established his observation post on the third Hoor of a
building in order to obtain the requisite observation
for the maximum artillery support of the attack.
Enemy tanks and infantry were in the street below and
enemy infantry were in adjoining buildings. While
observing and directing artillery fire, Lt Mills was
seen by the nearby enemy and his position was thereupon taken under fire by hostile tanks and mortars. I le
remained in this extremely hazardous position through
out the action. I lowever, he did order the other members of his part to a lower floor. On occasion, Lt Mills
fired upon enemy so close to his position that short
rounds of his own fires hit the building in which he
was stationed. Even after the enemy wounded him
painf'ully Lt Mills continued to direct fire. I lis skill
and bravery brought down heavy and accurate supporting fires under which our infantrymen made their
successful withdrawal. I le himself was one of the last
to leave Lohn.
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Lt Col Howard W. Greer, commanding officer
of the 3d Battalion, aided materially in the Lohn attack by his personal efforts. The advancing companies
were being held up by direct tank fire. Lt Col Greer,
who was directing operations from an observation
post in the loft of a barn in Fronhoven, with Capt
Hill, his S-3, and Capt Richard Trauth, his artillery
officer, sighted the tanks. Although the enemy opened
fire on the barn, scoring several direct hits and knocking off the shingles, Lt Col Greer stayed in the Observation Post and directed artillery fire on the tanks.
He then came down from the loft and personally directed towed tank-destroyer guns into a position to
engage the tanks. After they were on the target, he
went back into his position in the loft of the barn,
where he remained until the enemy tanks withdrew.
Although the battalion was unable to take its objective that day it inHicted heavy casualties on the enemy.
The action of Capt Charles R. Shaw, commanding
officer of Company "I," also contributed greatly to our
attack on Lohn. Company "L" which was attacking on
the right was pinned down by extremely heavy smallarms, machine-gun and direct tank fire. Capt Shaw,
realizing that to advance would mean that both his
Hanks would be exposed, nevertheless decided to continue the attack. Personally leading his company, he
so inspired the men that they reached the near edge oF
the town, their objective and held the position until
reinforcements could arrive. This was done in spite
of the extremely heavy fire that the company encountered.
Another example of aggressive leadership was
shown by lst Lt Francis L. Herbert who, advancing
at the head of his platoon, shot and killed three German snipers from a distance of about 150 yards before
he himself was wounded in the shoulder. Despite his
wounds he immediately fired on and killed the sniper
who had hit him. I-le then continued to lead his platoon forward, advancing with his men about a hun dred yards before he was so weakened by his wound
that he fell to the ground. Although he could no longer
advance with them and was forced to lie in a prone
position, Lt I Ierbcrt continued to issue orders to his
men, directing the movement of his platoon into
the outlying buildings of Lohn. By keeping control
of his platoon despite his painful wound, he prevented
his men from bogging down in the attack and remaining in the open field where they would have been subjected to heavy artillery fire.
After Company "K," led by Capt Joseph C. Reaser,
entered the town to reinforce the defense already set
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up, it was subjected to intense enemy fire. A short
time later it was decided to withdraw our forces in
the town. By this time Company "K" had suffered
several casualties so that in planning the withdrawal,
Capt Reaser was confronted with the problem of
evacuating his wounded as well as withdrawing the
remainder of his company. He supervised and successfully completed the withdrawal of his company
to a point 800 yards to the rear with a minimum number of casualties.
Upon completing this withdrawal, he decided to
remain behind and personally direct the evacuation
of his wounded men. Although subjected to intense
artillery and mortar fire and in direct view of an enemy
tank which fired on his position continuously, Capt
Reaser successfully evacuated all his wounded men
to a position of safety where they could be given medical treatment.
Three members of a machine-gun section, S/ Sgt
Clyde A. Thomas, Sgt Dominick S. Fanatice, and Pfc
\\!alter R. Yates, were supporting Company "I" in
its advance on Lohn. When the company became
pinned down by fire, these three machine gunners,
acting on their own initiative, made their way through
the riflemen and drove on into the town. Seeing their
fearless action, the riflemen rose and followed them.
After entering the town, they proceeded to clean
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out the houses. An enemy tank moved up and began
firing at the buildings they were clearing. Although
they knew they would draw fire, these three men
fired on the tank and it was forced to withdraw. \Nhen
the company was ordered to withdraw, these same men
volunteered to cover the movement, staying in Lohn
until the last man had left.
SEIZURE OF LOHN
During the night of the 22d-23d of November,
final plans were completed for again attacking Lohn.
The 2d Battalion was to jump off from Fronhoven at
0700 on the morning of the 23d.
During the night previous to the attack a constant
stream of artillery fire was directed on our positions.
At 0700 when Company "E" and Company "F' were
starting to jump off, the enemy threw over the
heaviest artillery concentration this Regiment had
encountered. It struck Company "E," completely
disorganizing it. Therefore, the company was forced
to move out late. It did move out, despite fearful casu
alties, with twenty men, and with Company "F" succeeded in getting on the objective by 0915. Company
"G" and Company "L," which was attached to the
2d Battalion for this operation, were sent in to reinforce the position.
The lst Battalion supported the attack of the 2d
Battalion by firing on Lohn from its positions in
Erberich.
The enemy still continued to attack our positions
in Lohn by fire, and a steady stream of both direct
and indirect fire was placed on the town. At 1112
the enemy, determined to retake the position, launched
a quick-striking counterattack with ten tanks and one
hundred infantrymen. With well-placed artillery fire
and all other available weapons, the attack was repulsed with heavy casualties to the enemy. The 230th
Field Artillery Battalion succeeded in knocking out
two of the tanks and the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion destroyed two more.
With this attack stopped, our position in Lohn was
secure and consolidation of the objective was completed. The 2d Battalion had an estimated forty to
fifty enemy dead on their position. The total number
of P\Vs captured by the Regiment during this period
was seventy-two. The 3d Battalion took over the 2d
Battalion's position in Fronhoven after the 2d Battalion attacked Lohn.
Had it not been for a number of individual acts
of courage and heroism, the attack on Lohn would
not have been successful. Following are accounts of

some of these acts which contributed directly to the
taking and subsequent holding of Lohn.
As has been stated, when the troops started to cross
the Line of Departure, the enemy laid down a terrifying artillery barrage squarely in the center of the advancing columns. This fire was so concentrated and
heavy that it killed or wounded thirty-nine officers and
enlisted men in some three minutes in Company "E"
alone. This naturally caused extreme disorganization.
The battalion commander had sent 1st Lt William
Barenkamp, the Battalion S-2, up to check on the
organization of the movement and to see that the battalion crossed the Linc of D~parture on time. When
the artillery struck, the men scattered for cover. Lt
Barcnkamp unhesitatingly volunteered to assist the
company commander in reorganizing the remaining
men of the company to continue the attack. T here
were only twenty men left. With that small group,
the company commander jumped off across the open
terrain towards the objective in the face of heavy artillery and direct enemy machine-gun fire. Lt Barcnkamp followed in the rear.
I lalfway across the open field the company commander was killed by machine-gun fire. The men
hesitated when they saw their leader felled by this
accurate fire. Lt Barenkamp, realizing the seriousness
of the situation, and on his own initiative, went to
the head of the troops in the face of the withering fire,
took command and led them on to succeed in accomplishing their mission in the town.
J le immediately organized the company objective
for the defense and set up a roadblock on the enemy's
main line of communication. These defenses had
scarcely been organized when the enemy counterattacked. With this small group of men and a few
more from other companies who succeeded in reaching
the objective, the counterattack was beaten back by
bitter determination and dogged fighting. Due to the
aggressive initiative and gallantry displayed by Lt
Barenkamp in taking command of a seemingly hopeless situation in the face of direct and deadly enemy
fire, that part of the objective assigned to Company
"E" was taken and held.
The company commander whom Lt Barenkamp
was assisting was Isl Lt Donald W. Colvin, commanding oflicer of Company "E," who, exposing himself continuously to the murderous fire, sought to rally
his men for the attack. Several times after assembling
a part of his company, shells landed upon them wounding several of the group. Each time seeing two or
three of their number hit by the flying shrapnel, the
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men instinctively sought shelter. It was under the
most trying and difficult circumstances that Lt Colvin
assisted by Lt Barenkamp labored to assemble and
reorganize the company.
In spite of these adverse conditions, Lt Colvin
made a rapid reorganization and prepared to make
the attack as planned. When his company was ready,
he radioed his battalion commander that he had only
twenty men and that he was moving into the attack
regardless of circumstances. At approximately 0715
the twenty men of Company "E" with Lt Colvin
leading crossed the Line of Departure in the face of
hostile artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. As it
has been told, Lt Colvin was killed a few minutes later.
Again the Hcgiment lost a fine officer.
Lt John l\1. Jacobsen, commanding officer of Company "F," realizing the necessity of his company attacking in coordination with Company "E," moved
to the head of his troops and urged his men forward
into the attack. Although enemy artillery fire continued in its intensity and the enemy had now opened
up with machine-gun and small-arms fire, Lt Jacobsen remained at the head of his troops, vigorously
maintaining the momentum of the attack while constantly exposed to enemy fire. Although the company
had suffered fifty casualties, the courage on the part
of the company commander and his coolness under
fire, with utter disregard for himself, so inspired his
men that they attacked with renewed vigor and determination. Linder the superb leadership of Lt Jacobsen, Company "F" moved swiftly forward and seized
its objective, inAicting approximately fifty casualties
on the enemy and taking many prisoners.
S/Sgt George Pete, Gf Company "F," was hit by
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fragments from an artillery shell after he had advanced a short distance toward the objective. Despite
his painful wound and on his own initiative, in the
absence of his squad leader who had been wounded,
he reorganized the four remaining men of his section
and led them to the objective while exposed to direct
fire from an enemy tank. He moved his section to
the extreme left Hank, carrying a machine gun and
four boxes of ammunition with him, which was the
basic load of three men. After organizing his men
in defensive position while subjected to intense artillery and small-arms fire, he remained there despite
the fact that he and his men were the only ones manning the line in that area. When the enemy counterattacked, S/ Sgt Pete's gun aided greatly in repelling
this attack.
The tanks which had moved in with the infantry
were blocked on the outside of the town by enemy
minefields. Orders were immediately sent back for
the supporting engineer platoon to remove the mines.
This engineer platoon was on another mission, and
the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon was called on
to accomplish the task. Since the Ammunition and
Pioneer Platoon had lost both its platoon leader and
platoon sergeant and three other men, Capt Willie B.
Irby, commanding officer of the 2d Battalion Headtiuarters Company, voluntarily set out with the few
remaining pioneers to accomplish this mission.
Capt Irby led them across the Bat, open terrain under mortar and small-arms fire and directed tank fire.
Upon reaching the minefield, they methodically
cleared a path so the tanks could advance. While
working in this exposed position, Capt Irby saw several of the enemy attempting to get in a position
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where they could fire on his men. He shot and killed
one and forced the others to withdraw back into the
town. Then returning to the job of removing mines,
he helped the men complete their mission. Because
of this inspired leadership, the mines were removed,
thus allowing the tanks to advance in support of the
infantry.
Company "G," in reserve at the beginning and during the attack, was ordered forward as soon as the lead
companies reached the town. As Company "G" pushed
forward over the open terrain the leading riflemen,
slowed down by the intense artillery fire, showed signs
of weakening and possibly stopping. Pfc Polowchak,
Company "G" runner, on his own initiative made his
way to the front of the column and assuming the du
ties of first scout, led the column forward with new
vigor. Inspired by Pfc Polowchak's courageous action,
other riflemen left their covered positions and pushed
on with the column into the town, which was under
heavy artillery fire.
Later in the morning, at approximately I 000 hours,
after his company had taken its objective, Pfc Polowchak, again on his own initiative, began searching for
remaining enemy in the sniper-infested buildings of
Lohn. He heard a noise in a cellar. Suspecting it to
have been made by enemy and determined to investigate, he threw open the door to the cellar, pointed his
carbine down into the darkness and ordered the occupants to come out. When no one appeared, he pulled
the trigger of his carbine which did not fire, the magazine having been emptied. At the click of the trigger,
however, eleven frightened Germans filed up the stairs
with their hands over their heads. Pfc Polowchak captured seven more prisoners that morning, making a
total of eighteen to his credit, over half the total
amount taken by his company that day.
As Company "G" moved into the town of Lohn,
hostile artillery and small-arms fire forced the men to
take cover in near-by houses. T /Sgt Lee R. Kirby, acting platoon leader of the 4th Platoon, refused to let
himself become pinned down by the enemy fire. Calling to his men who had taken cover, he told them he
was going to clean out the town and anyone who
wanted to help could follow him. Then without once
looking back, he walked down the street toward the
enemy. This bold action of T / Sgt Kirby gave the men
the courage they needed. As he proceeded down the
left side of the street, very quickly they left their cov
ered positions and followed him in the attack. The
platoon pushed through the town rapidly, clearing
the houses of enemy as they went, and sent twenty-

five prisoners to the rear. The force of this attack
caused the enemy to withdraw toward the east. T / Sgt
Kirby was the first of his platoon to reach this eastern
side of the town . The retreating Germans made an
opportune target for the machine-gun section of T / Sgt
Kirby's platoon and, under his direction, the section
went into action to deliver effective fire on the retreating Nazis.
Sgt Halph M. Chafin, of Company "G," advancing
before his squad, led his men to the objective and
then aggressively and fearlessly continued to put the
enemy to rout. I !is platoon, now depleted to seventeen men, supported by one machine gun and two
BAHs, one of which Sgt Chafin manned, fought its
way to the west edge of the town where it set up
its defensive positions. When the enemy counterattacked, the platoon's lone machine gun had a stoppage,
thus reducing the platoon's fire power to a dangerously
low level.
Within a short time, the enemy had infiltrated to
within twenty yards of the platoon's position, and the
situation was becoming extremely critical. The enemy
was now so close that they threw hand grenades
in an effort to drive back our troops. At this paint
with complete disregard for his own personal safety,
Sgt Chafin stepped into the middle of the street
along which the enemy was approaching and emptied
his BAH into the attacking force, causing the Germans to turn and run. In doing this, Sgt Chafin
exposed himself to the direct fire of an enemy tank
which was covering the road as well as a hail of automatic fire which the enemy was employing. Due
largely to his courageous action, this part of the dangerous counterattack was successfully repulsed.
Advancing before his men, T /Sgt f loward E. Deadmon of Company "G" successfully led his depleted
platoon through the intense artillery and machine-gun
fire to the objective. ll pon reaching Lohn he and his
men assisted in driving out enemy tanks and supporting infantry. After placing his men in defensive po
sitions T / Sgt Deadmon saw the German counterattacking force. The platoon's supply of ammunition was
almost exhausted in the initial attack. Healizing the
need for ammunition T / Sgt Deadmon made his way
through intense artillery fire to his Company Command Post about 600 yards away. There he procured
as many bandoliers of ammunition as he could carry
and returned over the same hazardous route to his
platoon.
The enemy approached the platoon's position but
was turned back by intense small-arms fire from the
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platoon. T /Sgt Deadmon fearlessly exposing himself
to the enemy's fire, personally accounted for several
dead Germans, and his leadership and display of great
personal bravery were determining factors in stopping
this attack in our area.
In view of the heavy casualties encountered and the
threat of the enemy counterattack, Company "L" was
ordered to move up and support the 2d Battalion.
Enemy artillery barrages were falling constantly as
Company "L" approached from the west of Lohn.
Capt Joseph E. Brown, Battalion S-3, met the company as it entered the town. Realizing the necessity ol
placing the company into position immediately, Capt
Brown led the men through the heavy shelling to
the eastern side of the town. Here he personally placed
each platoon where it was able to employ its weapons
to the maximum effect.
During the counterattack Capt Brown constantly
exposed himself to enemy small-arms and direct tank
fires as he moved from one position to another in an
effort to determine the strength of the enemy. Through
this action, he was able to keep constantly informed on
the strength and direction of the enemy thrust and to
make a shift in our own strength if necessary. Because
of Capt Brown's skill in placing the troops, they were
able to bring the full force of their fire power on the
attacking enemy.
On the 23d the 1st Battalion also supported the attack of a battalion of the I 19th Infantry Regiment
when it took the town of Pattern. According to plan,
the lst Battalion opened with extremely heavy fire on
the enemy positions. The purpose of this fire was to
divert the attention of the enemy to the south and
southwest making him think that an attack was coming from that direction. At the same time, the I 19th
Infantry was to attack from Aldenhoven which is
northwest of the town of Pattern.
At 1245 the I st Battalion opened up with mortar,
machine-gun, tank, antitank and tank-destroyer fire on
the enemy position. At the same time the I 19th
Infantry Regiment started its attack. So effective
was our fire that the enemy was completely fooled
as to the direction of the attack and the attacking troops
were on top of them before they knew what was happening. The battalion of our sister regiment succeeded
in knocking out three tanks and capturing some sixty
prisoners.
At the end of the day's fighting on the 23d the 1st
Battalion occupied a defensive position in Erberich,
tlie 2d Battalion was in Lohn, while the 3d Battalion
held Fronhoven.
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On the 24th of November the battalions remained
in the same positions while the divisions on our right
and left drevv· abreast. Constant improvements in all
of the defensive positions were made. Incoming fires
dropped off considerably. In order to insure a good
coordination with other units, contact was maintained
with the I 19th Infantry Regiment to our left front
and the l 04th Division on our right. This was done
at night by means of patrols which contacted patrols
from these other units at stated hours during the night.
Despite the tactical situation a good Thanksgiving
dinner was served each man in the 1st Battalion, even
though in some cases the food had to be hand-carried
to the men in their fighting position.
The Regiment continued to hold its defensive position on the 25th and 26th of November, 1944.
Enemy action continued to be light, consisting mainly
of harassing artillery fire. Cqntact with units on our
right and left was maintained by use of patrols. The
defensive positions were improved and all equipment
was cleaned. Men were taken to the rear for baths,
and the last truckload of the evening was hit by longrange German artillery near Zopp, Germany, killing
four of our men and wounding ten.
Company "L" reverted to the 3d Battalion at 0800.
The l st Battalion discovered foodstuffs buried
behind false walls in a cellar in one of the buildings
in Erberich. While this in itself does not constitute
any enemy action against us, it is well to bear in
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mind that weapons can be hidden in the same manner.
OPERATION AGAINST ALTDORF
Continuing the drive to the cast the Regiment was
given the mission of taking the town of Altdorf on the
27th of November. This town, located on the banks
of the lnde River, was situated in a position that made
it a very difficult objective to take. The condition of
the terrain north of the town was such that to attack
from that flank was impossible. The enemy controlled
the territory to the south of the town, so that the only
possible way to attack the enemy was in frontal assault
over flat, open terrain.
For this operation it was necessary to gain control
of commanding ground located approximately 1000
yards west and a little south of the town. The mission
of taking this ground was given to Company "K" of
our 3d Battalion. This rifle company was reinforced by
two platoons of heavy machine guns, one platoon of
tank destroyers, and a platoon of antitank guns. Because of the excellent observation that the enemy had
on the route to this position, it was necessary to move
in under cover of darkness. Company "K" started
at 0300 on the 27th, and was in position by 0630. The
only resistance met on this move was a small amount
of small-arms fire which did not materially delay the
advance. In addition to supporting the attack on Altdorf this group had the mission of supporting, by fire,
the attack of the I 15th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, at Kirchberg.
A forward Regimental Command Post was opened
in the town of Pattern at 0820.
The 3d Battalion of the I 19th Infantry Regiment,
which had been attached to our Regiment for this
operation, was given the mission of taking Altdorf.
It attacked at 1130 on the 27th. Again the terrain
made operations very difficult as the area through
which the battalion had to attack was flat and open.
Rains of the past few days had made the ground so
soft and muddy that it was impossible to use tanks
for supporting fires. The battalion was able to advance to a point approximately 800 yards west of Altdorf, but here the direct fire of the enemy forced it
to stop and take up a defensive position. Any attempt
to maneuver the men was quickly observed by the
enemy who placed a steady stream of fire on anybody
or anything that tried to move. Vehicles that tried to
assist in the attack bogged down in the mud. During the late afternoon it was realized that no further
advance could be made; the end of the day found our
troops occupying this commanding ground which was

held during the night in preparation for an attack the
next morning. Although the 3d Battalion of the l 19th
Infantry Regiment was not successful in taking the
town of Altdorf in this attack, excellent information
was secured in regard to the positions of the enemy.
This information aided us greatly in our operation the
following morning.
Because of the excellent fields of fire that the enemy
had and his ability to spot even our smallest mov~,
it was found that the only solution to the problem of
taking the town was to attack under cover of darkness.
The 1st Battalion of our Hegiment was given the
mission of attacking at 0430 through the positions
that we already occupied. It being the policy of this
Regiment to make plans to handle all possible situations that might arise, the l st Battalion had, four days
previous to this, been ordered to prepare plans for a
night attack on Altdorf; thus they were fully prepared
to attack when called on.
In preparation for this attack the 1st Battalion
moved east from Erbcrich at 0230 on the 28th of November to the jump-off point which was our defensive position west of AltdorL This movement
was characterized by a very high degree of discipline,
morale and planning; the entire battalion with attachments traversed one and a half miles of unmarked terrain in the darkness and succeeded in slipping into position silently, and well-organized for the
assault. At 0430 the attack began with Company "B''
on the left, Company "C" on the right, and Company
"A" to the right rear. In order to employ the element
of surprise to the utmost, there were no artillery fires
on the objective. Each attacking company was in four
columns preceded by two squads deployed as skirmishers. Our troops had hoped to get within handgrenade range before being discovered, but friendly
artillery time-fire which was supporting an attack of
the division to our right illuminated our men as they
came over this open ground. In spite of the most
careful plans that had been made for this operation,
this was one contingency that had not been foreseen.
The moon also came out from behind the clouds and
the two sources of light silhouetted our men against
the skyline, affording the enemy excellent observation
of our movements.
As soon as the presence of our troops was discovered
the enemy started to fire his Final Protective Line
fires with machine guns. At least eight guns opened up
on our troops as they advanced. In spite of the extremely heavy fires that the battalion encountered,
it pushed forward. Advancing in the face of these
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heavy fires was extremely hazardous. Our troops had
been discovered beyond effective rifle grenade range.
Never did men show greater courage. They crawled
down the hill toward the guns, working their way
forward under the cones of incessant fire. After crawling to within rifle grenade range of the enemy, the
forward troops killed some and caused the others to
Hee by a concentration of grenades which was fired
for nearly ten minutes. Later a captured German officer told an interrogator th.at our advance under this
machine-gun fire was amazing because they (the
Germans) had believed their position to be impregnable against a frontal attack.
Before the attack the men had been briefed thoroughly as to their mission and also as to the position each man was to occupy when he reached the
town. Driving on into the town, the assault echelon
quickly forced its way to assigned positions at the far
end of town to prepare for defense. Suppurt echelons
proceeded to destroy by-passed pockets of resistance.
In the town itself seven enemy tanks and a personnel
carrier were operating. The tanks were going up and
down the streets firing as they went and the infantrymen were attacking them with the antitank weapons
available to riflemen. Refusing to give up the town
after they had once taken it, our men fought on and
succeeded in forcing the tanks to run. One of the
tanks was knocked out and destroyed, and hits were
scored on others, undoubtedly causing casualties
among the crew members. The personnel carrier was
quickly disposed of. Within an hour and a half of the
time that the battalion was on its objective, it was possible to bring up tanks, tank destroyers, and antitank
guns in order to consolidate the positions. After the
enemy tanks had been driven out, the cleaning-up of
the town took place and continued until 1400. The
enemy commenced to lay in heavy barrages of mortar
and artillery fire; these fires increased considerably
during the day and night, consisting of almost every
known type of German fire. It should be noted here
that the rocket launcher used during this operation
was for the most part ineffective against the tanks
which were encountered as several direct hits were
scored without stopping them. When all other means
had failed, Capt Murray S. Pulver, commander of
Company "B," fired a yellow smoke grenade at one
of the tanks and blinded its vision . It is thought that
this same tank is the one which ran into a house and
crashed through the floor into the basement.
Evacuation and supply of this battalion in Altdorf
was a diflicult task as it was impossible to bring up
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Thanksgiving dinner. Top: Staff Sergeant Robert Guest, Staff
Sergeant Robert Hoffman, Lieutenant John Hurley, Lieutenant Richard Newman, Lieutenant Matt LaVail. Center:
Lieutenant Harry Peters and Staff Sergeant William Veteto.
Bottom: Captain Charles Pritchard, Lieutenant Ray King,
Staff Sergeant Richard Ziegler, Maior Ralph Kerley.

any of the vehicles normally used in supply. This difficulty was somewhat overcome by the use of l\1-29
carriers as this vehicle with its full track could traverse
the soft and muddy ground. The route of approach
to the town was covered by enemy fire, and because
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of the exposed position of the route he was able to
shell it accurately. In spite of these bad conditions the
battalion was able to evacuate twenty-six of our men
who had been wounded. It also evacuated thirteen
Germans wounded besides carrying on the normal
operation of supply.
After the 1st Battalion had passed through the 3d
Battalion of the I 19th Infantry Regiment, the latter
attacked to our left and seized the territory north of
Altdorf, thus protecting our Bank. Company "I,"
I 20th Infantry Regiment, relieved Company "K" of
the same battalion and continued to hold the high
ground west of Altdorf.
Extensive planning and preparation had been made
for this attack and the speed and success of the attack
bear witness to this fact. As for the doughboy who
carried out the orders, it is again impossible to adequately describe the job that he did. f le moved in
under cover of darkness and tackled the enemy
on his home grounds, captured seventy-four prisoners
and in8icted an additional estimated sixty casualties
on them. Many more of the enemy escaped in the
dark. Not only did our riAemen accomplish this by
closing with the enemy and whipping him decisively,
but armed only with the weapons that an infantryman
can carry he drove the supporting tanks out of the
area and across the Incle River.
Lt Col Ellis W. Williamson followed Company
"B," one of the attacking companies, in order to supervise closely this attack on Altdorf. In spite of the
intense small-arms and artillery fire which the battalion encountered when it was detected, Lt Col \rVilliamson kept the advance going by his personal leadership. After reaching the objective, he personally
supervised the clearing out of the town. In the darkness it was an extremely difficult job. His courage and
aggressiveness in thus closely supervising this difficult
operation assured its success, enabling the battalion to
take its objective with a minimum of casualties.
One of the reasons that the tanks were driven out
of Altdorf was the action of Pfc William J. Henderson. With the seven tanks driving up and down the
streets firing as they went, Pfc J lenderson decided to
do something about it. J le first encountered a tank
as it advanced slowly up one of the principal streets
of the town. Standing in the street and firing alone,
he succeeded in hitting the turret of the vehicle, which
stopped momentarily after being struck. Making no
effort to return the fire, the tank made a withdrawal
out of the town and across the river. Undoubtedly one
or more of the tank crew \\'ere killed or wounded.

Pfc Henderson heard another tank approaching.
This tank was using a spotlight to illuminate the
streets and buildings, then machine gunning any tar
gets that appeared. Pfc Henderson remained in the
street and, although picked up by the spotlight in his
exposed position, he fired a round at the turret. Although the tank was not disabled the spatlight was
knocked out and the tank withdrew. Later, whil~ the
men were preparing their defensive pasitions, tanks
were again heard- five German tanks moving in a
column. Pfc 1-Ienderson fired one round at the leading tank and also one at the f~fth vehicle as it brought
up the rear. Although none ol the tanks were disabled.
the action of Pfc l lenderson no doubt played a ma
jor role in forcing the tanks to withdraw.
First Lt Don W. Soper, antitank officer with the
1st Battalion, was given the mission of moving his
antitank weapons into the town as soon as possible
after the early morning attack to help in the holding
of the town. I le was instructed to move in behind
other supporting units. Lt Soper, desirous of giving
support as quickly as possible, made a personal reconnaissance on foot across the flat terrain and into the
town. There he learned of the seven enemy tanks that
were roaming up and down the streets, shooting wildly. I le immediately returned to his unit and led it to
proceed into Altdorf. By-passing other units, Lt Soper
brought his guns into the town and helped consolidate
the gains of the battalion.
The difficulty of getting tanks into the town was
largely due to the condition of the ground and also
to the fact that it was a night operation. First Lt Jean
J\1. llbbes, tank platoon leader, made a personal recon _naissance of the ground shortly after the attack was
launched. After gaining the information that he
sought, Lt llbbes returned to his tanks and personally led them over the open terrain to the town. Although the noise of the moving tanks drew more
enemy artillery fire, he remained on foot, exposed to
this fire, and succeeded in bringing his tanks up in
suppart of the infantry. The enemy tanks had left
before our tanks arrived, but our tanks convinced c1uite
a few Germans that it was useless to continue the fight.
Sgt Parker Jesse, wire chief in the 1st Battalion.
followed closely behind the Battalion Command
Group in the attack but, due to the speed of the advance and the darkness, he and his wire team, which
was laying wire as it moved ahead, lost contact and
veered off to the right. Coming upon a group which
he thought was the rear of our attacking echelon, Sgt
Jesse was greatly surprised to see the dark objects to
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his front evolve into an enemy tank with supporting
infantry. He knew that to run or hit the ground
would be fatal, so he spread his crew out and advanced
toward the enemy. The Germans, apparently thinking they were being attacked by a much larger force,
retreated to join their own unit. While it was retiring
the tank passed between the Battalion Command
Group and the attacking riflemen. From that night
on a bazooka became part of the required equipment
of the Command Group.
First Lt Charles P. Crepeau, S-2 of the 1st Battalion,
carried out his duties under the most trying conditions. Enemy fire was so intense that orders had been
given that all men would remain in their foxholes or
under cover at all times. Lt Crepeau nevertheless exposed himself to this fire continuously in order to gain
the most information possible about the enemy activiThe Germans used big mortars against us
ties. Although stunned by enemy shells, one of which
killed a man an arm's length away, he stayed in the
As has been stated, supply and evacuation was a
fight for thirty-six hours carrying out his duties. Although in a dazed condition he refused to be evacuated very difficult problem. The only type of vehicle that
until his work was completed, after which he collapsed could make the trip, without becoming mired in the
and was evacuated in semiconscious condition.
mud, was the full-tracked vehicle M-29. Pfc Jack
While the defensive positions around Altdorf were R. Smith, Pfc Max E. Hambleton and Pfc Harrison
being established Capt Floyd B. Spurlock, commander L. Flint were the drivers of these vehicles that made
of Company "C," came across a large group of men the trips between Pattern and Altdorf. Under constant
who did not appear to know where their assigned de- artillery, mortar and direct fire, these men worked
fensive positions were. Upon investigation Capt tirelessly and without regard for their own safety for
Spurlock learned that the men constituted an entire a 24-hour period after the battalion was on its objecreinforced rifle company from another division which tive. Because of their action, it was possible to evacwas attacking lnden, to the south of Altdorf. Because uate the wounded quickly thus saving many lives.
At the end of the day's operation, the 2d Battalion
of the intensity of enemy shelling this company could
not leave Altdorf until the following night. Just after continued to hold Lohn. The 3d Battalion remained
it had left, another lost company from the same unit in its position at Fronhoven. The 1st Battalion had
entered Altdorf and availed itself of the extra housing completed the organization of its defense in Altdorf,
facilities for the next twenty-four hours before moving and physical contact was made with the 11 Sth Infantry
south under cover of darkness to participate in the Regiment on our left through the 3d Battalion, 1l 9th
Infantry Regiment, and contact was made on our right
battle for Inden.
One of the problems that existed after the capture with the 104th Division.
On the 29th of November the Regiment remained
of Altdorf was maintaining communication between
the various elements. Pvt John F. Duffy, radio oper- in its positions of the previous day. The 17th Cavalry
ator, was responsible for keeping contact under very Reconnaissance Squadron was attached to our Regitrying conditions. For the first thirty-six hours wire ment effective 0900 on the 28th of November, and
communication could not be maintained due to the relieved the 3d Battalion, I 19th Infantry Regiment,
heavy enemy lire. Pvt Duffy, who was operating his on the 29th, the occupation of the position being
radio in the Battalion Command Post, voluntarily completed at 2040. At 2054, the 3d Battalion, 119th
moved from the basement of the building to the Infantry Regiment, was released from attachment to
ground floor in order to maintain contact. 1-Ieavy shell- our Regiment. Company "L" relieved Company "I"
ing continued and numerous shells hit the Command and maintained the sa~c defensive position west or
Post but Pvt Duffy stayed in his perilous location, thus Altdorf.
The 2d Battalion mortars aided the attack of
enabling the battalion to keep contact with all units.
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the 104th Division on Inden by firing smoke and later
reports showed that the screen was effective.
The enemy continued to harass our positions with
artillery and mortar fire, the greatest concentrations
being in the town of Altdorf. Several rounds of delayed-action shells penetrated buildings before exploding.
Four American planes bombed our positions and
friendly units in the vicinity of Langendorf, inAicting several casualties. The first attack came at 1600.
Although identifications consisting of panels, smoke
signals and pyrotechnics were displayed, the planes returned at 1615 and bombed us again.
On the 30th of November the lst Battalion was
still in position in Altdorf, but relief was started late
that night and completed early the next morning, and
the battalion was moved to an assembly area in Erberich. The 17th Cavalry Reconnaissance Sguadron
took over the Altdorf and our Company "L" pasitions
and continued to defend the sector we had occupied.
The 2d Battalion remained in position in Lohn and
the 3d Battalion remained in the town of Fronhoven.
Enemy fires during the day consisted mainly of harassing artillery and mortar fire with Altdorf receiving
the most attention. Contact with units on our Ranks
was maintained by means of patrols. Other patrols

were active along the banks of the lnde River on both
sides and information concerning enemy positions was
gained. Units in the rear areas conducted woods fighting and other training.
Thus, the I 20th Infantry Regiment completed one
of the most successful months of fighting up to this
time. Although the actual advance of our troops did
not start until the 16th of the month, from that time
to the end of the month we had succeeded in driving ten miles into enemy territory. Starting from a
defensive position which ran approximately along a
line from a position north of Wurselen to Ofden,
Germany, we had hammered our way to the banks
of the lnde River, forcing the enemy to cross to the
east of that stream.
The enemy defenses consisted mainly of a series
of well-fortified towns and it was necessary to neutralize each one before driving on to the next. Fire
and movement, on a battalion scale, was the key to
the success of the attacks. Hesistance stiffened day by
day the closer we got to the lnde Hiver but the enemy
was unable to contain our advance. During the course
of our advance we captured fifteen towns, the climax
of the drive being the capture of the enemy stronghold
of Altdorf on the banks of the lnde River.

DECE~IBER
December, 1944, began with bright prospects, and
many men in the I 20th Infantry could envision German surrender before the end of the year. Our forces
had breached the Siegfried Line, and with the constant pressure of the Russians on the east boundaries of the Reich, many Gis felt that Germany must
be on the verge of collapse. For those who coddled
themselves into believing this, the month was to be
one of cruel disappointment and rough living.
The Regimental CP had been established since the
taking of Erberich in November in a chateau-like
farmhouse which had belonged to some wealthy citizen of Langweiler, Germany. The battalions were assembled in towns in the vicinity: the l st at Erberich,
the 2d at Lohn and the 3d at Broichweiden. There
the troops had set up in houses and were recuperating
from the successful drive from Birk to the banks of
the Incle River, culminated by the spectacular and
successful night attack on Altdorf. The Begiment's forward positions in the vicinity of Altdorf were occupied
by the 17th Cavalry Heconnaissance Squadron, attached, which completed its occupation by 0042 on
the first day of the month.
The Division Hecreation Area at Kerkrade, formerly the Bolduc School, known as 'The Monastery,"
with its Hed Cross coffee and doughnuts, its GI and
USO shows, and its passes to Kerkrade, provided a
welcome rest for the deserving men of the I 20th this
month. The 3d Battalion moved there on the 2d of December for two days, while the 2d Battalion moved
back from Lohn to Broichweiden. Two days later the
2d Battalion was trucked to "The Monastery," and the
lst Battalion moved to Broichweiden, while the 3d
Battalion replaced the 1st at Erberich. Another rotation on the 4th of December shifted the 2d Battalion
back to Broichweiden, the 1st to the Recreation Area.
Two days later the 1st returned to Broichweiden.
TRAINING IN THE COMBAT AREA
The battalions which were not in the Recreation
Arca conducted a daily training schedule, and from the
6th to the 12th of December all the troops had regular
periods of instruction and practical work. The Regiment had found in the recent campaign that tankinfantry teams could do extraordinarily successful
work. Accordingly, much time was given to training
the infantrymen to ride the M -4s and to dismount in
time to give the maximum in all-around protection.
Account also was taken of the fact that in the defense
of his country the German had consistently set up his

·lines in and around towns and villages, like Euchen
and Lohn. Troops were, therefore, taught the lessons
learned through battle experience in those places. And
finally, a third stress was laid on night tactics; the operation at Altdorf had proved that the I 20th could make
night attack spell ruin for the Krauts.
Training also included woods fighting, although
the Regiment little realized at the time how important
this form of battle was to be in its later operations.
All weapons were fired, from the pistol to the 57mm
AT gun . Athletics were organized, and church services were held.
ATTACK ON VIEHHOFEN
At 0240 on the 13th of December Company "L,"
commanded by l st Lt George R. Reeves, began a small
campaign of its own. lt moved from Erberich to a
position a half mile southeast of Altdorf and across the
Inde; there it went into position facing the northeast
while the 4 l 4th Infantry Regiment attacked the town
of Schophoven. Company "L" protected the left Rank
of the attacking forces until Schophoven fell to the
-t 14th in the afternoon.
Viehhofen was a hamlet due west of Schophoven,
and was known to contain a small force of enemy.
The Germans had organized their defense to oppose
an attack from the west, from the north of Altdorf
across the river. At 1830 Company "L," with its Line
of Departure already across the lnde, rose from the
south to surprise the enemy on his weak left Rank.
With no difficulty, Lt Heeves and his company captured the town, the ground around it, and sixteen soldiers of the Wehrmacht.
Five Company "L" men were wounded during the
attack. It was impossible to use vehicles in crossing
the open ground, but the imperative need to have aid
for the men was recognized. Men in the Weapons
Platoon volunteered to carry the wounded across the
muddy ground to lnden and grabbed up doors, in lieu
of litters, on which to place the casualties. The
three miles to lnden took time and selfless effort, but
in the end, five lives were saved.
The night before the attack a listening post had
been set up between Altdorf and Viehhofen. T / Sgt
John Hescigno accompanied the men of the post on
their way from Erberich through lnden; there an incoming shell wounded him severely in the leg. Crippled and in pain , he continued with his mission and
dispatched the men to their post at the proper time,
as directed. I l e joined his company in the attack and,
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Lieutenant Colonel Cantey describes his battalion's part of "The Perfect Infantry Attack" to General Simpson and other
senior officers of Ninth Army

after the objective had heen taken, helped evacuate
the wounded. Only then did he submit himself to
be cared for by the medics. Of such devotion to duty
is the success of the I 20th, or any regiment, made.
Viehhofen lay between the Inde and Hoer rivers.
Before the fall of Viehhofen, Altdorf was exposed and
under observation from the high ground east of the
Inde. Now Viehhofen lay exposed to enemy troops
on the high ground east of the Roer. The waters of
the river became no-man's land and were to remain
so for months to come, until the Roer Line was
stormed, like the Siegfried Line before it. Company
"L" and later "I" and "K" were shelled consistently in
Viehhofen, so much", in fact, that unit movement had
to be postponed at times. The 3d Battalion companies
were, for some days, the only 120th Infantry units on
the front lines.
The day after the attack Company "I" relieved Company "L,'' which returned to Erbcrich. And on the fol lowing day, Company "K" took over the positions of
Company "I," which joined the remainder of the bat
talion. These companies maintained constant patrol
liaison with the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron in
Altdorf, and the 4 l 4th Infantry at Schophoven. The
constant rains during this period made (1uagmires of
the fields and turned pathways into streams. Com
munication and transportation were major problems.
In the meantime, from the 13th to the 16th of De

cember, the battalions continued training, including a
review of map-reading, mine-laying, and weapons
technique.
So sound tactically had been the operations of the
30th Infantry Division that Lieutenant General Simp
son, commanding the Ninth Army, directed that our
troops prepare demonstrations of what they had ac
complished. The !20th Infantry Regiment had the
lion's share of this honor. On the 13th and 14th of
December demonstrations were conducted showing
how we had supported the I 17th Infantry attack upon
St. Joris and how we had maneuvered to seize Lurken,
Langweiler, Laurensberg, and Obermerz by flank attacks. Observers included General Simpson and nearly
all senior commanders of Ninth Army units. !he 2d
Battalion journal records the distinguished assemblage
in an entry at 1505, the 14th: "Lt Gen Simpson, three
Corps commanders, six Division commanders and a
total of about eighty officers were present at our demon
stration." All commented favorably.
COUNTEROFFENSIVE
News reached the Regiment on the 16th of Decem
ber that the German 11 igh Command had that day
launched a large-scale offensive to our south, and that
it was using paratroopers up and down the front.
Patrols were dispatched at once from all hattalions to
keep an eye out for enemy parachute troops, and the
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Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon had the mission of scouting the Birk-Euchen-Broichweiden area.
Between Bardenberg and Birk, enemy soldiers were
thought to have landed by night, and to be lurking
in fields and harassing traffic. Rear echelons were out
in force, and a few prisoners were rounded up.
Men of the 120th Infantry will remember Sunday,
the 17th of December. They will remember returning from the religious services in the little church and
chapel of Broichweiden, thinking how near over the
war seemed, planning for as merry a Christmas season as possible in the devastated German country town.
Company commanders had already cleared out dayrooms and platoons had cut their own Christmas trees.
Suddenly, about noon, the entire Regiment was
alerted. With misgiving, troops received hasty orders
to be ready to leave by 1600; hurriedly, the men rolled
their packs. Company "K" had been relieved from its
positions in Viehhofen at 1100 that morning by the
17th Reconnaissance Squadron, and at noon had just
reached Kohlsheide, close to Kerkrade, where the
men had been promised they would have two weeks'
recuperation period. Unloading had not been completed nor had billets been assigned when the disappointing word came: "Prepare to move." The 17th Reconnaissance Squadron was relieved from attachment
to the l 20th Infantry and attached to the 29th Div1s1on.
\i\'onl came that the entire 30th Division was on
the move; our Regiment was to join the convoy behind the other two. Darkness came and the men
grabbed what sleep they could before climbing the
organic and Quartermaster vehicles which were to
take them- where?
The real story reached the men much later and
sifted down slowh-. In brief, it was as follows:
\\' ith typical c;erman strategy, the Wehrmacht had
struck in a least suspected and lightly defended area:
the Ardcnnes. It was here that in 1940 they had attacked through Belgium to France, with Paris their
target. Now they were trying again to cross the shadowy Ardennes. They had a new target : Antwerp; and
a new ohject: to split the Allied Armies and isolate the
troops in the North. This was their immediate object;
hut more important in the Nazi mind was the breaking up of an Anglo-American winter drive in this
sector which would ccrtainlv be coordinated with
the Russian winter offensive. ,They succeeded in delaying our drive into Germany, but they were to pay
an expensive price.
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Von Rundstedt chose the approximate boundary between two American Corps, the \! and the VIII, for
his main strike, and wedged his way through St. Vith
toward Bastogne. Once his spearhead had blasted its
way almost to St. Hubert he apparently planned to
knock out both flanks and widen his breakthrough.
Here is wher.e the I 20th entered the picture.
MOVEMENT TO BELGIUM
The Command Post at Langweiler closed at 2230
on the 17th of December and the Regimental Convoy
departed at midnight. Down the highway through
Broichwei<len to Aachen, the Kaiser-city, battered
and ghostly in the dead of night, trailed the entire
Division. Enemy aircraft were active; men were alert
for bombing and strafing; flares in rapid succession
lighted up the roads from all sides; ack-ack guns sputtered on both flanks. The convoy was unharmed,
however, and moved steadily forward to an area in
the vicinity of } Iausset, Belgium. The Regimental
CP opened at Eynatten at 0105 the morning of the
18th of December. The Battalions were placed in
Regimental perimeter defense. The I 17th Infantry
was assembled to our south, the I 19th to our southwest; forming a Division perimeter defense.
The key to future operations came with the order
that the 30th Division was now attached to the V
Corps in the First Army, which was to contain the
north flank of the breakthrough. Hegiment closed its
CP at Eynatten at 1027 on the 18th of December,
and moved through the wooded, snow-sprinkled hills
south of Eupen. About 2000 yards north of Malmedy,
at Beverce, the Regimental CP was established by
1300.
In October Yanks had first moved into Malmedy on
the heels of the retreating Germans, found it the most
hostile of the "liberated" towns in Belgium, and remembered that the whole area before the last war had
hcen German.
On the 18th of December two battalions of the
I 20th moved through Malmedy to take up defensive
positions outside the town which marked approximately the north flank of the German penetration.
They found it a colorful, busy city, where Gis had
once had recreation and amusement, and people who
had never heard a shot fired were hastening up and
down the streets. By now, US Army rear-area outfits
whose signs still remained on the corners had left the
area; most of them had abandoned equipment, food
and drink in an effort to escape the powerful Nazi
counter-drive.

Mafmedy to the Vicinity of St. Vith

DECEMBER
The lst Battalion took the Regiment's left flank on
the heights in the vicinity of Chodes, where its CP
. "A" an d "C ," were powas 1ocated. T wo compames,
sitioned to defend the town on a line parallel to the
mountain crest road which, farther west, ran down
into Malmedy; the position also encompassed the
hamlets of Beussire and G'Doumont. Originally in
reserve, Company "B" was later detached from the
1st and attached to the 3d Battalion, which had meanwhile deployed itself to protect the south and southwest of" Malmedy, including a large portion of the
highway leading to Stavelot, as yet in enemy hands.
This latter town was later wrested from the Germans
with extreme difficulty by the I 17th Infantry.
The 2d Battalion remained at Beverce in Division
reserve, setting up roadblocks and planning front-line
reinforcement in case of a German attack. Company
"G" moved to Francorchamps to set up additional defense around Division I leadquarters.
As the men dug in on the heights above the town,
they laughed about one of Goebbels' master propaganda tales, broadcast by "Axis Sally" from Berlin
during the Division's journey to Belgium. On the way
to halt the German drive was, as "Sally" called it, "the
30th Division, Hoosevclt's elite SS troops."
DEFENSE
The 3d Battalion, I 17th Infantry Regiment, had
established some defense lines around Malmedy early
on the 18th of December. The next day, however,
Company "I" relieved the battalion of the I 17th, and
the I 20th 1 assumed responsibility for the defense of
the Malmedy sector.
Control of the road nets was an important factor
in the defense of this area. The W ehrmacht had been
successful in its drive because, though tanks had been
canalized by the wet weather, armor had been able
to crash through all blocks.
Defense was the order of the day. Positions were
dug deeper and camouflaged more skillfully. The lst
Battalion sent a patrol east, which contacted the 16th
Infantry Hegiment, lst Division, at Weismes
( Waimes) at 1528; a one-squad contact outpost was
established at once.
Combat patrols moved to the southeast but did not
contact the enemy.
The 99th Infantry Battalion became attached to the
Hegiment and at once took positions around Bevcrce,
1 Attarhed:
30th Reconnai•sance Troop, 99th Infantry Battalion
(Hepsrate), 52fith Armored Infantry Battalion (less one company),
291Mt ~;ngineer Comhat B!lltalion (~linu • ), 82:Jd Tank Destroyer Bat·
tu lion. :'Iii nu• : 2d Battalion (in Division reserve).
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Because each has a Purple Heart, they know how to dig
deep: Privates First Class William Young, Allie Aldrelii, and
Frederick Woodson

with one company defending a bridge one-half mile
southwest of the village, and another protecting the
crossroads at Monbijou, southeast of Malmedy. The
30th Heconnaissance Troop, also attached, patrolled
the road running west from Malmedy and south to
Thioux. Other attachments were the 526th Armored
Infantry Battalion in positions along the road running
parallel to the main highway southwest of Malmedy,
and the 29 lst Engineer Battalion, manning roadblocks throughout the Regimental area.
Tuesday, the 19th of December, was cold and wet,
and soldiers of the Regiment were noting that civilians
in the area spoke fluent German and had sons in the
German army. Warning came from higher headquarters to trust no strangers, particularly civilians,
since friendly elements had been fired on when they
entered Malmedy. Suspicion was not to end with
civilians, either, since three Germans had already
been captured in American uniform, and 150 were
reported to be operating similarly disguised behind
our lines. And along with these disconcerting facts
came notice that a strong attack was to be expected
at any time. Sensing trouble ahead the troops were
alert and suspicious.
Patrols were aggrnssive but found the enemy defending only key routes and strongpoints; it looked as
though the main power was being withheld for an
attack against us.
The following day at 1330 the !st Battalion moved
from Chodes to the heights southwest of Weismes.
This operation brought our lines closer to those of the
16th Infantry, and extended the Regimental area to
the advantageous hills of Chivre-.Mont and Arimont.
One company, "A," defended the lst Battalion front,
while Company "C" maintained contact with the
16th Infantry; Company "B" was relieved of attach-
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We also used AA weapons against the panzers

ment to the 3d Battalion, reverted to 1st Battalion
control, and took over defense of the roadblock at
Monbijou. Company "B," 99th Infantry Battalion,
was then released from this defense, attached to the
3d Battalion, and assumed the former positions of
Company "B," I 20th Infantry, along the highway
southwest of Malmedy. The 3d Battalion took over
most of the 29 lst Engineer Battalion roadblocks.
The 30th Division was transferred from the V to
the VIII Corps on this date.
Pressure on the Regiment increased gradually, and
light concentrations of artillery and mortar began landing in our area.
In the late evening of the 20th of December, Intelligence notified the front-line troops that enemy forces
would probably hit our lines about 0300 the next
morning. Almost on the hour a strong German motorized patrol ran into 1st Battalion defenses along the
main road into Weismes; a halftrack bounced on
several of our mines across the road, sent equipment
(much of it captured from Americans) Aying into the
high oaks on either side of the road, and left several
Germans burned hopelessly, one screaming intermittently all night. Other infantry beside the 'track were
shot at and shelled; many surrendered. One prisoner
had been a ballet manager and had taken his troupe
to America before the war. In perfect English, he explained that America could never win the war, "for
Germany has so many new secret weapons!"
In the early daylight, the enemy performed another
typical trick. During the night, three Germans had
driven a captured US M-8 scout car toward the cross
roads in front of Company "A's" positions. There, an other of our mines had knocked a wheel off the M-8,
and the Germans had remained all night in a house
near the crossroads. The next morning they found a
jeep left by a TD outpost near the house; perceiving

a comrade burned and only semiconscious on the road
a few yards in front of our lines, they mounted the
vehicle and rode boldly in front of our riAemen to
where the wounded man lay. The jeep was challenged by the roadblock. The driver answered in thickly accented English, "You are crazy!" Hurriedly he
picked up the moaning body and started to turn the
jeep around. With riAe grenades, bazooka, and M-1,
the doughboys of Company "A" blasted him. Two
men were killed instantly; the other two were wounded
and captured. With such unbelievable boldness and
unHinching courage did the Nazi mind plan to befuddle the enemy and rule the world!
Again at 0430 the enemy struck, this time on the
right Hank, defended by the 3d Battalion. Two companies of infantry with ten tanks moved against the
positions beside the main highway running into Malmedy, apparently to seize the Malmedy-Stavelot road.
Two outposts had been overrun when the enemy
hit the paper mill.
Near where the road crosses the Warche Hiver a
mile and a half southwest of Malmedy stood the paper
mill. The road junction there was a strongpoint of the
3d Platoon of Company "K." ~Jere, not far from the
Company CP, the force of tanks with infantry paused,
and while one tank maneuvered and attacked, the
others gave supporting fire. After six hours of fighting, men of the strongpoint, still holding the tanks at
bay, repositioned itself in and around the paper mill
fifty yards away from their original holes.
In crossing the treacherous river one man was hit
by riAe enemy fire and his leg was broken. Pfc Leo
Miller dragged him over the slippery stones under
-fire to the safety of the building.
Pfc Francis S. Currey, BAR-man, had been firing
energetically, but when he found a bazooka in the
mill he picked it up eagerly and sought ammunition
for it. The TD halftrack across the road was known
to hold some; and so with only one purpose, he rushed
across the exposed roadway to procure the rockets.
f le returned with the rounds, and from an advan
tageous, though exposed, position loaded for another
man, Pk Adam Lucero, who blasted the turret of a
tank and knocked it out. Currey and Lucero tried to
fire on other tanks from a second story window across
the street from the mill hut they were spotted after
a short round.
Currey took a bazooka out alone, and while Lu
cero covered him from the window he fired on a house
which the enemy had captured and around which
they had grouped their tanks. The TD halftrack was
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not far away from him; Currey made a dash for it and
pulled some AT riAe grenades from it. From a Aank
position he then fired all the grenades and damaged
three tanks. The halftrack was still inviting to Currey and again he ran to it, turned the .SO-caliber
machine gun against the enemy, and fired. The
position was not advantageous, however. He saw a machine gun that better suited his purposes and made a
30-yard dash to a .30-caliber near the bridge. It was
jammed but Currey removed a ruptured cartridge and
started a protective rain of bullets which permitted
some TD men trapped in holes close to the German
tanks to return to safety without drawing fire.
There were other great deeds that morning. The machine-gun platoon of Company "M" led by 1st Lt
Kenneth R. Nelson received the full fury of the attack. Concealed by fog, enemy tanks and infantry,
covering their advance with heavy fires, at times
fought their way to within 20 yards of the platoon's
guns. Men of the platoon stubbornly returned this
fire with machine guns, carbines, and fragmentation
and white-phosphorous grenades with such effectiveness that one onslaught after another was repelled. Lt
Nelson time and time again went from one pasition to
another, constantly exposing himself to the enemy's
murderous fire, for the purpose of coordinating the
platoon's defensive fires. Lt Nelson thus exposed himself for several hours from 0430 to about 1000, when
he was wounded seriously. He refused to be evacuated,
continuing to direct his platoon from the building to
which he had been carried. There he died-a brave
man. T / Sgt John Van Der Kamp, platoon sergeant,
replaced Lt Nelson in the dangerous mission of coordinating the defense immediately after the lieutenant was struck. Shortly thereafter, T / Sgt Van DerKamp too was wounded but he continued his hazardous duties until the enemy's attack was completely repulsed. lst Lt Arnold L. Snyder, mortar observer, in
addition to carrying out his usual fire-control duties,
secured a bazooka to bring effective fire upon the
enemy from a dangerously exposed position.
The enemy's attack, though vicious, was stupid.
Our lines east of Malmedy were formed in the shape
of a "U ."On the left of this "U" was the 99th Infantry Battalion. At the base was Company "K." Elements
of the I 17th Infantry Hegiment were on the right side
of the "U." The enemy attacked through the darkness
down the center across the open fields. v\'ith the arrival of dawn he had pushed forward within the "U ,"
being concealed by fog which limited visibility to less
than fifty yards. Suddenly, at about I 030, the fog
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Private First Class Currey used all these weapons at the paper
mill

lihed and there were the Germans where Americans
like to sec them- - in the open. Fearfully devastating direct fires struck the Germans from three sides. Mortar
and artillery observers brought down heavy concentrations where the Germans were most congregated.
rhe proximity fuse was used for the first time by artillery supporting our Regiment. Germans ran and
screamed like crazed men-few escaped.
The next day, news Hashes over the air told that
Malmedy had been retaken by the Allies. Members
of the 120th grinned, for though the artillery was
still falling intermittently in the town, they knew
"Jerry" had never taken, nor even come close to taking, Malmedy.
At last the enemy had met the Hegiment in this
sector, but as yet he had made not a dent in our defenses. The troops were uneasy, however, as they dug
a little deeper, connected foxholes with trenches, and
put more dirt on their hole covers. More reports
reached the men about untrustworthy civilians; one
woman was rumored to walk ahead of enemy vehicles
and patrols, shooting a burp gun to indicate that it
was safe for them to advance. For the doughboys digging on the bald hills it was a matter of watching and
waiting-and keeping warm. Snow fell on the 27th
of December and several succeeding days so that
the entire area became blanketed in white. The foxholers had to take turns warming in the nearest available houses which, particularly on Chivre-Mont
(Company "A") , were not very near.

Malmedy before the bombing

A task force was committed on the 21st of December in the vicinity of Burnenville, west of l\1almedy.
The 99th Infantry Battalion, with one company of
light tanks and Company "B'' of the 740th Tank Battalion, cleaned out the area and prepared to repel an
attack in that sector.
"AMERICAN" PATROLS
Some soldiers suspect that the enemy drinks himself to intoxication before suicide attack or patrol.
Early in the morning of the 22d of December and
again on the 23d, incidents occurred which were wild
enough almost to support that belief. They show the
Germans' persistent attempt to bluff and outtalk our
doughboys. They found, incidentally, that they
couldn't.
Pfc William J. Henderson and Pfc Simon A. De
naro, of Company "B," were on a roadblock assignment along the Malmedy road 300 yards north of
Gerornont at 0230 on the 22d of December. Visibility
was poor, but through the mist the two men on guard
perceived the bright lights of an American halftrack
advancing from the south towards a minefield one
hundred yards in front of the lines. Behind the halftrack the men could hear a noisy column of tanks,
armored cars and more halftracks. Suddenly the column halted; the enemy could be seen around the
vehicles, some removing the mines from the road.
Crawling out of his hole for a better field of
fire, Denaro triggered several bursts on his BAH. From
the column came voices protesting in English that
they were friendly troops, and that if they weren't
American, why would they have their headlights on?
Denaro fired a few more bursts. "Come on down here,"
he heard them yell back. "We have some pretty Frauleins!" Denaro was not tempted. Then he began to receive return fire. Our lines were alerted and mortar

flares were sent up. I lcnderson, bazooka man, crept
up beside Denaro and fired on the halftrack, which
he disabled, and on other vehicles. By this time our
mortars and artillery were zeroed in on the column,
and the enemy retreated.
Thick snow had fallen the morning of the same
day, when just before noon the enemy sought to test
our dispositions again. Two American jeeps, contain
ing Germans, drove hastily to the roadblock on the
crossroads in front of Company "A." An antitank gun
prepared to fire, hut hesitated because several civilians
were noted running near the house and the road. The
jeeps took note of the roadblock, turned around and
escaped before the antitankers could pull the trigger.
A little more than a half hour later, riflemen and
antitank men noticed some men in American uniforms creeping toward them on their left Aank. Observing German equipment, machine guns, mortars
and bazookas, our troops turned on the strangers with
rifle fire. At the head of the German patrol of about
twenty men was a vociferous noncom, who yelled
energetically and shouted orders at his men. The patrol
returned our fire, and shot bazookas into antitank
trucks near the guns. Pfc Roy C. Johnk, cannoneer in
an antitank-gun crew, turned to a near-by .SO-caliber,
switched its direction of fire upon the enemy and,
though he had had little experience with the gun
could, by directing short bursts at each advancing
enemy, cause such consternation that the patrol lost
heart. After only ten minutes from the time they were
first seen they had withdrawn into the wood and off
to the left Rank of the battalion.
Word of the skirmish reached Lt Col Ellis W. Wil
liamson, 1st Battalion commander, and in the con
fusion and haste of the message to him, the patrol was
exaggerated to a "battalion." Eager to see the situation
for himself, Lt Col Williamson rode in all speed to
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. . . and after

Company "A" and went to the scene of action. The
men were shaken; some were wounded. With an assurance that staggered observers, he hastily organized
a ten-man patrol of the antitank men and a lieutenant
standing close by. The men rallied, and formed a
skirmish line which moved through the woods over
the route of the departing patrol until Lt Col Williamson felt the men were in danger of their own
artillery. No German remained. There were only
blood tracks which merged; and tracks, too, of seemingly dragged heels. Apparently the patrol had suffered
numerous casualties.
Lt Col Williamson returned with the men and
checked the story of the "battalion." He warned those
concerned that reports should always be checked.
"Jerry's" tactics in the assault are ever to terrify his
opponents with tremendous volumes of fire, to create
an appearance of having more men than he does have.
Meanwhile, to keep the enemy out of town at all
costs, three bridges south and southwest of Malmedy
were destroyed.
Night brought darkness and cover for the men who
were perfecting the Hegiment's 2 defensive setup.
The Engineers laid deliberate minefields, while
riflemen and men of the Battalion Ammunition and
Pioneer Platoons, directed Lt Salvatore Petinga and
Richard J. Lewman, dug and buried them, occasionally
under direct enemy fire. Concertina wire was strung
between the forward lines and the minefields.
On the 23d of December the enemy was little in
evidence; the 1st Battalion reported a patrol had observed ten Germans in the area to the battalion's front.
Early in the morning the enemy tried once more a
ruse destined to failure. Seven Germans in stolen
•Attached: (to and including the 27th of December) 30th Recon·
naissance Troop; 99th Infantry Battalion (Sepa~ate); 526th Armored
Infantry Battalion (le• • one company); 29~ •t Engmeer Combat I.lat·
talion (Minu s) ; 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion; 1 company of medmm
tanks, 740th Tank Battalion.
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American uniforms and with American and British
equipment planned to get through our lines to spot
our military installations and return. At 0200, supplied with maps, brass knuckles, and hand grenades,
they approached a crossroad I 000 yards north of Geromont. They were halted by a member of Company
"B," S/Sgt Daniel Barbuzzi, then on his way from
his company CP to his platoon area. Coolly their leader
replied that they were artillery observers. The speech
was slightly accented, and none of the men had a
radio. The guard was suspicious. Armed only with
a pistol and hand grenades, Barbuzzi yelled loud
enough to alert his comrades, "Move, and I'll mow
you down." When some of the Germans stirred uneasily towards the ditch beside the road, he fired two
rounds from the .45.
Soon American soldiers had taken the patrol prisoner, and the men, young and in tiptop shape, were
found to be members of the l 50th Panzer Brigade,
reportedly attached to the lst SS "Adolf Hitler" Division, an old opponent from Mortain. Information
received later from First Army indicated that all seven
spies were tried and executed. Barbuzzi's T /E weapon
was the M-1 riAe, and perhaps he regretted a little that
he hadn't been carrying it that night. But he took
good care of his pistol after that.
By now our Army realized that the counteroffensive
was Hitler's do-or-die bid for comeback, and with Hitler anything was possible. Accordingly, from Division
came the instructions for the Regiment to carry gas
masks at all times, and to practice wearing them daily.
BOMBING OF MALMEDY
The 23d of December was the
which friendly aircraft four times
l\lalmedy, which it presumably
enemy hands. Civilian property

first day of three on
bombed the town of
supposed to be in
was lost, and some
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Our men extricated the survivors

casualties resulted among the townspeople, whose confusion at this sudden attention from American planes
was only slightly less than that of our own forces. One
man in the Regiment was injured, two were missing.
This proved to be only a mild sample of what was to
come the next day. Christmas Eve day was bright,
and the valley of l\1almedy looked like a Christmas
card. Two hours after noon the buzz of planes was
heard. At 1430, eighteen B-24s dropped bombs which
neatly leveled the main square and the central part
of the town. Some of the front-line positions were
also bombed and strafed, but no real damage was
caused outside of the once busy and unharmed Army
rest area. Various company and platoon CPs in town,
including that of AT Company, were hit directly, and
left many soldiers buried beneath the debris. Fire consumed many of the buildings and whole blocks lav
in heaps of rubble. There were many Army death's
and civilians casualties were huge. Army aid men were
busy caring for the Belgian wounded, as well as our
own soldiers. The dead were laid row on row in the
school playground, and covered with any available
material.
There was a lot of work for the soldiers in I\ lalmedv

on Christmas Eve. Digging people out from under
was a delicate but difficult job, and it took far into the
cold night.
Sgt Frank Palco, aid man with Company "M," was
approached by a young girl in distress. She took him
to an air-raid shelter which had suffered a direct hit
and urged him to rescue three women who had been
crushed by the fallen supports in such a way that their
legs were lacerated and pinned painfully to the ground.
Palco had no surgical tools, but he pulled out his GI
scissors and performed one of the crudest-yet most
effective- amputations in history. Two of the women
survived through the excruciating torture without
benefit of anaesthetic. Palco later disclaimed any de
sire to become a surgeon after the war.
The 3d Battalion suffered most of all, for its com
panics were located all through the town with its kitch
ens established in the heart of the building area. With
in a few minutes, the kitchens of both Company "L"
and Company "K" were destroyed with their com
plete staffs, and that of Company "M" seriously damaged. i\ lost of the burden of rescue fell upon the Bat
talion I leadquartcrs Company, whose platoons went
into immediate action, putting out fires, digging out
people, clearing paths. The 1st Battalion sent medical
aid at once.
While our troops were husy giving all possible aid.
our Air Forces bombed us a second time that day.
Fortunately, the damage was slight.
.
Lt Col Greer, the Battalion commander, was cner
getic and with his staff reorganized and stabilized the
panic-stricken people. During the evening hours every
man did his utmost in the face of the totally unneces~ary catastrophe; the wretched town, once so pictur
csque and lovely, was now a beehive of half-angry,
half-dazed, hut very busy men. Among those who gave
unselfish aid to the civilians were Lt O'Shea of Com
pany "I," T / 4 Burner of Battalion I Ieadquarters Com
pany, and Pfc Conroy, also of I leadquarters Company.
Lt Col Peter 0. Ward, Hegimental Executive Officer,
was among the most active. The 29 lst Engineer Battalion did miraculous work in opening vital roads and
extinguishing fires which threatened to destroy the
town. Soldiers remember civilians staring at the sky
that evening. "American planes?" they murmur in a
still-shaken, mystified voice. Few of the soldiers could
find it in themselves to answer. ·1 ·hey could only look
away. They were mystified themselves.
Christmas brought another light air raid. Again
there were civilian casualties, hut only one man in the
Hegiment was reported injured.

DECEMBER
2o BATTALION'S CHRISTMAS OPERATION
Meanwhile, on the 23d of December, the 2d Battalion was attached to the I 17th Infantry Regiment.
Company "E" was at once reattached to "Lovely
Ladies" task force, the 33d Armored Infantry, which
attacked from the Bois de Lancre, two miles west of
Stavelot, south to the high ground between Petit-Coo
and Ster. Company "E" met considerable difficulty,
and Company "F" was ordered to the assistance of the
force and committed east of Company "E" in the vicinity of Ster. No artillery preparation was fired for
either of these attacks. The enemy resisted boldly and
with heavy fire.
Two machine gunners of Company "H," Pfc Andrew S. Melendrez and Pfc John D. Boutin, both in
support of Company "E," observed that the riflemen
were pinned down by heavy small arms. They edged
and crawled to a forward flank, set up their machine
gun and sprayed the enemy positions. As a result, the
enemy abandoned their posts, and Company "E" was
able to advance to its objective.
Company "F'' found its advance halted at 1400 by
a strongpoint on its right flank. A squad led by S/ Sgt
Thomas Munoz, volunteering to investigate the obstacle, moved around to the right, where they found
the enemy in a house on the outskirts of Petit-Coo.
While his squad deployed, Munoz rushed the
house, knocked the door in, fired on six retreating
Germans and killed three. Others were doubtless
wounded. The strongpoint was reduced, the right
Hank secured. The objective fell to Company "F."
On 23 December there was enacted the most remarkable individual exploit of the Hegiment's history.
[t cannot be said that it was the bravest deed because
time and time again men of the Regiment reached the
ultimate of courage. But no one exceeded the great
courage shown by S/ Sgt Paul L. Bolden and, above
all, no other soldier accomplished a mission of such
great difficulty. Elements of Company "E" were pinned down by extremely heavy automatic and smallarms fire from a house 200 vards to their front in PetitCoo. S/ Sgt Bolden told the platoon leader that he
could take out the enemy, thereby saving lives that
might he lost if a st1uacl or larger unit assaulted the
house. Accompanied by T / Sgt Husscll L. Snoad, he
crawled toward the enemy. Heaching a position near
the house, S/ Sgt Bolden charged, covered by his comrade. The enemy replied with intense fire, and killed
T / Sgt Snoad, who bravely was firing into the Germans from an exposed position. S/ Sgt Bolden in rapid
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succession hurled fragmentation and white-phosphorus grenades into the building, rushed to the door,
kicked it open and cut loose with his submachine gun.
He was struck solidly, not glancingly, by four bullets
in his shoulder, chest and stomach. Miraculously keeping his feet, he withdrew a short ways to shelter and
waited for the surviving Germans to come out and surrender. When none appeared to give themselves up,
despite his ebbing strength, he again charged the
house, firing as he advanced. No Germans remained
alive and when our troops arrived they counted thirtyfive enemy dead, all or most of whom having been
killed by S/ Sgt Bolden. S/ Sgt Bolden recovered completely from his wounds, which undoubtedly would
have killed a lesser man, and later President Truman
awarded him the Congressional Medal of Honor at the
White I louse.
The Regiment lost an outstanding leader when
T / Sgt Snoad gave his life to assistant S/ Sgt Bolden.
Courageous, self-sacrificing, a superb soldier, a real
man was T / Sgt Russell L. Snoad.
On the following day, the 2d Battalion plus Company "L," I 17th Infantry, was ordered to attack toward the north banks of the Ambleve River from a
Line of Departure extending 1000 yards east of PetitCoo. Attached to the I 17th Infantry, Company "G"
was also to participate in the attack, but from another
direction. The enemy was still clinging to the high
ground on the north banks of the Ambleve River
which swerved to make an arrowhead in the vicinity
of Trois Pants, two miles south of Petit-Coo. In an
effort to drive the enemy from the banks and the arrowhead north of the Ambleve, American troops were to
drive south from the area around Petit-Coo, which
had been seized by Companies "E" and "F" the day
before, and also to push to the west from Parfondruy,
a small town a mile west of Stavelot. In thus driving
in from all sides, the 30th Division hoped to push the
enemy back from the north tips of its "bulge."
Company "G's" mission was to drive west from Parfondruy, and to meet the remainder of the battalion
( and Company "L," I 17th Infantry) in order to tie
in on the left (east ) Aank of the objective. On Christmas Day, at about 1000, Company "G" struck across
the open ground lying parallel to the river. There the
enemy brought down torrents of artillery, mortar and
automatic fire. Furthermore, an American armored artillery battalion, firing short, placed a heavy concentration on the company. Casualties sustained reached
an overwhelming figure, and the company reeled back
slightly, established an east-west line with its left Rank
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We caught Germans wearing U.S. Army uniforms

tween Petit-Coo and Trois Ponts, and Company "E"
held ground to the left (east) of Company "G" along
the river.
During the next two days the 2d Battalion troops
had an opportunity to see evidence of German savagery-they saw old Belgian farmers who had been shot
in cold blood. One pregnant woman had been shot
in the back; the bullet, tearing a hole in her abdomen,
had thrown the unborn child to the ground. Children
had been peppered with automatic fire. The Nazis
had spared no one in their ferocious drive, no doubt
believing that if it succeeded no one would care about
the slaughter; if it Failed the slaughterers were doomed
anyway. a
On the 28th of December, the 2d Battalion was relieved of attachment to the I 17th Infantry. That regiment took over positions along the river hank, and the
2d Battalion returned to Francorchamps in Division
reserve.
Cl l IUSTMAS, 1944

touching Parfondruy, and dug in for the night. Aid
men tended the casualties in a house near the ParIt wasn't the Christmas some of the men had looked
fondruy road, but were unable to evacuate the seri- forward to back in Germany, but there were some
ously wounded because of the intense fire between features which marked it a special day. For instance
the house and the town. Members of the mortar sec- the !st Battalion kitchens produced a luscious turkey
tion volunteered to help the men out, and success- dinner, and men were transported to houses where it
fully carried the wounded to safety. Company "G" could be eaten in comparative warmth and comfort.
was ordered to withdraw the following day to Par- The 2d Battalion had its big meal on the 26th; the 3cl
fondruy.
had to wait several days before the bombed-out kitchCompany "G" was not the only unit to suffer the ens could be replaced. The Hegimental commander
first day of the attack. From low ground into the woods sent each man a "stocking From Santa," tied with a
upon the heights over1ooking the Ambleve, Com- reel ribbon, and containing a pack of chewing gum,
pany "F" and Company "L," I 17th Infantry, slugged four bars of candy and a gray wool sock, which made
forward. The snow sifted down occasionally, and the a pair along with the one that held it. Warmth was
air was biting. After encountering heavy fire, they dug - the greatest concern of every man, and the socks and
in only halfway to the objective by nightfall.
candy gave a lot of it. Of course in the mountains
The day after Christmas, the 2d Battalion of the Christmas trees could be had for the cutting. Troops
I 19th Infantry was attached to our 2d Battalion. Its decorated these trees with antiradar foil dropped by
companies attacked through the companies on the line airplanes.
to take the high ground swiftly. The enemy had withEven if it was not the holiday the men had hoped
drawn during the night, and by early morning, 30th for, a certain Christmas spirit could not he extinguishDivision troops could see the river from the northern ed. Perhaps the faces of the little children on that terheights. Companies "G" and "F' of the I 19th de- rible day before when bombs were raining on the town,
fended a line embracing the arrowhead near T rois made Lt Col Greer offer his "Santa Claus" suggestion.
Ponts and the ground around the woods, Coreux. Or perhaps it was the memory of the Yuletide he had
That same afternoon, Company "G," I20th Infantry, known back home. At any rate, he told his men about
followed a long route from Parfondruy to replace Com- the Children's I lospital in Malmedy and remarked
pany "G" of the I 19th in its positions on the point how good it would be for the men to give the con
near Trois Ponts. Company "F," I 17th Infantry, was tents of their stockings and some of the fruit and nuts
attached to the 2d Battalion and relieved Company that had been sent them from home to the little child"F," I 19th Infantry. Company "F," !20th Infantry,
new•papero of 15 .May 111411 carriPd an account of the trial
took positions along the cast hanks of the Amhlevc be- in •American
Europe of the perpPtrntorK of th etm outrage ~.
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dren who would have no gifts. And his idea caught
like wild fire. All the members of the Battalion and
many in the other battalions sent in their "stockings"
for the donation. The 230th Field Artillery Battalion
would not consider being left out, and sent a half
load in a I Y2-ton truck, filled with Christmas goodies.
Finally, Lt Col Greer took two %-ton trucks, fully
loaded, to the children in the Malmedy Hospital.
The 3d Battalion Journal remarks at 2030 on Christmas night:
"Lt Col Greer returned from being Santa Claus .
. . Some one had a Christmas anyway. . . . ( He)
should be congratulated for the merciful thought that
started the avalanche, particularly after the three days
just gone through, which would and did remove all
semblance of mercy from many of our hearts and
thoughts. Col Greer returned . . . with a sparkle in
his eyes that could have been a tear of happiness. He
drew a picture of joy and thankfulness."
I

One man was to write of that memorable Christmas
day: "Everyone seemed happier after the episodein spite of the awful licking they had taken. GI Joe
had done it again."
During this period enemy action was light. Artillery and mortar fire was sporadic and only harassing
in nature.

An illustration of why we made our own camouflage uniforms

ture of whom was the mission for the raid. Observers
picked up the counterattacking forces, and artillery
Time-on-Target concentrations along with machinegun and mortar fire from the 1st Battalion accounted
for a large tally of enemy casualties. We often have
Defense means constant improvement of positions, wondered how the Krauts felt when they learned they
and troops spent Christmas week perfecting their per- lost all those men counterattacking an empty town.
On the 28th of December, the 3d Battalion moved
sonal and collective installations. Patrol activity continued; contact was maintained with adjacent units. some elements into positions south of the highway
Up to this time, the I st Battalion alone had laid 7000 running east from Malmedy. Company "B," which
antitank mines, and stretched barbed wire by the had occupied this area, now shifted into locations in
truckload along the bushy fields sloping down from rear of Company "A," to give defense in greater depth.
the heights around Malmedy.
The 2d Battalion, still in Division reserve, moved at
1315 to Xhoffraix.
HA IDS
To "feel out" the enemy, as well as to harass him,
Hedomont was a tiny Belgian community extend- raids are good tactics. Hedomont had been first on
ing along the crest of a hill 2000 yards south of Mal- the list. Otainmont was next.
At 1630 on the 29th of December, Company "B,"
medy. For Company "C," 99th Infantry Battalion,
the village was the target for a raid on the 27th of 99th Infantry Battalion, opened the "attack" on OtainDecember. Supported by heavy weapons of the 1st mont. Supporting fire from the !st and 3d Battalions
Battalion from their positions on Chivre-Mont, by was directed at Hedomont so that the enemy would
Company "B," 99th Infantry Battalion, from the be deceived about the target of the strike. An hour
heights southeast of Malmedy, and by the 230th Field and twenty-five minutes later, Company "B" returned
Artillery, Company "C" attacked at 1600. The com- with the report that it had encountered no Germans.
pany entered the town quickly because it encountered
Additional minefields and concertina were laid during the last two days of the month. Positions had been
only light mortar fire.
"Jcrry" counterattacked as usua I. But Company "C" constantly improved, and by now made a formidable
had withdrawn, bringing back prisoners, the cap- defense line around the ruined Malmedy. Friendly
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planes finished up the year with a final light bombing on the 30th of December, causing three civilian
and two soldier deaths, and three soldiers injured.
So, in the black of night, as snow was falling, 1944
was gone forever. Eventful, if not happy, for American soldiers, it had seen the 120th Infantry leave the
United States in February, spend three and a half
months in England, and land in France on the 12th

of June; it had seen the Regiment distinguish itself
at St. Jean de Daye, St. Lo, Mortain, Birk, Altdorf,
and now Malmedy; it had seen the Regiment take
each objective and hold it at all costs.
The last month of this year had been one of its
most eventful. It left the I 20th Infantry Regiment
on the north Rank of the German counteroffensive,
holding tenaciously and well.

JANUARY
The "uneven humps" were investigated, and by the
light of a bright moon were discovered to be the bodies
of approximately fifty American soldiers. They lay
in groups, on top of one another and in disorder.
Some were shot in the head. A few of the patrollers
remembered stories of men in a Field Artillery Observation Battalion who were captured and murdered in
a field near Malmedy. This, then, was the site of the
infamous massacre, details of which were later described in Yank. At a later date, the information
was confirmed; when the field came into American
hands picture recordings were made of the horrifying
evidence of German cruelty there.'
The platoon continued on its mission. Moving to
the woods next to the house, they surprised and capRAIDS AND PATROLS
tured a German prisoner, a slim 120-pound superman
The enemy to our front was quiet; he did not make who looked about thirteen years old. ( A battalion com
himself obvious, nor did he throw any but harassing mander later wondered if he wasn't "so small that he
fire into our area. Though he seemed eager to keep should be thrown back.") Word was sent to the patrol
us worried he remained ever cautious and made no leader who, then knowing that the patrol's mission had
been accomplished, withdrew the party back to our
show of power.
I ligher heack1uarters needed more information re- lines.
garding the unit opposing us. It also wanted to test the
One man in the patrol chose to stay behind. Within
defensive power set up against it. With the double fifty yards of enemy gunners he lay in the deep snow
mission, then, of worrying "Jerry" and of capturing all night. He made slight movements of his hands
prisoners of war, a series of combat patrols pricked and feet to keep from freezing; but knowing the enemy
enemy lines during the first two weeks of the month. would be alert to movement for some time after the
Information these gathered was to be used as a basis patrol had been stirring, he waited till daylight before
for an offensive to reduce the German salient, al- starting to creep.
He made his way, almost numb, to the man whom
ready being hacked in its western extremities.
he
had stayed behind to save, a man who had been
Three hours into the new year two platoons of
Company "B" set out across the snow to capture Ger- hit seriously by machine-gun fire and had fallen into
man prisoners and to investigate a strongpoint in a a ditch. J le tore his snow suit to make bandages and
house 200 yards southwest of the road junction at applied them hastily to the man's back. Snipers noted
Baugnez, in front of Company "A." When the main the movement by then, and started to fire occasionally
body of the raiding party had reached the road junc- in his direction. He dragged the man over the snow
tion which came to be called "Five Points" for the to the Five Corners, where he found a wheelbarrow.
number of roads which converged there, the ten-man f le placed the wounded man inside and wheeled it
point had been turned south toward the house. The toward his own lines bv a covered route. He tried to
point came to within thirty-five yards of it when it was solicit help from civili;ns; one gave him cognac, but
fired upon. Capt Pulver recognized two machine all feared German reprisals and turned him away.
guns, one firing from the house, the other from a I le reached at last a Company "A" outpost, and propoint 200 yards west of it. } le dispatched one platoon cured aid there. The wounded man was saved. The
to flank the house from the left, and held the remain- man who brought him to safety was his assistant squad
der of the men to keep the attention of the enemy by · leader, Sgt Herman A. Fischer.
fire. Noting more movement the enemy poured autoOn New Year's Day, 1945, the Luftwaffe assembled
matic fire and rifle grenades on the patrol; the patrol to strike what they hoped to be a decisive blow against
leader was killed. While the platoon Hanking the American and British airfields. Apparently "Fatso"
enemy on his right was passing through the fields Goering, lover of good drink himseH, thought that our
southwest of Baugnez, some of the men stumhled
1The German unit wh ich murderPd the eivil ittns in and neRr Petit·Coo
over uneven humps in the ground.
Bl•o rommitted this atrocity. See t he prereding foot not e.
Like the New Year's Eve that preceded it, New
Year's Day, 1945, was no more noisy or festive for
the I 20th Infantry Regiment than the previous week
had been. In foxhole strongpoints which formed a
semicircle, starting at a location about 1500 yards
southwest and extending approximately 4000 yards
southeast of l\lalmedy, Belgium, troops thought the
snow was colder than usual. The turkey dinner served
at noon tasted good, but otherwise there was still
watch to be stood, weapons to be cleaned, and gloves
to be thawed out, before 1730 when the sun set. On
our left were elements of the I st Division, on our
right the I 19th Infantry Regiment. The Regimental
Command Post was still at Beverce.
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Ayers would be suffering from New Year's hangovers.
The Luftwaffe, according to reports later received, did
execute some damage on Allied aircraft but American
and British fighter pilots, alert and ready, shot down
many of the German planes. As a result, the Germans
suffered far more damage than they inflicted. A squad-ron or so of German fighters flew low over the Regimental area, apparently lost and looking for landmarks. Our infantrymen manning caliber .50 guns accounted for three. Two were seen falling in flames
after having made their way back over the German
lines while a third crashed on the edge of the ravine
opposite the Regimental Command Post.
OTAIMONT AND IILIYER
On the 2d of January two raiding parties were planned. Company "I" was briefed on attacking strategic
ground 500 yards southeast of Otaimont from the
north through our lines. It was to take prisoners
and withdraw on order to our regular positions. Meanwhile, Company "B," 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, was to drive through Hedomont and Baugnez
for Buyer, the high ground 1500 yards southwest

of Baugnez. It was to be supported hy fire from the
1st Battalion, and also to be prepared to withdraw on
order.
At 0830 on the 3d of January both companies
moved out on schedule. The day was foggy, snow fell
for almost an hour, and observation for supporting
fire was almost impossible. Company "I" met a force of
only about thirty men, who offered little resistance. It
appeared that the raid would be a fast, snappy affair;
the 3d Platoon, leading on the left, had already pushed
beyond the town and along a hedge into a wooded
area. Then suddenly events took a change for the
worse, and appearing apparently from nowhere the
enemy inflicted seven casualties upon the 3d Platoon.
Actually, the new snow had sided with the Germans
and had camouAagcd their defensive position. The
3d Platoon had walked on top of them before realizing it.
But the tankers were speeding into the town, and
after some had reached the woods, they helped Hush
out the enemy. The tanks had to keep shifting position lest German bazooka teams slip up on them,
as they frequently tried to do.
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Antiaircraft artillery was moved in to strengthen our defense against the panzers

Gradually the enemy mortar and artillery fire on
Otaimont increased in intensity, and throughout the
day was so strong that Company "I" men suffered
seven casualties from mortar fire alone. The lst Platoon lost its leader, and its sergeant and acting runner assumed the leadership during the fight. Capt
Charles R. Shaw, commanding the company, says
of that platoon runner that he "ran it like a veteran,
placing the squads in position and supervising their
digging-in. All day he continually checked with the
company CP and his squads." Company "I" soon
came to know this remarkable runner. His name was
Sgt Ramon R. Zepeda.
During the severest time of the fight S/ Sgt Charles
L. Tate of Company "I" saw a wounded comrade,
suffering from shock of his wounds, dazedly wander
ing around in an area being sprayed by intense enemy
small-arms fire. Disregarding the danger to his life,
S/ Sgt Tate rushed a distance of 20 yards to the
wounded man to assist him to cover. While helping his
comrade to safety, S ;'Sgt Tate was killed. Thus died
a brave soldier. There is no greater courage than that
of giving one's life to save another.
Company "I" had taken three prisoners when at
1930, according to plan, it was ordered to withdraw.
Resistance proved stiffer against Company "13'' of
the 526th Armored Infantry, however. They reached
f Jcdomont, but just beyond the town met withering
machine-gun fire which made it clear that the Germans intended to hold I I uycr at any cost. Artillery

was light until about 1630. When Company "B"
withdrew at that time, enemy fires increased considerably.
FOXHOLE LIFE, 1945
The next week saw our defenses ever improving.
Reconnaissance patrols explored the wooded areas of
the front and located enemy islands of defense.
The men in foxholes were living crudely, and
there was no small danger of trench foot and frozen
hands and ears, as well as common colds. Doughboys
were therefore rotated to near-by houses where they
might warm up, wash, massage their feet, have haircuts, and eat. Squad leaders led men in daily walks
within the area to exercise their feet and keep the
men active.
Feet are the most sensitive parts of the body to
cold, and standing stationary guard for a prolonged
period was an uncomfortable and dreaded duty for
the men of the l 20th Infantry in the cold January
snow. Colonel Purdue designed "booties," simple moccasins made of three thicknesses of blanket cloth. T / 5
Morris Pinter, Regimental tailor, perfected the design.
These booties were worn under overshoes in lieu of
shoes and proved of great value in adding to the comfort and preserving the health of the men. Major John
J. Eberhardt and Captain Robert McClain worked incessantly for nearly three weeks procuring the large
number of American and captured German blankets
required for the project. Furthermore, Captain l\1c-
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ground southwest of Baugnez, while the 2d Battalion
from Weismes planned to take the settlement of
Thirimont and Haussart, the high ground south of it.
Accordingly, on the night of the 12th of Janu ary the 2d Battalion moved to \Veismes. The 1st
Battalion was to attack through the other battalions
after they had secured their ohjectives; it was prepared to seize Ligneuville.

f ILIYEH

All travelers were checked because the Germans tried to
send spies into our area

Clain accomplished a miracle in finding and prevailing upon a salvage repair unit to do the necessary
sewing. Care of the feet was vital in this weather, and
the "booties" proved of highest value in adding to the
comfort and preserving the health of the men .
I he snow had added new problems to tactical op
erations. Patrols began to improvise snow suits from
sheets and old goods in abandoned huildings; almost
all the soldiers found material to use as a white cover
for their helmets. For transportation of ammunition,
sleds and toboggans were found or constructed.
On the 5th of January the I st Battalion, I 19th Infantry, was attached to the I 20th Infantry Regiment,
and relieved elements of the 99th Infantry Battalion
( Separate) in their pasitions in the vicinity of Beverce.
The 99th Infantry Battalion and the 526th Armored
Infantry Battalion were released from attachment to
our Regiment. Reverting to Regimental control the
2d Battalion took over the positions around Chodes
which had been occupied by the 526th Battalion.
On the 8th of January the 2d Battalion relieved
the 3d Battalion on the line, while the latter took
over the positions at Chodes.

On schedule at 0800 both battalions struck. Deep
snow slowed the advancing units, and tanks and tank
<lcstroyers were useless.
The 3d Battalion plan was a "pincer" on a small
scale. Company "K" with tanks attached was to attack between f Iedomont and Gcromont from the
northwest of I luyer, while Company "L" was to
strike south from the vicinity of Five Points, both
to meet upon the high ground. Echeloned to the left
rear o f ( ',ompany "K ," C'.ompany "I" wou Id move be'tween the lead companies, clearing out Geromont and
by-passed pockets en route. The plan looked perfect.
But from the minute the attack began, things did not
go well.
The two lead companies met withering small-arms
fire. Company "I" moved out, and desiring to gain
contact with Company "K," swung more and more to
the right. After clearing Geromont, Company "J"
continued 300 to 400 yards, still without contacting
Company "K." A sudden wall of small-arms resistance met the (',ompany "I" riAemcn as they trudged
through the knee-deep snow toward Huyer. Mem
hers of the lead platoon heard their commander, Lt
-Andrews, yell "Keep moving!" just hefore he fell

D-DAY IN BELGIUl\1
Attack plans meanwhile had been drawn up, and
D-Day was to be Saturday, the 13th of January. H hour was 0800. The strategy of the operation was a
double strike, one from each Rank of the Regimental
wne aimed at the enemy's probable strongpoints.
From the right Rank near l\1almedy the 3d Battalion
was to move forward to take f Iuyer, the high

Booties

JANUARY

141

a strong platoon. Still undaunted, they pushed forward to take the remainder of the high ground that
they found farther to the south overlooking Ligneuville. Suddenly came much firing to Company "I's"
right rear and soon the sounds were discovered to
emanate from a platoon of Company "K," led by Lt
Merle J. Sheen, which was struggling with an enemy
force.
The remainder of Company "K" was still battling
far behind, and the Company "I" platoon joined with
that from Company "K" to continue the drive forward. The two platoons made an advance of 1000
yards, overcoming an enemy patrol and reaching within 500 yards of German artillery pieces.
Then, at 1500, word reached the group that Companies "K" and "L" had gained the main heights of
Huyer, and that the remainder of Company "I" was
to return there, leaving the Company "K" platoon on
outpost.

The Germans left behind them this booby-trapped American
canteen

dead, a victim of enemy automatic fire. Thus began
the most furious period of battle that day for Company "I." Clumsy in the deep snow, tired and partially disorganized, the men could not escape the
merciless fire of the German weaPons.
Companies "K" and "L" were likewise held up and
suffering a similar struggle. The casualties sustained
hy all three companies reached a new high . Com
pany "I" was still unable to contact Company "K" on
the right (west), hut pushed on alone. Into the
f luyer thickets it forged its way, hampered hy
enemy concealed in the woods on its left flank, cleaning out as large an area as it could and reaching the
hilltop at last.
There the men looked around at each other and
realized they now made up a force of no more than

The 2d Battalion found its assignment tougher.
Thirimont and the hill behind it were considered by
the enemy to be the key to the area, and he clung to
them tenaciously. Artillery, mortar and small-arms
fire were deluged upon the attackers. Company "G,"
with one platoon of Company "H" attached,
pushed forward and with supreme effort gained the
outskirts of Thirimont. Alone the company fought to
the main street in the rural settlement. Company "F"
had been assigned to clear the route for armor, since
the path which Company "G" guided upon was unsuitable for tanks. But Company "F'' met the most
petrifying fire and was forced to halt when the casualty toll reached a demoralizing total. All officers with
the company except the commander became casualties. Tanks endeavoring to lead the way struck mines.
This left Company "G" in Possession of a third of
the town without support; it had taken approximately fifty prisoners but its casualties were also numerous.
"We saw some men in white uniforms, like the
ones our men were wearing," said Lt Robert S. Warnick, one of Company "G's" officers, "and they came
into town over the way Company 'F' was scheduled
to use. We shouted to them, and figured that at last
we had some reinforcement. But the men in white
began shooting at us, and with binoculars we picked
up their Jerry uniforms; we had to tighten our defense
and keep fighting
"It wasn't till we tried to send our prisoners back
that we realized we were surrounded. The Krauts had
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closed around at our rear, and Wt: realized we were
cut off in that Godforsaken town. At the same time
the men were fighting all over the place, in the houses
that were spread far apart, and mostly from room to
room. All we could do was hope Company 'E' would
break through the Jerry ring and come to our help.
"Just before noon we spotted about a hundred infantrymen counterattacking us, and we had to call
for all the artillery we could. We kept fighting without losing ground until evening came on, and we still
hadn't received any help. When we spotted more tanks
and infantry coming toward us, we drew in our 1st
Platoon and tightened up for the defense. About this
time we received permission to withdraw; 2 and the
company commander, Lt Charles W. Moncrieff, called
the officers together to decide on how we could best
extricate ourselves without taking too many casualties in the process. It was at best a ticklish situation.
'The officers met at a house near the main road in
town, and it wasn't easy to get there, because the
Krauts had the road zeroed-in with automatic fire,
and everyone that crossed it had to run to dodge the
bursts of fire directed down the street at him. We
were all together deciding how to get out of town
when the enemy tanks broke through the lines and
cut our company in half. They came whipping up the
street right at the house where we were. We had to
call artillery on the street to keep the tanks at bay.
The enemy infantry began to rush the house, but we
managed to hold them off. But the tanks kept firing
at us in the house all the time.
"Almost half the company was on the other side
of the street. It was stupid to try to get to them because the street was held firmly by the enemy, and it would have been hopeless for us to attempt to drive
all the tanks off. We decided that it was a case of
letting the individuals on the other side of the road
act for themselves; by infiltration they might have
reached safety. Then we began our own withdrawal,
and most of us reached the battalion, although Lt
Moncrieff was wounded."
General Hobbs was at the battalion CP and spoke
with Lt Moncrieff before he was treated by the medics.
Plans were meanwhile being completed for an attack
on Thirimont by the 1st Battalion, and the remnants
of Company "G" were assigned to help Company "F"
•Note by tht Regimental Oommnnrler: In iu•tiee to Lt Moncrieff, he
never a•ked for, nor "received permi•sion to." withdraw. The Regimental
Commander ,,;aw that it would hf> impoHMihlt> to rPinfor<'fl Company ''G"
except at the coHt o( t•xcetudve C'&Mualtifls. Two of the thrf>e radioM with
Company "G" had cut out, apparently lwcau•e the extreme rold had dam·
aged the batteri ... The third in•trument wa• failing rapidly. The Regi·
mental Commander realized that the •urroundPd troop• would he help!•••
without means of communication for dire<·ting artillery tire• and there·
fore he ordered Lt ~loncrieff to withdraw.

take a strongpoint outside the town at the same time.
The strongpoint was a tough objective, particularly for
so battered a company as "F," and it was not seized till
after the fall of Thirimont. The elements of Companies "G" and "H" left in Thirimont were found later
to have been captured.
Meanwhile, after supporting the initial attack by
fire, the 1st Battalion was in readiness for an attack
on Ligneuville and had moved forwar!'.! toward Baugnez. Because of the heavy resistance encountered by
the others, the 1st Battalion did not continue onward; instead Company "A" outposted Five Points,
while Company "B" was positioned in defense of
Geromont. At noon the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, was ordered to prepare plans for a night attack
on Thirimont, Hanking it from the west. Our first,
and unsuccessful, attack had been from the north.
The Hegimental Command Post ha~! moved from
Beverce to Monbijou in the morning and, as evening
came, plans were completed for the seizure of Thirimont and I Iaussart the next day. Because it had
ample time to work over the details of the operation,
the 1st Battalion made sure that each man was thoroughly oriented and knew his exact duties.
TIIIHIMONT
At the dark hour after midnight on the 14th of
January an advance party from Company "B" moved
out from Five Points to establish a block on the
Ligneuville road, I 000 yards east of the high ground
Huyer. The remainder of the battalion followed when
the roadblock was set up, moved I 000 yards south almost to the block, then swung east into the Pange
Stream valley and up the steep hanks and winding
road into Thirimont. The riHemen of Company "C"
led the way. That company was to seize the rear outskirts of the town; then Companies "A" and "B" were
to push through and take the remainder of Thirimont.
At 0445 the enemy began to snipe and drop mortar
shells, and his opposition increased steadily until in
the early dawn the battalion was forced to halt. Snow
prevented any armored support, and tanks bogged
down in the soft stream bottom. Patrols sent to Aank
enemy strongpoints were unable to advance. When
daylight began to glimmer over the housetops, it became suicidal to attempt to move heavy weapons over
the open ground to the support of the battalion, and
the plans for Companies "A" and "B" to go through
C
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of the road. At 1330 came a light counterattack in
which thirty infantrymen with one tank were repelled.
Inside the town elements of the 9th Parachute
Regiment, 3d Parachute Division, had set up an ironclad defense, and they fought with a fanaticism of
which Hitler must have been proud. As darkness was
closing in, about 1730, they counterattacked with one
battalion of infantry advancing in waves and supported by one company of tanks. Company "C" in
the lead rallied its fire power, and called for artillery.
The enemy pushed madly forward to within fifty
yards of our hastily dug-in lines along the hedgerows
and roadways which make Thirimont a complicated
network. There two tanks were knocked out by artillery, and the infantry backed off. Pressing our advantage we forced the enemy to withdraw to the east
and pounded him with artillery as he Hed!
The 3d Battalion positions on I Iuyer were taken
over by the I 17th Infantry at !030 on the 14th of
January. 3 Pine-covered and even higher than l luyer,
I laussart (Hill 551 ) was known to be full of snipers who had caused numerous casualties among the
troops in Thirimont. It presented a formidable problem but it was the principal key to the entire Ligneuville sector. At 1150 the 3d Battalion crossed the Line
of Departure and moved generally parallel to the road
from Baugnez, striking I laussart from the northwest. Along the road where destroyed American vehicles were still lying in testimony of the German
breakthrough, men met constant harassment by artillery and rocket shells, aimed at the obvious route
of advance.
Into the draw of the Pange Stream the troops ran
across the open ground and up the hill toward the
heights ahead. The enemy was prepared. I le had
chosen positions for his automatic fire and artillery
observation posts which were impossible to detect.
Leading the 3d Battalion in what was to become
an historic battle was Company "I," still so sorely in
need of replacements that it functioned as a platoon.
Behind was to follow Company "K." _The lead company gained the second hedgerow on I !ill 551 before
receiving any opposition.
With the mission or seizing the hill, alone if necessary, and then to give supporting fire to the !st Battalion in Thirimont, Company"!" swung right (south )
and then headed up the hill (northeast), in an effort
to strike the enemy from the rear.
~com pan y

it
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" J/' wttM ntt udwcl to the 1 17tl. I nfa ntry until 1 600, when
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Our good friends , the artillerymen
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Many were wounded at Thirimont

Six months later, a German PW, formerly mortar
battalion commander, who was present during the defense of Thirimont told Col Purdue that originally
f Iill 55 l had been but lightly defended by the Ger
mans. But when the Nazis saw the advance of the
riAemen on the hill, as they could sec every movement for miles around, they ordered a battalion to
take positions upon it and hold it at all costs.
All at once, then, when Company "I" was 250 yards
from the top of the hill, the enemy, who had gained
positions by that time, began to fight back with terri
fying intensity. The German superiority in numbers
soon began to tell, for though Company 'T' struggled
bravely on, it could not prevent the enemy from gradually encircling it; almost a battalion was combatinga mere platoon.
Company "I" men kept hoping Company "K"
would appear to help in the assault. A runner sent to
contact Company "K" returned to find that in the
meantime Company "I" had been forced to withdrav.'
and leave about a half s<1uad, which had hcen cut off,
either captured or killed.
Company "K" was struggling too. In and around one
house, Jerry had set up defenses against which
Company "K'' advanced over the snow, in the open .
The enemy let go with their maximum. A squad
leader, who had distinguished himself a month before,
at a paper mill near l\lalmedy, observed where the
strongpoint was and with two of his pals ran 200 yards
toward the house. The three men ducked into a barn
next door for cover. The buddies all came from upper
New York State, and they fought with ardent and un

beatable teamwork. With riHes and hand grenades
they tortured the enemy on the ground Aoor of the
house, forcing them at last to go upstairs. Pfc Ra~
mond W. Gould had distinguished himself by leading a squad to knock out a strongpoint on Huyer;
now he ran to a back window to catch the Germans
by surprise. As he climbed in, however, an ene1m
observation post near by perceived him and cut hi1~
down. Sgt Francis S. Currey and his comrade, Pfc
Adam Lucero, did not hesitate a moment; they fired
a BAR and threw hand grenades into the upstairs
from outside until they were fired on from another
enemy position. They went inside and fired through
the windows; soon they had forced the enemy up
stairs again. The remainder of the squad had come
to the ham, meanwhile, and were firing persistent!~
through the walls and windows of the house. For
three and a hall' hours the scrap continued. At 1730.
Sgt Currey had his men put hay from the barn in the
house and ignite it. Soon the house was aflame and
the enemy was forced to withdraw, with losses, into
the night. The "pillbox" was reduced, and the t\10
pals responsible were unscathed.
There were many more well -installed strongpoints,
however, and though Companies "I" and "K" finally
gained contact, darkness found the 3d Battalion dig
ging in 500 yards short of its objective. Parrols were
sent out to reconnoiter the areas to the flanks.
The 15th of January saw the battalions resume the
attack with a superhuman effort. Just before d<m n
the enemy directed a two-company attack against the
!st Battalion clinging to the outskirts of Thirimont.
Two hours later, Lt Col Ellis W. Williamson, its commander, sent Company "A" on the left and Compan~
"13" on the right to strike the remainder of the town
( 0815 ) . The enemy called his utmost support and
threw all his strength against the attackers.
I le was in an unusually advantageous position to
do so. Indeed, the whole to\\'n was a bastion, a defense town of ideal specificatiom. Its approximatek
one hundred houses were for the most part thickwalled stone larmhouses, spaced at distances of from
fifty to one hundred yards. Edging forward, the
riflemen faced a series of hristlinvr> forts, irrcgularlv
•
spaced pillboxes, from whose windows automatic
weapons were mutually protecting. Wherever the~
could, the enemy troops utilin·d the cellars, and, considering themselves invulnerable, they flayed the ad
vance with persistent fire . Later, men were to sa~ ,
"The sniper fire hoth from tlw house and the hill
(I laussart ) was terrifying. \ lcn who walked up

Forty-two German paratroopers held this Thirimont house until it was set afire by a rifle grenade

right for only a second or t\A'O would suddenly drop
dead. None could trace where the shot came from.
rhere was Capt Pulver ( Commanding Officer of
Company 'B') who walked around as straight as a
flagpole directing tanks and leading them into position; how he escaped heing killed is a mystery. Anybody else who stood up for long dropped again for a
lot longer."
I lad our armor been available at the start of the
l'11irimont fight, we \\'oulcl have had a much easier
task. Snow and mines delayed tank and tank destroyer
movements into the town until the night of the l 4th l 5th. By means of a road-building Feat, supporting
l'ngineers ( Company "C," 105th Combat Engineer
Battalion) that night constructed a pathway over
which we moved a small amount of armor before the
frozen crust broke through completely. The tracked
vehicles moved to positions behind the hedgerows
or houses and blasted at the pillboxes which caused
the most dillicultv. The tankers fired on the basement for severai minutes, then infantry troops
rushed at the house and reduced it. Jn all cases it was
slow going; it was hard persuading the enemy that
after his "victory dri\·e toward Liege" he was actually
going to be pushed hack into Germany again. It was
especially hard when the Germans began to bring
forward some Mark IV tanks to supplement their pill box defense. I lad it not been for the two platoons from the 743d Tank Battalion and a platoou
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from the 823d TDs, the town might never have been
taken . The mobile powerhouses were able to engage
the tanks so effectively that by noon the I st Battalion
had swept through the town.
Lt John lYAmico reported by I 330 that Company
"A" had taken its objective and consolidated its defense. Only a few minutes before the attack the former executive officer had taken over Company "A."
The old company commander, Lt Edward W. Hunn,
had suffered what he thought was a superficial wound,
a scratch on his back; he had fought steadily on until
a few moments before the jump-off for the final
objective, the eastern outskirts of the town. Then,
suddenly, he had collapsed; it was later found that
the bullet had pierced the small of his back, ricocheted
off his small rib and had rammed itself into his chest
just below the heart. The bullet was found to be
~w>oden, a device which the Germans had used during the desperate close combat fighting of the hedgerows. Tired, but sticking to their dug-in outposts on
the edge.of the town, the men of Lt D'Amico's Company "A" knew the enemy had been desperate and
fanatical. But not strong enough.

I IAUSSART ( HILL 551)
\Vest of Thirimont, however, the battle continued
to rage. At 0815 the 3d Battalion had attacked again,
and in the afternoon only small, costly progress had
been made. Help was requested.

Several men were needed to carry one wounded soldier back to an aid station

In the Command Post of the 2d Battalion, whose
Companies "E" and "F" had been withdrawn to Weismes from their dug-in positions before Thirimont,
plans had been made to take the high ground "Wolfsbusch," 3000 yards south of Thirimont, and across
the Ambleve (Amel) River. Accordingly, at 1315
Company "E," followed by the remainder of the battalion at 1415, left Weismes by truck and dctrucked
at the road junction 800 yards south of Baugncz. The
troops then started for their objective on foot.
At 1600 orders came to Lt Col James W. Cantey,
Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, to return to
help the 3d Battalion. Colonel Purdue had divided

"Haussart" into two areas; the southern portion was
to be the 3d Battalion objective, the north half the
2d Battalion's.
The 2d Battalion returned to the initial road junction where it had detrucked, and from a Line of De. "G" ancl "F" m
.
parture t llere, attac ked, Compames
the lead. The 3d Battalion pushed with renewed effort at the same time. Light tanks could have speeded
the taking of the objective, and continuous effort was
made to get them on the high ground. lbe steep slope
was covered with more than two feet of snow, however, and the tanks bogged down again and again.
Late in the morning Company "L" had run into a
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strongpoint. A platoon led by T / Sgt Monte W.
Keener was pinned down by a machine gun whose
location was impossible to discern. The men tried to
move forward; a squad leader jumped up aggressively
and ran a few yards when a sputtering from a hidden
gun caused him to fall dead in the snow. Another
man had already started forward and had gone about
twenty yards when the fire cut him dead, too. Before it could be knocked out so that his platoon could
advance, T /Sgt Keener knew that the emplacement
had to be found. Decisively he jumped up to make a
rush; as he ran he hastily surveyed the terrain, and
when the bullets snapped around him he lunged toward where he thought they had originated. He had
gone twenty-five yards when he saw the enemy
grouped around the death-dealing weapon. I le yelled
to his men and pointed to the location; then he
dropped to his knee and fired his BAH into the nest.
I !is men were moving to knock out the emplacement,
when, hit by the machine gun he had discovered,
T /Sgt Keener fell forward on his face.
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Lt William H. Callaway had brought his own platoon up on the right of T /Sgt Keener's. Having seen
T /Sgt Keener, and taking in the situation at a glance,
he organized his own platoon for a Ranking raid on
the nest, grabbed what he could of the adjacent platoon, and sweeping around fifty yards to the enemy's
right he assaulted the emplacement and destroyed it,
taking a toll of fifteen dead and five captured Germans.
Continuing to lead the two platoons, Lt Callaway
dispersed his men in a wooded area near the crest of
Haussart. Though Company "L" was trying to move
forward, he knew that if his men left their positions the
infiltrating enemy who were sniping at them and the
enemy who was delivering the Ranking fire pinning
down Company "L" would gain an advantage and
the hill would have to be taken again. He realized
that while his men held the ground, someone would
have to annihilate the enemy positions.
Still struggling uphill, the tanks were gaining the
high ground an open field away from Lt Callaway.

The regimental command post moved to a hotel in Ligneuville

Though one man had been killed and another woundeel taking the exposed short cut, he dashed across a
field and down a path to meet the tanks and bring
them forward. Up the hill he led them 600 yards to
a point near enemy strongpoints. Once the tanks had
gained vantage points near the crest of the hill the
enemy was easily beaten. Lt Callaway used a tank
to evacuate nine wounded men of his platoon. H~ had
had a full day.
Capt George R. Reeves of Company "L" was an other hero of the day. f le had exposed himself to di- _
rect artillery fire on positions which were holding up
his company. A sniper sighted him, and he felt a
sharp crack at his hip, but on inspection found a bu!let had pierced his clothing, his wallet and field glasses
without even scratching him. Capt Reeves continued
to go from group to group, reinitiating the attack, still
ignoring the many bullets which peppered the ground
and trees all around him. Company "L" seized its part
of the objective despite very heavy casualties as the
result of Capt Reeves' superb bravery and leadership.
Captain "Indian Joe" Reaser was wounded during
the attack on Hill 551. His executive, 1st Lt. Glyn L.
Persons, proved himself an able successor when he personally led the company in the attack upon the strongly
held enemy positions. After capturing the initial objective, he directed the movement of his men across an
open field. I Iere, he was seriously wounded by an

enemy shell which killed his radio operator standing
next to him. Healizing that the field could not be
crossed, he ordered his men to move to cover From
which they could later continue the attack. H.emaining
in a semi-exposed position, he directed the removal
of eight wounded men from the area, refusing evacuation for himself until all of his wounded men had
been returned to safety. Furthermore, he continued
to skilfully direct his company by shouting carefully
thought-out orders. Not wanting to expose his men
to additional danger, he ordered them not to come
after him until nightfall, electing to remain in the
deep snow during daylight. J le saved the lives of
many of his men.
T / 4 Frank E. Palco, Jr., aid man attached to Com
pany "M," also saved many lives on that day, the 15th
oF January. With intense sniper fire directed at him,
T / 4 Palco, responding to a wounded man's call for
help, crawled 125 yards to reach him. Dragging the
wounded man to safety, he made him as comfortable
as possible and returned to his Company Command
Post to get assistance. Tanks were then sent to evacuate wounded in the area, and T / 4 Palco led one of
them to the wounded man, directing his evacuation.
When Lt Persons was wounded, he and another sol
dier carried the officer to partial shelter, the best avail able. There he gave Lt Persons first aid, and also
treated the wound of the man assisting him who was
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hit by sniper fire as they were taking the officer to
cover. I le later discovered a man lying in an exposed
position who had been wounded the day before. T / +
Palco carried this man to the rear and evacuated him.
In addition, he treated 12 other wounded men and
evacuated them from the area subjected to enemy
fire. Such was the caliber of the soldiers of the negimental Medical Detachment.
By night the objective had fallen into our hands.
Eighty-seven prisoners of war were taken, although
most of the enemy had fought ferociously until killed.
Three consecutive days of fighting had brought a long
casualty list to the I 20th Infantry negiment, too. It
paused for a day to reorganize and consolidate its
gains. Patrols cleared the area south of f laussart to
the river.
General I lobbs, the Division commander, entered
the 3d Battalion CP on the day after the fight. I le
was speaking with Colonel Purdue about the bitterness of the battle. The Germans had outdone themselves in organizing clever, deceptive, powerful defenses on the ground. The Germans had fought viciously for each inch. But the men of the 30th Division, of the I 20th Infantry, had overcome the terrible
obstacles. Not easily, no. But with a fortitude and
persistence that did honor to every man associated
with the unit. Briskly the General complimented Lt
Col Greer. f lill 551 perhaps was as hard a battle as
was fought in this war, in the Pacific, or the European
Theater. Men agreed on that.
Meanwhile the I 19th Infantry Hegiment had seized
Ligneuville, and "Wolfshusch" to the southeast. On
the 17th of January at 1630 the Hegimcntal Command Post moved into a once luxurious resort hotel
in Ligneuvillc. A half hour later the 2d Battalion
had relieved the 3d Battalion of the J 19th lnfantrv
on the high ground, Wolfshusch. At this time th~
30th Heconnaissance Troop was attached to the I 20th.

The 3d Battalion took over the former positions of
the 2d Battalion and with the 1st Battalion remained
in the vicinity of Thirimont. The I st Battalion sent a
reconnaissance patrol to determine with what strength
the enemy held I I ill 522, another key to the area
2500 yards east of Hecht, on the St. Vith road. Led
by Lt ,Hobert i\ 1acCulley of Company "C," the patrol
delved far into enemy territory and observed enemy
strongpoints in strategic locations. Moments were
tense when an enemy group was observed to have
infiltrated to the rear of the patrol, perhaps to cut it
off. But stealthily the patrol withdrew through thickets
covered with snow and returned successfully to supply vital information to the battalion.
OBJECTIVE "QUEEN"
On the J8th of January the I 20th Infantry struck
again. The objective was the high wood, Hill 522,
but Hegimental Headquarters passed down the code
word for the objective, which was "Queen." From the
2d Battalion front on Wolfsbusch, the 1st Battalion
attacked south over a route well-reconnoitered by Lt
MacCulley's patrol the day before. It moved through
the thick pine forest to the high ground and encountered little opposition. It captured two enemy patrols
without disclosing its formation or committing a large
number of men. By 1330 men had dug in, and though
they received intermittent tank fire which caused treebursts, no casualties were suffered.
The enemy is known to counterattack with persistence and regularity. This occasion was particularly humiliating to the enemy, and he made his counterattacks especially frequent and vicious. In the following days he tried desperately with this strategy to
eject our troops.
Three and a half hours after the 1st Battalion had
moved onto its objective it was struck by a force of
five tanks and one hundred infantry. The tanks were
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canalized, however, by snow and woods, and two were
speedily put out of action by bazookas. The infantry
withdrew.
They returned, however, later in the evening. A
block established by the 1st Battalion on the road running north into Kaiserbaracke destroyed two more
tanks and an assault gun. Again the Germans with drew. But this time they left behind forty prisone~
and thirty-five killed. Our victory, however, cost the
life of a brave soldier, S/ Sgt Frederick 0. Sawyer of
Company "C." While engaged in the battle with the
counterattacking enemy tanks, S/ Sgt Sawyer assisted
another man in knocking out an approaching tank.
I le later deliberately fired upon a second tank to divert
the attention of its crew from his squad which the tank
had pinned down with its machine-gun fire. I le gave
orders to his men to seek cover and, while firing upon
the tank, was killed by its machine-gun fire. In intentionally exposing himself, S/ Sgt Sawyer paid the
supreme sacrifice to enable his squad to withdraw, regroup, and attack again to force the tank's withdrawal.
So objective "Queen" was secured and held. To the
men of the Ist Battalion who were there, there must
always be some touch of cold and hunger in the word.
They knew objective "Queen" by name, and had not

lived in the frozen woods long before they came to
hate its atmosphere. The main road was the only quick
route over which to bring supplies, but until it was
opened, until the enemy had been driven from his
stubborn roadblocks, food and clothing had to be
brought over a devious, forested route which was long
and could take only small vehicles like l\1 -29 "weasels." \.Vithout blankets men found the nights endless and sleepless; with only meager "K" rations, the
days were tiresome and nerve-racking. Occasionally
rocket fire would set the w<x>ds echoing. The men
crept miserably in the frigid foxholes and stamped icy
Feet against the ground.
The battalion Command Post was only a little larger
than a foxhole itself, dug-in on the reverse slopes of
I !ill 522. The hattalion commander remembers the
night after the objective was seized, when as he was
trying to doze, a husky rifleman planted a heavy GI
shoe in the CP hole and yelled lustily at the men inside, "Where the hell is the CP?" The battalion commander couldn't answer; he was too busy struggling
with both frozen hands to keep the GI hoot from
crushing his face, where it had been placed. Every
now and then the snow sifted down in Hurries. That
. . "Q ueen. "
was 01)jeCt1ve
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The 3d Battalion meanwhile moved to Hill 522
to reinforce the defense of the 1st Battalion.
The key to success in this area at this season was
the maintenance of communication, supply, and evacuation routes. Particularly with Ranks and rear expo~ed, the S-4 assignment was doubly difficult. No
vehicles could go without convoy. Wet weather and
shell fire constantly hampered telephone wires, and
the wooded, hilly terrain made radio a troublesome
method of keeping contact.
To keep supply lines open, the 2d Battalion, still
holding Wolfsbusch, sent elements to protect the
vulnerable main road leading to the forward battalions.
The 30th Heconnaissance Troop kept contact meanwhile with the 23d Infantry Hegiment 4 on our left.
The Germans, too, had realized the importance of
roads in preserving a strong defense. Three of their
blocks had to be by-passed in the initial stages of the
attack on I I ill 522. One was at the railroad crossing
north of the hill, one at Kaiserbarackc, and another
at a dirt crossroad 500 yards due north of Kaiserbaracke. The latter was in the zone of the I 17th Infantry
and had held up that regiment for two days. On the
19th of January, Company " K" of our Regiment was
given the difficult mission of making a night attack
through unreconnoitered woods in order to assist the
I 17th Infantry. Led by that indomitable fighter Captain "Indian Joe" Heaser, Company "K" was brilliantly
successful. At the railroad crossing Company "K" was
able to break up the enemy block and destroy a Mark
IV and an assault gun. At Kaiserbaracke our pressure
forced four assault guns and a staff car to attempt to
make a getaway to the south. Elements of Company
"C" and of the Antitank Platoon, !st Battalion, deployed on both sides of the escape route, destroyed all
five vehicles.
This was Captain Heaser's last operation. H e
entered the fight suffering from a wound received a
few days earlier and again he was wounded, fortunately not seriously. l le remained with his company
until the mission was completed. But the wound ultimately caused "Indian Joe" to be evacuated. Thus the
Hegiment lost one of its outstanding company commanders.
Our troops destroyed many pieces of enemy armor
during this operation. Seven tanks or assault guns,
two halftrack personnel carriers, and one staff car
lay wrecked between Kaiserharacke and I !ill 522.
Several other uncounted German tanks were found
'The ht Infantry Divis ion wa• operating on our left. The 23d Infantry
Regiment, of the 2d Infantry Division, wa• attached to the 1st at this
ti mt..
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One of the many we knocked out on the 19th of January

destroyed throughout the timber. In the wooded terrain and foggy weather long fields of fire did not exist;
the tanks had to be attacked from close quarters. Rifle
grenades and particularly bazookas proved invaluable
and accounted for most of the destroyed enemy vehicles.
FECKELSBORN
Patrols on the 18th of January had ascertained that
enemy infantry were well-entrenched around Feckelsborn, a tiny settlement on the Recht road west of the
St. Vith highway. Relieved by the !st Battalion, I 19th
Infantry, the 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry, moved
into the attack at 1400, the 19th, from the area of
the 1st Battalion on Hill 522 along a ridge extending southwest into the hamlet. Brilliantly led by Lt
Col James W. Cantey, who kept the troops organized
in the face of an initial artillery barrage falling on
them, the advancing battalion met only light resistance
and had consolidated the gain by 1700. Of the eighteen prisoners captured, some indicated that they had
expected an attack from the west and had been taken
by surprise on their right Rank.
On I !ill 522, the night of the I 9th-20th was the
coldest and stormiest yet, the riflemen decided. Nothing seemed to be ahle to function in the numbing
cold. The radios went dead, telephone lines were out,
and no vehicles could come near. The German artillery alone functioned better than ever, and like the
snow and wind, continued all night, though not altogether so consistently.
The supply problem was acute. At I IOO on the
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morning of the 20th, a savior appeared in the form
of Maj Chris McCullough, 1st Battalion executive
officer, who, with a hand-carrying party, had brought
food and blankets to the 1st and 3d Battalions. In the
3d Battalion forward CP he found Lt Col Greer, Capt
Trauth, Artillery Officer, Lt Jack W. Gollust, Communications Officer, and T / Sgt Peters, bitterly cold
and miserable after the night's tortures.
Supplies were never more welcome. Throughout
the entire drive, of course, bringing forward food and
clothing was a pressing and ever-looming problem.
Company and battalion executives slaved- and had
to change plans many times. Frequently the men had
to do without. The suffering made commanders
wince. The first sergeants were frequently company
heroes. Belin, Shtundel and Seamans in the 3d Battalion were called "towers of strength" by the doughboys. Clelan L. Belin, of Comr.any "I," had even on
Huyer brought forward faithfully all he could in an
M-29 "weasel." He knew, as Capt Shaw said, that
"chow and rolls were a welcome sight because a hole
in the snowy, cold ground was no picnic in any man's
Ianguage. ,,
Then on the morning of the 20th came saturation
artillery and rocket fire on the I st and 3d Battalion
positions. Ten men in the vicinity of the 3d Battalion
CP were wounded, and one was killed. Capt Charles
E. Pritchard, 3d Battalion f lead(1uarters Commandant, was wounded in both legs; his driver, Pfc Constantine, was killed.
NlEOEH El\1MITZER I !EIDE
Assigned to the I 20th Infantry was Objective
'Tare," the village of Nieder Emmitzer I leide, and

the high ground immediately north of it. A patrol
from the 1st Battalion set out at 1830 on the 20th
of January and drew fire halfway to the objective.
Commanded by Lt Francis E. Smith, the patrol had
observed well, and reported installations so accurately that the battalion was able to move where
the enemy line was weakest. At 1000 the 1st Battalion,
with Companies "A" and "B" leading, maneuvered
far to the west of the St. Vith road, by-passed the German line strongpoints and swung in upon the enemy
from his rear. The artillery observer with the Battalion
brought fire upon a battery of German horse-drawn
artillery before the Germans realized that their front
lines had been by-passed. By then it was too late for
them to resist effectively; they were thrown off balance. Thirteen prisoners were captured, and the
enemy was evicted from the ground on the right of
the St. Vi th road around Nieder Emmitzer f leide.
An hour and forty minutes after the 1st Battalion,
the 3d Battalion proceeded over the same route towards Nieder Emmitzer I Ieide. Then, after pushing
up to the 1st Battalion line, it attacked through to
seize the ground left of the road on the high ground.
Companies "I" and "L" pushed farthest to the cast,
but the entire battalion was so decimated and exhausted that the men had a slow and difficult fight.
The battalion encountered assault guns and infantry,
but was able to push on to Objective "T" and consolidate a defense by ! 645.
Supply routes again had to be cleared. Company
"C," which had remained on a roadblock on "Hill
522," was sent to open the road to Nieder Emmitzer
f leide. Company "K" assisted. Company "G" relieved
Company "C" on the roadblock.
The 30th Reconnaissance Troop relieved the 1st
Battalion, I 19th Infantry, on "Wolfshusch" at 0900,
and established contact with the I I 7th lnfantrv on
our right ( west ) .
'
COUNTERATTACK ON WALD
The night of the 20th-21st of January was long and
cold, and the men were tired. At 0400 a German patrol was noted, and three of its members were shot
before it could escape. At the first glimmering of dawn
enemy artillery increased slightly. B rations were
served for breakfast, nevertheless, and feeling secure,
some of the troops were trying to keep warm in their
blankets, when, at 0915 the enemy made a spectacular
appearance.
From the cast around Born came two assault guns
with 150 infantry; they hit our lines in the vicinity of
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where a fire break crossed the main road just north
of Nieder Emmitzer Heide. The enemy drove hard
for the main road; whether to turn right to tear asunder our line, or to turn left to escape to his own, no
one knows. The attack was preceded by artillery,
and for a half hour was raging at a furious pace; the
lead assault gun hit two 57mm antitank guns at the
road bend, smashing their breechblocks, and hitting
a-jeep close by; it fired on a machine-gun nest of Company "K" and killed all four men therein. And it
raced back and forth in the firebreak while the enemy
infantry around the tanks scattered and fired small
arms into our positions.
Tanks of the 743d Tank Battalion on the main road
kept the self-propelled gun from leaving the break.
Conspicuously in the center of the fray was Capt
George L. Reeves of Company "L," who at the first
shots had left his CP dugout and picked up an M-1
rifle near by. Someone discovered later that he killed
six of the enemy personally. Once, when the lead
self-propelled gun commander raised his hatch cover,
Capt Reeves shot him and saw the gun retreat at once
rapidly. Fighting not far from Capt Reeves were Lts
O'Shea and Doyle of Company "I." Throughout the
vicious attack, the three officers bolstered the men,
Capt Reeves with the spirit of a man who knows he
cannot be hurt. I le was to learn later that afternoon, at
a much tamer time, that he was all too vulnerable; a
surprise rocket barrage caught him as he dashed to
warn some of his men to take cover from enemy
fire; he was wounded seriously.
In a forward 3d Battalion CP meanwhile, on the
east edge of the infamous "Wald," the Germans had
taken command. When it had first struck the line,
the self-propelled gun had fired into the front-line
dugout, killing a radio operator and wounding a
member of the Battalion Intelligence Section. After
the gun had continued on in a vain attempt to gain
the main road, the German infantrvmen had moved
in and had taken prisoner a radio' operator and an
officer, Lt James Bickley, Battalion S-2, who once previously had been taken prisoner by the enemy, only
to escape after several weeks of captivity behind the
enemy lines.
Meanwhile, closer to the road, Companies "K" and
"L" were able to pin enemy infantry to the ground.
One tank was able to direct frontal fire at the assault
guns, keeping them from breaking through. Lt Col
Williamson was meanwhile skirting through the
woods on the east side of the road to Rank the guns;
with him he took T /Sgt Thomas Fogli, a veteran of
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long standing from Company "A," then in reserve,
and eight riflemen of Fogli's platoon. Three tanks
moved with the squad and, while protected and directed by the infantrymen, they pulled into position
on the German's right Rank; in a minute they were
firing at the enemy and had destroyed one of the
guns, while another turned and Red in the direction
from which it had come. Small-arms and tank fires
accounted for most of the Germany infantry, who lost
twenty-four captured and seventy killed.
COMMUNICATION, SNOW, TROUBLE
Ever since the day of the first attack against Thirimont and Huyer, the wiremen and radiomen had
been taking a beating. The 610 and 300 radios
strapped to their backs weighed heavier, and with
each new hill the burden became more unendurable.
At times almost waist-deep, the snow increased even
more the difficulty of movement. Then, only a few
hours into the attack, the batteries began freezing and
became useless. With an ingenuity which had always
been a recognized characteristic of "GI Joe," radiomen
contrived a "blanket" for their instruments, a woolen
covering made from socks and old clothes; slipped
around the piece, it diminished the danger of freezing
and solved to some extent the radio problem. Struggling along close by the riflemen, the radiomen could
be heard shouting in tight, frozen voices, "Sugar Able
this is Baker Mike .... "
Not far behind the radios came three tired figures
with a reel of wire. Twisting around the trees, they
trudged, stopping every now and then to make sure
of their direction. The road to St. Vith would have
been an easy route for wire, but the road was usually
held by the enemy long after the woods on either
side had been taken. Every once in a while, as they
plunged through the drifts toward the front-line companies, a barrage of rocket fire, or heavy artillery,
would shatter the trees. Sometimes the wiremen had
to trace their way back then, to mend a break. Many
times they had to help a wounded comrade to the aid
station.
It was a 24-hour job for every wire team in the Regiment. When the fatiguing ordeal of establishing the
lines was done, it was only a short time before the
call came for men to repair the wires. It snowed most
of the time, and just to find the wire presented a problem. But if you followed along with the wire in your
hand, through the tortuous pathways of the Wald,
you usually found the break in the line, or the company, if you were looking for a company.

Our lost obiective in the Ardennes

In fact, following the wire was usually the best
way to find a unit in these same-looking woods, especially when the map locations were slightly inaccurate and when there was nothing but trees from
which to gauge location on the ground. Once the
wiremen were lost trying to locate Company "L," and
when they radioed the company to send a guide to
the battalion CP, Capt Reeves, the commander, sent
men who one after the other became lost. The situation looked hopeless for a long time, but the wiremen
fina11y discovered that they had come within fifty
feet of the company without knowing it, so snowed
under and hidden were the dugouts. Sometimes radio
relay stations had to be used between battalion CPs
and OPs. In chilly foxholes the radiomen nestled
down, and passed the message from one station to the
next. Provided, that is, that the cold and thick woods
did not make hearing impossible.
All night long on the 20th-2 l st, the wiremen of
the 3d Battalion Headquarters Company had worked
through the woods, following the route of the battalion to Nieder Emmitzer Heide. At 0100 they still
had 300-400 yards to go, but found themselves out
of wire. "We had gone four miles to cover a two-mile
distance," said Lt Jack W. Gollust, Communications
Officer, "but since the road wasn't open, we had to
take the long way. In our situation, there was nothing to do but go back to the CP over the four-mile
route and bring up more wire. When we got back,
we found the road was open." By early morning, the
wire had been laid along the highway to the front-line
companies.
But with the opening of the St. Vith road came

the tanks and TDs to take up defensive pos1t10ns.
Tracked vehicles have always spelled doom for wires,
and hundreds were gnawed apart in the firebreaks
and on the main road. Soon calls were coming in
for line repairmen, and they set out through the snow,
feeling their way along the wire. That morning ( the
21st) the counterattack struck as they were working
just behind the MLR. But in the middle of the fight,
communications were established. Soon the good news
was to come over the copper that the enemy had been
rcpelJed. "Trouble?" asked Lt. Gollust, "We had hell!"
TWO EMMELS
Two objectives south of Nieder Emmitzer I leide
remained to be taken. The 2d Battalion moved forward on the 22d of January from Feckelsborn. Company "F" attacked Ober Emmels, a village which
dominated the western half of the objective. Company "E" moved through Company "F" to take Nieder Emmels, the eastern, northern portion. Resistance
was light since friendly troops were putting pressure
on the southern tip of Nieder Emmels. Five enemy
tanks were knocked out or captured, however; in one
the motor was still running long after the town had
been taken. Inside, riflemen found the tank driver
frozen to his controls- dead. One hundred eighty-one
prisoners were captured in the day's action.
Prisoners of war stated that they were overwhelmed
by the speed with which our forces surrounded them.
It is more than likely, however, that the enemy felt a
constantly growing pressure, too, and sensing our relentless progress, did not care to stop it. Sometimes the
progress did not seem to be relentless. The supply
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We fought through snow and over hills

routes always seemed endless, and the enemy had
fought so fanatically that every man must have wondered if the advance were worth our losses. But the
I 20th Infantry had come through the ordeal with
every mission accomplished, and if anyone had the
ambition, he could have wandered among the camouAaged, white foxholes and seen, here and there, a
bearded smile from the man on guard, or could hear,
now and then, a rough laugh from a doughboy
crouched over his K-ration-box fire. At any rate, even
though the cost had been high, the I 20th had been
too much for the enemy to handle.
The seizure of these last objectives made possible
the recapture of St. Vith by the 7th Armored Division, which had been the last American forces in the
town at the time of the German breakthrough. Elements of that division attacked through the 30th Division lines in the Nicder-Emmels region on the 23d of
January.
At 2230 the 3d Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion
of Ober Emmels; the latter moved back to its former
area at Feckelsborn. The following morning the lst
Battalion replaced the 3d Battalion, which moved
hack to Malmedy.
The 30th Reconnaissance Troop had been relieved
of attachment to the I20th Infantry at 1730 on the
22d of January, and was attached to the I I 7th.

The next three days gave the Hegiment a chance
to rest and reorganize following the bitter campaign.
Men warmed up in the shelter of a BelgiaR home for
the first time in a week. Reinforcements joined the
outfit. Light training included: battle orientation discussion, combat tips from veteran soldiers, first-aid
instruction, and winter combat hygiene.
Care and cleaning of equipment naturally took first
attention in training. All weapons were brought up
to A-I shape.
TRAINING DAYS
On the 27th of January the Command Post of the
l20th Infantry moved from Ligneuville to Sart, Belgium, and was in operation at 1115. From Nieder
Emmels the lst Battalion moved to Verleumont; from
Feckelsborn the 2d Battalion moved to Sart, and the
3d Battalion moved from Malmedy to Halt. Antitank
Company assembled in an area at Provedroux. On
the following day Cannon Company, with the 230th
Field Artillery, moved into Salmchateau.
On the 28th of the month training began. Billets
were cleaned and church services were held. Weapons
were cleaned and checked.
The last three days of January were given to training, firing of weapons, and recreation. One noncom
from each platoon attended Regimental Gas School
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We returned to the old, familiar battle-scarred towns

on the 29th. The 1st and 2d Battalions saw a film on
"Germany: Non-Fraternization."
Part of the lst and 3d Battalions had baths in Stavelot. All battalions were familiarized with the new
M -24 light tank. Improvised snow suits, woolen "booties," and Quartermaster arctic clothing were fitted and
distributed.
At the end of January the German salient in Bel-

gium, which had ended hopes for peace in 1944 and
had startled once-complacent optimists in noncombat
zones, had been reduced to a "bubble." Von Rundstedt's counterattack was already mentioned in papers
as a "fizzle," and compared to the dying convulsions
of Ludendorff in the last war.
The I 20th Infantry will long remember the "Bulge"
in Belgium. The doughboys may not remember the
spectacular success they had in overcoming some of
Hitler's few remaining crack paratroopers, nor the
brilliant tactics of their commanders, nor the superhuman effort they expended in the worst of circumstances. But they will remember Thirimont and Haussart, and Hill 522, and the counterattack on Wald.
Even more will they remember the dull, cold hours of
watch, the long, dark days of plodding through snow,
and the foxholes they dug in the pine woods and camouflaged over and over again. They will remember the
cry of incoming tree-bursts, and sleeplessly bitter
nights, and cold K rations.
Later, at a presentation of awards, Maj Gen Leland
S. Hobbs, commander of the 30th Division, was heard
to say, "In every hot spot, in every heavy encounter
since D-day- excluding only D-day itself- you men
have been there, and have come through on top."
And so, along with St. Lo and Martain, the campaign of the Belgian Salient took its place among the
most difficult assignments of the Regiment. The
doughboys had fought doggedly and yard-by-yard
against a stubborn enemy, a cruel climate, and unfavorable terrain. Another tough spot- another victory for the 120th Infantry.

FEBRUARY
On the lst of February, 1945, the Command Post
of the I 20th Infantry Regiment was located in Sart,
Belgium. The Regiment was in a period of rest and
training following the "campaign" of the Belgian
Salient, where it had pushed the German lines from
Malmedy to Nieder Emmels. The Antitank Company was in Provedroux; Cannon Company was with
the 230th Field Artillery Battalion in Salmchateau.
The lst Battalion was billeted in houses in Verleumont, the 2d Battalion at Grand-Sart, and the 3d
Battalion at Halt. All battalions were receiving reinforcements, and extensive training was conducted,
covering group tactics and weapons technique.
The deep snow which the Regiment had come to
know so well in Belgium had begun to thaw out, so
that training in the battalion area was carried out in
slush. Word came that the Germans had been pushed
back beyond the lines through which they had effected their terrifying but abortive penetration. Plans
for continuation of the fall offensive in Germany, disrupted by Von Rundstedt's counterdrive, were to be
resumed; the Division was to return to Germany; by
the third day of the month march tables were completed. Secrecy was to veil the entire movement to
the new location; accordingly bumper identifications
were painted out and shoulder patches were removed.
It was without sorrow that the men who had fought
through the cold and wilderness of the Ardennes left
the winter and the mountains behind; as the men
rolled their packs, spring had already warmed the
countryside.
On the early morning of the 3d of February, at
0345, the Regimental Command Post at Sart closed,
and with bright lights the first vehicles in the Regimental convoy crossed the Initial Point at Salmchateau at 0400. Well-packed in the trucks and
clutching their weapons and rolls, the troops rolled
through Verviers, Eupen, and Aachen, to territory increasingly familiar to them. At Aachen blackout lights
only could be used, and men of the Hegiment began to
realize that they were once again close to combat, and
that, at the root of all the secrecy of the movement,
a new mission was in store for them.
By 0800 the forward elements of the Regiment had
reached the vicinity of Broichweiden, Germany, a
town which the 2d and 3d Battalions had seized in
mid-November. In the center of this town the Regimental Command Post was established shortly after
0800. Also in Broichweiden in an area where it had
expected to spend Christmas week, the lst Battalion

was installed by 0950, followed an hour later by the
2d Battalion which settled in an adjacent area in the
same community. The 3d Battalion reported that it
had moved into an assembly area 1000 yards north of
Zopp by 1150.
The old, familiar, battle-scarred quarters needed
considerable renovation, and the soldiers went about
this with enthusiasm, glad to be free of snow-covered
foxholes. The weather was drizzly and dark, reminiscent of the fall rains of the Birk-Euchen-Altdorf
days. When it was announced that the 30th Division
was once again in the Ninth Army, the conversion to
the "old days" was complete.
NEW PROSPECTS ON THE ROER
During the four days of training after the 4th of
February it became increasingly apparent that the
I 20th Infantry would soon be headed across the Roer
River, where the lines had been stabilized since early
December. It became apparent, too, that our Regiment would play an important part in crossing that
river, last natural barrier before the Rhine.
In November the 1st Battalion had taken Altdorf
on the Incle River, which was a tributary of the Roer;
south of Altdorf on the lnde was the town of lnden;
between Ind en and the Roer was Pier. Both this village and Inden were to be key points, focal bases of
operations, for the future crossing.
On the morning of the 6th of February, Lts James
J. Butler and Michael A. Esquivel of the Intelligence
and Reconnaissance Platoon were oriented by the S-2,
Major Ezekiel L. Glazier, on taking patrols to explore
the banks of the Roer in the vicinity of Pier in attempt
to find a suitable crossing site for the Regiment. Six
patrols of three men each set out at 2200, each with an
area to cover and with the mission of crossing, if possible, and investigating the opposite bank. Engineers
accompanied three of the patrols.
At 0620 the next morning the last of the six patrols
returned to the Regimental Command Post drenched,
and shortly thereafter the S-2 reported to the G-2 the
following information: "One patrol got across. It saw
nothing, although it covered the entire area-and had
a 'swimming' good time!" The patrol had searched
the woods on the east side of the Roer. It found that
although the river was generally only 35 to 45 yards
wide, it presented a real barrier because of the swift
current. The soft mud bottom, too, was hard to negotiate, and though the men were equipped with
chest-high rubber boots they sunk deep. One man ,
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Practicing river crossing on the lnde

Pfc Robert V. Phipps, wearing GI galoshes, reached
the far side more easily than the others.
INDEN, FORWARD ASSEMBLY AREA

Had the Schwammenauel and llrftalsperre Dams
been blown both at once, the waters of the Roer would
have risen to engulf Pier and cover the village of
Krauthausen across the waters from Pier. Engineers
in the sector of the dams estimated that, if they had
not already done so, it would take the Nazis four days
to prepare the demolitions to blow both dams. It was
therefore a double victory when on the 9th of February American troops ( 78th Division) fought their
way through the town of Schmidt to the high banks
of the two dams before the installations could be
blasted. Immediate investigation proved that though
the dams were saved, the enemy had blown the valve
outlets and the conduit from the llrftalsperre. This
permitted a flow which caused the river to rise in
some places to three times its normal size, though not
a third of what it might have been with both dams
blown .
Consequently, when patrols from the Intelligence
and Reconnaissance Platoon returned early the morning of the 8th of February, it was through no mere
whim of nature that it had to report the river's phenomenal rise from knee- to chest-height since the
night before. The 2d Battalion sent a patrol with
members of the l05th Engineer Battalion on the night
of the 8th of February; the engineers were unable to
find a suitable crossing site. On the next night, 2d
Battalion patrols discovered the Roer had risen another two feet, and noted that water ha.d reached the
edge of the Pierer Wald, a wooded area across the
river from Pier.

The troops were not surprised, then, to learn on the
7th of February that they were to move forward under
cover of darkness. Regimental f Ieadquarters and the
3d Battalion were moving by truck to Inden, and the
1st Battalion to Putzlohn west of Inden. The 2d Battalion was to remain in Broichweiden till next day.
On schedule at 1900 the Regimental Command
Post left Broichweiden; by 2010 it had reached its new
location. The 3d Battalion had closed in bv 2100,
the lst by 2130. Forward clements of both b~ttalions
were stationed in much-demolished Pier.
WAITING FOR Tl IE ROER STRIKE
The 2d Battalion was prepared to move to Pier, but
Plans for the river-crossing attack had been decided
the scarcity of quarters brought about a change in
plan; instead, it moved at 1800 on the 8th February upon by the night of the 8th of February, but it began
to Lamersdorf, south of lnden; this town it reached an to appear that "Jerry" had cleverly managed to delay
hour later. Only the mortar platoon of Company "H" our operation, at least momentarily. Another patrol on
and elements of I Ieadquarters Company were garri- the night of the 10th of February ascertained that the
river was still too high to cross easily.
soned in Pier.
Meanwhile daylight Observation Posts and night
Plans for the Roer drive were set: I I-hour was to be
0530 the next morning ( the 9th). Meanwhile, how- Listening Posts were keeping steady tab on the towns
ever, two six-man I and R patrols which on the night of Krauthausen and Sclhausen across the Roer from
of the 7th of February had gone to investigate the Pier, and Niederzier across the fields beyond. In
river banks again reported that the water had risen Schophoven, north of Pier along the Roer, in Merken,
since the night before, and that none of the men had due south of Schophoven, and in Pier, were estabbeen able to cross. When the S-2 made inquiry as to lished Regimental OPs, which from church spires carethe reason for the sudden rise, higher heaclc1uarters fully observed the enemy's movement. Bicyclists and
said it might be the spring thaws. To the south, light vehicles were seen; men were noted entering
however, were two dams which controlled the Roer, "haystacks" and running to factories in Krauthausen
and at that moment heavy fighting for the possession and back again among the houses. Wide trenches, apof the dams was under way.
parently unoccupied, could be watched, too, along
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with wire obstacles damaged by artillery. Attached to
the 230th Field Artillery Battalion in lnden, Cannon
Company brought fire upon many of the enemy observed.
The period of waiting for the waters of the Roer
to go down was not spent in idleness. From the 9th
to the 12th of February, while OPs were watching the
river and the enemy, the battalions engaged in extensive training with emphasis on river crossing.
G-2 reports indicated that, rather than utilizing the
elaborate trenchwork already constructed, the enemy
was organizing the defense of built-up areas on the
Cologne plain to our front; accordingly town assault
and tank coordination instruction was given. The
new light tank M -24 was reviewed with the men, and
down the ruined streets of In den, Lamersdorf, and
Putzlohn, reinforcements learned with battle veterans
the tricks of house-to-house combat.
With infinite care and painstaking effort, since it
was to be of key importance, the river-crossing instruction was given on the banks of the lnde River. Where
the river makes an S-turn between lnden and Lamersdorf, 3d Battalion selected four sites. At the first,
troops learned how to load, launch, and row the rubber assault boats; at the second they were taught how
to handle rubber and wooden craft; at the third, they
practiced crossing in small boats and establishing local
security at once while the rope was being fixed across
the water; at the last site, they were instructed in handling large engineer boats. Officers of the Begiment
decided on the technique to be used; by paddling to
keep the boat's nose facing upstream, the men caused
the current to push the boat to the far shore.
Since smooth functioning was vital, men of all battalions were rehearsed frequently on the sequence of
duty and maneuver of the boats. The placement of
weapons and seating of personnel had to be exact and
automatic; the order of crossing within each unit was
memorized by each man. Scheduled to lead in the
Regimental attack, the 2d Battalion practiced crossing
on four different nights as well as almost every day;
the 1st Battalion also practiced at night.
In the "Durwiss Pit," a large mine excavation
where the Germans had abandoned derricks and engineer equipment, units and individuals of the Regiment fired their weapons. Beside the modern Adolf
I litler Autobahn north of Eschweiler, Antitank Company and tanks used the "Pit" for a range. Mortars
were fired in an area between Putzlohn and Lamersdorf.
On the 17th of February the 3d Battalion left Inden
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at 1800 and traveled to Kerkrade where for two days
it enjoyed a stay at the Division Rest Center. When
it returned the evening of the 19th the 2d Battalion
moved to the rest area, and stayed till the night of
the 21st.
During the period I 7th-21st of February there were
several other events.
Britain's Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery visited the 30th Division; in honor of the occasion the
Regiment spruced up its camouflage.
Sporadic enemy shelling harassed lnden and Pier.
On the night of the 14th of February an enemy
plane dropped approximately five bombs in the
Inden-Lamersdorf area. One wounded four men engaged in the lst Battalion practice night river crossing.
The same night robot bombs made their first appearance to our knowledge in this sector; they continued
the following day and reminded the troops of the
robot bomb days and nights near Malmedy.
Jet-propelled planes were seen on and after the
20th of February. The enemy seemed to expect
"something was brewing" in our sector. And well he
might.
FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR A CROSSING
On the 18th of February patrol activity became
active again. The 2d Battalion dispatched a patrol
that night which succeeded in crossing the river southwest of Selhausen, and proceeded one hundred yards
inland on the opposite bank. It turned north, passed a
double-apron barbed-wire fence, took care to avoid the
complicated but apparently unoccupied system of
communication trenches, some of which were caved
in. The patrollers were pecked at in one area by a
machine gun. At a point 500 yards north of where the
patrol had originally crossed it returned to the friendly
side and reported by 0200.
The next night and the night after that, patrols
made their way to the banks, and tried to cross again,
but the current swept the little boats like straws back
to the near side, and though engineer men were assisting the infantrymen, no crossing could be made in
the Regimental sector.
On the night of the 21st of February four five-man
patrols from the 2d Battalion were dispatched again
to reconnoiter the terrain across the Roer in our sector,
and to locate, each with certain limits, the most expedient crossing location. One patrol failed to cross
where the swollen river and swift current overcame all
attempts. Another followed a line of telephone poles
south of Schophoven toward Krauthausen; it made a

The Roer

muddy path, but the patrol finally maneuvered a small
boat to the opposite side and scouted the brush and
fields in enemy territory to its front before returning.
A third patrol picked up its assault boat from Pier and
moved south over the swamps toward Selhausen. Led
by Lt Francisco Calabrese, the men, who were from
Company "F," chose a spot opposite the southern tip
of the Pierer Wald. After crossing they struck another water obstacle, the l\ 1uh Ien teich Canal. Two of
the party reconnoitered north and found a recently
constructed wooden footbridge, while another swam
across, and made his cautious way toward Selhausen.
He discovered a barbed-wire obstacle on the edge of
the town before he rejoined the remainder of the patrol. Meanwhile the last patrol had found a crossing
in the area of the I 19th Infantry on the left ( north )
and on the enemy side moved south in an endeavor to
find from that side a good crossing point. They tried

to return in the !20th lnlantry sector at a place where
the current was too strong; the boat capsized. One man
was lost, while another had to be pulled to shore. Since
it was a clear night, the enemy sensed something stirring. The splashing and the paddling drew fire.
Of this nature were the days preceding the longdelayed attack across the Hoer. Each scrap of information was utilized in making the final plans. On the
22d of February, while companies were trammg as
usual in the lnden -Lamersdorf vicinity, attack plans
were completed.
Initially, after crossing the river, the Hegiment was
to take four objectives:
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"A"- Krauthausen, opposite Pier, was to be taken
by the 2d Battalion, as was
"B"- Selhausen, south of Krauthausen and Pierer
Wald.
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"C"-Berg, a tiny community located on the high
ground east of Krauthausen, was to be seized
by a company of the 3d Battalion, which
was to help the 1st Battalion take
"D"-Niederzier, a large town east of Berg.
Plans for crossing the river, an assignment which
was by far the most difficult of all, had to be formulated with extreme care, since the Hoer in our sector
was more swollen and known to have a swifter current than in other areas. The final orders called for:
(1) crossing in small assault boats and by a footbridge
at a point due east of Pier; (2) if ( I ) failed, crossing
in engineer boats at a site northwest of Selhausen;
(3a) if these plans both failed, crossing two companies
in amphibious "alligator" LCVPs, at a site near the
Pier road, and the remainder at a footbridge in the
I 19th Infantry sector near a castle-like structure
( Mullenmark) south of Schophoven; (3b) if all others
failed, crossing the entire Hegiment over the footbridge near the "castle." Orders from higher headquarters had dictated that the Alligators were not to
be used unless other means failed because these vehicles were to be saved for the Rhine crossing.
Under cover of darkness at 2030 on the 22d of February, the 2d Battalion moved on foot to Pier. The
other battalions prepared to go forward, the 3d to Pier
following up the 2d, the 1st to replace the 3d at lnden.
D-day was designated to be the 23d of February.
f I-hour for the attack upon Krnuthausen was to be
0330. Before then the river had, of course, to be
crossed. The artillery was to fire preparatory concentrations from 0245 till H -hour.
CROSSING Tl IE ROER

It was 2300 when, according to plan, two parties
of engineers (Company "C," 105th Engineer Battalion) left Pier toward the banks of the river. One
was to attempt the construction of a footbridge about
a hundred yards north of the Pier road. It was encountering severe difficulties in the eddies of the
swollen river when the project was discovered by the
enemy, and shelled. The party abandoned what it
deemed a hopeless task.
The other party was to secure a rope across the Hoer
parallel to and slightly south of the road. The river
was a half mile wide at the point, and the banks were
treacherous and noisy, Hooded and crisscrossed, like
the field to the west, with ankle-deep canals. It took
the men two hours to gain the opposite side in a boat
and to attach the rope.
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Shortly before 0 I 00, Company "G" left Pier and
moved across the fields to the crossing site. It was
clear and bright for nighttime; visibility aided our
operations, though it gave the jumpy and expectant
enemy an advantage, too. The first large boat was
slid into the shining water beside the rope and loaded.
It was pulled outward into the current. Progress was
slow and treacherous; the boat reached a point just
short of the opposite bank, when it capsized and the
passengers scrambled to the opposite shore. A second
boat maneuvered its way jerkily and very slowly. A
third tipped over before it made a good start.
Other elements of Company "G" were, meanwhile,
attempting to cross in small assault boats by paddling
at a point 200 yards south of the Engineer site. Several boats managed with difficulty to reach the enemy
side. The battalion S-3, Capt Joseph E. Brown, moving between the two attempted crossings, kept activity
organized and troops dispersed and well-ordered. He
sent word to Pier that the small boats could negotiate
the river better than the Engineers' rope-drawn craft,
and diverse elements of Company "H" and Battalion
f Ieadquarters Company scurried to assemble the needed boats, of which sixty-four were available.
Executive officers generally play a passive, rearward
role during an attack, but Lt Charles H. Westbrook,
of Company "H," was among the most active at 0230
when he learned the assault boats were needed. Organizing the remnants of his company which were not
attached to others into carrying parties and impressing
them with the urgency of the job, he assembled the
boats, carrying the paddles himself, in two trips he
led the men with the craft forward to where the assault troops could pick them up. During an enemy
barrage en route from Pier he was wounded in the
leg; his men were disorganized until he rallied them
and continued forward. Later, after he had dressed
his wound, he was to play an important part in regulating transportation during the first thirty hours following the river crossing.
The engineers had meanwhile managed to maneuver the large rubber boats across the waters at the site
farther south, and the battalion commander shifted
some Company "G" troops there to try crossinos. Going was difficult, many boats were overturn~d, and
only a platoon succeeded in gaining the opposite bank.
Meanwhile Company "F'' had started for the river
an hour after Company "G." It moved over a different
route 300 yards south and parallel to the Pier road.
Alligators had been ordered to try to cross (as according to Plan 3a); it was hoped that they would be
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Krouthousen-the scene of bitter fighting the night before
this picture was token

quicker than the small boats used by Company "G."
Accordingly, the Alligators, or amtracks, moved out
beside Company "F' and continued forward up to
and into the waters of the Roer one hundred yards
south of the small boat crossing. In a few moments
they had gained the opposite shore with ease.
The enemy had not been oblivious to what was
happening, and at the boat crossing the clear night
had betrayed our troops. Mortar fire began falling
in the crossing area and in the fields where Company "G" was waiting to board the boats. Capt Brown
ordered the company to seek cover in the German-dug
entrenchments there. Our own artillery preparations
had by this time been continuing for almost threequarters of an hour. It was close to H-hour; yet only
thirty Company "G" men were across the river.
In the darkness and noise of the devastating barrages being placed on the enemy, and during the constant harassment from enemy mortars and small arms,
plans were changed. The battalion was notified Plan
3a would go into effect and Company "F," well briefed,
loaded into Alligators and was shuttled across. On the
opposite side the platoons organized and moved forward to a Line of Departure to await the attack. When
all but the weapons platoon of Company "F' had been
transported across, the Alligators began to shuttle Company "G," still waiting in the fields.
The first platoon of Company "F" was organized
and moving through the Pierer Wald southwest to
the Line of Departure when the first explosion was
heard. The troops realized all at once that they had
run into antipersonnel mines. Soon more explo-

sions gave notice that the whole woods was planted
cleverly with every kind of trip and pressure device.
Since many had already become casualties by a chance
step which set off a charge, demoralization was imminent. It was a situation which called for real leadership. There was a moment when the men were uncertain whether to step forward, to turn back, or to
freeze.
Sgt James C. Yankie found his platoon thoroughly
disorganized. He helped to regroup the men, and
merged his own squad with another. With spirit and
encouragement he led them both forward to the rendezvous point near the LD.
One platoon in the advance lost its platoon leader
and then its platoon sergeant. The platoon guide,
S/Sgt Floyd M. Montgomery, was fortunately a
man whose initiative and bravery were equal to the
situation. Although the badly shattered platoon numbered only twenty noncasualties, Montgomery took
the reins, rearranged as was necessary, and spurred
the men on to the rendezvous point. I le led the platoon throughout the attack, proving his ability, readily
exposing himself in order to lead his men to their objective.
T / Sgt Elmer Kitchell was struck by the same
boobytrap that wounded his platoon leader, but he
concealed the fact and led the platoon through the
perilous wood and later in the attack. Not far away
T /Sgt William A. Smith, from Company } lcadquarters, voluntarily took command of another platoon
which had lost its leader and sergeant, reorganizing it
for the attack.
When the lst Platoon had reached the LD, where
the company was to assemble, it found that the 2d
platoon was missing. In an effort to hurry the latter
group and bring it forward safely, Pfc Marcel G.
Belisle, a runner, volunteered to return over the route
the I st had used to guide the missing platoon. He
felt his way in the blackness of the woods, avoiding the trip wires and taking care not to stumble
against the bushes where shrapnel-filled concrete
mines had been attached and camouAaged. I le found
the other platoon at the river edge of the Wald, and
led them without casualties back to the LD.
Soon after the lead clements landed, the Command
Group of the company debarked from the Alli
gator and received word of the hoohytraps. The group
was naturally eager to get forward as quickly as possible. An assistant squad leader with the group, Sgt
Stanley 1\1. Wisotsky, volunteered to act as advance
scout through the mined area. I le cut trip wires as-

Smoke enveloped our troops
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Word had by this time reached the battalion commander that numerous casualties were occurring due
to the large number of mines. Company "G" was almost completely on the east side of the Roer; the Alligators were returning to shuttle more men across.
Lt Col Cantey ordered the crossing of only the number of men necessary to stage the planned attack; he
held one squad and the mortar section which would
be needlessly exposed in merely trailing the company
through the Pierer Wald. lie notified Lt Robert L.
Moore, assistant Battalion S-3, in Pier, to take Company "E" and the remainder of the battalion there,
over the footbridge near Schophoven in the zone of the
I I 9th Infantry Regiment. I le himself picked up the
remnants of Companies "F" and "G" still on the
Pier side and returned through Pier to leave them
with Moore, while he went on ahead. Lt Moore managed the different groups skilfully and brought Company "E" to its Line of Departure 500 yards east of
the footbridge by 0500.
The Roer River footbridge

certained to· be attached to pull devices; he marked
other mines; and he brought the group forward to the
LD area in less than an hour. There, Capt John M.
Jacobsen, commanding the company, realized that
the delay caused by the mines would necessitate a
postponement of the attack. The platoons would
have to be coordinated and notified of the new plans.
S/ Sgt Lawrence Grogan hurried off to deliver the
message to some units of the company assembling
several hundred yards north of where the captain
was making final plans. It was an important and
dangerous assignment to maneuver through the woods,
but he returned soon and safely.
When the Company Executive Officer, Lt George
W. Terry, and his party followed in the rear through
the same area, a mine exploded and wounded Pvt
Frank l-1. Vore. Because he had been on a patrol in
that area the night before and felt that he was therefore the best qualified to guide the group, Vore volunteered to take the lead in spite of his in jury. I le
brought the party forward to the remainder of the company without additional casualties. Proceeding forward, Lt Terry ran across a large number of lost troops.
These he formed in the column. It became necessary
many times to hold each trip wire and pass it from
hand to hand so that no one might carelessly hit it. Lt
Terry brought the last group of Company "F" to the
forward assembly area in this manner; there the company prepared for the attack.

ATTACK ON KRAUTIIAUSEN
The companies were to attack separately when they
were ready. Each had a separate objective and each
had a separate artillery preparation which it was to
call when ready.
Originally the attacks were to start at 0330. Company "E," the first to attack, was not ready till 0500.
In view of the fact that the river and sector had been
unfavorable, it was a tribute to preplanning and efficient management that the entire battalion was across.
The I 19th Infantry had already seized its primary objectives, because it had not met the consistent misfortune nor the series of mishaps which slowed the
l 20th's river-crossing operation.
The enemy was probably surprised when, after the
first devastating artillery barrage at 0330, no attack
was forthcoming. Perhaps the second preparation at
0500 was less a warning. It was the "real thing" when
Capt Walter E. Wert led Company "E" across the
Line of Departure perpendicular to the river and 500
yards east of it. The objective was called "Able Easy"
-the north half of Krauthausen. After the heavy artillery that had struck it, the enemy was pounded and
groggy. The riflemen moved forward aggressively.
As daylight threatened to expose the bridgehead
and its activity, generator and chemical smoke, along
with artillery-fired smoke-shells, veiled our troops
ideally. Many doughboys commented later on how
many lives were saved by the smoke.
Meanwhile Company "G" was struggling through
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the Pierer Wald, troubled to some extent by the same
boobytraps which were inflicting casualties on Company "F." Sgt Stanley A. Parley and S/Sgt John E.
Flores, squad leaders in Company "G," guided their
platoons without casualties through the Wald, but
the other platoon fared less favorably. T /Sgt Vernon
E. Housh lost his platoon leader because of an antipersonnel mine. Fortunately, he was able to lead his
platoon in veteran style. As the Company made its
way to the Line of Departure he was called upon to
give Rank protection, and to reduce a strongpoint in
a house near the canal which Rowed through the
northwest tip of the town. He deployed his men on
the Rank, built up a base of fire against the house, and
then led another group from his platoon toward it. He
was wounded by a machine gun during his maneuver,
but he diverted the enemy. Elements of another platoon moved in to seize the house and reduce the obstacle.
"Able Easy" had been taken by 0630 when, having
worked its way through the Wald to its LD along the
edge of the woods southwest of Krauthausen, Company "G" was ready to attack. Its objective was "Able
George," the south half of the town. It moved steadily
forward in the assault, meeting spotty stubborn resistance and heavy small arms. After three hours the
troops were still dodging snipers on the eastern outskirts. The main road out of the town to the east
crossed a north-south railroad track. Close to the road
was the railroad station. I lcre the Nazis organized a
strongpoint, and commanded the open ground around
it with numbers of machine and Schmeisser burp
guns.
Three mortarmen of Company "H," Lt Irvin H.
I larris, S/Sgt David C. Shepherd, and Pfc Herman
Butcher, attached to Company "G," were attempting
to knock out a machine-gun nest not far from the railroad station at about 1000, when nine Germans who
had not seen them cut between them and the main
body of Company "G" to strike the company on its
right Rank. The three mortarmen, still unobserved,
followed along a hedgerow, behind the enemy to a
good firing position. They killed or wounded every
member of the Hanking party. In the hurry of battle the
company little realized how great was the danger that
menaced them, or how much they owed to the observer party.
Meanwhile the railroad-station defenders had fired
a bazooka on some of our assaulting troops attempting to rescue a wounded Nazi from an exposed position. Organized and led by the commander of Com-
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Footbridge over a canal east of the Roer

pany "G," one platoon planned a simultaneous triple
assault from different sides of the building. They
pushed with coordinated effort into the station and
emerged with six prisoners. Inside were Christmas
trees and a Yuletide booklet for SS troops with a preface by Himmler. In one corner a German soldier had
thrown his half-eaten stew-chow, which had to be foregone for more pressing matters. By I 030 Krauthausen
had fallen.
SELHAUSEN
Harassed persistently by boobytraps, Company "F'
was the last to reach its LD, the wood line northwest
of Sclhausen. By 0700, though diminished in personnel to little more than a platoon, it attacked toward the town. All the platoon leaders having become
casualties prior to the attack, Capt John M. Jacobsen was forced to make a hasty reorganization. At
H-hour he took the lead.
The 2d Platoon was led by T / Sgt Everette Goins,
who pushed ahead to arrive close after the lifting of
friendly artillery concentrations. A machine gun just
west of the main crossroads in town sputtered at the
advancing platoon. Some of the men, with Goins
leading, rushing forward toward the weapon, firing
from hip or shoulder as they assaulted. He closed in
upon the nest alone. In a fast exchange of fire, Goins
killed all four men in the emplacement, miraculously
escaping death or injury.
Limping slightly from a mine wound he had received in the Piercr \Nald, Sgt Darrel A. Gaudet,
squad leader in the I st Platoon, was moving into the
town with his men when he noticed elements of the
3d Platoon, adjacent to his own, pinned down
by machine-gun fire. Acting quickly and on his own
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m1t1ative Gaudet detached his squad from the 1st
Platoon and led it to positions from which it could
support the pinned-down platoon. He exposed himself at times to make sure his men were giving real
help; the reinforcements to the troops which had been
delayed were so valuable that the 1st Platoon was able
to move forward at that time to its objective.
T / Sgt Herbert R. Taylor of Company "H" led the
machine-gun section which was supporting Company
"F." When his section ran into the mined area and
suffered a large percentage of casualties, T / Sgt Taylor
immediately directed the evacuation of the wounded
and then returned to reorganize the men of his depleted unit, led them through the woods by personally disarming many of the explosives which he found
in the darkness. By thus enabling his men to safely
advance through the woods, their guns were set up in
support of the rifle clements attacking the town.
Later, he led his men in clearing the enemy out of
the houses of the town, personally killing five Germans.
It was 1035 when Selhausen fell, and Company
"F" consolidated its defenses. Objectives "A" and "C''
were taken.
The heroism of those soldiers of the 2d Battalion
who went through the minefield is beyond description
-in fact beyond imagination. Groping through dense
woods in complete darkness, wading cold pools formed
by the Aooded river, these brave men suddenly and
without warning struck the mines. The enemy, hearing the explosions, brought down mortar fire. Almost
immediately, about fifty casualties resulted. Overcoming fear of the mines, of shelling and, most of all,
of the unknown, these superb soldiers slowly made
their way toward their objectives, suffering all the time
ever increasing casualties. Where else does history record the story of infantry advancing at night through
a shelled minefield and into the unknown dangers of
dark woods? Those soldiers who did what lesser men
never could have accomplished reached the absolute
ultimate of unit courage.
SUPPLY
As soon as the objectives had been consolidated,
guns, food, and vehicles had to be sent across the
river to the troops. Supplies were carried originally
on the Alligators. From 1100 on the 23d of February
during the day and following night, six Alligators,
some of the cargo type, which opened ramplike at one
end, and some of the personnel type, equipped with
ladders, plied their way back and forth across the river.

Supplies were carried over at first on Alligators

Later, when it was safe to bring vehicles over, the
pontoon bridge near Schophoven was also used. Engineer troops completed a bridge near Pier, under cove1
or smoke. TWO days were required for the task.
Ammunition dumps were established by the 2d
Battalion on the far side; Sgt Onnie R Baker, battalion transportation noncom, under heavy fire kept the
necessary equipment rolling forward.
The Muhlenteich Canal between the Roer and
Krauthausen had to be bridged because the canal constituted an obstacle to the transportation of supplies
from the receiving point. About noon of the 23d of
February, when the 2d and 3d Battalions were sending in prisoners, Lt John G. Gerl, Assistant Regimental S-3, was in charge of the supply point where
the Alligators unloaded in Krauthausen. Born in Germany, Lt Gerl was Huent in the language. Assembling
the prisoners near the canal, he explained to them that
the sooner the bridge was built the sooner medical
supplies could be brought to be used for their wounded comrades. The prisoners set about laying beams
in place across the canal with typical Teutonic ardor,
and soon it was completed.
The supplies were placed in three battalion piles,
so that each head,1uarters was able to send for ammu-

. . . and then by truck

mt10n and food as it needed it; thus the piles grew
and diminished for a day and a night. The problem
was difficult, but it was handled smoothly and without letup.
BERG
The 3d Battalion was following closely behind the
2d, and when Company "E" moved into Krauthausen
· "I" an d "K" were upon its
. h eels. The
C ompames
entire 3d Battalion was assembled in the town by
1130, ready to push ahead through the enemy's
broken lines.
At 1148, from the eastern edge of Krauthausen,
Companies "I" and "K" moved forward to take Objective "B," the high ground around the tiny settlement
labeled "Berg" on the map. On the left (north) side
of the main road Company "I" pushed forward
through occasional mortar barrages and machine-gun
fire.
A platoon under Lt John A. Doyle found in its sector a large structure which later was discovered to
have been an artillery Observation Post, equipped
with radio, maps and telescopes. The riflemen moved
forward toward the building steadily and when they
were within fifty yards of it, machine guns fired across
their front. At the same time the defenders began to
throw grenades from the windows. Though wounded
in the groin by one of these, Lt Doyle continued forward into the house with his men; they overwhelmed
the enemy, and thirty-eight prisoners were rounded up,
twenty of whom Lt Doyle assembled alone. Only after
his platoon was dug in on the objective did he submit to medical treatment.
"My left company and left platoon of my right company is on 'Baker,'" reported Lt Col Howard W.
Greer to the Regimental Command Post at 1217.
Company "K" had one platoon held up by a selfpropelled gun. By 1250, however, it had surged to
the high ground and was digging in facing the once
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prosperous rural town of Niederzier. Eighty prisoners
had been taken at Berg.
NIEDERZIER
The 1st Battalion was following behind the other
two; at 0600 it had established a CP next to the 3d
Battalion in Pier. It remained there during most of
the day; at 1730 it moved by the Schophoven road
across the footbridge over the Roer and across the
Muhlenteich Canal. The troops continued the march
through Krauthausen and toward Berg. At 2300 the
battalion was ready to move across the Line of Departure through Companies "I" and "K." Following
closely behind a withering, brilliant series of highexplosive and white-phosphorus concentrations, Companies "A" and "C" led. They headed due east to take
the southern portion of the town. Since this assault
was not directed at the north side, Company "A"
found the enemy comparatively free to throw as much
firePower as they could against the flank of the attacker. To destroy a strongpoint which delayed its
advance, Company "A" took one hour and a half.
But actually the advance would have been much
slower if the infantry had not kept close behind the
artillery; it was so close, in fact, that two enemy pillboxes, three 75mm guns, and numerous soldaten,
hiding low during the concentrations, were overrun
and captured. The attack was not halted bv the drainage canal which bordered the town on the ~ear ( west)
side. Previously, after careful study of aerial photos,
the shrewd battalion commander had decided to carry
"bridges" with his troops in case the ditch proved to
be a serious obstacle. Riflemen in Companies "A" and
"C" struggled over a mile of muddy fields clutching
300 pounds of tough timberwood, and were prepared
to set the pieces in place when the time came. The
battalion found the bridge in its sector blown and
mined, but the foot troops were able to jump across
without resort to the timbers.
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those men whose ignorance as to the cause of the explosion had brought their excitement to the panic
stage. With steadiness and order, he arranged for
transportation of the wounded to the aid station. He
was hit on the face himself, just below the right eye.
but not until all the men had been cared for, and the
defense organized, did he have his own wound tended.
Later, the explosion was discovered to have been
caused by a bazooka shell- our own- which, left with
the pin pulled in the launcher, had been jarred when
the man who carried it placed the muzzle end on the
ground to rest. The detonation when the shell slid
and hit left a tiny crater in the courtyard.
There remained an active section of town to be
A 75mm antitank gun near Niederzier. The flat, open ground
cleared. When the story of the explosion brought
is the reason for attacking Niederzier at night.
suggestions of boobytraps throughout the area, no
The command post of the enemy's 958th Infantry one was eager to move through the houses in a hurry.
Regiment was located in Niederzier, according to in- S/ Sgt Silas L. Baird, Pfc Giovanni M. Deluca, Pfc
formation obtained from prisoners. Officer candidates, Louis C. Forrester, and Pfc Albert D'Onofrio, all of
newly released to the front lines from school, rein- Company "A," took up the mission with speed, howforced the German regiment. But resistance was by no ever, and moved unhesitatingly toward the houses
means fanatical.
still known to hide lurking enemy. One German was
Mortar concentrations and machine-gun final pro- firing from a house the roof of which was blown off.
tective lines were passed through with few casualties. Perceiving his silhouette against the sky, Sgt Baird
Southwest of the town a series of trenches formed a and Pfc Deluca both shot at once and killed him. Alstrongpoint which was entirely ineffective, and which most simultaneously another sniper shot one round
at an American through a window, but was seen by
supplied the battalion with fifteen prisoners.
The 3d Battalion attacked from its Berg area at Pfc Forrester and killed before he could take aim for
0030, first following the route of the 1st Battalion, a second shot. After the consternation caused by the
then turning north to strike the enemy in the Rank, explosion, the boldness of these men rallied the reto seize the northern half of the town. It also found mainder of the company, and soon order was estabopposition light, though sniper fire was troublesome lished.
and a self-propelled gun in the woods east of town
Flushed with victory, lst Sgt James C. Wray, of
fired a number of rounds into the area.
Company "D," came up the gray streets with a group
When some of the Germans were forced from the of men he had organized shortly before, and reported
southern 1st Battalion side of town to the northern they had just destroyed a machine gun. Located to the
portion, they ran from the "kettle" into the "fire" of the battalion's right rear, the automatic weapon had
3d Battalion, which at the time was consolidating its harassed evacuation of the wounded, and had further
defenses around the northeast section of Niederzier. endangered the men who were victims of the exploBy 0630 troops were well organized in a strong de- sion.
fense around the outskirts. The 3d Battalion had no
The tree-lined road from Krauthausen to Niederzier was still suspected of being mined when, shortly
casualties.
Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had pushed far into after 0300, a jeep driven by Pfc Walter W. Cudthe town, and was engaged in cleaning out the houses. worth carrying Lt George A. Stewart, 1st Battalion
In a courtyard just off a once-blooming little square, liaison officer, sped into the town. In the enemy's efpart of Company "B" was assembled while leaders fort to prevent consolidation by our troops, the
were reconnoitering defense positions. Without warn- streets were still subject to consistent shelling, and
ing, an explosion occurred in the midst of the group, the two men had scarcely dismounted at the Battalion
killing two and wounding twenty-nine. Though his CP when a barrage in the area flattened all four tires
executive officer was killed instantly, Capt Murray S. of the vehicle. Not long afterward, a new jeep which
Pulver, commanding, remained calm and quieted Cudworth had acquired received a shelling, and the
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driver discovered with disgust that the disaster had ·
occurred again: all four tires were Rat.
All aid stations which had moved across the river as
soon as possible were kept busy. In Krauthausen Capt
Frank Koschir established the 1st Battalion station
and worked tirelessly under heavy strain during two
nights and a day. The M-29 "weasels" brought the
wounded for his care in a steady stream.
IPW reports later indicated that the 958th Regiment, whose CP had been in Niederzier, had begun
to move its rear installations out at 1900 the evening
before. The enemy staff must still have been in town
Armored pillbox in front of Niederzier. Camouflage was rewhen our troops were entering.
moved before toking the photo.
The successful crossing of the I 20th Infantry was
made possible by the perfect cooperation given the
H.egiment by Colonel Russell A. Baker, commanding
Meanwhile the 3d Platoon from Company "A" had
the I 19th Infantry Regiment. During the planning attacked from the southeast section of town toward
stage Colonels Purdue and Baker had prepared de- Frentzerhof I 000 yards away. Accompanying the platailed alternate plans whereby either regiment was to toon was Sgt Jesse DeSoto, machine gunner from the
use the bridge of the other in the event enemy actions Weapons Platoon, to supply supporting fire. About
or Rood prevented the completion of either one of the halfway to the objective, the forward elements of the
bridges. When it became necessary for the .I 20th to platoon noticed a German, who was later learned to
use the I 19th bridge, Colonel Baker coordinated the be an officer, brandishing a white Rag one hundred
movement for the common good. So skillful was his yards in front of them. All at once he seemed to change
work that most of six infantry battalions used this his mind, and ran to a position near by which the men
bridge without confusion or loss of time, despite the quickly recognized to be a 75mm-gun emplacement.
necessity of reserving bridge space from time to time Apparently attempting to fire, he was not quick enough
for returning the wounded. Had it not been for Colo- to load and aim alone. Sgt DeSoto had located himnel Baker's cooperation, the Regiment would not have self in an advantageous though exposed position, and
while the riflemen closed in, peppered the position
been nearly so successful.
with automatic fire. The officer was found dead beWEIDERHOF AND FRENTZERtIOF
side the gun; the 75mm was still intact, however.
Enemy in two chateau-farms between Niederzier While the platoon continued forward toward its oband the Hambach Forest to the east harassed the town jective, Sgt DeSoto gave supporting fire and was efwith sporadic fire. At 1515 on the 24th of February fective in keeping enemy opposition to a minimum.
the lst and 3d Battalions each sent a platoon to clear
The men had not left the 75mm gun far behind
out the strongpoints. Weiderhof was located beside the when they were fired on by three machine guns lokey-route road-leading to Steinstrass north beside the cated on the Ranks. S/Sgt Kenneth I. Gleason, plaI Iambach Forest. Division planned to pivot its attack toon guide, was in the lead, and noticing the position
at Niederzier, turning its might northward in a Rank- of the nearest gun slightly west of the buildings,
ing sweep toward Garzweiler and Dusseldorf. The pushed forward through the high grass until, at close
117th Infantry was scheduled to push through the range, he fired an antitank grenade into the installation. Though the other two guns were firing con120th lines in Niederzier to take Steinstrass.
It was, then, vitally important to destroy the strong- tinuously from the woods farther north, Sgt Gleason
holds at Weiderhof and Frentzerhof, both of which made a rush across the open ground to the shelter of
commanded the highway. From Company "K" a pla- a barn. Pfcs Harry L. Dust, Alfred A. Warren, Robert
toon made its way parallel to the road to Weiderhof, H. Steeves, and Richard F. Willets, of Company "A,"
encountering only small-arms fire. It effected an easy and T /5 Michael C. Prisco and Pfc Charles E. Larentrance into the house by 1545 and captured fifteen son, of the 1st Battalion AT Platoon, were close beprisoners therein. At once the platoon established an hind and dashed to the building where Gleason was.
A 20mm gun turned upon them suddenly from their
outpost there.

.
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left flank. The buildings of the large farm formed a
square, and even in the face of all the fire these had
to be searched out. The seven men worked in teams
and boldly made their way through the rooms. Three
enemy were killed; others were routed and ran back
into the Hambach Forest. The 3d Platoon, which
dubbed itself the "Assault Platoon," returned to Niederzier with mission accomplished.
The strongpoints were cleared and at 1600 the
I 17th Infantry, which had pushed up close to our
lines, was ready to attack. It moved through the 3d
Battalion past Neu Hambach to take Steinstrass after
a difficult fight.
At 2100 that night (the 24th) Company "C" dispatched a patrol to search out an area 200 yards deep
within the light woods of the Hambach Forest east of
Niederzier. Back in two hours and forty minutes, the
patrol reported it had seen no enemy.
INTERIM BETWEEN DRIVES
By the morning of the 25th of February, it was believed that the enemy defenses had been breached.
Ninth Army plans called for a sweeping push northeast toward the Rhine. The I 17th Infantry was pressing the attack on Steinstrass, while the I 19th on the
left (west) was seizing high ground and built-up areas
toward the towns of I Iollen and Rodingen. When
they were taken, the I 20th Infantry was to pass
through for continuing the attack north.
Until that time our Regiment had the mission of
defending the Division's flank and rear. At 1337 on
the 25th of February the Command Post moved from
Inden to Niederzier. That morning the 80lst Tank
Destroyer Battalion replaced the 823d in attachmen~
and a company of TDs was in turn attached to each
battalion of the Regiment, to be used in the defense.
The 30th Reconnaissance Troop was also attached to
take up defensive positions around Niederzier. The
next day (the 26th) both were relieved of attachment.
Investigation of Niederzier, which had been a key
point in the enemy defense, led to the discovery of
many effective installations which had been utilized
by the enemy. A steel pillbox with revolving turret
near the main road, dug-in positions equipped with
undamaged guns, a fake cannon emplacement, and
two extensive minefields over both the Oberzier and
Krauthausen roads, were reported. These examples of
wasted effort seemed to indicate poor morale, and
the prisoners, disheveled and feeble, served to strengthen that impression. When asked why he did not,
according to his instructions, hold to the last man,

one bushy-haired German noncom said our infantry
had followed the artillery concentrations so closely
into Niederzier that there had been no chance to offer
even a small-arms fire fight. Most of the PWs were
laughing as they filed into the Interrogation Point;
they were glad to be leaving the Fatherland and its
struggle for Kultur.
In order to protect the right Hank of the Division,
the 3d Battalion was ordered to establish four roadblocks east of the Steinstrass road in the Radinger
Wald opposite tiny settlements called Neu Hambach
and \Vinterbach. Company "K" took up the positions at 1405 on the 25th of February after half an
hour's maneuver against only scattered individual opposition. A platoon of Company "L" relieved Company "K" later the same day. At 0200 the next day
Company "L" passed the four roadblocks to establish
four more farther north in the Radinger Wald nearer
Steinstrass. In an hour all eight roadblocks were in
position covering the right flank of the Division.
SWING TO THE NORTH
The progress of the I 17th and I 19th Infantry Regiments was rapid, and into their hands had fallen Steinstrass, Lich, I Iollen, and Oberempt. At 0800, Col Russell A. Baker, commanding officer of the I 19th, explained how successful the flanking strike to the north
had been. "Think the Krauts are a bit confused," he
said. "We jumped a 'screaming Meemie' outfit, and
picked up forty-eight out of fifty-two. They were digging in, facing the opposite direction!"
The fall of Rodingen (Objective "Patty") 500 yards
north of Ho11en ("Louise") to the I 19th Infantry on
the morning of the 26th of February was the signal
for the I 20th to move through on the attack. Objectives to take were:
"Marge," the town of Kalrath due north of Rodingen, and
"Jean," Grottenherten, south and almost contiguous with
"Helen," Kirchherten, both being northeast of Kalrath.
The Regimental commander had completed his
plans and at 0900 issued orders for the operation.
The remainder of the morning was a busy one for
the entire Begiment. At 1437 the Command Post
moved from N icderzier to a lone farmhouse 300 yards
southwest of I Iollcn. The 80lst TD Battalion and
30th Reconnaissance Troop were relieved of attachment. Elements of the 744th Light Tank Battalion
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then they ran. Growing pressure forced them to retreat east toward Grottenherten.
One assault gun with a Mark IV chassis was Hanked
SEIZURE OF KALRATH
on the main road before it could pull out. The GerAccording to order, the 2d Battalion, less Company man tanker was starting his motor when Sgt Darrell
"F," moved immediately to an assembly area south of E. Fuller and Pfc Carl V. Ivey each made direct hits
the Steinstrass-Julich road and within the Hambach with white phosphorus grenades. The sudden flame
Forest, while the Commanding Officer made his recon- was sucked in by the motor. After an attempt by the
naissance in and around H.odingen. After his return tanker to drive away hastily, more hand grenades, and
he brought the battalion forward to that town, so that especially the intense heat and smoke, drove the crew
by 1720 it was ready to attack Kalrath. The 1st Bat- out into the eager hands of Company "G."
During the German armored counterattack upon
talion with Company "F" left Niederzier at 1630 to
our troops in the streets of Altdorf in November, we
enter Rodingen and assemble by 2030.
The 3d Battalion remained in its roadblock posi- had accidentally learned the value of white-phosphortions and in a perimeter defense of Niederzier till us rifle grenades in combating tanks. As the result, rifle
1100 when the I 13th Cavalry Group occupied the grenadiers and bazookamen were given training in the
positions. The battalion moved to an assembly area use of this projectile. With it we never failed to immediately whip enemy tanks which were operating
within the town.
Though it had been prepared to leave earlier, co- defensively. The white phosphorus enabled our men
ordination with the 2d and 3d Battalions of the I 17th to approach within easy killing range, or set fire to the
Infantry forced our 2d Battalion to wait till 2030 to tank, or else cause it to flee. Upon at least four ocpush northward to Kalrath. On schedule in the dark casions Aeeing tanks were immobilized by crashing
of evening Company "G," leading, started forward into obstacles. So proficient did our men become in the
parallel to the Rodingen-Kalrath road. The enemy's use of the white-phosphorus grenade that they were
defense had been hastily organized around the town; disappointed when the tank succeeded in escaping;
a few strongpoints with automatic weapons were formerly they had been glad for these tanks to leave.
Enemy mortar shells were still falling in the town,
posted on the Ranks.
One of Company "H's" mortar observers, S/Sgt Company "G" doughboys were cleaning out houses
David 0. Shepherd, was among the forward troops along the main street. Crowded in an archway one
when a machine gun on the southwest tip of town group was waiting for a fellow group across the street
greeted them with a sudden hail of bullets. One of the to finish cleaning out its assigned houses, since one
riAemen carrying a bazooka was panicky and claimed had to cover the other searching. In the black of night
he did not know how to fire the weapon. Shepherd some of the group saw a form approach with the aspulled the bazooka from him and picked up two surance of one who was among friends. When he
rounds. After crawling forward to within twenty yards gripped at what proved to be a machine pistol at his
of the enemy machine gun, he took careful aim and side the soldiers realized he was attempting to fire at
fired into the house where it was located. RiAemen them. With a Hick of his finger he could have sprayed
farther back followed up with a barrage of white them, but he was not quick enough. S/Sgt Minor L.
phosphorus riHe grenades which silenced the machine- Miller, squad leader, had squeezed off two M-1 rounds
from his hip, and the stranger fell dead. He was disgun nest.
Once the machine-gun nests on the edge of town covered to be an officer who had apparently recoghad been eliminated, the company gained the build- nized the Americans only a few seconds before they
ings easily. Tanks had begun to fire sporadically from recognized him.
the town, and light mortar shells were falling, but in
Meanwhile Company "H" machine gunners were
twenty-eight minutes the riAemen had forged their pushing forward to place their automatic-fire protection
way to the objective. Lt Arthur J. Saalfield had taken at the extremities of the town. Sgt Charles F. Perkins
over the company only a few hours before the attack, and Cpl John D. Rill selected a spot for their gun
and two of his platoon leaders were inexperienced, to cover a road leading northeast from town; from
but he remained among the foremost and kept his several houses near them they received harassing fire.
men moving forward. Inside the town, tanks poked On their own initiative they decided to clean out the
their muzzles around corners of houses and fired; houses. Accordingly, leaving the remainder of the
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crew at the gun, they went through the houses, and
before they returned to duty at the roadblock had
turned in thirteen prisoners.
Lt Robert E. Curtis was organizing the machinegun defense of the town; when a sudden, exceptional
artillery barrage began falling, he took shelter in a
house, and there soon found himself helping the riflemen clean it out. Some of the doughboys had become
disorganized in the heavy fire and the darkness. Taking them in hand, Lt. Curtis placed them to form an
effective defense line around the area.
T /Sgt Grover C. Cox, also of Company "H," led
some of his men to the north tip of Kalrath to establish another roadblock and, when a tank tried to force
its way into the town he took one of his guns forward
to a better position. From there he was able to disperse the supporting enemy infantry and to apply pressure on the tank itself until it turned and fled.
By 2240 the town was mopped up, and the TDs
were en route to strengthen the defense. Behind them
came ammunition vehicles of Company "f I." The road
had been cleared by Engineer mine detectors; it was
therefore a shock when two lead TDs ran over mines,
later discovered to be plastic.
The explosions brought down enemy artillery, causing one man along the road a serious wound. Having
noticed the soldier suffering, T /Sgt Rother P. Morrow, platoon sergeant of the mortar platoon, ran 300
yards to where he saw an unused jeep on the side of
the road, drove hack, and loaded the wounded man
inside. While every one else lay low awaiting a new
barrage, Morrow sped hurriedly toward Rodingen
and an aid station.
In the confusion caused by the barrage, the Company "E" command group lost radio contact with its
battalion. When a Company "f I" radio operator, Pfc
Morten Melsen, heard that the Company "E" radio
channels had been disrupted, he rushed from his position one hundred yards to the road and coming upon
the radio operator struggling with his apparatus, he
quickly adjusted the channel, so that in the middle of
the enemy barrage contact with the battalion was established again.
English Hail tanks were sent for to clear the roads.
The TDs then passed through and took up positions
in the town, which was consolidated by 2300.
The 2d Battalion had also the mission of seizing
a small built-up area 500 yards southwest of the lst
Battalion's next objective, "Helen," the town of Kirchherten. Shortly after 0100 a platoon sent from Company "E" to seize the point was almost to it when it
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met a strong volume of small-arms and tank fire. The
patrol leader called for artillery; while the isolated
building-group was being pounded, he received what
he believed to be an order to withdraw. The platoon
had reached railroad tracks halfway back to Kalrath
when it met Lt Col Ellis W. Williamson of the 1st Battalion, who was reconnoitering the area just prior to the
attack of his battalion, which was even then heading
toward the Line of Departure. Lt Col Williamson
told the platoon leader to hold his men near the railroad tracks, since he might be needed to help clear out
the buildings before the attack could go forward. The
platoon was incorporated into the attack plan, and
while the battalion was to by-pass the chateau, the
Company "E" men were scheduled to reduce the resistance there.
GROTTENHERTEN AND KIRCHHERTEN
Shortly before 0300 the 1st Battalion with Company "F" attached was forming along the northeastern
edge of Kalrath in preparation for the attack. Someone perceived through the darkness approximately
thirty figures approaching from enemy lines on the
objective. But when a shot from the American side
rang out, confusion arose among the strangers. Then
it became apparent that they carried no arms, and
came probably to surrender. Meanwhile, they had
turned terror-stricken and fled singly back across the
field to the safety of the German lines. Some said that
they were German soldiers who could not wait till
morning to give up.
The attack followed a series of artillery concentrations progressively nearer to the objectives. Company
"C" moved on the southernmost flank toward Grottenherten ("Jean"), while Companies "A" and "B"
pushed toward Kirchherten ("Helen"). From the start
tank activity could be heard in and around the two
towns. After the attack had begun the platoon from
Company "E" searched out the chateau-like structure
which it had been sent to seize earlier. Surprisingly
enough, the place was found devoid of enemy; the
automatic fire was presumed to have come from tanks
which had displaced farther east.
It was not till five months later that the real heroes
of the chateau were discovered to be men from a company "B" Squad. Close to the Line of Departure, they
had decided that they would permit nothing to arrest
their advance behind the artillery onto the objective.
Fearing that the house might hold them up and might
prevent a repetition of the Niederzier triumph, they
had moved against the building, and a grenadier had
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We always were forced to watch out for mines

fired some phosphorus grenades at the figures inside.
One German had been killed, one wounded, in the
sally. When the attack time came, they had pushed
forward, and they never thought of it again. Besides.
the attack had not been as smooth as Niederzier, and
they were mixed up in some rough fighting.
Shortly after, while the companies waited close to
the town for the lifting of the artillery upon it, two
tanks lurking behind haystacks remained unseen.
Then suddenly when a building set afire by the artillery and enemy flares exposed the troops thus deployed
and motionless, the tanks moved out from their places
of concealment, rolled to within I 50 yards of the
nearest units and, spraying automatic fire, poured
bullets into the exposed troops. Company "B" bore
the brunt of the armored attack, for it was closer to
the tanks and unprotected by a slight draw which
Company "A" used. Initially nine men were killed
and five wounded. The tank continued to blast at the
forward platoons.
S/Sgt Lester A. Carbonneau and S/Sgt William
D. Cloud, squad leaders in the lead platoons of Company "B," crawled one hundred yards to the rear toward a haystack, near which they found a member
of Company "E." The two sergeants explained the
situation, since the 2d Battalion men had thought the
fire was from a machine-gun nest.
A bazooka team was summoned from the platoon
and the Company "B" squad leaders led the team to
Rank the tanks from the south. The four men crawled
silently forward till they were only fifty yards from
the rear end of one of the tanks, and not far from
the other. The team fired two quick rounds. One hit
the turret of one of the tanks, and helped to alert both
to the fact that they were being attacked from the

rear. Both tanks moved out straight forward; they
came so close to the prostrate bodies of some of the
Company "B" men that the soldiers had to roll away
to avoid being crushed. As riHe grenades began to explode close to them, the tanks turned east and escaped
around the north tip of the town. Prisoners were taken
from entrenchments close to where the tanks had
been.
The wounded men had, meanwhile, lain helpless
and powerless to escape from the scene of action. Pfc
Albert I I. Damore had been hit seriously in the left
leg, but was able to crawl back to where he could
be given first aid. J le reached the aid station and was
bandaged. Then of his own accord, he returned to
the field of action to help evacuate and administer
first aid to others. At that moment he was badly
needed.
Pfcs Donat J. Lavio and Marion A. Welch were
struck with stones from the burst of the tank shells.
They had worked their way well forward close to the
protective draw toward the town, almost holding their
breath lest the tanks spray them as they crawled. They
finally reached the buildings on the edge of town,
and there found they had to fight their way through
the houses. By this time, the tanks had withdrawn
and the remainder of the company was reaching
Kirchherten. Lavio and Welch continued alongside
the others, and though told to go back and take a rest,
they forgot their wounds in the excitement and stayed
with the assaulters.
Company "A" had reached the town too; S/Sgt Gerard J. Slania, one of the squad leaders, carried a flamethrower, which he had kept close while he crawled
inch by inch through the tank fire. I le controlled the
temptation to throw it away since he felt it would be
much needed in the town. After the hard pull with a
68-pound load, he joined his platoon in cleaning out
the houses. Later he picked up a German prisoner
and strapped the flamethrower to him. The German
soldier followed Slania obediently and without question or attempt at trickery. When morning came and
the prisoner of war was to be evacuated, he begged
to be allowed to stay with Slania and his men. I leapparently wanted to join the Americans and carry the
Hamethrowcr in all fights thereafter. I lowever, probably he was trying to demonstrate that he was a "good"
German who had been forced to fight Americans.
Once these men and other infiltrating parties which
had had to crawl most of the way were inside the
town, it was quickly and aggressively mopped up.
S/Sgt Kenneth I. Gleason, one of Company "A's" pla-
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toon guides, had cleared thirty-two houses in one hour
and brought four enemy and sixty civilians to be questioned. He had narrowly escaped death when in a
cellar he had pulled the trigger of his pistol just as a
German soldier on whom he Hashed his light was
fingering his machine pistol. Gleason had also killed
another Nazi when he threw a grenade into the window from which the enemy was firing.
The enemy tanks were by this time making a desperate effort to escape from the town to the north.
On the north edge of Kirchherten Company "F"
knocked out a Mark IV with bazookas. Two Mark IVs
were caught by artillery as they sped toward Garzweiler. With its muzzle facing neatly into a near-by
window one Mark IV was found intact and with motor
running in an inclosed farmyard. Apparently caught
by surprise, the crew had surrendered.
At 0415 the enemy was still making small abortive
efforts to gain back the town or a portion thereof.
S/Sgt Silas L. Baird, of Company "A," originally with
the support elements, had just come forward to organize a block of eleven men along a road going east from
town. Enemy movement was soon observed; when
tanks and infantry could be sighted, the roadblock
defenders poured such a hail of small-arms fire upon
them that the formation turned north and was not
seen again. When later another group of German infantry came toward the block they were welcomed
by a barrage of bullets which caused seven enemy
dead, four of whom were ascertained to have been
killed by Baird's own submachine or "grease gun."
In the early morning the 1st Battalion commander
brought Company "F'' from reserve to clean out a
northwest section of town. Meanwhile, Company
"C" took Grottenherten with case so that bv 0500 with
few casualties for the Hegiment, the two 'towns were
secured. Not long after dawn at about 0750, however,
observers noted what seemed to be a counterattack
forming to the northeast.
Company "A" was defending the east approach.
When he noticed the movement, Sgt Jesse de Soto,
machine-gun squad leader in that company, grabbed
his light machine gun. He proceeded to the upstairs
window of a house, where he could observe what was
happening. f le could see two tanks and some infantry moving against his lines. When they came within
easy range he fired from the hip upon them in long,
persistent bursts. The tanks turned on him; after shells
had twice struck the house, he withdrew from his
vantage point; he had, however, succeeded in disorganizing the infantry.
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Meanwhile, Lt Roy V. Young, Company "A" platoon leader, had discovered the threat from the east
and chose a bazooka man with his own last name,
Pfc Lloyd \i\1. Young, to help him fire on the tanks.
They tried the upstairs of a house, but found it was
too far away to be effective. They then crossed the
street and went into a yard which was only 200 yards
distant from the tanks. Lt Young loaded, while his
namesake fired two rounds which missed their target
and drew machine-gun fire. Just as the two Youngs
turned to retire to the house, Lloyd was hit in the
head by machine-gun fire and killed. The tanks were
already turning, however; they withdrew hastily with
whatever infantry had survived.
The counterattack had failed. By this time the company of light tanks, 744th Light Tank Battalion, and
two Platoons of Company "B," 823d TD Battalion,
moving over the main Kalrath-Grottenherten road,
had taken up positions in the town.
Of the sixty prisoners taken in Kirchherten, some
were dressed in brilliant impressive uniforms discovered to be those of the local police. Others said
they were members of the Junior Luftwaffe; of them
the 1st Battalion S-2, Lt Ernest F. Sharpe, reported:
"Judging from their age they must have Hawn kites."
The l SOth Panzer Lehr Division was identified; it
was an old opponent from Normandy, apparently
meeting with no more success this time than it did
the last.
Soon after the objective had been consolidated,
rear elements and supporting units were pouring into
the town, following close behind the attackers. Company "F" rejoined its parent battalion at 1415 on the
27th of February in Kirchhertcn. It found the 2d
Battalion had not been idle, having moved into the
town at 0800 that morning. Coordinated with the
1I9th Infantry's attack on Ilokenholz, the seizure of
objective "Sarah," the settlement of Kaishorb northwest of Kirchherten, had been set for the early afternoon.
KAISI IORB
After considerable time spent in coordinating supporting fires and briefing units on the plan, Company
"E" attacked at 1220. One platoon of light tanks from
the 744th Light Tank Battalion, and the two TDs
which had not been damaged at Kalrath, were attached
to the company. Leapfrogging each other, the tanks
followed the advancing infantry at 200-300 yards,
while the TDs stayed in the rear to cover the assault,
and moved up by echelon. Just before the troops
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reached the town, the tanks surged ahead and, since
only small-arms opposition was met, it was only thirtyeight minutes from the time of attack to when
Kaishorb had fallen. Forty-four prisoners were taken.
Another small built-up area named Hahnerhof lay on
our left (west) out of our sector. It was not taken,
however, until later that afternoon. At 1625, a platoon
of Company "E" attacked over I 000 yards to the chateau area which was seized without opposition in
twenty minutes, the enemy having Red. After capturing the chateau, the platoon returned to the Regimental zone, rejoining its company at Kaishorb.
The first of the Volkssturm captured by our Regiment were taken from "Sarah." One had a long, sad
story to tell, and he painted a tragic picture of Germany's convulsive efforts to muster up every scrap of
manpower left in the Reich.
GARZWEILER
The 3d Battalion had meanwhile left Niederzier in
trucks at the time the lst Battalion was attacking
Kirchherten. After reaching Rodingen at 0330, the
men gathered what rest they could there till 1000,
when the battalion moved into Kirchherten. Lt Col
Greer awaited the word to attack Objective "Nora"
(Garzweiler), due north of Kirchherten.
The Regimental Command Post moved from the
isolated farmhouse south of Hollen shortly after lunch,
and was established in a former restaurant on the
main square in Kirchherten.
The weather had been dark since the first days after
crossing the river, and the afternoon of the 27th was
still overcast. For a Line of Departure the 3d Battalion prepared to use the sloping ground extending
east from Kaishorb to Konigshoven, taken shortly before by the I 19th Infantry. Company "I" moved into
the attack at 1530. Then using two M -IOs of Company "B," 823d TD Battalion, and the M-24 light
tanks of Company "B," 744th Light Tank Battalion,
Company "K" mounted the armor and moved from
Kirchherten through muddy fields across the Line of
Departure in a giant armored skirmish line. Company
"I" led on foot.
Garzweiler, like Niederzier, was apparently to have
been a key defense center, for it contained l05mm assault guns, antitank guns, and tanks, and was surrounded by minefields. Nevertheless, after the battalion crossed the Line of Departure at 1530, it met no
resistance till it was close to the town. There the troops
encountered a volume of small arms mainly from the
right Rank. Here was an intricate trench system pro-

tected by minefields and concertina wire. Much of the
trench system was covered and in places was fortified
into improvised pillboxes.
"Marching fire had always been drilled into the men
back at lnden and near Zopp," someone who was there
told later, "and as soon as the enemy opened fire, not
a man hit the ground, except several on the right Rank
- they were casualties- but immediately opened fire
continuing to advance. The training paid off, because
the enemy quickly waved a white Rag and fifty-one
prisoners filed out of the trenches."
One TD was detracked by a mine, but the assault
lost no momentum and continued into the town easily.
Pvt Francis I I. Martin was hit, but his desire to get
into the town was so great that no amount of persuasion could turn him back; he followed loyally and
helped clean out the houses.
Pfc Walter R. Yates was not confused about the
type of gun he was firing. It was unusual to see anyone firing the light machine gun like an Ml, but Yates
knew what he was doing. A Wearons Platoon man
of Company "I," which had taken position on the
east edge of Garzweiler after the town had been seized,
Yates had seen two Germans running as fast as possible at a distance of about 400 yards due east of his
position. Immediately after he had begun firing, the
legs of his light machine-gun bipod were sunk deep
into the mud and his shots were grazing so low that
had there been any grass, it would literally have been
shaved off. But Yates rapidly changed his position to
correct this fire; Battening out on the ground, he held
up the gun barrel with his left hand and after squeezing off two more bursts, saw that he had felled both
Germans. The next morning, eager to sec whom he
had killed so efficiently, he made an inspection of
the bodies, and discovered that his victims were no less
than a captain and a lieutenant.
Company "L" pushed into Garzweiler behind the
other two companies. Pfc Edward R. Kranz and Pfc
Kenneth E. Rowley were assigned to cover the road
leading northeast from the town while the houses were
heing cleared. Not long after they had reached their
post on the outskirts, they saw an enemy truck heading toward them. The two Company "I" men halted
the vehicle and marched the two soldier-occupants
into the town to be evacuated through the PW cage.
A few minutes later a German command car attempted
to pass the two men without stopping. It did not go
far; both of the Nazis inside were killed by the rifles
of Kranz and Howley. It was almost 1700 when the
two "roadblockers" saw what must have been about

We took lots of prisoners during the Battle of the Roer

a platoon of enemy trying to enter the town. From
a near-by house, Kranz and Rowley fired fiercely on
the enemy; one German fell dead; shortly after another was wounded, and in a few minutes the enemy
had withdrawn. As a two-man roadblock team, Kranz
and Rowley proved themselves topnotch.
Of an estimated 350 enemy in the town, 216 gave
themselves up. They were old, and welcomed capture
in a most un-Nazified manner, brandishing at their
captors the safe-conduct certificates, Passierschein,
fired by Allied artillery. However, it was necesssary to
knock out two or three tanks, the crews of which
wanted to fight. The three l05mm assault guns,
three antitank guns in perfect condition with rounds
loaded and breeches closed ready to fire, three Mark
IVs, and one Mark V completely intact were prize
seizures of the day. Garzwciler was consolidated by
1930.
The 1st Battalion with Company "A," 744th Light
Tank Battalion, had been ordered to follow up the 3d
Battalion, to be called in case of emergency. It halted
in a defiladed area 300 yards northeast of "Sarah"
till 2000, and then returned to its assembly area m
Kirchherten and Grottcnherten.
HEISDOHF AND ST. LEONARD
During the 3d Battalion attack on Garzweiler, Company "L's" assignment had been the reserve. The

morning following the capture of the town it was ordered to take Objective "Fanny," two built-up areas
2500 yards due east of Garzweiler; one, the town of St.
Leonard, being two hundred yards south of the other,
Reisdorf.
The attack took place at 0700. With two platoons
of Company "E," 744th Light Tank Battalion, Company "L" pushed into St. Leonard and Reisdorf so
that in less than an hour our infantry and tanks
held each settlement. Fifty-eight prisoners were taken,
and the list of captured equipment was increased by
one 40mm gun and one battery of 88mm guns in good
condition. Company "L" remained in defensive positions around the two hamlets.
Division Periodic Report of the 27th of February
announced that the enemy's perimeter defense of the
Neuss-Munchen-Gladbach area had been breached at
Garzweiler, and also in the XIII Corps sector. The
Germans, whose average company strength was now
reduced to 25-30 men, it continued, would probably
attempt a fighting withdrawal.
And so the enemy seemed to be caught on the run.
The 120th Infantry had gone more than ten miles
since crossing the Roer, but it was prepared to go
farther. On the last day of February elements of the
2d Armored Division which had been pushing close
behind our forward troops moved through the 120th
lines early in the morning-heading northward. The
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Regiment was still in contact with the enemy to the
east. A 2d Battalion patrol en route to Gustorf on the
Erft River was fired on while on reconnaissance 800
yards from the town. Plans were completed for the
seizure of Gustorf (Objective "Mary") and Laach
(Objective "Ida").

From Belgium to Germany for intensive training;
then across the Roer River in a frontal attack, and
northward in a Ranking, enemy-petrifying Row of
power. So, in brief, reads the Regimental history for
the shortest month of the year; it was the I 20th Infantry's most rapid action in combat.

MA.RCH
In the Battle of Germany, February had been notable for the crossing of the Roer River. During the
last six days of that month, the Allied forces had
rushed headlong with accelerating movement almost
to the banks of the Rhine. March was to see a repetition of that thrilling triumph on a much grander
scale.
As the month began the 120th Infantry was completing the seizure of final objectives in its zone, following the rapid advance from Krauthausen to Garzweiler. The Command Post was located in Kirchherten in a former Volkssturm headquarters which
even before that had been the leading restaurant in
the village. The 1st Battalion had seized the town
two days before, and its companies were still assembled in homes there; those of the 2d Battalion had
moved into buildings close by.
The 3d Battalion was organized in a perimeter of
defense of Garzweiler, which it had seized on the
27th of February, Company "L" was defending two
built-up areas. Reisdorf and St. Leonard, 2500 yards
to the east, having posted two platoons in each locality. On the last night of February Company "I" sent
a patrol to establish a roadblock on the Elsen- Gustorf
road. The enemy in Gustorf pounded angrily at the
roadblock with artillery during the early morning of
March 1st.
SURRENDER OF GUSTORF
Not long after daylight, an Observation Post of
Company "L" in Reisdorf noted three white Rags waving from civilian dugouts in Gustorf, 2000 yards
across the sloping fields. By 0930 all the men in the
company could see glistening white cloths Ruttering
from almost every dwelling. The battalion, and then
the Regimental headquarters, were notified. Colonel
Purdue ordered a party under a white Hag to investigate.
The 3d Battalion planned at once to send its S-2
Sergeant, William P. Veteto, and two members of the
Intelligence Section. One, Pfc William Klein, was
groomed to represent a captain; the double bars were
pinned on the Pfc's shoulders with careful deception.
At l 030, after turning a captured 88mm gun against
Gustorf from a hill 200 yards southeast of St. Leonard,
Lt John G. Gerl, assistant S-3, had just fired sixteen
rounds into the town when he was notified not to fire
any more; the surrender party was about to cross the
fields into the mystery town, filled in all probability
with enemy troops. A five-minute artillery preparation
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was fired before the group left, to let the Germans
realize it was not for lack of ammunition that our
troops wished to spare the town.
Capt Edward M. Hill, Battalion S-3, accompanied
the three men from the Battalion Command Post to
Reisdorf, whence the road led into Gustorf. At the
last minute the S-3 decided to replace one of the Intelligence section men; the real captain took his place
beside the false one. Then, taking the white Ragstaff,
the sergeant started over the dirt road. The three men
stayed well dispersed, for they did not trust the enemy
to honor the white Rag if he did not happen to be in
the mood.
Gustorf had a peacetime population of approximately 3000, and since it was located along the Erft
River, was of strategic importance. It was surrounded
by trenches, and from its houses the enemy observed
movement in the area and registered their artillery fire.
Though they did not know it, it was fortunate for the
three men striding with determination toward Gustorf
that the Germans, having decided to abandon the
town, were running with equal determination toward
the bridge which was the escape route to the east.
At 300 yards from the town, Sgt Veteto pointed to
the dugouts along the road. Stopping for a moment,
the men called on the civilians to come forward in surrender, but there was no movement in response. After
five minutes, the men continued down the slight grade
into town. "Captain" Klein was prepared to act as interpreter. The German peasant told them fifty soldiers
had just escaped across the Erft. As he spoke, seven
of the Wehrmacht who had not escaped appeared at
the door of one of the houses. They came forward
sheepishly and were taken prisoner without further
ceremony .
. Klein asked if there were any more soldiers in town;
he was told that all who had been there were now fleeing across the bridge. In proof of the point, the three
Americans could see some from a distance retreating
hastily over the river, but as emissaries under truce did
not attempt to stop them.
The party was walking down the main street and
had gone 400 yards into the town, surrounded by chattering, eager civilians who insisted again and again
that the soldiers were all gone. Three more bedraggled
Germans in uniform issued forth from a basement,
increasing the prisoner ranks to ten.
Satisfied that the town was free of soldiers, the three
men turned with their prisoners to head for friendly
lines. On the road back they heard a resounding ex-
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bridge; the men could not even reach an island formed
by a split in the Erft, at a point where the road crossed.
They were exposed in every movement and suffered
seven casualties from intense artillery, two killed and
five wounded. All these men were in the 1st Platoon
which was sent to protect the bridge site. The enemy
was looking directly down at them from the buildings
in Neuenhausen and directed heavy artillery and
mortar concentrations upon them. No effort was made
to capture Neuenhausen because it was outside the
Division zone. Troops of Company "K" went to outpost the hamlet of Laach, 1000 yards north of Gustorf; they met no enemy there and had consolidated
positions by l 700. As the enemy retreated, he shelled
Gustorf viciously, causing a man to be killed near the
3d Battalion CP.

TI IE HELIEF OF KAPELLAN

Major General Leland S. Hobbs, Division Commander

plosion which the soldiers told them was the demolition of the one Erft Bridge in Gustorf; later they were
proved correct.
OCCUPATION OF GUSTORF
At noon, Lt Col Greer, Commanding Officer of the
3d Battalion, was ordered to move his unit into Gustorf. Reinforced by a platoon of Company "B," 823d
TD Battalion, by Company "B," 744th Light Tank
Battalion, and by a platoon from Company "C," l05th
Engineer Battalion, the 3d Battalion crossed from
Garzweiler into Gustorf. Company "K" took up positions in the north section of town, while Company "L"
occupied the southern portion. With the engineer
troops, elements of Company "I" endeavored to secure
any bridges remaining intact; they found none. The
occupation was complete at 1600 on the 1st of March .
In the process twenty-nine more prisoners, three machine guns and an ammunition wagon were seized.
Company "I" dispatched a patrol from the 1st Platoon at 1745 to investigate more thoroughly the blown
bridge and to attempt to cross the Erft into the suburb
of Neuenhausen, which lay directly opposite Gustorf.
The patrol was fired on at the site of the destroyed

North of the l 20th Infantry sector around Garzweiler, the 83d Division was pushing its attack toward
Neuss, opposite Dusseldorf. Its 331 st Regiment had
seized the towns of Noithausen, Orken and the western half of Grevcnbroich, where it held defensive positions. At 1525 on the 1st of March, the 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry, was directed to relieve the 3d Battalion, 33lst Infantry, in these towns. Trucks carried
the companies to their new locations; a platoon of
Company "B," 823d TD Battalion, was attached to
the battalion and moved with it. By 1915, Company
"A" with two tank destroyers had moved into Noithausen, Company "B" into Orken, and C-Ompany
"C" with two tank destroyers attached, moved into
western Grevenbroich.
The morning of its arrival there (the 2d of March),
Company "C" sent a patrol to investigate the eastern
section of Crevenbroich. The company lines extended
up to the river. An equally large city area lay on the
other side, and it was this area that the patrol was
to "feel out." The river split where the road crossed,
and formed an island. From there the patrol received
enemy small-arms initially but, edging around houses,
it continued and crossed the bridge to the island.
There a road junction formed a Y, with the tail extending over the bridge into the east side of town.
From the extension of the tail a machine gun sputtered several times at the men. After a few moments
this ceased. When the patrol boldly rushed across the
bridge the opposition seemed to melt in front of them.
The men continued through East Grevenbroich and
in the afternoon after searching out the entire town,
found it clear.

MARCii
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At 0930 that morning the phone rang in the Regimental Command Post; Division G-3 wanted to speak
to Colonel Purdue. When he answered he was told:
"In the town at (200813) there is an American command post. To the northeast about a half mile is a
crossroad. It has been overrun by seven tanks and
some infantry. Pick up a company of tanks from Colonel Duncan, and a company of infantry, and get on
up there." "How about using my TDs?" "Use whatever you need. Have Williamson send a patrol to that
town and if it's clear, find out what's on the other side.
First of all secure the town, and secondly, restore the
positions at the crossroad. We'll send another battalion to the town of Elfingen for your reserve." "Have
those tanks report to the 1st Battalion." "All right. It
will take about forty-five minutes."
Colonel Purdue paused a moment to assimilate the
facts. The "American CP" was that of the 33lst Infantry, 83d Division, and the town was Hemmerden,
only about a mile north of Noithausen, occupied by
the I 20th Infantry Company "A." Company "I" of
the 33 lst Infantry had taken the village of Kapellan
northeast of Hemmerden; it was this company which
had received the counterattack when the enemy broke
Brigadier General William K. Harrison, Assistant Division
Commander

Brigadier General James M. Lewis, Division Artillery
Commander

through to the crossroads. Much of this was not
learned until later when the Colonel reached Hemmerden.
When Lt Col Williamson received the information
he decided to send the nearest Company, "A," to accomplish the task. By 1445 that afternoon the trucks
had arrived at Noithausen, and Lt John D'Amico
loaded his company hurriedly. Over the main road
the company was carried to Hemmerden, which had
11ot yet been attacked by the enemy.
Company "A's" initial mission was to set up a semicircular defense around the town to prevent an exploitation of the breakthrough. The platoons organized blocks on the roads leading north and east from
the town.
Information was scarce at that time; it became
known that Company "I," 33 lst Infantry, had been
cut off in Kapellan; that the enemy had pushed all the
way through the town and captured a brewery 700
yards northwest of it; that another company of the
33lst Infantry attacking north was held up by a roadblock seized from Company "I" half a mile northwest
of the brewery.
Lt lYAmico was ordered to clear Kapellan and to
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Kopel/an

eliminate the roadblock which was delaying the 33 Ist
Infantry's attack north. In haste a plan was adopted
to attack the south tip of Kapellan from Hemmerden ,
then head northeast up its drawn out main street, turn
west at the north tip, clear the brewery, and £nally to
strike the enemy holding the crossroads.
Pulled hastily from roadblock assignments the men
were ignorant of their new mission, and there was
little time to tell them. After brief orientation they
were hustled to a Line of Departure at the southeast
edge of I Iemmerden. At 1515 the signal to advance
was given, following a barrage of artillery which
wounded two men and caused a wave of uneasiness
throughout the company. Lt D'Amico and his platoon leaders rallied the men and steadied them, calmly
disregarding Hying fragments.
A patrol which had reconnoitered the south tip of
Kapcllan reached I- Iemmerden with word that the
enemy had prepared a strongpoint in a barn near the
first intermediate objective, a crossroads on the southern outskirts. Knowing then that he would hit an
enemy position there, Lt D'Amico headed his company toward the south extremity of Kapellan, as
planned. One platoon led, with the mission of seizing
the barn.
S/ Sgt Gerard J. Slania was in that lead platoon
at the head of his squad. When he saw the first

machine-gun burst from the vicinity of the crossroads
on the intermediate objective, he was slightly more
than half way to it. During that first burst one man
was killed, another wounded. S/ Sgt Slania yelled to
his squad to keep coming, and as he advanced, fired a
white phosphorus grenade on the emplacement where
the machine-gun fire seemed to originate. Other members of the squad quickly brought antitank grenade
fire on the enemy. I-le heard the automatic fire again as
he was busy fixing another grenade; when he fired the
second time, the result was no response from the
enemy. When the smoke cleared, the machine gun
was found destroyed. The Germans Heel to other
emplacements, where they were captured when the
platoon moved in to seize the £rst crossroads. Lt
D'Amico left one squad at this south tip of town to
protect his rear as he led the remainder of the company up the street to the northeast toward the heart
of Kapellan. The barn near the crossroads was vacant.
At first there was no opposition. After the company
had crossed a north-south railroad 300 yards from the
crossroads already secured, it began to run across elements of Company "I," 33 Ist Infantry, and from them
gathered more information. After taking Kapellan,
Company ''I's" troops had spread out until its defensive line was dangerously thin. One platoon had been
assigned to the south portion of town, another defended the north, while the third prepared an outpost
around the brewery west of town. The weapons platoon had emplaced mortars behind (west) of the line
of houses along the street, but began to receive harassing sniper fire from the woods between the Erft and
Kapellan. Men of the platoon of Company "I" said
their leader was farther on nearer the principal intersection in town.
As Lt D' Amico approached the 331 st Company "I"
platoon CP, he saw that the enemy was holding the
main crossroads tenaciously. Machine guns and an
antitank gun captured from the 33Ist Infantry were
positioned to defend it, and two tanks were firing on
the buildings in the center of Kapcllan, from an area
between the intersection and the brewery to the west.
As he watched, one of the enemy tanks hastened past
the intersection to the east, headed for Wevelinghoven across the Erft. He took shelter in the Company "I" platoon CP when a thundering heavy mortar
concentration hy the enemy fell around it.
At about this time a platoon from Company "B,"
743d Tank Battalion, started up the street behind the
riflemen. Its instructions had been to follow them into
town and, after some difficulty in skirting the obstacles

En route to recapture Kopel/an

at the southern crossroads, it approached the scene of
action. Lt D'Amico sent two of the M-4s to clean out
a side street on the right of the main thoroughfare;
another he gave the mission of interdicting the principal crossroads; the other two he led around some
houses to try to Hank the remaining enemy tank.
Meanwhile the artillery observer found a post in a
house to observe for registration on the route of escape
over the Erft.
One squad of Company "A" was trying during this
period to destroy the machine-gun nest at the intersection, since it covered the length of the main street
with accuracy. S/ Sgt Chester L. Goodwin, the squad
leader, beckoned to Pfc l larry L. Dust behind him to
dodge into a house on the right. Both pushed through
the rubble of German homes toward the back yards in
order to circle around behind the machine gun. They
crawled over a few chicken coops and through the
mud toward the house sheltering the enemy nest.
When they ran into a six-foot wall, they listened a
moment; one hoisted the other up, then clambered
over the wall himself. \\' hen they hit the ground on

the other side they could see the Germans at a .30caliber heavy machine gun- an American weapon.
They did not wait for the enemy to look around.
They killed three almost simultaneously with their
rifle fire while the others dodged around another wall
and escaped to the east. Goodwin and Dust recaptured
a halftrack, an antitank gun, and the machine gun,
which had all been seized from the 33 lst Infantry.
By that time the intersection was almost cleared of
the enemy. Suddenly the clatter of a tank was heard,
and a Mark IV shot through town and Aed eastward
to Wevclinghoven. The friendly tanks which Lt
D'J\mico had led to flank the l\1ark IV had not been
able to leave the protection of the houses without unnecessary risk so bazooka teams had begun to sneak
toward it. Possibly seeing himself surrounded and
about to be destroyed, the enemy tanker made his decision to whip across the river to safety. When he
passed the intersection he was moving so fast that the
M -4 covering it had no time to pick him off.
The heart oF Kapellan was now in friendly hands.
Lt D'Amico told the platoon of Company "I" to cover
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A wards were presented during lulls in combat

his rear, and he brought forward the squad from the
southern crossroads. Leaving a platoon to block the
road to the east and a squad to block one leading
northeast, he wheeled the remainder of the company
to the northwest. Forming at the edge of town, the
troops were readied to take the brewery. Some prisoners gave indications that it would be an enemy
strongpoint. The platoon of Company "I," 33 Ist Infantry, which had held it had already been captured,
it was learned, like the platoon in the north of Kapellan. The majority of both had been evacuated through
German channels.
Pressing 700 yards uphill to the wrecked beer factory, the men closed in to find it deserted. Near the
building, a many-passaged air-raid shelter was by no
means deserted; in it huddled 250 civilians with six
wounded German soldiers and a wounded American.
About 1725 Company "A" was prepared to move
parallel to the 33 lst Infantry's route of advance. But
having received word that the enemy had given up
this position, largely due to the diversion in Kapellan, the company started back to Hemmerden over
the route past the crossroads. A battalion of the I 17th
Infantry had entered Kapellan to relieve the Company "A" roadblocks, so that the company became a
complete unit again. En route it was surprised by fire
from the crossroads held by elements of the 33 Ist In184

fantry. Quickly notifying the troops there of the mistake, the company moved through the block, then
southeast into Jlemmerden. At 2130, the men
mounted trucks and were carried back to their area in
Noithausen. Company "E" had moved to I lemmerden
as reserve; it returned to its assembly area at the same
time. Fifteen prisoners had been taken. Later two
Mark IV tanks were found disabled by artillery on
the Wevelinghoven road near the river. The 83d
Division expressed appreciation.
FINAL DAYS OF THE ROER OFFENSIVE
The 2d Battalion moved from Kirchherten on foot
the morning of the 2d of March. After pausing at an
area near Belmen and Elfgen at noon, it moved by
early afternoon into an assembly area in Elsen, west of
and contiguous to Grevenhroich.
On the same day the 3d Battalion sent another patrol with engineer sc1uads to the banks of the Erft at
the point where the main road crosses. While the
bridge on the near side of the island formed by the
river-split was ascertained to be completely demolished, the far span was only partly destroyed and still
passable by vehicles. From its area around Gustorf
and Laach, the Battalion maintained contact with adjacent regiments.
Soon after the seizure of Gustorf the Regimental
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Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon had established an OP there; across the Erft the enemy was
observed constantly during the daylight hours. At
1030 on the 3d of March the OP reported friendly
tanks sweeping up from the south near Frimunersdorf. In less than half an hour troops were closing
in without a struggle upon the town across the river.
By 1230 Neuenhausen across from Gustorf had been
taken by allied troops, which thus enabled the 3d Battalion to withdraw from its defensive positions and to
assemble in the town. The 120th Infantry was no
longer in contact with the enemy.

tank and Service Companies (Tuddem), Cannon
Company and the 230th Field Artillery Battalion
(Susterseel, Germany), Company "C," 105th Engineer Battalion, and Company "C," 105th Medical Battalion (Broeksittard).
The following week, up to the 21st of March, all
units were engaged in training and recreation. Training included: attack of strongpoints under smoke,
bangalore torpedoes, night tactics of the individual
soldier, special long-range test firing up to 4500 yards
of 81 mm mortars, and boobytrap and AP mine detection and disarmament.

PAUSE AT ELFGEN

THINGS REMEMBERED ABOUT HOLLAND

Regimental Headquarters had moved from Kirchherten to Elfgen, a mile southeast of Elsen, at 1220 on
the 2d of March, being thus centrally located among
the battalions: the 1st in Grevenbroich area, the 2d
at Elsen and the 3d at Gustorf. For four days the
Hegiment took a "breather," conducting light training
and resting.
On the newly taken ground the troops practiced
tank assault tactics, trained in night formations, and
learned better the technique of "mouseholing" from
house to house. The 2d Battalion units fired 75mm
guns captured at Garzweiler, using an excavation
pit "range" near Furth close to Elsen.
For the first time the Regiment was faced with
severe civilian problems. The sudden sweep of the
Allied armies into the Rhineland caught civilians by
surprise before they could think of evacuating, if they
wanted to do so. Full of questions and requests, they
swarmed around our perplexed soldiers. Frequently
they made a headache of the problem of billeting, and
at Gustorf they had to be evacuated. The CIC detachment was kept busy.

"While we are accomplishing our mission in training during this period," said Colonel Purdue to the
officers, "the men should be encouraged in recreation
and social contact." Some of the memories which
I 20th Infantrymen will cherish in years to come will
include:

TRIP TO REAR AREA
On the 5th of March plans were completed for
movement of the Regiment, in Division convoy, to a
new area on the Holland-German border near Sittard,
I Iolland. On the following day units of the I 20th
sped westward, the organic vehicles completing the
move on the 6th, the foot elements in trucks on the
7th of March. The route included famous battle landmarks: Julich, Aachen and f Ieerlen.
At 1806 on the 7th of March the Hegimental Command Post was established at Broeksittard, Holland,
while the battalions were assembled in towns in the
vicinity: the 1st and 3d at Wehr, Germany; the 2d at
T uddern, Germany. Also located close by were Anti-

- The day on pass in Heerlen (or Maastricht, or
Sittard), where the Army facilities and Dutch hospitality made a twelve-hour pass seem very, very
short.
- The company dances in one of the Dutch hotels
in Sittard, each arranged through Lt Don J.
D'Auben of Antitank Company and Lt Robert S.
Gillette, Athletics Officer.
-The volleyball, softball and baseball games in the
fields around the German towns, when companies
rivaled each other in athletic prowess.
- The company day-room, scene of "bull sessions"
and beer parties. One typical day-room (Company
"A's") was decorated with Varga-like art by members of the company; it boasted, too, a radio and
maps showing the situation on all fronts. The plush
sofa and easy chairs were a welcome contrast to the
foxholes, barn floors and trucks to which the riflemen had become accustomed.
- The dish of ice cream which different company
kitchens mixed, carried to Heerlen to have frozen,
and served for chow. And
- The first signs of Spring.
PERSONALITIES, NEW AND OLD
During the pause at Broeksittard the Regiment suffered two losses: Lt Col Ward and Lt Col Greer left
the 120th Infantry.
Lt Col Peter 0. Ward, Regimental Executive Officer, was suddenly ordered on the 8th of March to re-
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Lieutenant Colonel Peter 0. Word

port to Headguarters, 9th Infantry Division, located
in the Remagen sector to the south. He made a hurried departure on the 9th.
An "old-timer" with the Hegiment, Lt Col Ward
came to the !20th Infantry in 1942. A graduate of
the United States Military Academy in 193 l, his previous tours of duty had included three years at Fort
Sam Houston, Texas, two years in Hawaii, and a year
at Fort Benning, Ga.
From 1942 through maneuvers in Tennessee and
the crossing to England, Lt Col Ward commanded the
3d Battalion; under his leadership that battalion had
done outstanding work. Always able to make his men
give their utmost, he was a natural choice for Executive Officer when Lt Col Garvin B. Farris became ill
in England a month before the invasion of the Continent. On going to the 9th Division as regimental
commander, Lt Col Ward joined the l20th's former
commander, Brig Gen f lammoncl D. Birks, Assistant
9th Division Commander.
Lt Col \\lard was driven to his new post by T / 5
\Villiam T. Satterwhite. When he took Lt Col Ward
over the Remagen Bridge, he made history as the first
man of the I 20th Infantry to cross the Rhine, taking

the title from Lt James J. Butler, first man of the Reoiment into Germany, who led a patrol over the riv0er
ten days later.
Ten days after Lt Col Ward's departure Lt Col Joseph E. Reynolds came from the 2d Armored Division
as the new Regimental executive. A native of Kentucky and a graduate of the U. S. Military Academy
in 1939, Lt Col Heynolds was assigned to the
29th Infantry. For over five years he served with
that separate regiment, receiving his majority in December, 1942, and his lieutenant colonelcy less than a
year later. With the 29th Infantry he saw service in
Iceland and England, and from the 25th of August,
1944, in France. On the 25th of February, 1945, he
was assigned to the 41 st Armored Infantry of the 2d
Armored division; on the 19th of March he left for the
120th Infantry.
On almost the same day as Lt Col Ward made his
(.l eparture Lt Col Howard \V. Greer left the Hegiment
for a rotation leave to spend thirty days at home in the
United States.
In less than a month, Lt Col Greer was to be in
Baltimore with his wife. Though from Maryland, he
had had much schooling in Florida, having received
his commission from the University of Florida in
1939. I le came to the 30th Division when it was still
at Fort Jackson, South. Carolina. At Camp Blanding,
he took command of Company "B," and received
his captaincy there. J le was made Executive Officer
of the 3d Battalion after the Begiment arrived in
France, and at the death of Lt Col Paul W. McCollum in October, took command of it. With Lt Col
Greer went one of the familiar personalities of his
headguarters, "Hicky" (short for Old Hickory), the
black spaniel which he had brought with him from
the Battle of the Bulge.
To replace Lt Col Greer came Maj Chris McCullough, former Executive Officer of the lst Battalion.
Famed for his "twin toothpick" moustache, Major
"!\lac" proved he was ready to lead the battalion in
one of its most crucial assignments. Perhaps he felt at
ease in the 3d, since he had made his debut in combat
as commander of Company "I." Replacing him in the
lst Battalion for a short time was Capt Delmont K.
Byrn, former Company "I I" commander. Later, Major
Reynold C. Erichson, returned from a 30-day rotation
leave in the States, and was assigned to the I st Battalion as executive.
Colonel Purdue said of his executive ollicer and departing battalion commander, "When I was in the
process of taking the regiment over from Brigadier
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General (then Colonel) Birks, he told me that 'Pete'
Ward was his right arm. He understated 'Pete's'
capabilities. Calm, smart, hard working, intensely
loyal, and possessing a remarkable sense of infectious
humor, 'Pete' Ward's value to the regiment cannot
be adequately described. As proof of his soldierly
qualities he took command of the 47th Infantry R.egi~
ment when that regiment was at a low ebb because of
casualties. Furthermore, immediately after assuming
command, he lost both his executive officer and S-3 as
a result of enemy action. Also, that regiment was engaged in one of the most difficult operations of its
history- that of the R.emagen Bridge. Colonel Ward
distinguished himself as a regimental commander,
successfully overcoming the many handicaps which
he inherited immediately upon assuming command.
When he left I felt as if I had lost both my arms and
half my head."
"Soldiers do not come any better than Lt Col I toward Greer. Succeeding Lt Col McCollum during a difficult fight, Lt Col Greer brilliantly rolled up that
part of the Siegfried Line within his sector. It is remarkable that he could have commanded a battalion
so well after having been a battalion executive officer
for only a few weeks. His subsequent seizure of
Bardenburg was a superb action. I-tis feat of destroying two enemy tanks, for which he was awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross, inspired the men of his
battalion to superhuman efforts. Lt Col Greer continued to lead his battalion brilliantly and well in all
subsequent actions up to and including the Rohr crossing. To see him leave hurt, but it was only fair that he
be sent home on rotation because he had fought in
many, many hard battles extending over a period of
several months."
NEW OPERA-I ION IN SIG! IT
Preparations for a new operation bega.n on the 14th
of March, when certain staff officers left Broeksittard
to inspect the terrain where the I 20th was to operate.
Later, Col Purdue Hew to the Hhine for reconnaissance. The crossing site lay far to the north over a
route through Roermond and Straeling to Rheinberg.
In the vicinity of that city, elements of the 75th Division held a line on the west bank of the Rhine River
opposite Spcllen, l\1ehrum and Gotterswickerhamm.
With its series of dikes on either side of the river, its
flat, sandy beaches sloping only gently into the waters,
and its grassy fields and dirt roads, this country was
carefully studied by the commander and his staff.
Three Observation Posts were chosen and on the

Lieutenant Co/one/ Joseph E. Reynolds

following day manned by the Regimental I and R
Platoon. One was situated in a factory in Ossenberg
three miles north of Hheinberg; another was in a lone
tower which had to be entered and left under cover
of darkness, 4000 yards east of Ossenberg between the
river and the first dike; and a third was in the upper
story of the mansion at Hasselshof, almost in the center of an eastward bulge formed by a loop in the Rhine
northeast of Rheinberg. Within a few days the S-2
was well acquainted with the nature of enemy movements in the area which was to be taken.
Not long after, the battalion commanders and their
staffs were shown the terrain and each was briefed
on his part in the coming action. From maps and
visual reconnaissance, sand-table reproductions of the
area were constructed in the battalion training sections in Holland; each road and house was accurately
located; each group of trees was faithfully reproduced.
Company commanders and platoon leaders were
oriented; finally, the men themselves were briefed and
coached in their collective and individual missions.
The success of the Roer crossing had gained the
30th Division some reputation for this type of operation. Certainly the fact that they had done it
once successfully made the men more confident
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about a repetition of the feat. But the troops were not
perfect, and they rehearsed again the river-crossing
technique. On the Maas, near Echt north of Sittard, the battalions rotated turns at training; each
practiced day and night crossings. The rifle troops
rowed engineer storm boats to familiarize themselves
with their function and to learn how to handle them.
Antitank units loaded guns and jeeps on the Navy's
Landing Craft, Vehicles and Personnel; and on Landing Craft, Mechanized.
It was no surprise, then, when units were notified
that the Regiment was to leave its Dutch "home" on
the 20th of March. The entire Division was to assemble in the Rheinberg-Ossenberg area, and transferred from the XIX Corps to the XVI Corps.
What surprised the men more was the fact that the
trip was to be made at night. Instructions had been
for every soldier to remove his Division patch, for
every vehicle to have its identification marked out.
More than the trip from Belgium to the Roer area,
this movement was to be with utmost secrecy. Men
of the 75th Division, in whose sector the 30th was
assembling, removed all identification markings as
well.
lip and down the Rhine front, deception was the
key word. Any especially heavy vehicular movement
in one sector was well duplicated in all others; any
concentration of artillery emplacements in one sector
was copied in all others; and all movements were at
night, even those of rear echelons. New code names
were temporarily put to use. Under such a veil of
secrecy, the I 20th Infantry prepared to move north.
On the evening of the 20th of March, trucks lined
up in the battalion areas, were loaded, and started
north by 1850. The Regimental Command Post
moved from Broeksittarcl into the center of Rhein berg,
where, as Colfax Nan 53, it occupied once again a
cellar. In rear (west) of Regimental Headquarters
the battalions assembled in various built-up areas. The
1st Battalion in the vicinity of Kamper, the 2d near
Wesselshof, and the 3d in I Iorstgen. Swarming in
the settlements, the civilians were juggled in different
houses to accommodate the troops. By 0200 on the
21st of March the 3d Battalion, last in the convoy, had
closed into its new area.
During the lull of the next three days the troops remained in their quarters most of the time and were
given final orientation. Truckloads of men were shuttled forward to the edge of the Rhine and from covered positions behind the levee were shown the
ground over which they were to operate. Landmarks

like the windmill near Gotterswickerhamm and the
church steeple by the river were pointed out as appropriate locations for future installations, so that no man
would be lost, and could, if the necessity arose in the
heat of battle, find headt1uarters and aid stations.
For the unit commanders and staff officers the final
days before the assault were busy. The Regimental
attack order had numerous annexes, including supporting-fire plans for the lst Battalion, for elements
of the 291 st Infantry ( 75th Division), and for Company "C," 624th TD Battalion; it included priority
lists for command, medical, armored and supply vehicles, and movement plans for the attached units.
Each detail had to be coordinated.
PATROLLERS OVER THE RHINE
Deception was part, too, of the front-wide patrolling
plan . When patrols were sent to enemy lines in one
sector, similar ones were dispatched in all others.
\Vhen the 30th Division arrived in the area around
Hheinberg, patrols from the 75th Division holding
the lines had met with ill success; all had failed to
cross.
It was with apprehension, then, that Lt James J.
Butler led his five-man patrol toward the Rhine at
about midnight on the 19th-20th of March. From the
I and R Platoon, which had moved to the Rheinberg
area before the remainder of the Regiment, the men
with Lt Butler, Sgt John E. Miller, Cpl Benjamin W.
Hart, Pfc Louis K. Westerfeld, and Pfc Robert V.
Phipps, were veterans of Roer patrols. At 0130 when
they boarded the assault boat to cross, they found the
Rhine broader, but less treacherous, than the swollen
Roer. They pushed off the shore nearest Ettroig, a
group of farm buildings a mile east of Ossenberg.
The current had swept them 400 yards downstream
when ten minutes later they hit the opposite shore.
For several minutes all the men waited motionless in
the boat, listening for enemy movement. They heard
nothing and stepped ashore. One of their missions
was to investigate the angle of the slope. It was gentle
and rose only slightly to bare, Hat ground. Behind them
friendly searchlights threw a glow against the sky.
Realizing that it was causing them to be silhouetted,
they began to crawl inland with an eye for enemy emplacements and minefields.
They made their way for 600 yards without encountering any evidence of enemy. It was growing
late by this time; to avoid being exposed by daylight,
the patrol had to turn around at 0415 and head back.
It returned to the river bank by a different route, one
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found to be clear for attacking troops. The men hit
the friendly shore farther downstream a mile north
of Ossenherg; behind them enemy flares lighted the
area.
The following night another patrol was to try crossing. Lt Michael A. Esquivel pointed on the map to
the town of Mehrum held by the enemy; gathered
around him, his men in the I and R Platoon, Cpl
\Villiam L. Oakley, Pfc Melvin L. Goldblatt, Pfc
William M. Jakovac, and Pfc Arne A. Luoma, followed his finger indicating the place they were to
cross-due south of Mehrum slightly cast of Ettroig.
As scheduled, they crossed at 0240 the morning of
the 21st of March, and when they landed, Pfcs Jacovac and Luoma stayed by the boat, while the others
started forward to find a route of advance inland.
From the stone embankment close to the water the
men began working their way forward to a winter
levee one hundred yards farther in. They were not as
lucky as the patrolmen of the night before. As they
came closer to the levee they perceived foxholes and
dugouts. They began to crawl when they heard enemy
movement. They found the levee was not hard to
climb, hut Lt Esquivel had to change the route to
avoid an enemy outpost. They crept within ten yards
of one group of Germans who were talking in whispers.
For a while, the patrollers had to work their way
laterally rather than in depth, even then passing
within several yards of sentinels in dugouts. Once
they were challenged; they did not stir a muscle in
reply. Some minutes later they continued. In two
and a half hours, they had penetrated 200 yards inland and crossed 400 yards of enemy terrain parallel
to the river. They had passed at least four outposts,
at least twenty Germans.
Stealthily they crept back to the boat, where the
two men on guard said enemy troops had come close
to them, too, but that silence had allayed the Germans'
suspicions. At 0540, the boat carrying the patrol was
darting through the Rhine waters toward friendly
lines. They had found another spot where the terrain
favored a crossing; ~t was later used.
Another five-man patrol, led by Lt Butler, also
crossed the Rhine the same night. At 0110 it started
from the same spat used by the earlier group with the
mission of test-climbing the levee walls with full field
equipment. The boat was carried too far downstream
by the current, however; by the time the men had
returned to the place of origin, it was daylight, too late
to start again.
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As well as the three Regimental Observations Posts,
a 2d Battalion post in a dike-dugout near Ettroig supplied the S-2 with much information on the apparent
disposition of enemy defenses and individual movements noted. On clear days visibility was up to seven
or eight miles. Minefield markings, stakes entwined
with barbed wire, deserted barges, and numerous emplacements, were reported during the period.
MINIATURE IN THE RHINE "BIG

PICTlH~E"

The "big picture" at this time showed many divisions lined up on the west side of the Rhine ready to
bust the German defenses there and to continue eastward. Farther south several divisions had already
crossed the river at Remagen, and were poking at the
bridgehead corners, ready to break out.
North of the Rheinberg-Ossenberg region were
British troops poised for an attack across the river at
Wesel; to the south was the 79th Division, scheduled
to cross simultaneously with the 30th. The Division
attack plans for the 30th had been formulated for a
long time: they called for a tri-regimental push, the
I 19th Infantry on the left (north) Rank across from
Buderich, the I 17th Infantry in the center opposite the
defense town of Spellen, the l20th on the Division's
right flank, to cross due south of Mehrum and to
swing right along the bulge in the river and then to
move eastward.
The big initial objectives for the I 20th following
the crossing were goose-egged on the overlay as
"Bette," "Blondie," "Abner," "East and West Lana,"
''Daisy," and "Ruth." Of these the 2d Battalion was
scheduled to take the first four.
They were Mehrum ("Bette"), a front-line defense
town, just north of the two levees; Wurm-Gotterswick
("Abner"), a small community 1000 yards north of
Mehrum; Schanzenberg ("Blondie"), an elongated
town 1000 yards still farther north; and Lohnen and
Vorde ("East and West Lana"), two of the largest
towns in the vicinity northeast of Mehrum. It was a
large territory for one battalion. To hack it off, Company "G" was going to swing around the Momm
River line and take Wurm-Gotterswick and Schanzen berg, while Company "F" seized Mehrum. Company "E" was scheduled to seize Lohnen.
The 3d Battalion's objective included Gotterswickerhamm ("Daisy"), a strong defense town on the dike's
edge east of Mehrum, to be taken by Company "K,"
and Mollen ("Ruth"), east of Gotterswickerhamm,
which was to be seized later by Company "I." The lst
Battalion was to follow the movements of the others,
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disintegrate, be characterized by sporadic town and
strongpoint defenses, with local counterattacks by
piecemeal commitments of very limited reserves.
Once into and through the woods on the high ground
east of the Autobahn (Staatsforst Wesel), it is believed the enemy will be incapable of continuing a
thrust to the interior of Germany . . . "
That, briefly, was the picture. That was a gaze into
the crystal, a forecast of the role to be played by the
120th Infantry.
BEFORE f I-HOUR

View from the levee on the west bank of the Rhine

ready to assist or push through on a moment's notice.
The 30th Division G -2 periodic report gave a brief
picture of what the Regiment faced in this new,
large-scale operation:
". . . The towns of . . . Mehrum and Lohnen are
focal points of CPs and services, organized for defense
and constituting a battalion reserve line . . . The
principal unit garrisoning the east bank of the Rhine
River from Wesel to Mollen is the l 80th Division ...
"Besides losing a great number of trained troops
between the Rhine and Roer, (the enemy) lost a great
deal of material . . . The defenses facing us today are
no more than what he has been able to dig and lay in
the short time of two weeks, supplemented by the
fixed antiaircraft gun positions, both light and heavy,
which surround the Ruhr Valley in abundance, and
may be capable of employment in a ground role.
Troops facing us across the Rhine are remnants of
those who were able to escape over the river, hastily
parceled out to their defensive sectors, and being reorganized and reinforced as quickly as replacements
could be scraped together from all sources, and transported into the line.
"It is believed, therefore, that the enemy is now disposed in a linear defense with little depth. It is anticipated that a heavy, fast attack across the Rhine River
will achieve a breakthrough of his Main Linc of Resistance, will reach the double railroad embankments
before his forward troops can fall back upon them
. . . and break into the open just as did the attack
over the Roer River.
"From there on it is expected that resistance will

On the night of the 23d of March, the Regimental
S-2 and S-3 Office was active in final preparations for
what was predicted as the "final push." Optimism was
high, and in leisure moments wagers on Germany's
defeat within three or four weeks were made. Colonel
Purdue reported to General f Iobbs, "The Regiment
now is at the best combat efficiency of its history." The
subse(1uent brilliant attack proved his report was ac
curate.
Liaison officers from the subordinate and attached
units stood near the operations desk ready to be called
on; they included a lieutenant from the 744th Light
Tank Battalion, and one from the XXIX Tactical Air
Command, to coordinate air strikes with ground attacks. Along with these were liaison personnel from
the regularly attached units: 230th Field Artillery
Battalion; Company "B," 823d TD Battalion; Company "C," 105th Engineer Battalion; and Company
"C," 105th Medical Battalion. They wise-cracked
among themselves, but when their various missions
were assigned they left hurriedly; they knew the last
minutes before f I-hour were speeding by; they knew
that evervthing had to be ready bv 0200 on the 24th.
Mean~hile, down the dark roads on the outskirts of
Rheinberg filed the riflemen and heavy-weapons men
en route to the crossing site. f laving left its area at
2305, the 2d Battalion was in the lead, and reached
the area near Ettroi~ first, where Company "G" left
the remainder of the battalion to organize its separate
crossing site due east of Ossenberg. Company "F"
formed to lead the assault across the river due south
of Mehrum, with Company "E" ready to follow closeIv. The 3d Battalion left f IorstQ'en at 2200; it had a
long march to the vicinity of Rheinhcrg and on to
Ettroig.
At midnight the crossing site was in the process of
being organized. Engineer squads were planning
bridge construction and approaches for amphibious
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vehicles, smoke pots were being laid; guides and noncoms were assigning supply-point areas; vehicles were
beginning to arrive. At this time enemy artillery was
sporadic; it landed on key crossroads; one jeep suffered
a direct hit which caused two casualties.
The men in the battalions were accounted for and
grouped near the first dike on the south s~de. Until
II-hour they remained dispersed in rear of the levee
and began to dig prone shelters in the fields. Engineer
trucks carried storm boats and lifebelts to the levee
embankments, there depositing them in rows.
Essential vehicles from the battalions began to assemble in areas near by, ready to act as messengers,
to bring smoke pots and other supplies, to evacuate
where necessary. Some of the 1st Battalion vehicles
pulled into their planned assembly area at 2345 and
drivers were dismounting, when all at once a heavy
enemy concentration of artillery whistled, then shook
the ground in successive concussions. Two men in the
group were instantly killed. T / Sgt Donald D. Babcock was in charge. Hurrying from one vehicle to another without concern for his own safety, he told the
men to get into the trucks again and follow him to a
new area. Since the enemy had probably sensed the
movement in this area, Babcock's order made good
sense; within fifteen minutes the area was cleared of
trucks, and no vehicles were lost.
Meanwhile the units which were to give supporting fire had moved into position. The 1st Battalion
had emplaced mortars behind and machine guns on
the first levee, where they were adjusted and in
readiness. Not far away 57mm antitank guns from
the 291 st Infantry, 75th Division, were dug in, ready
to give direct fire support along with the M-18s of
Company "C," 6 l 4th TD Battalion, pointing 90mm
guns toward Mehrum from points just i.n rear of the
dike. During the two hours before the Jump-off, the
1st Battalion alone fired twenty tons of ammunition.
Twelve hundred and fifty pieces of artillery supported the crossing of the 30th Division and the 79th
Infantry Division on its right. The ammunition allowance was unlimited. At midnight all guns fired simultaneously. The far bank erupted. For two hours the
enemy suffered concentrations the like of which have
been seen but few times in all of history. For 120 minutes shells of all calibers from 105mm to the big 8inch fell upon the krauts at the rate of hundreds per
minute. The artillery also greatly assisted in our plans
for deception. Concentration.s first landed upon the
bank, then shifted inland a few hundred yards, only
to come down again on the bank. At the same time

90mm tank destroyers, 57mm antitank guns, and
machine guns brought heavy direct fire from the levee
on our bank into enemy positions. Finally, terrific
mortar concentrations from our own organic weapons
as well as from those of the 75th Infantry Division
added to the preliminary bombardment of the enemy.
Exactly at 0200, according to carefully prepared detailed plans, our fires shifted to cover the crossing.
Artillery and mortar concentrations moved inland a
few hundred yards, direct fire cannon shifted to form
a safe lane. The machine guns, no longer firing tracers,
elevated their fire some twenty feet over the enemy's
head. Such shifts had been made before during the
two-hour preparation, and the enemy learned that the
fires might return upon him at any moment. As a result of this deception plan, our first boats were able to
land without opposition.
THE RIVER CROSSING
The men of Company "F" and, at the different site
to the northwest, those of Company "G," formed by the
levee.embankment, buckled the double-tube life preservers around their waists, and lifted their assigned
storm boats in readiness. Officers' eyes were glued to
their watches.
Two o'clock had been ushered in with a din that
had lasted two hours as the artillery concentrated on
the enemy defenses, the machine guns sprayed, the
mortars popped and the direct-fire heavy weapons
blasted. With one surging effort the human wave
lifted the boats over the first levee and hurried toward
the water. Swiftly the storm boats were slid into the
Rhine; swiftly the riAemen clambered over the sides,
and the engineer with each boat started the motor.
In less than two minutes the first wave had reached
the opposite bank. Men rushed over the beaches
while the storm boats returned for a new load. The
life preservers were returned and used again.
At 0202 came the welcome message to the rear CP
in Rheinberg: "Boats got off on time; no reaction since
we jumped off." The enemy's initial apathy in response
to our attacks did not last long. Ten minutes later, Maj
Glazier, the S-2, watching from the levee, reported :
"No mines yet, but we arc getting a little more reaction now, mortar and artillery." It did not stop the
assault companies, however, for near by the Regimental commander relayed the news a moment later
that the lead company was already across the first dike
on the opposite side and heading toward the second,
the larger "winter" levee. Then the radio reported
"Some artillery is landing where our boats are work-
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ing." Company "E" started across fifteen minutes after the attack upon Mehrum was reported progressing
well. The 3d Battalion moved to the first levee ready
H-hour.
A prisoner captured later said that the Germai:c; to follow. LCVPs or Alligators were to help carry
had limited themselves to five rounds of artillery a the battalion across rne river. At that moment the
day, to save a large supply for the day of expected column could not be found. It was to have started up
attack. At midnight before H-hour, he lamented, the the river at a site farther north, and its arrival had
line to the Observation Post had been severed by shell- been carefully timed not to betray the assault by the
ing. Whether this was true or not the enemy defenses noise of its motors. Some frantic calls were made
were not as strong as expected. Onto key cross- before, at 0325, it was located, and the LCVP drivers
roads and probable landing sites the enemy sent oriented.
small barrages, for the most part air bursts. They inElements of Company "K" and Company "L"
creased in intensity, however, as the day progressed, mounted the vehicles behind the first levee and were
and from daylight till noon were heavy.
carried 500 yards to the river, where other elements
Meanwhile, the boats were causing difficulty. Some of the battalion were boarding storm boats and assault
had motor troubles and Aoated helplessly downstream craft. Directing the crossing on the near shore, Lt
to land some distance from their planned destination. Harry R. Peters, 3d Battalion adjutant, kept a steady
When S/Sgt Sam Javitch in the first wave of Com- Aow of well-dispersed boats and amphibious vehicles.
When the 3d Battalion began to cross, there were
pany "F" looked around for his platoon leader, he
saw only the black blotch of the lieutenant's boat more mixups. Company "K" was landed in farbeing swept away, and had to gather the milling pla- separated units, aod in the shuffle Lt Edwin J. Franktoon at once and form it for the attack. He led the lin, Battalion S-2, had to take charge of the rear elements and bring them up to the Line of Departure,
men through some heavy fire that morning.
Company "G" was having still greater difficulties. where Capt Harold P. Plummer, the company comConfused by the heavy friendly supporting fires and mander, waited with the remainder of the men.
Led by Lt Alvin H. Gordon, the lst Platoon of
smoke on the river, some engineers steering the
hoats turned around without knowing _it and landed Company "L" was delayed when the LCVPs to carry
some of the men on the friendly shore; other members it did not appear at the designated point. After the
of Company "G" were landed only to find that they vehicles had at last been found and the men had
were on a bar and thus stranded from either shore. mounted, the lead driver did not know where to make
Largely because irregular inlets characterized the the crossing, and Capt Earl F. Wilson had to spend a
shore on the enemy side, many of the men who were half hour reconnoitering for the site. Then, after
crossing, there was considerable confusion when eledepasited there were separated and disorganized. .
A fine leader, lst Lt Charles B. Pike, lost his life ments of Company "M" became involved with Comwhile attempting to reorganize elements of Company pany "L" troops. The organization had to be accom"G." Lt Pike had been hospitalized during the train- plished on the move.
At 0600, when Company "I" was crossing on the
ing period prior to the Rhine crossing. Having argued
his way out of the hospital he had reported to his com- LCVPs, one had motor trouble and twenty-five men,
pany commander, Captain Charles W. Moncrieff, Jr. a part of two platoons, under the command of Lt John
a few hours before the start of the operation. Captain C. DePutron, were ordered to jump overboard and
Moncrieff had told Lt Pike that it was not necessary swim to safety. Shortly after the riflemen had done so
for him to accompany the company because they ha~I and were splashing to shore, the LCVP motor began
sufficient officers. Lt Pike answered, "You cannot do whirring, and the vehicle whipped around to the
without me, Monty." At the time Lt Pike was killed friendly shore without attempting to pick up the
he was leading to the company zone men who had Aoating men. The Company "I" men lost their
been landed downstream from the planned landing personal equipment and were unable to rejoin their
area. En route upstream in order to rejoin the com- company for two days.
To tell of the cause of the poor support given by
pany it was necessary to knock out an enemy position.
Lt Pike died in driving out this position, but his spirit the Alligator crews is not a pretty story. Many of
Jed the group to the company in time for the men to those men had attempted to fortify their courage
assist in accomplishing the company's mission.
from the bottle. Officers of that unit had been shown
By 0316 the entire 2d Battalion had crossed, and the route to the loading and embarking point; further-

194

HISTORY OF THE 120rn INFANTRY REGIMENT

more, white tape marked that part of the route which
was across-country. Despite this prior reconnaissance
and marking of the route, the Alligators were over an
hour late in reporting to the prescribed loading area.
An appreciable number of the members of the various
crews were drunk. The resulting delay and confusion
seriously interfered with the crossing of the 3d Battalion. However, the Regimental and 3d Battalion
commanders, making the best of a deplorable situation,
quickly improvised an alternate plan of using boats
which had returned from ferrying the 2d Battalion
across. The engineers manning these boats, being
good soldiers, quickly adapted themselves to the
changed plans. As the result the battalion was landed
after only a two-hour loss of time.
The 3d Battalion was almost entirely across by
0450. With increasing vigor in a vain attempt to
halt the attackers, the enemy began firing heavier
artillery, particularly on the north shore. Lt Walter
M. Bowers was leading his machine-gun platoon from
Company "M" from the landing site past the first dike;
they were in closed formation because of the poor
visibility. A heavy enemy barrage surprised them,
killing two men and wounding nine instantly. Lt
Bowers had been struck in the neck himself, but
realizing the importance of continued support for the
initial drive, he did not stop but took his men forward
until the final objective for the day, the Division
bridgehead, had been consolidated.
Since 0300 the 1st Battalion had been assembled
at Ettroig, waiting to follow the 3d. Its members dug
themselves in while the enemy's defensive fires fell in
their area. By 0500 they were loaded on LCVPs and
storm and assault boats and began the crossing.
By that time vehicles, including a platoon of TDs,
were assembling in different areas near Ettroig prepared to cross in support of the foot troops. These had
to pass through the marshalling area, where Capt
'Thomas J. J looper maintained communication with
the engineer officer in charge of the beach. As transportation became available, Capt I looper sent supply
and personnel vehicles to the beach; in charge of the
marshalling area, he had to keep constant check
on all movement of traffic in the busy area around the
crossing site. His job became more complicated as
vehicles became more numerous, and in the night
·with drivers unfamiliar with the roads, he found it
necessary to retrieve some that became lost and lead
others along the correct route.
In sending vehicles across, a priority list was adhered to strictly. When the vehicles reached the

beach, \VOJG Percy E. Dempsey, Assistant S-4, or
WOJG Angus T. Smith, Assistant Munitions Officer, were on dutv with the beachmaster and saw that
they were loaded in order and as rapidly as possible.
fhe incoming artillery, particularly heavy during the
early hours of daylight, delayed only momentarily the
flow of supplies; the armor was held up, however,
while the Navy-operated LCMs were eagerly awaited
all morning. These had met with trouble; at 0548 it
was learned that at the site in the I 17th Infantry sector where the LCMs were being launched, much artillery was playing havoc and had scored direct hits on
three of the craft. Later direct fire delayed the LCMs,
hut three more LCVPs were reported en route upstream for the 120th's use. WO Dempsey and WO
Smith meanwhile insured the readiness of first medical, then command and artillery, and finally radio and
wire, vehicles, for the LCVPs. Priority on the LCMs
was held by the TDs.
Close behind the 3d Battalion companies landing
on the far shore was Lt John G. Gerl, Assistant Regimental S-3, who was to take over direction of the
landing points south of Mehrum. With him as he
went into action were Sgt Theodore Shayer, who organized the movements of vehicles coming and returning over the Rhine; T /4 Louis C. Smith, who followed Lt Gerl faithfullv to transmit his radio mes·
sages; and Pfc Donald A. Delancy, who, driving an
M-29 "weasel," pulled out many vehicles stuck deep
in the soggy beach ground. Lt Gerl was both policeman and intelligence section. J le had to insure the
smooth How of supplies, particularly ammunition,
to the fast-moving front lines; he also had to expedite
the speedy evacuation of wounded men and prisoners;
and he was invaluable in relaying essential information to the rear command posts. By midday on the
24th of March traffic was well-organized and fastmoving.
The most interested participant of the vast show was
Colonel Purdue. From a point of vantage close to a
dugout on the first dike, he watched each wave and
saw each well-planned detail go into effect. I le gave
quiet orders, and when some plans did not work out on
schedule, he reassured "Jim," "Mac," and "Butch,"
his battalion commanders. All pertinent information
he relayed hack to the rear CP.
Beside him, under cover of the dike embankment
about daylight were approximately seventy-five officers and men observing the progress of the attack and
awaiting orders. A sudden concentration of encmv
artillery caught them unawares; Colonel Purdue on
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top of the embankment slid partially down the side
when a shell landed within two yards of him.
Realizing that the enemy had guessed their location,
everyone hit the ground. Colonel Purdue stood unharmed and unshaken; he turned to someone beside
him: ''I'll have to do something about the enemy
shelling." Then he turned toward all the group huddled in the area. \Vith firm equanimity which established no small reassurance in the hearts of those who
heard him, he ordered them to keep dispersed. Without further ado, he turned to the business of calling
for smoke to veil the bridgehead movements and the
bridge construction which the engineer troops were
to begin at 0600.
Most unfavorable factor in the use of smoke on this
occasion was the total absence of wind. Orders were
to carry smoke pots to the opposite shore, for use there
in case additional smoke were needed.
By 0623, smoke was billowing upward; without
wind to cause it to spread, it dispersed quickly. The
thick concentrations caused anyone caught in them
to cough heavily, however, and in spots it became an
obstacle for artillery observation. An hour later many
men had become sick from it; Lt Gerl at the unloading
point was vomiting, and six of his detail had been
evacuated for nausea. Despite the illness caused by
the smoke, the Hegimental Commander ordered it
continued because it was better for a few men to be
sick than for many to risk being observed and shelled.
Under cover of this smoke, construction of a bridge
was begun at 0600 by elements of the I I 53d Engineer
Group in charge of the beach. Most of the morning
enemv artillery fire caused long delays; in the afternoon: rather than work from the near shore, the Engineers Aoated the support barges to the opposite side of
the river and worked toward the Rheinberg side. As
twilight bega.n falling, and al.I through th~ nig.ht,
enemy aircraft struck at the bndge and crossmg site._
Antiaircraft units responded with heavy volumes of
fire.
2n BATTALION: MEHRLIM
Mehrum was a small town situated snugly behind
the "winter" levee in the center of a bulge formed
by a loop in the Rhine Riv~r sout~ of Wesel. It ~as
a key point in the enemy defen~e lme, ~nd on the dike
around it was organized the defenses of the river.
Thirteen minutes after H-hour, the assault troops
from Company "F" were across the first dike. A few
minutes later the Regimental S-2 reported automatic
fire in front of them. Mortar and machine-gun fire

East bank of the Rhine near Mehrum

did not arrest the advance; Capt John M. Jacobsen of
Company "F" had organized his men speedily as they
debarked, and from a position well forward he urged
them to press the attack. They charged spiritedly over
the "winter" levee, and taking in at a glance the little
town spread out before them, they surged into the
outskirts. Miles behind them antiaircraft searchlights
were switched on, and from then on "artificial moonlight" illuminated the attack.
Close behind the riAemen came the heavy machinegun platoon from Company "H," attached to Company "F." T / 5 Harold E. Sipes and Pfc Robert R.
Reed were carrying one gun. While crossing the first
dike, Sipes was slightly wounded, but walked on without remarking about it. They were close to the second dike when they heard automatic fire from an
enemy gun ahead. They paused to note that the gun
was swinging wildly in free traverse to cut the attackers down. Almost simultaneously they spotted a shell
crater fifty yards forward and ran to it. There in the
loose dirt around the hole, they set their gun in action
and zeroed-in upon the enemy position. In a few minutes, the hostile spray had ceased.
Behind the Company "H" machine-gun platoon
came a mortar section from the same company, also
attached to Company "F." It reached the Mehrum
side of the river some time after the riflemen had
pushed forward in the attack; the mortar sergeant,
Willmer E. Sellers, had to organize his men alone,
and he led them toward the town hurriedly to catch
up. As he came over the second levee, he received
fire from an automatic weapon vvhich he was quick
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enough to spot instantly. Hastily lowering the muzzle
of his BAR, he moved ahead, aiming into the nest and
squeezing the trigger.
Without stopping, his section followed close behind. They moved in upon an emplacement where
seven Germans were crouched low, and when he
yelled, they put up their hands readily and came forward as prisoners. S/ Sgt. Sellars sent them to the
rear. Farther on, the group ran across fifteen more
enemy who were disposed of in the same manner.
Then, after halting his section, Sellars alone reconnoitered a route into Mehrum, selected a good firing
position for support of the troops already in the town,
and in a few minutes was back to lead his men to it.
Capt Jacobsen's men were penetrating into all sections of Mehrum by 0230. In phenomenally quick
time-less than an hour from the time they had
boarded the storm boats-they had taken their objective. At 0247, Company "E" was approaching the
edge of Mehrum behind Company "F," and Lt Col
Cantey, the 2d Battalion commander, called Maj McCullough to tell him things were going smoothly, that
the time was ripe for the 3d Battalion to cross. TransmittingJor Lt Col Cantey, Pfc Bernard L. Jones had
landed shortly after the assault troops, together they
had run and at times even crawled to keep close to the
action. Though Lt Col Cantey had told the radio operator that he could wait under cover when the going
was rough, Jones stuck close; shortly after 0300 he
announced the fall of Mehrum and its consolidation
by Companies "F" and "E."
THE "CAMPAIGN" OF COMPANY "G"
Isolated to some extent from the scene of the main
action, Company "G" was having numerous difficulties. It was hopelessly separated, part returned on the
storm boats to the friendly shore, part stranded on
little islands, and that portion reaching the proper destination thoroughly disorganized because of the irregular shoreline and loss of personnel.
On the enemy shore, Capt Charles W. Moncrieff,
company commander, was among those who could
not be located. Lt Arthur J. Saalfield, the executive,
was among the last to land, but he gathered as many
of his men together as possible and with approximately
thirty headed for the preplanned assembly area, near
where the "winter" levee crossed the Momm River on
the Regimental Boundary.
At some distance, a group of twenty other Company
"G" men had been landed and without platoon leader
or sergeant, both lost en route across, they milled un-

easily waiting for someone to take action. Pfc Earl A.
Otto was only a BAR man in one of the platoons, but
he knew where the company was to assemble. With
all speed, he told the twenty men to follow, and
they headed for the dike crossing.
There the two groups met, and with only fifty men
the company prepared to move against the initial objective. After serving in so vital a role, Otto reverted
to his BAR position. Now solely in charge, Lt Saalfield knew that, because of the previous delay, speed
at that moment was essential.
The first objective was northwest of Mehrum, a
bridge over the Momm River; it was labeled "Bill" on
the attack overlay. After the company of fifty men
had pushed 1500 yards, passing Mehrum on their
right, they rushed the Momm bridge by 0530.
Though opposition was negligible, there was no
indication that it would be so on all the objectives
between it and Company "G's" final goal, Schanzenberg. Since Mehrum had already fallen , Lt Saalfield
was eager to move ahead quickly. "Check Point Able
8" was a crossroads 300 yards southeast of the Momm
Bridge. Patrols found it defended, and the company
moved against it in attack formation.
T / Sgt Harry W. Boures pushed ahead toward the
crossroads and was among the first to see a machine
gun defending the key point. Firing his BAR from
the hip he rushed forward about seventy-five yards
and came upon the emplacement. In it were four
Germans, by that time quite ready to surrender. By
now the troops had closed in upon the area around the
crossroads.
The built-up section of Wurm-Gotterswick lay 400
yards to the east; Company "G" did not hesitate before
driving on to seize it. Being lightly defended, it fell
at 0550. When Lt Col Cantey, who had led his command group from Mehrum, saw that "Abner"
( Wurm-Gotterswick) had fallen, he sent for a platoon of Company "E" to occupy it, ready to move into
Schanzcnberg when it had fallen, and prepared, with
the remainder of that company, to continue the attack.
At \Vurm-Gotterswick, Capt Moncrieff joined his
company, but did not waste time to tell of his difficulty
in catching up. Lt Saalfield was cager to press on to
the company's final objective, and volunteered to take
forty of the men against Schanzcnbcrg, while ten
stayed behind with Capt Moncrieff to hold the area
till Company "E" arrived.
Schanzenberg presented more of a problem than the
first, smaller objective. It was a town of considerable
size, and for forty men, it was a hard "nut." Rifle fire
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was persistently strong as the men ducked through
the houses and forced their way down the streets. It
took almost three hours, but by 0935, Company "G's"
final objective for the day, Schanzenberg, was taken.
After Capt Moncrieff with ten men had rejoined
Lt Saalfield in Schanzenberg, they were surprised to
see approaching, individually, about ninety men from
the Company who had had many never-to-be-told experiences while lost along the Rhine shores.
LAST TIDBIT OF A BIG CHUNK: LOHNEN
Company "E" had moved up on the right beside
Company "F' following the seizure of Schanzenberg.
Later one platoon left for Wurm-Gotterswick. The
entire company followed, and when the town was
taken, moved into Schanzenberg. Company "F''
formed to follow Company "E" heading north.
At 1205 Company "E" made its initial attack.
From Schanzenberg it drove southeast into Lohnen,
largest of the towns thus far assaulted. Orchards extended on all sides of the town and made excellent
natural camouflage for direct-fire weapons; the enemy
utilized the foliage to conceal what few weapons they
had. Crossing the field several men were wounded by
machine-gun and 75mm fire from a tank.
The reserve platoon was waiting along the LD on
the eastern hedges of Schanzenberg when the attacking troops moved across the open. With that platoon,
Pfc Alfred L. Annis was carrying a light machine gun
when the enemy sprayed automatic and 75mm fire
against the attackers. He saw two men wounded by
tank fire lying helpless in the field in front of him.
After putting his machine gun where someone else
could watch it for a moment, he crawled to the men
and carried first one and then the other back to a place
of cover. Miraculously none of them were hit during
the procedure. Shortly thereafter Annis continued on
with the reserve troops into the town.
At Lohnen the enemy realized the strongest outer
line had been broken through; his secondary was not
so strong, and after a brief attempt to hold back the
tide, he withdrew. By 1330 the town was occupied
by Company "E." Companies "F" and "C" followed
Company "E" into the town, and grouped there in
houses.
East of Lohnen lay Vor<le, and through Vorde ran
a north-south railroad track, the first tracks east of the
Rhine. To press the enemy as far as possible, Company "E" sent two platoons at 1500 from. the east section of Lohnen to push forward to the railroad tracks;
by 1640 after encountering only individual isolated

Lieutenant Colonel Chris McCullough

opposition, the platoons had consolidated on the objective.
3o BATTALION: GOTTERSWICKERHAMM
. After an initial delay because of the temporary loss
of the Alligators, the 3d Battalion had crossed from
Ettroig at 0330. Companies "K" and "L" came first,
and at 0425 Division was notified that they were both
across. Companies "I" and "M" were preparing to follow.
Since Mehrum had already fallen, the 3d Battalion
did not have to pause. When the companies landed
they formed in column and, with Company "K" in
the lead, headed well-dispersed along the east side of
the levee toward the formidable defense-line stronghold of Gotterswickerhamm, where high and close to
the dike overlooking the river, the center of town
commanded all approaches.
At 0440 on the Line of Departure 500 yards west of
the objective, Maj McCullough helped organize Com-
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pany "K' and gave final instructions. It was 0520
when the company pushed forward. The enemy had
harassed its progress en route from the landing site by
sporadic artillery fire, and the opposition became
tougher as the troops ran against the town itself.
On the western outskirts protecting the road approach were antitank guns which were not disabled
until after the lead clements had entered the town.
In emplacements crucially located to cover the exposed attack route, machine guns began to open fire
against Company "K."
Pfc Austin B. Campbell saw one 150 yards in front
of him. Pitting his submachine gun against the
enemy's heavier piece, he ran toward it, firing, and
found he had cowed seven Germans; they surrendered
at once. The 1st Platoon was bottlenecked for some
time by another machine-gun nest. Calling five men
to follow him the platoon sergeant, 1 / Sgt Larry D.
Owens, circled to the flank within seventy-five yards
of the gun. From there the five men saw Owens rush
at the emplacement and, firing from the hip, jump
into the trench where the startled enemy had ceased
firing. l lis rapid shots caused three to slump down
dead; the other Germans (JUickly put their hands behind their heads-probably because one of those killed
was an officer.
Elements of Company "L" were following Company "K." Pfc Dair! L. Campbell was close enough to
the foremost troops to have some excitement. When
the antitank guns began firing rapidly from their positions near the road leading into town he was hit in
the helmet hy shrapnel which pierced the steel, but
did not scratch his head. Close to the town a barrage
forced him to hug the soil. I le heard a whistle and
then a terrifying quiver of the ground near him. He
twisted slightly to look around-a shell had landed
almost between his legs, but by good fortune, it was a
dud. His luck did not continue all morning, however,
for he was later wounded in the hand. Rejoicing that
it was not more serious, Campbell continued to fight
with his company all day.
At daylight Company "K" had just edged into Gotterswickerhamm. The enemy fought for each house
vard. At 0730 the company was being held up by a
~trongpoint on higher ground near the town's center;
a prisoner claimed that a howitzer, an automatic
weapon, and thirty to forty infantry were defending
it. Pfc Jethro \Naldron knew the technique of Hanking. He crawled and rushed alternately to a point
seventy-five yards on one side of the area so strongly
held, and fifty yards in front of any friendly troops.

Then he aimed and fired his rifle in a series of rapid
shots upon the enemy. In the enemy's confusion,
\Valdron's squad, who h<id seen him, ran against the
position and overcame it. Thirty prisoners filed from
shelter; two were officers. Behind them the squad
saw a 75mm howitzer, two machine guns, and an
antiaircraft searchlight.
Conspicuously close to the scene of action during
the attack on Gotterswickerhamm was the Battalion
Aid Station. Having landed with the riflemen, Capt
Allen C. Neiswander, the Battalion Surgeon, was
near enough to the line so that the wounded could be
administered to at once. l Ie moved into the western
outskirts of Gotterswickerhamm as soon as they were
cleared and straightened out available houses to facilitate speedy medical care. Where his Bed Cross Aag
was fastened to the hal[ destroyed gate many live
were saved.
The battle continued in the town. At 0830, Company "K" was still fighting from house to house. A
second-story-window machine-gun nest rained deadly
lead upon the soldiers in the street. Pfc George L.
Nyland stopped one, however. Two Germans were
playing havoc with some of the attacking squads
when they saw Nyland dashing toward their house.
I le had to cross one hundred yards to reach it, but
he was fast, and they could not train the gun upuu
him in time. They must have heard him stomp over
the first Aoor; before they could make a move to
escape, he was on the steps and was throwing two
grenades which landed close enough for them to know
he was in earnest. When he paused they came forward hurriedly, with their hands above their heads.
Prisoners brought word that there were several SS
men among the troops in town, and that they were
forcing a stiff defense, an iron line to be held at all
cost. In the southeast corner of Gotterswickerhamm a
pocket of resistance withstood all assault till midmorning. Maj McCullough decided to push elements
of Company "I" through Company "K." At 0837 after
the former company had taken over, it was still meeting hea\"y resistance, but the SS men were being
hard-pressed. When, shortly after, one officer was
killed , two others surrendered . \Vithin a quarter of
an hour all resistance had subsided.
The 2d Platoon of Company "I" was filing through
Gotterswickerhamm toward the eastern edge. Soldiers eyed each house with suspicion; no one could be
sure which had not been well cleaned out. During a
brief halt Pfc Louis Rosenfeld dcxlged into one,
opened a basement door and peered in. When he
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caught sight of twelve fully-armed enemy inside, he
pointed his M -1 and counted them as they sidled
guiltily out of the dark cellar passage.
A short time later when some soldiers ahead were
crossing an open area, Rosenfeld noted some chickens
stirring nervously beside a barn near by. Sensing that
they had been agitated by something, probably human, he ran forward a few steps to see six Germans
half hiding behind the barn. Though he was in an
exposed position, he yelled to them to surrender;
when they started to run, he fired a few rounds. The
Nazis turned around and gladly gave themselves up.
3n BATTALION: !VIOLLEN
Without a pause Company "L" moved out toward
an intermediate objective between Gotterswickerhamm and the next town, Mollen. It was to seize a
road junction linking an inland road with the chief
river ·road, an important location where the enemy
chose to make a stand in and around barricaded buildings. The time was 0845 when the lead elements
passed a once stylish roadhouse on the dike on the
eastern edge of Gotterswickerhamm and forged eastward over uneven ground toward the road junction.
The first opposition came in the form of machineoun fire from a position well to the west of the junction. When some of his squad were struck by the fire
T / 5 Frank B. Pelkey, Jr., sensing the enemy's location,
started for it. There was a barbed-wire fence in his
way, but with his wire cutters he clipped the strands
and, followed by his sc1uad, ran across the field beyond. Before the enemy on the machine gun knew
what had occurred, Pelkey was upon them and had
killed four inside the emplacement. The nest was
eliminated.
Squads fighting north of the road junction moved
speedily forward in their zone. Capt Edward M.
I lardy, Commanding Officer of Regimental Headquarters G->mpany, relayed a message to the Command Post. "He [Maj McCullough] went for the intermediate objective between 'Daisy' and 'Ruth,' and
took the north portion with ease." While the 2d Battalion was preparing to strike Lohnen, Company "I"
moved forward to attack Mallen ("Ruth") .
Company "K" followed the other companies and
ran across some of the enemy by-passed by the lead
elements. Not far from the road junction which Company "L" had already passed, the l st Platoon of Companv "K" was halted by enemy automatic and rifle
fire.' The foremost men in the platoon crept to within
seventy-five yards of the enemy emplacement. Four
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men tried to destroy it by rushing or creeping. All
were wounded by hand grenades thrown from the
enemy trench. Lt Thomas K. Voorhis saw the action
that followed. He told of it, "Sgt Donald J. Santella, assistant squad leader, perceiving the enemy
troops were holding up the advance, and acting entirely on his own initiative, carefully advanced about
fifty yards over open terrain to a position from which
he could effectively fire rifle grenades on the defending forces . . . vVhen Sgt Santella reached a woodpile about fifteen yards from the entrenchment he
took careful aim and fired a rifle grenade into the
trench, killing the officer in charge and wounding five
others, one of whom subsequently died of his wounds.
During the time Sgt Santella was preparing to fire the
enemy threw two hand grenades at him, neither of
which wounded him despite the fact that they were
thrown from such a short distance and at such a plain
target. Immediately after he had fired his grenade
Sgt Santella ran from his position and jumped into the
entrenchment with such speed that he succeeded in
forcing the surrender of the remainder of the enemy
force, taking ten prisoners."
Actually Company "L" met its strongest opposition
south of the road junction nearer the river, where the
Germans had prepared, in all probability, for assault
straight from the Rhine. Company "I" had pushed into
Mollen before Company "L," led by Capt Earl F. Wilson, could clean out the defenses on the west fringe.
He could see some enemy deployed in dugouts and
close to barricaded houses.
About 1400 Pfc Philip J. Vitale, of Company
"L," forced his way to a position close to one of the
houses where the enemy was struggling fanatically.
There he fired his rifle steadily at the front door,
and with a hail of bullets upon it, and shellburst
quakes close by, it fell open. With that obstacle
out of his way Vitale rushed at the house and appeared a few minutes later with six prisoners.
The advance was still going slowly when S/ Sgt
Raymond F. Lewis was hit in the shoulder within
twenty-five yards of an enemy machine-gun position.
Pressing forward, however, he called his squad to
follow; not until the objective was taken did he think
about the blood staining his shirt and return to the
medics.
The last of the enemy was fleeing to the east at
about 1450 when the southern entrance to Mollen
finally fell to Company "L." S/ Sgt Mike G. Demakos
had been foremost in the fight, and after the strongpoint had fallen, he took his squad beyond in pursuit
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of the enemy. The group kept going until it was
1000 yards in front of the company; enemy stragglers
put up no resistance, and in a short time Demakos
had taken ten prisoners. With them, the squad returned to the platoon.
Mollen had meanwhile been lightly defended.
When the attackers saw a Hight of eight Liberator
bombers dropping colored parachutes at 1313 on the
shore near Gotterswickerhamm, some must have worried that the Germans were using paratroops to drive
off the Americans. In actuality, the parachutes carried supplies for friendly parachutists north of Wesel
and had been badly aimed.
Capt Charles R. Shaw, veteran commander of Company "I," spurred his men in the speedy seizure of
l\follcn, which was in his hands by 1430. In half an
hour, Company "K" and the Battalion Command Post
were moving into Mollen; Lt Harry R. Peters, who
had distinguished himself during the attack by leading elements of Company "I" over the railroad trestle
on the west side of the town at a time when they were

hesitant to press the attack, helped organize the CP
in one of the modest Mollen farmhouses. The battalion had closed into the village area, ready for a new
attack by 1530. Company "I" reported contact with
the 79th Division on the right at 1500.
3u BATTALION: BRUCKHAUSEN
At 1415 the platoon of M-1 Os from Company "B,"
823d TD Battalion, rolled into the LCMs which had
been impatiently awaited since morning. With armor
on the way and Mollen being taken rapidly, the Regimental commander, in conference with Maj McCullough, began to plan for an exploitation of the
outer defense breakthrough. Company "I" was ordered to dispatch a patrol which would guide down
the road eastward and reconnoiter the first crossroads
from Mollcn. When the patrol had reached the
crossroads 300 yards forward they saw no signs of the
enemy and continued, still guiding on the road, to the
next key point, a railroad crossing 500 yards to the
cast. There again, no trace of defensive organization
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could be found; these facts were reported immediately. Then another patrol was sent out to investigate a
large objective farther east, "Mae," a farm-studded,
spottily wooded region named Bruckhausen. Throughout the region ran a network of country roads, many
tree-lined, and flanked by wide, green, fertile fields,
owned by well-to-do farmers of the neighborhood.
The patrol ascertained that the enemy did not hold
this area in force.
Bruckhausen lay 4000 yards east of Vorde, where
the most advanced elements on the Regimental left
flank, platoons of Company "E," were. Between
Vorde and Bruckhausen lay two objectives north of
the road patrolled by the 3d Battalion; both had been
originally scheduled to be taken first. The country
east of Vorde was open, however, and it was doubtful
that the Germans would elect to defend it strongly.
After Bruckhausen had been taken, it would be a
simple matter to mop up the area thus enveloped.
Maj Eugene H. Thomas, Regimental S-3, reported
to Division on the field phone at 1450, "The 3d
Battalion went through 'Ruth' ( Mollen). They're
planning to attack 'Mac' (Bruckhausen) and by-pass
most of the 'East Lana,' 'West and East Jean.'" In
order to exploit the breakthrough, the Hegimental
commander revised the assignment of armor; instead
of going to the 1st Battalion it was dispatched to
the 3d. A platoon of TDs and Company "B" of the
744th Light Tank Battalion arrived in Mollen about
1545. Company "K" mounted the tanks, and at 1600
the armored column moved forward over the long
route toward Bruckhausen; it was a wide sweep, a
swinging envelopment which was to take the I 20th
Infantry two to three miles ahead of any troops east
of the Rhine in that sector.
As previously reported by the patrols of Company
"I," the Germans had had no time to consolidate a
strong defense; those in the area were too surprised
even to escape. The tanks swarmed into "Mae"; the
infantry dismounted and forced the defenders from
their holes and comers. In some spots the tanks rode
astride enemy trenches and sputtered machine-gun
fire into the helpless soldiers inside.
Capt I larold P. Plummer, commanding Company
"K,'' had a right to be flushed with victory. One of
his sergeants, Donald M. McLeod, had on his own
initiative driven forward with the tanks attached to
his platoon. f laving observed close to seventy-five
enemy on the high ground 1500 yards ahead of
"Mae," he knew where to search for them, and when
he reached the area, yelling at his men to dismount
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and seize the ground, he rushed against the Germans.
Capt Plummer had meanwhile learned that T / Sgt
McLeod had led the men beyond friendly artillery
range, and had to order him b;ick. Forty-one prisoners
returned with him, and at least fifteen had been killed
or wounded.
The Bruckhausen area was consolidated by 1740;
the 3d Battalion moved in its entirety into defensive
and assembly areas there. The l 20th had taken ground
6.2 miles inland from the Rhine.
The exploitation of the remarkable breakthrough
was nearly stopped by fire of friendly artillery. At
about 1430 the Regimental Commander notified the
Division Artillery Commander not to fire in our zone
except on call because patrols were operating forward
in order to determine the extent of our breakthrough.
This information was relayed to the 79tb Division
Artillery on our right. At about 1615 the column of
Company "K," mounted upon tanks and tank destroyers, was en route to Bruckhausen. Suddenly a terrific concentration of at least four battalions of artillery
landed immediately in front of the column. Naturally
the column stopped. Colonel Purdue, who was with
the advance guard, determined the azimuth to the
friendly artillery and was in the process of radioing
that it be stopped when the fires suddenly ceased.
Seeing a Cub overhead, he had a sudden bunch that
the artillery had ceased fire only temporarily in order
to better adjust upon the column. He ordered, "Forward at top speed,'' and this order was quickly transmitted to all tanks and tank destroyers by radio. Immediately after the column cleared that area; the artillery landed where the column had been. The following foot troops were able to detour the impact area.
Fortunately the mishap caused only two casualties,
each being only slightly wounded. Information learned
later indicated that the air observer, from the division
to our right, had thought our column to be enemy.
lsT BATTALION: MOP-UP
The 1st Battalion had not played a spectacular part
in the action thus far, but had followed doggedly behind the scene of battle ready to be committed at any
moment. It crossed the river at 0500 and moved to
l\ilehrum. In a field southwest of the town the companies dug in and remained most of the day until
late afternoon. They encountered some small-arms
fire from nineteen enemy riflemen who had been bypassed by the 2d Battalion. But in a hasty mop-up
Capt Murray S. Pulver's Company "B" eliminated
them.
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Following the capture by Company "E" of the railroad tracks in Vorde, the 1st Battalion moved into
Lohnen in order to be close behind the 2d. It was
given the mission of cleaning out the area enveloped
by the 3d Battalion sweep. To expedite accomplishing
this mission, the Regimental Commander at Bruckhausen caused tanks to fire at random into the bypassed enemy area. This fire, coming from the east,
informed the enemy our troops were in his rear. Experience had proven that Germans usually quit when
partly surrounded.
At 1800, with Company "C" on the right, Company "B" on the left, the battalion moved on foot
through Vorde. Opposition was light, but at once the
prisoners began to be assembled. At 1530, 1000 yards
east of Vorde, past the railroad crossing, Company
"B'' swung to face north, in order to protect the exposed battalion and Regimental left Hank. Company
"A" pushed through beside Company "C," and together they moved into the housing area beside the
Dinslaken-\Vesel highway. It was the last high ground
before Bruckhausen, seized by 2130. Prize catches in
the advance were: 114 prisoners, three antitank
guns, a halftrack, and a Mark IV. Also overrun
were two road junctions where 500-pound bombs had
been emplaced, apparently to be used to blast away
the road; the Regiment's speed and the enemy's lack
of communications had prevented this.
Forty-seven prisoners were taken by Lt William A.
Hester of Company "C" and his platoon. The first
group of forty-one were knocked out near the railroad crossing when, after receiving small-arms fire,
Lt Hester deployed his men along the tracks and
peppered the enemy positions with BAR and rifle
bullets. After one German had been killed and five
wounded, thirty-six others were persuaded that the
fight was hopeless and surrendered. Then taking two
squads, Lt Hester headed for a group of houses one
hundred yards to his right front, and clearing them
out in the space of a few minutes, returned with six
more prisoners. The platoon was credited with two
officers in the haul.
During the night of the 24th-25th of March, the
Regimental Command Post left Rheinberg, crossed
the river for the most part in alligators and at 0215
reached a new location in Vorde. A skeleton party
was left behind until the late morning of the 25th,
when it rejoined the forward section.
lsT BATT AU ON: AUTOBAHN HILL
From the Regimental CP in the early morning of

25th of !\larch went a call requesting an air strike on
the next objective, "Helen." "Helen" was a wooded
hill overlooking, to the west, some farmhouses, each
named after its owner, Campermannshof, Rembergshof, and others; and overlooking to the east a halfcompleted autobahn, the construction of which had
been interrupted by the war. It was a part of the
Bruckhausen area, but lay 2000 yards northeast of
the section ("Mae") held by the 3d Battalion. The
air strike was on its way at daylight, and at 0745,
observing the bombing from its positions, the 3d Battalion reported that the air mission was "coming along
well."
By 0830, the lst Battalion had moved up with the
3d; Company "A" on the right and Company "B" on
the left were making final adjustments for an attack
scheduled for 0900.
Against what was reported to be an ordinary defense the doughboys drove forward under a blanket
of varied supporting fire of seven tanks, four TDs,
four 105mm assault guns, .SO-caliber machine guns
from two halftracks, and all organic weapons of the
1st and 3d Battalions. The ridge was smoked continuously for a length of one mile, and smoke covered
the exposed Hanks.
Thirteen minutes after the jump-off Lt Col Williamson reported, "Things are going along fine.
Jumped off on time. We've met small-arms resistance." When the riflemen had advanced 800 yards
from the Line of Departure, tanks with mounted infantry raced up to them and passed through to the
objective while the men on top fired BARs and machine guns. When they approached the forest a large
number of enemy seemed to surge toward them in
groups, in files, and as stray individuals, but not
counterattacking; all had their hands raised in surrender. They left few behind them to resist. By
1050, the lead companies had cut the autobahn on the
eastern extremity of the objective in two places.
During the attack T /Sgt Raymond R. J. O'Connor
of Company "A" and S/Sgt Dewey H. Harris set out
to investigate a trail which was on the battalion right
Hank close to the route of advance the troops were to
follow. The men had not gone far when, through the
trees, they spotted two Germans who, from dugin positions, could observe the movements of the
l 20th troops advancing in the open. I Tarris sank
silently to one knee and raised his BAR. The clatter
of the automatic fire was probably never heard by
the Germans; they slumped forward. Behind the
two dead Germans the men could see at a distance a
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heavy gun. They continued, however, down the trail,
passed an enemy halftrack, and ran into a shack where
they routed eight enemy from inside. As they took
another trail to head back to the company with the
prisoners, they came upon a German tracked vehicle,
a sort of "weasel," and saw from close-up the gun they
had spotted in the distance before-an 88mm piece.
It all proved that the Germans had not given up
without a try.
The attack to the autobahn was one of the 1st Battalion's few daylight attacks since the seizure of Erberich, Germany, on the 23d of November. Since Alt<lorf Lt Col Williamson's men had achieved fame as
"night attackers," and were even labeled "'Butch's'
Night Raiders." The hours of darkness had become
their favorite time of action. Colonel Purdue remarked once that though the first feeling toward attack at night is one of Fear- fear especially that the
wounded will not be located- the men who had <lone
it would rather attack at night than during daylight,
when the enemy is rarely surprised and has good visibility. The crowning triumph in attacks at night by the
lst Battalion, however, was yet to be achieved.
SOUTH BRUCKHAUSEH. HEIDE
At 1030 the 3d Battalion was following the 1st,
ready to strike its new objective, a wooded farm area
to the south also bounded on the east by the autobahn.
A group from the Battalion Ammunition and Pioneer
Platoon was busy all morning. In fact, it had been so
since the river crossing; close behind the fight at Gotterswickerhamm it had cleared of mines the vital roads
leading into the town. On the morning of the 25th
T ; Sgt Ashley H. Deaton took his men as close as 200
yards from the actual fire fight in order to clear the
roads for vehicles moving behind; when he ran across
some wounded men, he helped to evacuate them aided
by his men, Sgt Rudolph Paukoucek, Sgt Michael N.
Jacobs, T / 5 Michael N. Kloppenberg, T / 5 Keith J.
Severin, Pfc Paul G. Lane, Pfc William J. McCauley,
and Pfc Edward F. Franczewski. In some cases, they
had to give first aid. They did many jobs that morning; farther on they captured six German stragglers.
Throughout the advance of the 3d Battalion, these
men were close behind, clearing over six miles along
the wood-lined roads.
At 1210 Companies "K" on the left, and "L" on the
right, were lined on the south edge of the woods
which the l st Battalion had seized during the morning. Capt Edward 1\1. Hill, the S-3, accompanied by
Lt J Jarry Peters, S-1, and Pfc Larry Coughlin, came
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toward the troops from the vicinity of the enemy. He
had gone forward to investigate an unnamed body of
water, which he ascertained was fortunately not large
enough to hold up the attack. It was characteristic of
Capt Hill's preplanning that he took personal risk to
make sure nothing would interfere with the smooth
execution of the assault.
The companies started forward over the hilly terrain at 1215. They met little opposition and plodded
aggressively. Company "L" drove against the enemy
in a brilliant demonstration of marching fire, and
early in the attack captured an antitank gun with
prime mover, and set an ammunition truck on fire.
At 1255 Maj McCullough called Colonel Purdue
on the radio: "Curve (3d Battalion) has taken its
obiective."
"Good going!" responded the Colonel. "Now move
tw(}-thirds of your unit east of Objective 'Rose,' setting
up your defense to face to the south, southeast and
west. You should be prepared in the south and southeast part of 'Rose' for a counterattack. Your mission
is right-Rank protection for our 'Task Force Hunt'
passing through you. One platoon of TDs will be
sent to you as quickly as possible."
CLEARING THE STAATSFORST WESEL
Objective "Rose" was high, wooded ground to
the east. It lay 1500 yards from the autobahn in the
center of the woods called the Staatsforst Wesel.
"Task Force Hunt" was the 2d Battalion mounted
on the tanks of the 744th Light Tank Battalion and
two companies of TDs, 823d Battalion.
With its new mission, the 3d Battalion did not tarry
in south Bruckhauser Heide. With Companies "K"
and "L" in the lead, the battalion struck out, guiding
along a road which crossed the autobahn at right
angles, led into the woods, and rose onto high
ground. The enemy was initially little in evidence but
movement was handicapped by the terrain. Two
thousand yards east of the autobahn a trail turned
south where the main road headed northeast. The
3d Battalion wheeled to the right, striking down the
path to secure the Regimental right Rank for the
advance of the task force. The 3d Battalion troops
were 1000 yards in the lead by this time.
After turning south the troops struck the enemy's
first strongpoint. \i\lell-camouHaged in the almost
jungle-like undergrowth, a machine gun began to
rattle at the advancing squads. By this time the platoon of TDs had joined the companies, and two
M -1Os were called to the fore to blast out the nest.
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Before they moved forward, Pfc Karl G. Rosenquist,
Pfc Austin B. Campbell, and Pfc Michael Sammaciccia volunteered to accompany the armor, which was
more vulnerable than usual in the underbrush. With
bazookas they walked beside the two TDs as they
ground over the shrubbery and small trees. Though
the enemy was dug in, the 3-inch fire was enough to
tear their emplacements apart. The advance was continued.
The battalion was forced to make occasional halts
in order to bring up the tanks which had difficulty
negotiating the forest trails. Still encountering enemy
only occasionally, Company 'T' moved forward steadily. Lt John A Doyle took his platoon across an open
space and on into the woods again; an M-24 moved
into the clearing after him and with no friendly troops
visible, the tankers inside concluded the movement in
the woods opposite was by enemy forces. Lt Doyle was
acute enough to observe the tank's muzzle lowering
and being aimed. Sensing the mistake that had been
made, he ran fifty yards across open area, climbed
quickly on the hull and rapped vigorously at the tank
commander's hatch. It took only a few minutes to
explain the situation to the tankmen, but it saved
manv lives.
L~ter in the afternoon, the lead elements of Company "I" encountered an enemy strongpoint. Lt
Ervin M. Bruner did not waste time with elaborate
maneuver to overrun it. Calling for a light tank near
him to follow, he led it down a path he knew, and
pointed to the nest. Though he was exposing himself
daringly, his actions had excellent effect. With a few
rounds the enemy Position was destroyed.
At 1600 the 3d Battalion received devastating artillery fire. Among the high-explosive shells, enemy
artillerymen had mixed some incendiaries. When
one shell started a fire near the advancing troops,
one Company "I" platoon moved away from the
blaze into the trail. It had advanced some distance
before Pfc Wesley Jenkins noted that one of his pals
was left behind. Without hesitation he turned back
and retraced his steps through the woods near where
it was now burning brightly. A hundred and fifty
yards back he found the man he was searching for,
who had been overcome by the incendiary fumes.
Jenkins hoisted him as best he could upon his shoulders and carried him from the woods to the road,
where he was able to recover; that is the way a man
proves he is a real buddy. The two moved on in the
advance.
By this time the 3d Battalion CP moved to Stall-

bergshof, a farmhouse 500 yards west of the autobahn.
Supplies had a long route to come and were badly
needed. Constantly active in maintaining a steady
Aow of ammunition and food was Capt Ralph L.
Christy, the Battalion Executive Officer, who throughout the operation had been tireless in keeping contact
with adjacent units and learning and satisfying the
needs of the men on line. He was headed from the
CP to the rear to bring forward other elements of
the headquarters still behind when, halfway down a
slope, his driver swerved to the outer edge of the road
to pass an M -l 0. Simultaneously two mines were exploded; one under the M-10 did not affect even the
tracks; the other blew the back half of the jeep apart,
threw Capt Christy in the air, and wounded another man with him. As the medics carried him to the
rear in a "weasel," he died.
Capt Christy was an "old man" with the !20th.
Originally enlisted with the National Guard of his
home state, Pennsylvania, in 1939, he came to Company "B" in December 1942, following OCS. As a
platoon leader there, he went through maneuvers and
the trip overseas. On the 16th of July, 1944, he was
wounded in France. He returned on the 4th of September and was named commander of Company "C";
a month later he became a captain. On the 12th of
October he was wounded a second time, and when he
returned to the lst Battalion at Malmedy in December
he assumed duties as Company "A" commander. On
the 8th of January, after the departure of Maj Ralph
E. Kerley for the United States on rotation leave, he
was made executive of the 3d Battalion.
Rising to the occasion following his death was Capt
Paul R. Tuttle, commander of f Iead(1uartcrs Company, who on his own initiative assumed the duties ol
the executive in maintaining the supply Aow.
In the meantime the 3d Battalion was progressing
with increasing difficulty through the wooded area.
Moving forward along the road, the task force, too,
had met trouble. Because the woods gave concealment to a large number of automatic weapons, the
companies of the 3d Battalion withdrew slightly to the
main road while in the late afternoon the artillery
fired a series of concentrations on areas where the
nests seemed to be. During the sunset hours Company "K" on the left and Company "L" on the right
pushed southward down the trail again. The resistance had subsided, and the right Aank was cleared of
enemy. The battalion was then withdrawn to a
wooded area north of the main road near the trail
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junction for the night, to best protect the Regiment.
2n BATTALION : "TASK FORCE HUNT"
Before noon the Regimental Commander had sensed
a thorough breakthrough of the enemy Rhine defense;
in preparation for rapid follow-up and continued pursuit he planned a task force, to consist of: the 744th
Light Tank Battalion, Companies "B" and "A" ( the
latter newly attached) of the 823d TD Battalion, and
on the armor the infantrymen of the 2d Battalion.
Lt Col Richard J. Hunt, commander of the Light
Tank Battalion, was in charge of the force. It was to
form on the main route of advance just west of the
autobahn, move out over the road which the 3d Battalion had taken, and pass through to drive to the east
toward the town of Kirchhellen.
Lt Col Cantey readied his battalion. Company
"E's" Capt \Valter A. Wert had left for rotation leave
in the States. To replace him, Lt Col Cantey chose
the executive of Company "F," Lt George W. Terry.
At 1130, Lt Terry was given command of Company
"E" which was the lead company on the tanks. Preparation was made hastily, and as the tanks and TDs
formed along the road in the Bruckhausen area, the
men of the battalion mounted. Lt Terry climbed on
one or the lead tanks.
Immediately after the noon meal in Vorde at 1215,
the forward Regimental CP moved to Schwarzhof, a
spacious farm on the edge of a field before the high
ground ("l\ 1artha") which the 3d Battalion had taken
that morning. In the courtyard assembled the staff
and liaison vehicles; maps were spread out on jeep
tops; plans were scribbled in dusty notebooks. The
tracked vehicles rolled down the road with the doughboys perched around the turret. The tankers pulled
to the side to await word to move out.
At 1515 the lead tanks started forward from Stallbcrgshof near the autobahn. At that time the 3d Battalion had met little resistance; the move was to be
rapid . After moving 3000 yards up to the south trail
being utilized by the 3d Battalion, the tankers could
hear fire all around them. A few minutes later machine guns were being fired at them from the woods;
an enemy self-propelled gun appeared down the road .
Several deafening explosions announced the disabling
of the three lead tanks in "Task Force I lunt."
Lonv absent from the list of crack enemy units in
contac~ with Allied forces was the I 16th Panzer Division. Its commitment had been long awaited and expected. G -2 had suspected its presence i.n Holland
as final reserve. \\lhen at 1655 a pnsoner was

Machine gunners in the Staatsforst Wesel

identified as being from the 60th Regiment of the
I 16th Division, staff members realized that for a while
at least the advance would not be so rapid as expected.
Prisoners told how the division had been brought
from f lolland the day before and was preparing to
counterattack and throw back the bridgehead forces.
An air strike had caught their column, however,
and broken up the counterattack planned for that
morning. The 60th Regiment, in force, was moving
into the Staatsforst Wescl as the Task Force began
its advance; a meeting engagement was inevitable. It
was regiment pitted against regiment. The 60th, plus
elements of the l 56th Regiment, was forced on the
defensive during the head-on collision with the I 20th
Infantry and its attached tanks. Officers of the I 16th
Panzer Division believed the high ground which our
troops had just captured to be in German hands. As
the result, the meeting engagement surprised them.
Our soldiers, prepared for an immediate fight, gave
the Germans a terrible beating, though not without
cost of several good soldiers' lives.
Before the first tanks had been disabled the infantry
speedily dismounted and organized to clean out the
woods. It was difficult to see the enemy and though
the Germans had few tanks, they had much equipment prepared to throw against the attackers. Lt
Terry speeded the organization of his platoons and
had them formed into assault teams to knock out
strongpoints and enemy groups. In the confusion of
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machine-gun and heavy direct fire, enemy halhracks
could be perceived; some pulled into the shelter of the
thickets; others backed off the road into ditches.
Platoon Leader Raymond E. LcVan gave hasty
orders to his unit: he assembled some of his men in
a house down a trail in the woods. From there he observed an enemy tank, surrounded by a squad of infantrv, on the road which stretched forward and
arou~d to the right. Pfc Jack Shelton left the cover
ol' the house and ran to the trail to fire his BAR on the
infantry; he had fired only a few rounds when the
machine gun on the tank responded; he fell to the
ground wounded. Pfc Marvin B. Haley saw his
"buddy" fall and headed for him; he had to creep and
crawl to avoid the same fate as Shelton, for the tank
machine gun was still pointed in that direction. After
he had reached the wounded man he dragged him
fifty yards to the concealment of the woods and administered first aid. It was a close call for Shelton .
The enemy fought savagely, but Company "E"
fought as hard. Squads crept up upon enemy vehicles
and before nightfall had knocked out five halftracks.
Artillery was called and caught the enemy at a disadvantage; many were killed, and when a shell set the
woods afire, some were burned in the blaze. Another
round landed on an ammunition truck and exploding
shells shot wild rockets sporadically in all directions.
The Germans fell back. More prisoners gave themselves up. The commander of the lst Battalion, 60th
Regiment, was captured with his staff. Company "E"
brought in forty prisoners during the evening; as
night fell the enemy was in full retreat to the east.
Thev had lost, it was later learned, four halftracks
with multiple 20mm cannons, an ambulance, a loaded
ammunition truck, a searchlight and generator, two
75mm guns, three I OS mm field pieces, a truck, and
two tracked vehicles.
By 1900 the Regimental Commander was forced to
stop the attack because the woods on fire prevented
further advance. At sunset the road was still blocked
by an ammunition truck exploding. The 2d Battalion
took defensive positions in an oval in the western
center of the Staatsforst Wesel on objective "Rose."
COMPANY "A": LEFT FLANK PROTECTION
While the 3d Battalion protected the right Aank,
the 1st Battalion had b~en ordered to move along the
left (north) zone of the Regimental sector. Certain
crossroads and key points were to be cleared out en
route.
To perform this mission Lt Col Williamson called

upon Captain D"Amico of Company "A." In the midafternoon the latter led his unit from its area near the
autobahn to head east. Six hundred yards in front of
the company was the 3d Platoon; fifty yards ahead of
the platoon were the scouts,, Pfcs George A. Johnson
and Albert D'Onofrio. Across the steep slopes and
rough underbrush of north Bruckhauser He ide the
men guided in extended order toward the first main
crossroad near a small community called Nottenborm .
It caused a queer, deep-down feeling to advance
through no-man's land without being able to see far
ahead, and without knowing what the next step may
reveal. \iVith just that feeling, Johnson and D'Onofrio continued on the assigned route. If they thought
that by some good fortune the enemy would not be
present in that area, they were soon disappointed.
They came across a squad of Germans who ran in full
Hight at their approach, and were at too great a distance to be shot. Later the two men came upon an
enemy emplacement where the defenders refused to
run; three of them were killed and three captured by
the aggressive pair.
Down a gnarled road the 3d Platoon continued its
labored advance. Through the trees a house became
discernible, and as the lead elements reached it automatic and small-arms fire from the left cut the trees,
causing the platoon to hit the ground. Lt Jack R.
Henterlv ordered his men to make a rush for the
house a~d organized a defense there. One man, Pvt
Rosales, was killed as the squads dashed for the
building.
The house became a desperate fortress when a
counterattacking force of about a hundred Germans
was observed forming across the road only about 200
yards away. Lt Chester J. Churns called his Cannon
Company fire upon it and dispelled the immediate
danger. But at the same time a second threat consisted of numerous machine guns in and around another house 300 yards to the southeast, guns which
were cross-firing against the 3d Platoon. A machinegun section from Company "D" went into action and
with tracers set aAame the enemy's house, from which
the Germans Aed much terrified both by the fire and
also by the artillery being called upon them. The rest
of the story comes from Lt f lenterly and Captain
D'Amico:
"S/ Sgt Dale Cline then moved his squad down
the road and took up pasitions around the burning
house. S/ Sgt Trombley moved his squad one hundred yards past the burning house, but was stopped by
another strongpoint which consisted of two machine-
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gun squads and a riHe squad. Because cover was unavailable and the enemy had good observation and excellent fields of fire, the pasition became untenable.
The platoon withdrew; but later that evening the
company commander arranged for two light tanks
from the 744th Light Tank Battalion to assist another
platoon in knocking out the strongpoint. The tanks
were late in arriving; so the company decided to attack
without them and in a short time succeeded in capturing the strongpoint. With this point cleared the
mission of Company 'A' was complete. Shortly after
the company had organized at the crossroads for the
night, a patrol from the 2d Battalion made contact."
Company "C" faced north; Company "B" extended
the line farther west.
In the morning, harassed by sporadic artillery, Company "A" continued toward Museburghath and Hovelsberg. Shortly after 1300 on the 26th of March
Capt D'Amico brought his men to the ravine and
occupied the hill above it.
Afterwards, to prove the advance to the Hovelsberg
was not merely a matter of routine, Walter L. Johnson, lieutenant in Company "A," had the following
story to tell:
"The men were stretched out on both sides of the
road taking a break while I with a few other men
checked some houses about 200 yards to the south of
the road. It was about 1000 in the morning (26th)
. . . Suddenly all hell broke loose. Direct fire, artillery and mortars, hitting us all at once, quickly killed
one man and wounded eight others. Everyone was so
stunned and scared that they could only think of hitting the ground and hoping they would get through
somehow. With all this stuff coming in and everyone hugging the ground, T / Sgt Alfred E. Bollengier,
platoon sergeant ( S/ Sgt and platoon guide then)
kept his wits about him, came up the road and
got the men to fall back and bring the wounded men
with them to a point farther to the rear about 400
yards where they could get enough defilade to avoid
further casualties. Pfc Roy L. Elrod, assistant squad
leader (BAH man then ) , and Pfcs Lyse J. Ecker and
Clarence H. Wolfe, riflemen, all volunteered to help
T / Sgt Bollengier in carrying out one man who was a
litter case by putting him on a. blanket and bringing
him back 400 yards to a point of relative safety. There
was another wounded man who was unable to walk
and S/Sgt Louis R. Rizzo, platoon guide ( squad
leader then), S/ Sgt Edward R. \Veils, sc.1uad leader
(Cpl and assistant squad leader then), Pfc Cyrus !\~.
Estes, rifleman, and T / 5 Leonard Uphaus, ammum-
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tion bearer in the Headquarters Company Antitank
Platoon, but who was acting as an assistant bazooka
man attached to our platoon in this action, all acting
on their own initiative, carried this man out on a
poncho. In the meantime 2d Lt Robert M. Wallin,
platoon leader now, but who was then an excess officer, walked up from the rear of the column into the
beaten zone of the shelling to help in reorganizing the
men to assist another wounded man in walking back
450 yards."
2n BATTALION : THE STAATSFORST
At 2155 on the 26th Colonel Purdue told his battalions, 'The 2d Battalion will attack tomorrow at
0730 for Objective 'Hulda,' one company from the
south, two from the north."
"l lulda" was high ground east of the Staatsforst on
the Schmarze Heide, an open plot on both sides of
the road leading into Kirchhellen. The plan was for
Companies "G" on t~e left and "E" behind to swing
north in the thick woods and hit the enemy on the
Aank in a southward strike. On the right, meanwhile,
Company "F" was to drive cast using the Kirchhcllen
road as a guide, thus to hit the Gennans farther south
and press them on the opposite Hank.
In preparation for the morning's attack both Companies "E" and "F" dispatched patrols to reconnoiter
the respective Lines of Departure and zones of advance. The Company "F" men went forward only
one hundred yards before an enemy outpost one hundred yards west of the open ground fired upon them;
thev were forced to withdraw.
At 0100, a patrol whose members were Cpl John J.
Oglin, Pfc Walter H. Young, Pfc Robert J. McCarn,
and Pfc Richard \ i\l. Marquette, from Companv "E,"
swung northwest along the road toward Museburgshath, a road which was to serve as Line of Departure
the next day.
The patrollers guided upon the trail as they pushed
stealthily on. \,Yhen they came upon a clearing they
crept and crawled forward and, from the wood's edge,
saw a 105mm self-propelled gun with its muzzle
pointed directly down the trail. The men returned as
quietly and as quickly as possible. Artillery soon disabled the piece which could have withered our attack
in its initial stages.
Another patrol moved west through the Staatsforst
to its edge facing the bald fields of the Schmarze
I Icicle. In the distance its members heard armor moving. Without further event the patrol reparted back
to battalion headquarters at 0500. The sound of armor
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suggested heavy weapons moving into position; the
real purpose of the enemy armor was not discovered
till later.
Lt Col Cantey decided to attack an hour earlier
than planned originally, to gain additional surprise.
He received last-minute instructions from Colonel
Purdue: "'Fox' ( Company 'F') is going to the south;
their job is to slip through, not to attack any tanks
they meet. If they don't get through hy by-passing,
they won't get through at all." I-le told the 2d Battalion commander to throw a maximum of power against
the enemy defense, "as it can't be very deep."
At 0630 the 2d Battalion began its attack-maneuver. Company "F" moving south close to the Kirchhellen road made its way without hitting heavy resistance. In the first half hour it overran a Mark V tank,
already disabled, one which the night before had
slowed our advance through the woods.
At 0717, through an area touching the Regimental
boundary, Company "G" moved northeast around
the bald Hovelsberg east of Museburgshath. Close behind, Company "E" prepared to send a platoon ahead
of Company "G" to move southeast, and strike the
enemy from the rear.
Heading toward the woodline bordering the
Schmarze I leide the Company "E" platoon moving
south and Company "F" moving east had almost
joined hands by 0755. Shortly after 0800 the woods
up to the open ground Schmarze I- Ieide as far as 500
yards north of the Kirchhellen road fell to the I 20th.
After joining with Company "E," Company "F"
was given the mission of securing the road junction at
the corner of the Schmarze Heide where the Kirchhellen road emerged from the woods. The company
was to cross the road and defend against attack from
the south or east. At 0830 the 3d Platoon had maneuvered to positions along the woodline facing the
east, where it covered the advance of the lst Platoon
driving southeast toward the road junction and a lone
house standing in the open some 200 yards from the
woods.
It was when Companies "G" and "E" were consolidating, when Company "F' was close to its final objective, that the armor which had been heard so frequently in the early morning made its appearance. The German attack took the form of a task
force drive by a company of infantry and three tanks.
From Kirchhellen along the main road it struck at the
troops at the wood's edge.
While Companies "G" and "E" were at best halfprepared along the north-south trail on the edge of the

Staatsforst, Company "F' had not yet reached the
trail. As the enemy approached the air became alive
with 105mm fire and the spray of machine-gun slugs.
In particular, the lst Platoon was caught, exposed in
the advance.
In the first hail of enemy fire, the 1st Platoon leader
was killed. S/ Sgt Sam J. Javitch, who had distinguished himself in the Rhine crossing, went to the
head of the group and urged the men on to the objective. They rushed across the road and hastened to
positions facing the southeast. In order to delay or stop
the advance of the tanks, the Company "F" squads
separated the enemy infantry from them with smallarms fire.
Carrying a rifle grenade, Pvt Raymond Rottar
reached the edge of the woods and, deciding that he
did not have an adequate field of fire, made a dash
for the lone house in the plot across the trail. He
reached it safely but not unobserved. Adjusting the
grenade on the muzzle of his M I, he peered around
the comer to find his target. The German tanker was
quick, however, and one round landed squarely on the
brick beside Rottar's face; in the gallant attempt to
destroy the three tanks he was killed instantly.
The enemy had artillery support, which increased
with the approach of the enemy attackers. Not only
the woods' edges, but key crossroads and main routes
in the rear areas were hammered. Cannon Company
men sustained injuries while, in moving to a new
firing site, they were caught on the road. Shelling was
the heaviest encountered to that date in the Rhine
operation.
At I 000 Company "E" was receiving both tank and
artillery fire. S/Sgt Michael King was with the 2d
Platoon, which had been sent to reconnoiter a path for
vehicles and to make certain it was clear of mines.
Two squads were moving on either side of the road.
As they came closer to the forward elements of the
compa~y, the noise of the enemy attack became increasingly louder. All at once after they had apparently exPosed themselves in some way to one of the
enemy tanks, the platoon received several rounds of
direct. fire which ripped through the trees and exploded in the midst of the party. Men on both sides
of the trail hit the ground; more rounds crashed. Two
men near S/ Sgt King were killed; thirteen were
wounded. He began to take count of the two squads
on his side of the trail. Assuming command, he gave
hurried orders For the evacuation of the wounded and
reorganized the others so that the party continued
along the trail and Fulfilled its mission.
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Our artillery forward observer soon brought fire on
the enemy. It was a godsend to the troops when our
rounds began to fall. The tanks halted; the German
infantry was confused. After a few hours of resounding battle, during the course of which the 2d Battalion
suffered many casualties, the enemy began to slacken
his ardor. It was not, however, until afternoon that
the tanks withdrew toward Kirchhellen. When the
2d Battalion men tried to follow in pursuit, enemy
artillery pinned them down.
The 2d Battalion area had not been entirely cleared,
since the map was not accurate and failed to show as
much wooded area as actually existed. It was while
cleaning out the woods when men of the battalion began realizing the Germans had mined certain roads in
the area. Friendly tan ks exploded Teller-mines on the
mud trails. To clear these obstacles involved delay.
The road through the Staatsforst from the Regimental
Command Post was soft and with the passage of tanks
had become more and more torn and distorted. Details went to work with logs to make the road firmer,
but Colonel Purdue meanwhile ordered a rerouting
of traffic to the main highway north of the road passing the command post in order to avoid maintenance
difficulty and prolonged delay.
The forward command-post group moved over the
rutted, slashed road to a restaurant at a corner where
the mud road met the main paved highway; the rear
clements of the command post moved late that night
of the 25th to a house, Stallbergshof, on a hill close
to the autobahn.
LAST OF Tf IE STAATSFORST WESEL
Still with the mission of protecting the right Aank
of the Regimental zone of advance, the 3d Battalion
pushed forward at 0845 on the morning of the 26th.
Leading the other companies, Company "I" guided on
a path running parallel to the Kirchhellcn highway.
Along the route of advance were some trail junctions considered possible enemy strongpoints. The
enemy was lightly distributed in the sector, however,
and at 1II2 the battalion reported : "f lad some trouble
with infantry in the woods, but our artillery took care
of that."
During the advance by the 3d Battalion on the
26th, the worst aspect ·was the large number of enemy
ammunition dumps which littered the woods where
Company " I" led the way. There was ammunition of
cverv varietv, IOSmm, I 55mm, and rockets, piled
neatlv in different locations. Lt John A. Doyle, leading the foremost platoon of Company "I," noticed that
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the piles were wired for demolition, and with his men,
began breaking the wires and removing the blasting
caps from each stack as they came to it. Sometimes
the artillery had already done that for them.
There was an amazing delay when Company "I"
troops ran across elements of Company "E," l 34th Infantry, 35th Division, on the right (south) that
morning. The 35th Division company was out of its
zone, and had been sifting through close to the Kirchhellen highway.
When Company "I" drew within 300 yards of the
woods' edge, Maj McCullough committed Companies
"L" and "K" on the right of Company "I," which had
made contact with Company "F" by l 340, and took
up left Aank protection of the battalion. By 1630 the
3d Battalion had consolidated defensive positions as
far as 400 yards south of the Kirchhellen road at the
edge of the Staatsforst.
Company "I" dug in quickly, and wisely, since
the enemy began shelling the positions viciously, probably with the l 28mm antiaircraft guns later found
to be some 1000 yards forward. The men were "sweating out" the numerous artillery rounds, any of which
might hit ammunition piles throughout the woods.
Finally, late that night, the enemy hit one stack and
the resultant blast blew off the tops of some of the foxholes and wounded three men. The artillery fire continued; it was considered as unrelenting as the saturation fires which the 3d Battalion endured at Wurselen
the previous October.
lsT BATTALION : SCIIMARZE HEIDE
The heavy opposition met by the 2d Battalion at the
edge of the Staatsforst made it clear that another battalion would have to be pushed through to continue
the drive. For this assignment Colonel Purdue decided to use his 1st Battalion.
By I 340 Companies "B" and "C" were assembling
near the f lovelsherg which Company "A" had seized
shortly before. The plans for moving through the 2d
Battalion called originally for an attack at 1345; the
counterattack from Kirchhellen and the mined roads
forced its postponement until 1700.
When Companies "B" and "C" were moving into
the 2d Battalion area on the edge of the Staatsforst
they met a withering welcome. A. series of concentrations of artillery, even heavier than that which had
caught the 2d Battalion in the morning, set the trees
ringing with the whir of fragments and tore branches
and roots alike. The men were forced to the ground,
and without cover of any kind, or shelter from tree
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bursts, numerous casualties were sustained. Moving
about among his men, Lt Col Williamson was himself
wounded in the hand. Men said later that the shelling was the heaviest they had experjenced since Martain. This display of enemy strength caused the attack
to be again postponed to 2030 in order to take advantage of darkness.
The seizure of Objective "June"-the wooded
ground east of the Schmarze Heide-meant crossing
4000 yards of wide open country, vulnerable from
three sides. Though Colonel Purdue wanted to send
the battalion north through the sector of the I 17th
Infantry, which had slightly outdistanced the I 20th
when we were delayed by the forest fire, to do so and
thus to flank the enemy positions would have taken
many hours; because of the time element, a frontal
attack had to be made. With the heavy artillery still
falling, and with a mounting casualty toll and a long
difficult push to make, prospects were dark. Colonel
Purdue was admittedly more worried than he had
been at any time during the operation.
T rec bursts were still crashing in the 2d Battalion
area when Lt Col Williamson called his leaders together to outline his plans. They had to be exact; and
they had been worked out with minute care. First,
the preparatory fires were to create a real "smoke box";
in successive concentrations from a line midway to the
objective the artillery fire was to be poured before the
infantry, at the same time that the objective itself was
being heavily smoked; meanwhile on each flank the
2d and 3d Battalions' 8Imm mortars were prepared to
screen the advance with white phosphorus the entire
distance from woods to woods.
Much of the success of the attack was to hinge, however, on the plan for evading the heavy artillery which
had already wrought so much damage, and which
the enemy would doubtless employ to flail the Line of
Departure as soon as preparatory fires betrayed the
coming attack. Hence the two lead companies made
plans to run from the woods' edge, the probable artillery target, as soon as the !20th preparation began, to
an area about 500 yards forward of the woods. Company "A," meanwhile, was to remain in assembly at
the Hovelsherg, wait fifteen minutes following f 1hour, then move as quickly as possible to catch up
with Company "G."
There was increasing nuisance when the enemy
made small drives at the 2d Battalion lines in the evening before the 1st Battalion attack. At 1830 Pfc
George A. Oestreicher, of Company "l-1," from his ma-

chine-gun post in Company "F's" area, observed a tank
close to the lines; the German tanker was peering from
an open hatch and preparing to fire against the defensive troops. He closed his trap door quickly, though,
when Oestreicher began to splatter the tank with
machine-gun lire. As soon as the tank buttoned up
some riflemen maneuvered to destroy it with a bazooka
or ritle grenade but, realizing his vulnerability when
so close and without visibility, the tanker turned and
escaped toward his own lines.
Only a half hour before the scheduled attack the
enemy. threw a combat patrol of approximately twenty
men at the Regiment's lines. It struck at Company
"E's" left flank, and threatened to wedge itself between Company "E" and the I 17th Infantry. Pfcs
Russel E. Brown and Ray G. Sweet of Company "H"
stood in their emplacements and watched the enemy
come closer for some minutes. Hestraining itchy trigger fingers with difficulty, they waited till the Germans
came within 200 yards of their position; then they
sprayed the German prowlers liberally with automatic
fire. Scattering in all directions, the party was forced
to make a hasty withdrawal.
Meanwhile 'the lst Battalion companies were making final preparations, and Companies "B" and "C"
were forming close to the Line of Departure. Up until
a few hours before the jump-off the enemy continued
to lay heavy concentrations on the troops. Where
Company "B" was forming it was estimated that the
Germans were firing fifteen shells a minute into the
woods.
The guide of one of the platoons, T / Sgt William
R. Murphy, was following behind to keep the men
moving. He was still far from the edge of the woods
when he ran across eight of his men from different
squads who had become lost and did not know, in the
excitement and thick woods, what to do. Through
the still-persistent shelling, Murphy headed toward
the front of the platoon alone and, when he found
the leader, explained the situation. Still under heavy
fire he received his orders and went hack to pick up
the men, whom he placed in order for the coming
attack.
Faring no better in an adjacent area to the south
Company "C" was making last arrangements. The
radio was found useless in the thick woods. Substituting for the SCR 300 was T / Sgt Burnice T. Bahr,
a member of the headquarters group. who ran among
the platoons, allowing neither artillery nor the approaching darkness to slow him.
Up and down the Line of Departure strode ener-

MARCH

getic Lt Ernest F. Sharpe, 1st Battalion, S-2, delivering extra radios and charging the men with encouragement before their new engagement.
The 3d Battalion was making preparations to fire
supporting fire for the attack; along with the smoke
plan was a machine-gun mission to interdict the right
flank of the zone of advance.
The mortars in the meantime needed ammunition,
particularly smoke. Pfc Percy G. J. Boudreaux was
driving an M -29 "Weasel" loaded with ammunition;
with him were Pfc Levin C. Hitch and Cpl Isidore P.
Domenicone. Along the road subject to sporadic
shelling, the men continued up close to the mortar
positions. \iVhen they had stopped, a sudden shell
landing close, wounded Boudreaux seriously. Hitch
was quick to act; after placing the wounded man as
comfortably as possible in the M -29, he rode back in all
speed to the nearest aid station. Cpl Domeniconc
went forward to the mortar positions and with bearers returned to direct the unloading of the ammunition on the M -29 as soon as it had come back. So continued the drama of supply during the crucial hours
prior to the attack.
Cpl Paul C. Aldmon, gunner on a Company "C"
machine gun, crawled forward of the front lines before the attack began. He had spotted a source of
enemy automatic fire just previous to H -hour. With
the single purpose of keeping the nest quiet till the
lst Battalion overran it, Aldmon began firing against
it, and, knowing how much trouble it might otherwise
cost the battalion, neutralized it. At exactly 2030
Companies "C" and "B" began their 600-yard sprint.
They moved quickly. The enemy gunner was unable
to fire a shot before, as Aldmon planned, he was overrun.
The plan for evading artillery worked without casualty. The lead companies ran energetically for the
stretch of open ground; once caught up with the artillery concentrations they stayed close behind during the
progress to the objective. Company "A" waited; the
enemy threw a heavy hail of artillery and mortar upon
the Line of Departure and upon the supporting locations of the 3d Battalion. When the enemy fire ceased
the company hustled along the paths, and finally into
the open spaces, it dogtrotted to gain the normal interval behind Company "C."
The difficulties confronting the I st Battalion in
making this attack were stupendous. It was known
that the enemy occupied the far ( east) edge of the
Aying field and the woods on the right ( south ) . It was
believed that small groups of the enemy were in the
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woods to the left flank. Therefore, the attack presented
the problem of a movement the full length of a twomile airstrip against an entrenched enemy at the far
end, with certain enemy on one flank and probable
enemy on the other. Colonel Purdue developed an
unusual solution. Lt Col Williamson, with his usual
brilliance, perfected certain details of this solution. The
two assault rifle companies, "B" on the left and "C" on
the right, formed in close formation abreast after
running from the woods. A platoon of tank destroyers
formed in line for frontal fire while the tanks were in
column with their guns rotated for flanking fire. The
box-like formation moved straight down the center
of the flying field protected from observation by the
"U" of smoke placed upon the enemy. The tank destroyers maintained cannon and machine-gun fire into
the objective during the approach. The tanks fired
only upon enemy which disclosed themselves on the
flanks. Fortunately, the smoke kept most of the enemy
from observing our approach. Later, when the smoke
had lifted, enemy to the south Hank brought effective
fires against supply and communication vehicles moving forward to join the battalion after the objective
was seized.
The armor plan worked equally well. The tanks
and tank destroyers drove forward to the flanks of the
infantry. On the right a Company "C" officer walked
beside the lead tanks, directed the advance, coordinating the tank mission with the infantry mission.
Though Lt James L. Mosby, executive of the company, who led the armor, took the chance of being
pounded by artillery directed at the tanks, he was as
always calm and decisive. In Company "C's" zone
two groups of enemy armor were passed; the first was
unable to halt the battalion, the second was scattered
by the tank fire from the M -24s.
Several trenches of enemy infantry were overrun.
Though he had been wounded both in the arm and
leg, Pfc Elmer \V. Smith of Company "B" came upon
and captured three Germans in an entrenchment.
Later he helped search a house and produced six prisoners of war. He did not leave his squad that night,
but dug in and stood guard as usual. Later he refused
to be evacuated.
At 21 IO the 1st Battalion was halfway to the objective. Opposition had become negligible. Fifteen
minutes later the tanks were moving into the woods
and friendly artillery had been lifted. By 2135 the
battalion was upon its objective. The smoke was found
to have thoroughly baffled the enemy. Civilians stated
that when it came, the enemy relaxed, certain that it
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indicated no night attack; shortly thereafter the Germans were taken by complete surprise. The smoke on
the right Hank had, furthermore, completely blinded
the crews of four l 28mm and eight mobile 20mm
guns which did not fire into the attackers, who were
only a few hundred yards from them.
Company "B" took up a northeast defense in semicircle, while south of "B," Company "C" took positions
to cover the Kirchhellen road approximately 200 yards
on either side of it. Company "A" organized south of
the road facing southeast. Thus the lst Battalion
completed its most successful night attack. It had
seized an airfield with camouflaged railroad tracks,
two boxcars of bombs and ammunition, two 75mm
guns with halftracks, and much deserted equipment.
It had not lost a single man in the assault. It had
broken through the enemy literally "in a cloud of
smoke."
Colonel Purdue ordered Lt Col Williamson to
be evacuated following the seizure of the objective.
Although he had been wounded six times before, this
was the first time Lt Col Williamson had left the
field, and he was to be absent only thirteen days.
3n BATTALION: SCHLAGERS HEIDE

The I st Battalion had moved over the Schmarze
Heide north of the Kirchhellen road crossing the highway close to its objective. South of the road, ahead
of the 3d Battalion Staatsforst positions, lay the
Schlagers Heide, extending 4000 yards forward. At
the woods east of this ground the attack on the morning of the 27th of March was directed.
At 0600 Company "L" had formed on the right
( south) with Company "I" on the left, and keeping
as much off the open ground as Possible, both pushed
forward through the woods south of the Schlagers
Heide, with the mission of bringing the 3d Battalion
on line with the I st.
The advance of Company "I" was smooth and
quick. By 0843 the company was moving upon the
objective and had contacted, at a point about 200
vards south of Kirchhellen, the right Hank elements
~f the I st Battalion.
Company "L" on the Regimental right Hank met
considerable artillery fire, which continued through
the morning. By 1030, however, the men were up to
the east edge of the woods facing I lolthausen. During
the process of organizing a defense they were harassed
by enemy artillery. One self-propelled gun drove
close to the woods and was firing rounds into the area
when one of the lead platoons was preparing po-

sitions around a house; the men sought shelter hastily.
Perceiving the source of the disruptive fire, Pfc
Max W. Leake ran from the house to a point of vantage and fired two antitank rifle grenades in rapid
succession. I loping to move the self-propelled gun
to cover, the gunner withdrew partially; Leake had
drawn 20mm antiaircraft fire from an enemy position
at Holthausen, but he changed position and fired two
more grenades, one being white phosphorus. In a few
seconds the self-propelled piece, on fire, was enveloped in fumes and billows of smoke.
An observer with Company "L" from the 230th
Field Artillery Battalion, Lt Wayne H. Cofer, established his observation post in an obvious but strategic
house, shortly after the company had occupied its
positions. Soon the house he used was drawing fire,
too; nevertheless, before the day was over, he had
brought fire upon tanks 1500 yards to the right front
and others 800 yards to the left, some of which he had
knocked out.
At I I 00 the battalion had cleared the woods in its
area. Tn an inventory of captured equipment, a real
"take" was reported. Company "I" had seized a block
of elaborate, fixed antiaircraft installations, originally
used as protection for the airfield seized the night
before by the 1st Battalion. Near the dugout barracks were four l28mm guns, intact but for the removal of their firing pins. Twenty-three prisoners
were taken as well, with five Hakwagons, and a 20mm
gun.
2n BATTALION: IIOLTHAUSEN
At 0722 a report from the Hegimental Command
Post in the Staatsforst to the battalions said: "Another
intermediate objective added, called 'July.'" The
final objective was to have been "Sarah," the high
ground around Kirchhellcn, but with the German defenses seemingly broken, Corps decided to send
the armor through the infantry lines even before
Kircbbellen was captured.
"July" was J Iolthausen, a group of settlements 200
yards west of Kirchhellen. The 2d Battalion, which
had made the first attack in the Rhine operation, was
ordered to make the last.
It was to be a night attack, and for it, Company "K"
was attached to Lt Col Cantey's battalion. The plans
called for Company "G" to strike a settlement called
Ekamp north of the Kirchhellen road, while Company "F" took Janm
· hof an cl Company "£" capturecl
J lolthausen south of the road. Company "K" was assigned to follow the other companies and to seize a

Left: Sergeant James Maddrey examines a giant antiaircraft gun captured by Company "/." Right: Captain Charles Shaw and

Sergeant Furman Bishop inspect fire-control instruments of the German antiaircraft battery.

crossroa(Is I)etween C,ompany "G" an d Company "F ,"
and west of the other three objectives.
The Line of Departure was to be the woodline; for
Company "G" that northwest of its objective, and in
the !st Battalion area; for the others the forest edge
west of their objectives in the 3d Battalion area. In
the latter sector, Company "L" and a platoon of Company "I" cleaned out the woods up to the departure
point during the afternoon.
Two platoons of Company "A" were sent to the
edge of the woods which Company "G" was to use;
by 1400 they had secured the ground and organized
a defense along the treeline. An hour and a half
later the two platoons were disturbed by repercussions
of a blow struck farther north by enemy self-propelled
guns which crossed from north to south and threatened to move against the Company "A" platoons.
S/ Sgt Dewey l-1. Harris and Pfc Daniel W. Faacks
picked up some antitank riHe grenades and from dif~
ferent locations hammered the enemy guns. One of
them was forced to withdraw.
The frec1uent shift in annor, partially seen and
partially heard, in the area in front of his lines, caused
Lt Hoy V. Young to Fear another strike by the enemy.
Perceiving a lack of counterannor defense, he sought
a tank destroyer. Through the sporadic fire, accompanied faithfully by his radio operator, Pfc Johnny
P. Causby, he slopped through a swamp to an M -10
commanded by Lt Eugene Rohatsch, and asked him
to bring his weapan up to the line where it would
have better observation to knock out armor attacking
from the east. Though the marsh threatened to mire
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down the destroyer in a vulnerable spot, Lt Rohatsch
unhesitatingly primed his motor, raced across the
danger space safely, and pulled into position near to,
and in hearteningly close support of, the doughboys.
During this period heavy artillery had been falling
in this area, so much that Company "A" men later
painted a sign and posted it along the Kirchhellen
road: "Hot Box Corner-Courtesy of the 1st Platoon,
Company 'A,' !20th Infantry." Lt Donald C. Mills,
of the 230th Field Artillery Battalion, and his radio
operator, T / 5 Robert J. Garon, stationed themselves
to bring counterbattery on the German guns, and by
evening the fire had subsided.
The Schlagers and Schmarze Heide were two fields
which became well plowed during the course of the
day. Supplies had to be kept flowing forward, however, and among those who made Company "C" riflemen happy was Pfc Ogdin S. Sharpe, who drove his
cargo carrier, 1\1-29, containing rolls and food supplies to forward pasitions during enemy artillery barrages.
The 2d Battalion moved forward at nightfall. The
attack was called for 2100, and in imitation of the success of the night before, artillery and mortars were to
smoke the objectives and the Hanks; even Company
" K's" crossroad objective was to receive smoke from
Company "H's" mortars. A platoon of tanks and one
of tank destroyers attached to Company "G" were to
follow the infantry onto their objectives, as were a
platoon of tanks and a section of tank destroyers attached to Company "E," and the same to Company

"F."
Although the night was overcast, visibility was good

The Regiment captured a very heavy weapon in the Staatsforst Wesef

when at 2100 the four companies moved forward as
scheduled. Company "G" moved through Company
"B" and for fifty yards continued without opposition.
Then an artillery barrage landed on the attackers, and
one man was wounded. Pfc Virgil C. Boyles, medic
attached to Company "B," ran to the aid of the
wounded man even before the barrage ceased. l le
administered first aid and brought the man to safety.
The enemy had organized small defensive positions
in hedgerows around the farms which dotted the objective. I laving been fired on and sensing the location of one of the enemy strongpoints, Pfc Clifton W.
Cashion, a machine-gun S(jUad leader from Company
"I I," alone took the heavy gun, and carried it to an
advantageous spot; he placed it in position and began
to fire burst after burst against the enemy group. After
closing in upon the position, riHemen Hushed thirty
Germans from it.
Continuing forward two platoons reached the assigned objective, though there was some delay when
a third platoon was lost for a short time. Company
"F'' moved rapidly, however, and by 2210 was on its
objective despite casualties from artillery. The lst
Platoon was on the left Hank, and when it began to
veer too far north, Capt Jacobsen sent S / Sgt Lawrence J. Grogan to warn the platoon of its error and
bring it back. Grogan had to cross 500 yards, and at
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that time 20111111 fire was digging fmrows in the slopes;
he had to creep and crawl in spots but succeeded
eventually in accomplishing his mission.
After the company had reached its objective the
tanks had to be led forward, for the roads were muddy
and treacherous. Though wounded in the head by a
white phosphorus fragment, Pfc Arthur W. Fleischmann walked 500 yards to the rear, met the armor,
and brought it forward. Afterward he volunteered to
bring litter bearers from the settlement of l lase ken
to the objective, Janinhof, where some wounded men
were still waiting to be evacuated.
Company "K" had moved without opposition into
position on the crossroads by 22 lO.
Meanwhile Company "E" had jumped off on time.
Again under a newly appointed commander, since Lt
Terry had been made Battalion S-3 when Capt Joseph E. Brown was evacuated, the company was now
headed hy Lt Guy E. I logic. I le was faced with the
stiffest resistance of any of the companies, and had to
keep his men rallied during fire from heavy and light
artillery, and 20mm antiaircraft ground fire. At 2210
the company was still struggling into I Iaseken, intermediate objective before I Ialthaus. An enemy halftrack was knocked out by aggressive riflemen, hut a
Mark IV tank was holding them at bay in the driveway of a large country house. Lt J logic borrowed an
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M-1 and a riHe smoke grenade, and after firing to envelop the tank in white phosphorus fumes, took a
bazooka man to a point of vantage on the Hank of the
tank, and with two rockets disabled it.
At 2230 Lt f Iogle held the company on the intermediate objective until the friendly tanks and tank
destroyers could be brought up beside the riHemen.
Then the men drove on into Halthaus by 0300. During the fight communication between Company "E"
and Battalion was broken. In the midst of the fire
fight, Lt William P. Barenkamp, Battalion S-2, and
Pfc John Karambclsas negotiated the rough terrain
to make sure all was going well. They returned unscratched with a favorable report, indeed. Company
"E" did not suffer one casualty.
The 2d Battalion had seized all its assigned objectives by 0100, but for a few houses in Company
"G's" area. Shortly after 0415 the troops near Ekamp
were settled, and positions consolidated.
THE 8n1 AHMORED PASSES TllllOUGH
The enemy became quieter following the seizure of
the 2d Battalion objectives. Suddenly about 0530,
tanks were heard to the left front of the lines; in the
distance riHemen could see movement of vehicles,
and hurric.,'Clly the field artillery observer called for
fires. Pfc James D. Ray, of Company "H," had a
hunch the armor was not the enemy's. Jumping from
his hole, he ran to a position of better observation,
and though he thus exposed himself, was able to see
the markings on the vehicles; they were American.
He rushed back in time to stop the fire about to be
brought on friendly troops. It merited a celebration to
know American soldiers had gone that far.
The 8th Armored Division had crossed the Rhine
on the 26th of March and crowded the roads behind
the I 20th, ready to push through on order. The night
of the 27th-28th, tanks of that unit lined the roads and
filled wooded assembly areas beside the way. At 0600
they were to head eastward through Kirchhellen toward Central C':>ermany.
The armor rolled forward on schedule. Past the 2d
Battalion, long columns passed down the highways.
In the vicinity of l Ialthaus, Company "E" men
watched two lines of armor pass on either side of
them, till they merged into one on a third road leading through Kirchhellen. Between the men and the
road junction was approximately 500 yards of downsloping ground. From this area at first insignificant
rifle shots began to be received at about 0730. The soldiers paid little attention until one of them was hit.

Warrant Officer Al Hooper made good use of a captured
generator

Bealizing that some enemy were still holding positions before Kirchhellen even though the tanks were
passing on three sides, S/Sgt David C. Shepherd,
mortar observer for Company "H," decided to try to
eliminate the tiny pocket. Making hasty plans for a
coordinated attack, Shepherd discussed how best to
assault the enemy with Sgt Charles D. Lamb, who
drove a tank in Company "C," 744th Light Tank Battalion, and with T / Sgt Michael King and Pfc David
Owens, of Company "E." It was decided that the tank
would move forward after a mortar preparation on the
area, and accompanied by two infantrymen as protection, would mop up the resistance. These plans were
carried out without a slip. Shepherd timed the barrage perfectly, to cease just previous to the tank's assault. Lamb drove astride the enemy trenches, firing
steadily. King and Owens brought back twenty-seven
prisoners, and reported the "pocket" successfully
mopped up. A few hours later the l 20th Infantry
was no longer in contact with enemy forces.
PAUSE AFTEH THE BREAKTHROUGH
One day after the 8th Am1ored had passed through
the I 20th lines, the battalions withdrew from their
defensive positions and the men were billeted in
houses in the I lolthausen area. The 1st sent two companies into Kirchhellen; the 2d occupied the Janinhof
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area; the 3d remained in the dugout barracks on the
Schlagers Heide; and the Regimental Command Post
combined rear and forward in a farmhouse at Ekamp
on the 30th of March.
The troops cleaned billets, underwent foot inspections, and rested following the fatiguing operation.
On the 28th it was believed by higher headquarters that the Regiment would follow the 8th Armored;
the following day plans were formulated for movement on a four-hour alert. Also reaching headquarters
of the Regiment was notification that the 30th Infan-

try Division was now in the XIX Corps, in reserve.
Trucks were made available to the Regiment on the
31st of March, and boundaries for a move to the east
were revealed. All vehicles were to be supplied with
enough gas for 350 miles; final word was that the
30th Division reinforced and motorized had to be prepared to move on 12-hour notice.
Thus, with a fight of l 7t2 miles from the Rhine
behind us, and a long drive toward Berlin ahead, the
month of March ended in high optimism. After so
many months of war, German defeat was in sight.

APRIL
for the first day of April the following is an extract
from the After-Action report of the I 20th Infantry:
"The last two days of March had seen rapid advance by the 8th and 2d Armored Divisions from the
area around Kirchhellen, where the I 20th Infantry
had taken its last objectives on the 28th of March.
Plans were formulated for the 30th Division to move
behind the 2d Armored, eliminating pockets of resistance which the armor had by-passed. The general
sector of advance for the Division was to be contained
in: the southern boundary extending approximately
in a straight line through Dortmund, south of Soest,
Paderborn, Magdeburg, and finally Berlin, and the
north boundary, extending a few miles north of Munster, Hannover, Neurupen, and Berlin. The Division
was to be motorized.
"On 1 April, the Hegiment was located in the f lolthausen-Kirchhellen area; the Command Post was situated in the farmhouse at Ekamp. After morning prepparations had been made for the 'blitz' movement in
the wake of the armor, lead vehicles of the Regiment
passed the Division Initial Point at 1320; entirely
motorized, the remainder of the I 20th Combat Team
followed.
"In order, 1st, 2d, 3d Battalion, followed by Antitank Company, 230th Field Artillery Battalion, Cannon Company, Company "C" of the 105th Medical
Battalion, Company "B" of the 823d Tank Destroyer
Battalion, and Service Company, the Combat T earn
sped over the outskirts of the Ruhr Valley to the roll
ing terrain of central Germany.
"The convoy's route was through Wulfen, l laltern
( so close to the Ruhr industrial pocket that it was in
constant threat of shelling) , Dulmen, and Ludinghausen, to a dispersal point at Ascheburg.
"By 1820 the Regimental Command Post was established with the 3d Battalion at Drensteinfurt, with
the lst and 2d Battalions in the vicinity of Rinkerode.
This new blitz movement brought memories to oldtimers of the dash across France from Domfront into
Belgium. In the rush only essentials could be carried,
and even when CPs moved into spacious farmhouses
and mansions, the majority of equipment was left
packed on jeeps and trailers.
It was no longer a matter of pushing the enemy
foot by foot hut rather of keeping close upon his
heels. The 2d Armored ahead of our Regiment had
occasional contacts with scattered groups of enemy
forces, but its main effort was to keep a hot breath
upon the necks of the retreating Germans. When the

armor met any strong pocket, the 30th Division was
close behind ready to attack and reduce it.
For the men who were mounted on trucks and
driving the Regimental vehicles, for the doughboys
who were riding through enemy land-not walking
and fighting- for every soldier who watched the
roads stretching miles and miles ahead through tiny
villagas, over fertile fields and through green thickets
- without a Main Line of Resistance, a Line of Departure, or a no-man's land in sight-it was a thrilling
experience. Still it had its uncertainties. No one
knew when a peaceful woodline might tum into
a bristling strongpoint, or that a blown bridge might
indicate a Nazi "fight-to-the-last-man" position.
The 662d Quartermaster Truck Company helped
to carry the three battalions up to the Drensteinfurt
area. One member of that outfit, who had driven
some of the 1st Battalion men, was Negro Pfc Ned
Austin. He must have experienced some uncertainty
as regards "last-ditch" pockets when, in need of a new
tire for his truck, he headed from Rinkerode for Service Company the morning of the 2d of April. He had
been speeding down the road for some time when all
at once he noticed that he was headed straight for a
bridge which had been blown; as he slowed down
thirty-five yards in front of it, he began receiving
small-arms fire. Two men were in the truck with him.
and none lost any time ducking to cover along the
ditches beside the road.
Austin had a carbine and began firing. Then one
of the men, a cook, was hit and needed immediate
first aid. Propping him against his shoulders, Austin
half pulled, half lifted the wounded man away from
the bridge site. They had gone only about fifty yards
when they received more fire, this time from a house
at some distance from the road ahead of them. Believing they were entirely and hopelessly surrounded,
the cook wanted to surrender. Unwilling to accept
his companion's suggestion and taking instead a new
direction far to the left of the house, Austin struggled
over the fields determined to reach an American installation. He had sensed the right direction, for not
far away they found an aid station, and the wounded
man was tended to. The third man had meanwhile
been wounded, but taking a new route of his own,
he found a friendly unit and was saved. The road
Austin traversed was actuallv one which led, not to
Service Company, but to tl~e city of Munster, still
held by the Germans, and he had been south of it only
four miles. Later during that morning a roadblock
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was established to prevent similar cases of ambush.
At noon on the same day the Regiment continued
forward. In order, 1st, 3d, 2d Battalions, the convoy
sped along a route through Sendenhorst and Vorhelm;
and over one of Hitler's German projects-a smooth,
well landscaped autobahn-until after it passed Wiederbruck . Then turning right (southeast) it halted in
the area around Verl, where all units moved into billets.
The outskirts of the Ruhr Valley were beautiful,
particularly to soldiers whose eyes had become accustomed to devastation and destruction. Peaceful and
busy towns were a welcome relief after sights like
Krauthausen and Kirchherten, Mehrum and Mollen.
The green fields and woods were a source of joy to
the men who were used to seeing the fields near
Niederzier and Kirchhellen and to seeing woods such
as the Pierer Wald and the Staatsforst Wesel.
And for the first time increasingly large numbers
of liberated workers and foreign prisoners began to
Row down the roads where the Regiment advanced.
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Some walked with heavy packs and sweating brow;
others sat inside or walked beside nag-towed carts,
and had perhaps fixed a Hag of their country- France,
f lolland, or Belgium-to the crossbeams of the wagon.
Some smiled or waved appreciatively at the soldiers,
others were taking "breaks" sprawled beneath the
shade of the tree, and, tired after years of forced
labor, did not bother to look.
Headed by Capt Albert C. Gerould and Lt Adolph
Steiner, the IPW Team took no "breaks." With endless columns of suspected enemy to interrogate, it
remained busy far into the night, questioning all varieties of troops-mostly stragglers- from } Jome Guard
units and signal branches, men on sick leave and in
labor camps.
TELITOBERCEH WALD
The 2d Armored was moving rapidly ahead. Formed
into different combat commands, each made up of an
armored regiment and attachments, it moved along
different routes. I Ialting only on occasion to blast
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momentarily at some sniper's nest or building-strongpoint, the columns were rarely held up.
Guerrilla troops can defeat and destroy invaders
when the latter drive too far inland and away from the
protection of organized bases. That is what the
Homan armies in 9AD discovered when they thought
they had conquered the "Barbarian" land of a German tribe ruled by a chief named I Iermann. The "civilized" Romans had already seized most of the land
in western Germany, from Dusseldorf to Augustdorf. They had stationed an occupation army there,
but the German tribe lured the whole Homan army
to the grounds west of the Teutoberger Wald. There
in the forests, the Romans were badly beaten at
the hands of f Iermann and his boys on the high
ground.
It was in the dense forest which covers this ridge
that Combat Command "A" of the 2d Armored Division struck a real snag on the 3d of April. The roads
crossed the ridge at places where there were gaps, and
since these were narrow, they were, of course, easily
defended. Along the road which leads from a village
called Augustdorf, over the ridge into the rich towns
of Hiddesen and Detmold, a column of tanks was
halted by a roadblock and this time it was no easy
task to blast out the defenders; they were well-camouAaged in the woods and they had an advantage over
the tanks which were canalized on the roads. Unable
to see a target, and totally incapable of maneuver, the
armor of Combat Command "A" was stymied. It withdrew and called upon the infantry. Colonel Purdue
was notified.
lsT BATTALION: AMBUSH
It was noon when Colonel Purdue learned that the
German stand was serious enough to demand real
concentration from the infantry. The roadblock which
had stopped the 2d Armored tanks was located in one
of the highest and widest sections of the Teutoberger
Wald; it was the spot which proud Germans had selected for a monument to the invincible Hermann.
The advance elements of Combat Command "A" said
they had been opposed strongly at a point almost into
fliddesen on the east side of the ridge. Apparently
organized in a reverse slope defense, the enemy was
estimated to have at least a regiment pitted against the
American advance over the Wald at that point.
Back in V crl, the I st Battalion was alerted at once;
shortly after the noon meal it was on its way in Quartermaster trucks to the village of Augustdorf.
\Nhen Capt Delmont K. Byrn, acting battalion
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commander, arrived, Colonel Purdue had established
a forward Command Post along with some officers of
the 2d Armored in a chateau at the western base of
the ridge. Here it was decided to place the battalion
in defense for the night, in a semicircle which halfsurrounded Hiddesen, the town on the east slopes.
Company "B" would hold the left flank to a tip of
high ground on the left ( north) side of the Hiddesen
road, while Company "C" would take the right flank
to an eastern tip on a knoll due east of the town.
Company "A" was to round out the defense in the
rear of Companies "B" and "C." The troops were notified and prepared to take up the half-moon defenses
with drawn-back center, pivoted on the Augustdorff Iiddesen road. In the late afternoon Company "B"
was almost into position; Company "C" was heading
through the brush toward the assigned Rank.
Lt William A. Hester led the foremost platoon of
Company "C" in attack formation as it pushed
through the undergrowth of the Berlebek Forest, part
of the Teutoberger Wald. Of the action he tells :
"We were heading north, probing for the enemy
which we knew was somewhere near. . . . At 1700

The Teutoberger Wald

It was a real ambush, for the positions held by the
as we were descending the opposite slope of the hill,
and when we had emerged from the tall trees into a enemy never had been suspected by the armor which
dense, bushy area, mostly small evergreen trees, we had halted only briefly in this area. \Vhile informawere suddenly fired upon by enemy rifles, machine tion of the situation was being relayed to the rear the
guns, and panzerfaust. Our position was unusual in Company "C" platoon was in a critical situation, and
that we were on higher ground than the Germans who some of the desperation is apparent in the tale ol
had dug-in positions below us about 50 to 75 yards heroes which Lt I lester tells:
"S/Sgt Norman E. Skiver, a light-machine-gun secaway along the highway, as well as on high ground
to the north of the road, yet we were at disadvantage tion sergeant, called for the machine guns immediate
since we could not observe their positions through the ly. Pfc Glenn \\1. Pierson, although he was well
dense foliage. On the other hand, the Germans could aware of the intensity of the enemy fire and could
fire effectively at us simply by shooting into the shrub- see the men dropping around him, .did not hesit<lte
bery where movement was discerned, knowing Full to advance forward through the brush, which was
well that we had no cover to avoid being hit."
about fifteen yards in depth, in an effort to reach a
In the first half hour the going was tough. "The cleared area where he could bring observed machineenemy fire was so effective and our positions so ex- gun fire to hear. Just as he reached the edge of the
posed that we lost fourteen men in the ensuing thirty bushy area and stepped into the clearing, however,
minutes of action. Two were killed and twelve wound- he was killed by riAc shots through the head and chest.
ed. To disengage ourselves we needed covering fire I le fell about seven yards to the rear of S/Sgt Skiver
badly."
who had moved ahead to select a firing rosition .
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"The fire which had killed Pfc Pierson forced Pfc
Joseph P. Linehan, assistant gunner, to hit the ground
among the bushes and trees. Seeing that the gunner
was killed, however, he got to his feet, dashed through
the enemy fire to the gun and made an effort to put
it into action. Before he could do so, he was shot
through the neck and shoulder.
"Sgt Paul Pudelka, squad leader, who had been at
the head of his squad and who had observed the courageous action of the men behind him, crawled back
to the gun some ten yards and successfully set the
weapon up for action. When he fired a few bursts,
though, a bullet knocked his helmet off. I thought he
was dead, but aside from being momentarily stunned
he was unharmed. Despite the fact that the bullets
continued to zip around him Sgt Pudelka held his position by the gun and operated it aggressively until we
could get out our troops."
Meanwhile, Lt Hester rehtes, Sgt Skiver went back
to secure his second machine-gun squad, because he
thought Sgt Pudelka had been killed. \\'hen he
reached the shell hole where the 2<l Squad had been,
he saw two more wounded, Pfc Walton L. Deyette,
hit in the leg, and Sgt Bernard L. Beesley, who had
gone to rescue him, only to be hit himself. Realizing
that the latter was more seriously hurt, S/ Sgt Skiver
carried him to a pile of logs and gave him first aid.
Immediately after the action began S/Sgt Cecil J.
Snow and S / Sgt Cecil N. Permenter, twenty-five
yards to the rear, had deployed their squads and set up
a cover of fire which along with the light machine gun
helped cool the enemy's enthusiasm.
Lt Hester continued: "!'dost men had only one idea,
for which I cannot blame them, and that was to get
hack to the rear somewhere as c1uickly as possible and
some decent cover. I Iowever, I know six men who
out oF consideration for their fallen comrades risked
their chances of getting out unhurt to bring the
wounded out. S/Sgt John 1\1. Tharp, Jr., squad leader,
saw T / Sgt Yost fall. Yost didn't know that he was
dead . . . crawled ten yards through open ground in
an effort to reach T /Sgt Yost, only to be wounded as
a result. S/ Sgt Harold A. Gilley, sc1uad leader, stayed
to help with the wounded, and he, too, was shot
through both legs. Pfc George W. I Ianum, Sgt James
P. Maher . . . each got one of the wounded men and
assisted him in crawling fifty yards to cover. . . . "
Lt I lester told how his runner, Pfc Glenwood Ilerbert, had constantly exposed himself in an effort to
contact his leader and to carry word to secure help
or hring information where it was needed.
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Word of the conHict had reached the battalion commander in the meantime, and as quickly as possible
a platoon from Company "A" was sent to give support
to the company which had been trapped in an area
reportedly not occupied by enemy. It was decided
that Company "C" should withdraw, and that, rather
than a semicircle with tips farthest to the east, the
night's defensive positions should be an oval on the
reverse west slope of the ridge. The platoon from Company "A" moved up on the left rear of Company "C"
and dispersed to give a strong base of fire.
It became apparent that, while the enemy had no
artillery, he was using an improvised substitute. Holding panzerfaust in defilade and at a high angle like
a mortar, the Germans fired them singly and in battery. Apparently well supplied, the enemy hardly
paused between shots, and with the panzerfaust, automatic weapons and small arms, effected an almost impossible barrier in the wooded ridge-gap.
The Company "A" platoon suffered three casualties
before it could establish a volume of fire heavy enough
to permit the complete withdrawal of Company "C."
By 1820, however, the companies were once again
organized and had formed defensive lines as planned
around the Hiddesen highway on the reverse slope.
With Cannon Company attached, the 230th Field
Artillery Battalion had dug in near the chateau-lodge
at the ridge-base, ready to support the infantry's Main
Line of Resistance. Another platoon of Company "A"
had been dispatched earlier to probo enemy defenses
in another gap southeast of the main road, and to
investigate the hill farther south where the monument
to Chief t lermann stood. Nine men led the platoon
working its way forward on the right (southeast) of
Company "C." At about 1700 a burst of machine-gun
fire from their right told them that the enemy was
close and had spotted their advance. At that moment
the nine.men leading had gone forw~rd into high grass
ahead of the others who were on higher ground and
working through a thick woods. They had not yet
reached the bottom of the gap, and the enemy was obviously firing from across the draw at the lead men
in the high grass, since those in the woods were still
concealed by the foliage. HiHe fire began cracking,
and after three men had been wounded, all nine had
hit the damp ground and were seeking cover.
Pfc Robert I I. Burkhardt could sec three German
riflemen at a distance of seventy yards bringing enfilade fire upon his buddies. From his prone position
with a perfect sight upon them, he began to fire steadily at them. While he was diverting the enemy, the
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other men in his group crawled back to the concealment of the woods and to safety. Healizing the hopelessness of trying to continue forward, the platoon
sought permission to withdraw, and it was granted.
Meanwhile two machine guns on his left and to his
front began concentrating on Burkhardt's position.
He continued to fire. A few seconds later he was killed
by a burst. Pfc Burkhardt's self-sacrifice enabled his
comrades to crawl to safety. "He gave his life in order
that others might live." I le was a brave man.
As the afternoon wore on the German lines became
more clearly defined, and soon it was evident that the
area around Detmold was not part of a long defense
line, but merely a strong pocket; on both sides the
armor had pushed through with only minimum harassment.
In the evening a letter of instruction from Division
outlined the objectives for an attack to clean out the
pocket. While elements of the 2d Armored Division
swung around the Hanks to encircle the area, the I 20th
Hegiment was to seize the highway gap through the
ridge, the high Monument Hill, the rich residential
town of I-liddesen, and the city of Detmold beyond.
Monument Hill was to he taken first, and from it Hiddesen was to be attacked, while the highway where
the roadblock had easy observation an all attackers
was to be mopped up later. Due to the previous fast
movements we had run out of maps. This made maneuver and coordination difficult. Higher commanders
and staff members often led small units.

lsr BATTALION: MONLl !\'IENT HILL
Lt Ernest F. Sharpe, 1st Battalion S-2, was with the
lead elements, men of a platoon from Company "B,"
when they started south along the Hiddesen highway
at 0730 on the morning of the 4th of April. With the
remainder of Company "B" close behind, and Company "A" following in the right rear, the troops were
headed south from Hiddesen to reach a road leading
eastward which would take them to a Line of Departure due south of Monument Hill. As planned,
the companies turned left ( east) near the chateaulodge ( Lopshorn ) , and started along the road through
the woods. After a few hundred yards the road dwindled till it became a small, unnegotiable fire break.
Heading the battalion, Lt Sharpe decided to take
another road which led partially up the slope of a
hill next to Monument Hill on the west. Though it
was named Bietstcin, the men called it "Hill 393."
The new path was a big improvement, and the troops
were going quickly toward the LD, when near the

crest of "Hill 393" some men spied enemy movement.
Healizing that to reach Monument Hill this ground
would have to be seized, Lt Sharpe and Capt Murray
S. Pulver, commanding Company "B," called another
platoon up on the line with the first. At 0800 both
surged over the hill; the enemy did little resisting, and
approximately a platoon was captured.
From the top of "I I ill 393," Company "B" men
could see the low ground between it and Monument
Hill. Almost at the bottom of the draw was a poor,
secondary road leading into I Iiddesen; beside it were
a Few shacks. While Company "A" was moving up on
the right alongside Company "B" in preparation for
an attack across the low road and up toward the monument, enemy movement was spotted near the houses.
There was an uneasy shifting of positions, and the
companies saw several men dart from cover and start
up the sides of "Hill 393." It looked for a few moments
as though they were dashing to the American lines
to surrender, but suddenly they ducked aside, one by
one, seeking cover along the woodland crevices and
leafy underbrush.
At 1100 the attack toward Monument I I ill began
and the assault platoons descended toward the road.
They met almost no resistance; the prisoners taken
in rapid succession said they had tried to surrender, but
that their SS officer had called to them as they made
their way toward the Americans that he would shoot
them if they did not remain to fight. With characteristic obedience the Germans had remained. At that
point, while the prisoners were still talking, from a
wooded section of the draw extending away from I-liddesen strong automatic fire began to splatter against
the trees. The two companies called for Company
"D's" mortar fire.
The mortars of Company "l)'' were not themselves
free of troubles. Emplaced a few hundred yards west
of the I-liddesen highway, they were so close to the
lines that infiltrating enemy did not have far to go
to reach them. At l 030 some Germans had been
seen on the outskirts of the wo<x.ls around the emplacements, and Lt Glen L. Hohinson, a section leader of
the platoon, asked for volunteers to clean out the
woods around them, thus to prevent harassing small
arms and possibly bazooka or grenade damage to the
weapons. S/ Sgts William T. Blackburn and Wilfred
R. Doiron, section sergeants, S/ Sgt Joseph F. Perry,
squad leader, and Pfc Frank Carillo, ammunition
hearer, agreed to go with him, and they headed toward where they had seen the Germans lurking among
the trees. Continuing along the ridge, Lt Hobinson

On tanks into Hiddesen

sent some of the group into a draw beside it. Some
of the men saw two Germans running and wounded
both; later two more were surprised and taken at different places. One or two escaped toward the German lines.
With their Hanks free of enemy, the mortarmen of
Company "D" were ready to fire when the call came.
They dropped round after round into the enemy
machine guns at the head of the draw, and soon the
German weapons were silent.
From the road toward the monument, the attack
now began its second phase. Company "A" on the right
had moved only a short distance when it was assailed
by small arms from the area where the automatic
fire had originated. After retreating to more covered
positions during the mortar barrage, enemy troops had
started to fire again, this time with only rifles.
- Company "A" had to halt and swing one platoon to
the right to knock out the resistance. Meanwhile Company "B" continued toward the hillcrest, unopposed
until close to the top, when the enemy began a riHe-fire
resistance. Employing marching fire, barrages of riHe
grenades fired from the hip, Company "B" swept
over the crest and by 1230 had cleaned out the area.
As soon as Company "A" had put an end to the
Hank opposition, it moved up on the right and with
Company "B" organized a perimeter defense of the
hill.
Captured were more than fifty prisoners, as well as
the massive l Iermannsdenkmals, a statue and pavilion
commemorating the famous action where the Germans had driven out the Italians, unfaithful allies of
a more recent date.
3n BATTALION: IIIDDESEN
The two remaining objectives were Hiddesen and

Detmold. The 2d and 3d Battalions had mounted
trucks near Ver! at 0724 on the 4th of April and were
carried to assembly areas south and southwest of the
Chateau Lopshorn. By 0915 the troops were unloaded
and organized; the Regimental Command Post was
established in Augustdorf.
Maj McCullough took his battalion at 1132 to a
forward area in the draw, west of "Hill 393," in anticipation of the attack upon Hiddesen which he was
to take. As soon as the 1st Battalion had secured the
monument, he led his troops to the edge of the woods
southwest of Hiddesen and north of "Hill 393," from
where he could look into the open upon the bright
homes and well-tended fields. Company "I" was on
the right, Company "L" on the left, while Company
"K" followed Company "I."
The jump-off was at 1345, and it looked at the beginning as though it would be a difficult and lengthy
battle. Panzerfaust were plentiful again, and automatic and small-arms fire was heavy. Then it appeared
that while some key points were defended fanatically,
others were easily overrun, and the men there were
poor, desperately-chosen soldiers, tired and almost useless. Thus the line around the town was severed in
many places; the weak links gave away.
In Company "I's" zone Pvt William H. Lewis had
not been daunted by the initial outburst and marched
with detennination toward one of the fanatical outposts. It responded with a heavy volume; he had
closed in to within fifty yards when he was killed.
He had, however, successfully distracted the infuriated troops inside, and the remainder of the company
had broken through the outer defenses and moved
in to take the outpost.
Once the outer line had been decisively broken
through, resistance seemed to crumble. Company "L"
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surged down the streets on the left (north) side of
the town, Company "I" was meanwhile circling to
join it; by 1645 a perimeter defense had been established.
The enemy was still roaming over the wooded areas
and a few snipers were still standing post when Lt
Don W. Soper, antitank officer of the 1st Battalion,
moved with some of his men down the slopes from
Monument Hill toward Hiddesen. He was patrolling
a territory which had not yet been cleaned out, and
accordingly he was cautious.
Antitank men are not ordinarily assigned to patrol
duties, but the 1st Battalion was preparing to move
into Hiddesen behind the 3d, and it was essential to
know when the town was cleared and what route was
the best to use. At the moment there were no riflemen available for the mission, and rising to the emergency, Lt Soper had organized from his platoon a group
consisting of T /5 Michael C. Prisco, Pfc Roy C.
Johnk, Pfc Joseph N. Picazio, Pfc Carleton E. Summers, Pfc Ben L. Cloft, Pfc Donald D. Darwin, and
Pfc Michael P. Sackawicz.
They went about one hundred yards west and one
hundred yards north for the most part through woods,
and had just reached open ground when Lt Soper
saw a ligh~ing glint, as of glasses, and twenty yards
away spotted four enemy soldiers who had not yet
seen him. He had borrowed a handy BAR; without
losing a second, he emptied a clip. The men with him
fired too. They killed three men, but having seen
some others escape, Lt Soper communicated with the
Battalion Executive Officer who ordered him to return, to avoid walking into an ambush; at 1430, after
procuring a tank from the 743d Tank Battalion, the
patrol continued into I-Iiddesen.
Upon reaching the first house, the inexperienced
patrol fired into it, and then Darwin and Sackawicz
rushed in, accompanied by yelling from the others.
When the men went toward a second house they
saw three Germans running to it from the opposite direction. Johnk and Picazio fired on them,
wounding one and killing another. The third German
grabbed the wounded and together they reached the
shelter of the building where the two antitankers
rushed in upon them and took them prisoners. At the
next house Lt Soper contacted the 3d Battalion and arrangements for the 1st Battalion movement were completed. It was all a new experience for the antitank
men, but it had been highly successful.
The 3d Battalion had captured eighty-six prisoners.
Its new mission was to be prepared to help the 2d Bat-

talion, already assembling in Hiddesen, to take the
prosperous city of Detmold.
2o BATTALION: DETMOLD
At 1800 the 2d Battalion was making final preparations, but the attack did not begin till three-quarters
of an hour later. It was a risky assignment for Lt Col
Cantey's men. Detmold was supposed to be the heart
of the resistance area, and the route of attack was of
necessity over an open slope under perfect observation.
Company "E" guided astride a secondary but direct
road across the green fields, while Company "F" on
the left (west and north) swung wide, touching the
outskirts of the village of f leidcnoldendorf, then
sweeping down beside Company "E" into the city.
From the exposed ground the expanse of buildings
in the valley looked formidable. Actually the troops
met nothing; the battalion moved quickly into town.
There was danger in being lost in it, for it was too
large for a battalion to handle. From civilians it was
later learned that the enemy had abandoned plans to
defend it because of the large number of hospitals
there. On the eastern outskirts a few snipers potshotted at the squads sifting down the streets. They
were quickly silenced. A defense oF roadblocks around
the center of the city was established, but Lt Col
Cantey called plaintively over the phone, "It's too
large for a battalion."
And indeed the town contained more than hospitals. The next day investigation proved that around
the city were a modern airfield, a motor pool containing many vehicles, an ordnance depot, a small-arms
supply point, and numerous items of supply, including lilJUOr and clothing. One building was thought
to be a tank officer-candidate school because it was a
spacious government institution and there was a tank
range not far away. However, nothing could be
found to substantiate the suggestion.
In one hospital, American prisoners were being
cared for. Colonel Purdue visited them and gave special orders for them to be well taken care of, even assuring them a radio. Later Company "A" was assigned to
guard a hospital in the town.
The IPW report told of the motley crew of prisoners taken. Some men said they had been on furlough, hut en route back to their outfit, had been held
and coordinated into another unit on the spur of the
moment by a desperate but iron-willed SS major.
OVER BUNNING Tl IE AMBUSH
Meanwhile at 2000 on the 4th, Company "(',"
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which had remained in position near the Hiddesen
highway, was prepared to mop up the main road into
Hiddesen, and in so doing destroy the roadblock
which had caused it grief on the previous evening.
In an effort to destroy the estimated thirty SS men
holding the block, the company first called a heavy
artillerv concentration on the road barrier and vicinity. At the same time the area was blasted for fifteen
minutes with 3-inch and .SO-caliber fire from .the two
TDs attached to the lst Battalion. When the TDs
200 yards south of the road, directed by Lt Mosby,
Company "C" executive, had ceased firing, the doughboys overran the block to find the enemy had all Aed
but for three dead off the road back from the barrier.
\Veapons platoon men under Lts Robert MacCulley
and Robert Counsellor could claim the honor of driving off the Germans; they had fired over 300 rounds
of 60mm mortar ammunition . With Capt William
J. Aldridge, the Battalion S-3, mounted on one of the
lead vehicles the company rode on TDs and tanks into
Hiddesen; there by 2030 it rejoined the remainder of
the battalion,. which had already taken the path from
Monument Hill.
HERMANN, HANG YOUR HEAD

A German history' tells about the defense of the
Teutoberger Wald back in 9 AD:
"In Germany Quintilius \'arus, a 'peacetime' soldier, was in command . . . a man of slow spirit . . .
I le had been in Africa, Asia and Syria, where there
was no more fighting enemy, and he wore himself out
holding lavish parades . . .
"The Germans, much hated by Varus, saw through
his weakness . . . They flattered him: 'He had
brought right and justice in the country for the first
time . . . ' And thus Fate overcame him. The man
of fate who was to bring about Varus' downfall was
called Arminius (I lermann ) . I le had come to know
the Roman army service, Roman management, Roman
customs. f le hated the Romans only more burningly,
and meditated the throwing off of the yoke . . .
r lermann came to eat at his ( Varus' ) table and spied
on him without fear. Varus granted interviews willingly with the man who was meanwhile weaving a
net of conspiracy . . . Through the deception of
those plotting revolution behind his back, he allowed
himself to be lured to a wild territory nearer the
Weser ... In the ravines of the Teutoberger woods
from all sides he was attacked with his army of three
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legions, six cohorts .
and three cavalry squadrons.
The Gennans occupied the dominating heights, and
the legions were stuck in the marshy lowlands . . .
In three days the tired and discouraged troops collapsed all around. Already wounded, Varus ran himself onto his own sword . . .
"The Battle of the Teutoberger \.\'aid is one of the
crucial battles in \\lorld History. In it the free will ol
the Germans triumphed over the wealthy power of an
empire which until then had found its boundaries
only in the lack of transportation and the invincibility
of nature. It is the first decisive battle-victory of the
Cermans . . . "2
It is of interest to note that the Gennans' first hero
was a man of supreme deceit, as well as of military
prowess. Men of the I 20th have seen that the Germans have changed little in the decades since. But no
matter how proud the Germans may have been of
Hermann and his Tcutoberger \tVald, the 120th overcame both with comparatiye ease. Hermann must
have wept a tear as the tanks rattled past his hill, and
mumbled ceaselessly the death chant of the Germans."
race superiority and natural invincibility.
The civilians appeared to be disgruntled about the
disgrace too, and the CIC, aided by the IPW, had to
answer endless complaints and decide numerous local
tJUestions. In the meantime, soldiers found means to
celebrate and liquor discovered during the process of
sightseeing was welcome-and zealously attacked. The
Regimental CP moved from Augustdorf and Lopshom into a boarding house in Hiddesen at noon of
the 'ith of April. The units remained in their areas.
JNTERil\1
There was only a day, the 5th of April, to look over
Detmold for on the 6th word had already reached the
regiment that the 2d Armored ahead had crossed the
\\'eser River and needed infantry close behind.
The 2d Battalion was to lead. Attached were: Company "C," 743d Tank Battalion; one M-10 platoon of
Company "B" and the Reconnaissance Platoon, 823d
TD Battalion; and the I&R Platoon of Regimental
I Ieadguarters Company. The 2d Armored had bypassed much ground, which became the Regiment's mission to clear. With three main routes to
clean out, the 2d Battalion was formed into three task
forces; each was composed of a company of infantry
and an attached platoon of tanks, an attached section
of TDs, and a reconnaissance unit. Company "E"

'Deutacht G,.chirhtt by Richard Suchenwirth (Dollheimer, Leipzig
1941 ).

2 Free

trun•lation by Lt J . l\L Holden .
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the battalion to proceed at once to the Weser River for
protecting the 2d Armored's bridgehead. The 2d Battalion remounted trucks and continued eastward
through the village of Grohnde whose lawns ran
down to the waters of the river. Eight miles to the
north the I 17th Infantry was moving into Hamelin;
ten miles to the south the city of Holzminden had
been deserted by the W ehrmacht.
Across the pontoon bridge only recently completed,
the trucks carrying the 2d Battalion rolled toward the
rural settlement of Borry four miles away. l lere Lt Col
Cantey established his CP. Companies established assigned roadblocks in the small neighboring towns of
Latferde, l lajen, Frenke, and Brockensen. It was sunny and peaceful and war seemed far away from the
valley where men could admire the low hill ranges
around them. Civilians were full of complaints, but
Pyrmont
some of the soldiers observed that the armies sweeping
over the countryside could not seem to stop the daily
(Task Force "IT' for Hooper, in commmand) was to routine, the normal chores of townspeople who
be preceded by a squad of the I and R Platoon, and popped their heads up the moment the last shell exits route was the most northern, taking in Kirchdonop; ploded.
C'.-0mpany "F' ( TF "J" for Jacobsen) was to traverse
At 1130 the same day (6th of April), the remainder
the main route through Grossenmarpe with the Re- of the regiment followed along the main route
connaissance Platoon of Company "B," 823d TD (Cappcl-Grosscnmarpe-Hagcn) to assemble in areas
Battalion, while Company "G" (TF "M" for Mon- in the Pyrmont region: the lst Battalion in the recrieff) was to follow an I and R squad over a southern sort town itself, the 3d Battalion at Grohnde, and the
route through Mossenberg. Beginning at Detmold, Regimental Command Post at I famelshenburg. By
all planned routes ended at Bad Pyrmont, a pleasant 2000 all units were reported settled. Around Grohnde
resort town near the Emmer River and the Grohnde artillerymen of the 230th Battalion dug emplaceForest.
ments, prepared to defend the bridgehead.
At 0800 the advance began and the task forces on
On the 7th the 2d Battalion ·maintained its posieach Bank ("H" and "M") kept as even with the tions, and the remainder of the regiment stayed in its
center column as possible. Opposition was negligible. area. In the morning one roadblock was moved to a
The reconnaissance elements met groups of mongrel new position south oF the regiment's sector until the
soldiers, some begging to surrender, others running, armor of Combat Command "B", 2d Armored Divihalf terror-stricken, half befogged, to the nearest sion, had pushed through it to the east. Then
woods for concealment, in some cases only to turn late in the afternoon, at 1910, Company "G" of the
around and wave a white Bag vigorously. At dominat- 330th Infantry, 83d Division, relieved the 2d Battaling or questionable areas the reconnaissance troops ion on the bridgehead roadblocks.
Pyrrnont was no small problem. Coupled with the
dismounted and proceeded on foot through the woods
numerous stray prisoners who straggled into the PW
or over the hill.
Progress was rapid so that by 1132 the battalion had cage, medical personnel and sick men created the
reached Pyrmont, where the overlay read "Phase line usual constant work for the CIC and interrogation
'Rat,'" the day's objective. More a mountain resort staff. Disgruntled prisoners and invalids told how
than Detmold, Pyrfll.ont was also more a hospital combat teams had been fonned from a group of hostown filled with German invalids and medical staffs. pital cases. One officer took charge of thirty-three
Down' its streets walked medical officers as proud as men, all heart, lung or kidney cases. Armed with
Kaisers and well protected by the Red Cross bands on seven pistols and two panzerfaust, they had set out to
defend the Vaterland. A thousand men had been
their arms. Here the battalion awaited orders.
Instructions came in the early afternoon, directing ordered to their combat outfits, though doctors pro-
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tested that they were not cured. There were still
many inmates, however, and though the high-ranking
doctors strutting to their wards with pretty nurses
seemed to feel that Pyrmont was an "open" city because of the sick men there, the hospitals caused the
regiment almost as much trouble as the W ehrmacht
itself could have. It was natural that tension should
exist since no one knew how legitimately the men
were authorized to be in the hospitals or how soon they
might rise up to pull some fantastic, werewolf stunt.
At the time Hadio Berlin was lauding massive damage
done to Allied forces in occupied territory. In fact, on
the night of the 7th, rumor of a Nazi disturbance
caused commanders to be alerted, and a special guard
to be posted. Nothing occurred.
Spring had reached the countryside around Pyrmont. In the historic Schloss von Klenke, a castle
almost surrounded by a moat, and decorated with
ric~1 paintings and collections of antique war implements, including spears and muskets, the Regimental
Command Post had been established after the baroness
owner had been informed that she would have to move
to another of her houses. With her retinue, which
included a girl's reform school group, she hastened off,
surprised that we would not live in the same house
with civilians where that situation could be avoided.
The Regimental staff moved in, marvelling at the
great oak fireplaces, the ancient family-tree banner,
and the numerous wild-life prints.
Wars do not stop for baronesses or for soldiers living
well in castles, however, and movement still eascward
started again at 0730 on the 8th of April. The 3d Battalion started toward a ridgeline, "433," approximately 35 miles away. Attached were: Company "B"
743d Tank Battalion; the Regimental I&R Platoon;
two M -10 platoons, Company "B," and a reconnaissance platoon, 823cl Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Again with three task forces, each formed of a motorized company with attachments, the advance covered two main routes. One, to the north, took the
Company "L" force leading over two ridges through
Berry and Laucnstein to I Iemmendorf and then to
Ahrenfeld, all green prosperous towns. Company "I"
followed Company "L." Meanwhile Company "K"
followed a southern route through Esperde, over the
Dcrith I I ill Range, to Salzhemmendorf and then due
south to Ockenzen. There were no fights en route; the
warm rides were becoming a pleasure. On the eastern
· o f the n'd ge "433"
. "L" an d "I"
section
, C ompanies
established outposts and roadblock defenses. Platoons
had CPs in the little country villages of Levedagsen,
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Ahrenfeld, Heinsen, Marienhagen, and Weenzen.
Company "I" in Ockensen overran a military clothing
storehouse and men there sported crash helmets and
flashy belt buckles which, though gaudy, were cheaply
made.
At 1000 the remainder of the Combat Team followed the 3d Battalion into the new area. The 2d
Battalion had to walk from Borry through Lauenstein
to I lemmendorf, where it set up nine roadblocks to
cut off the northern approach to the area. The 1st
Battalion had left Company "A" guarding a hospital
in Detmold and when it moved to new areas in Wallensen and Thuste. The Regimental Command Post
was established in a hotel restaurant in the center of
Salzhemmendorf. Here the regiment remained for two
days; processing stragglers, coping with civilians, and,
as always, planning.
ADVANCE TOW ARD BRUNSWICK
The evening of the 9th of April, Division orders for
movement reached the Command Post and two hours
later (1900) a quartering party set out for an area in
the regimental sector twenty-five miles farther north
near Hasede and Gross Forste northeast of Hildesheim. The assembly area there was to extend on
both sides of the Zweigcanal Hildesheim, even though
the I and R Patrol after reconnaissance said all four
bridges in the regimental sector had been blown.
Scheduled to precede our advance in this area was an
attached troop of the I 25th Cavalry Squadron, 113th
Cavalry Group.
The next morning at 0700 trucks carrying the 1st
Battalion led the regimental column across the IP
at Hemmendorf and drove eastward through Benstorf,
Elze, Nordstemmen and Rossing. Behind the 1st
Battalion came Regimental Headquarters; Antitank
and Medical Companies; Company "B" 823d TD
Battalion; and Company "B," 743d Tank Battalion. Since few trucks were available the other battalions had to wait till later for transportation forward .
At a road junction between Hasede and Gross
Forste, the different units assembled in field and
house groups to which the quartering party assigned
them. Without a crossing over the Zweigcanal in
the regimental zone, the advance was halted while
plans for movement forward could be formulated. A
temporary Regimental CP was established. In the
meantime, after the 1st Battalion troops had dismounted, the trucks returned to Hemmendorf to load
and bring forward the 2d Battalion.
In midmorning at the Command Post it was

Canal east of Ufingen

learned that the regiment was to cross the canal over a
bridge in the sector of the I 17th Infantry to the north.
A new route, through Ahrbergen, Sarstedt, Codringen, Algermissen, and Bersum, was mapped at
once. The 1st Battalion climbed aboard tanks and TDs
and about noon rolled forward, trying to digest a hasty
K ration as they rumbled over the country roads. The
2d Battalion in trucks reached the assembly area at that
time and joined the end of the column behind the
Regimental Headquarters group.
The lst Battalion had orders to clear the Regimental zone of advance up to Phase-line "Min," an
area near the tov.rn of Borsum. But early in the afternoon Lt Col Williamson was ordered to continue east
past "Min" along a route extending south of Brunswick only twenty-five miles away. En route the battalion passed through t I udessum, Ahstedt, Feldbergen,
Steinbruck, Gross and Klein Lafferde, Bodenstedt,
and other tiny country settlements common to that
section of continental Europe.
Men of the attached cavalry were loath to approach
the successive towns in vehicles because of the danger
from ambush. However, the situation called for energetic and rapid motorized pursuit; there was not
time available for approaching possible enemy positions on foot. There comes a time when field officers
must lead in person in order to set an example. As the
result, Col Purdue rapidly led the cavalry toward
Ufingen. The enemy there was lying in ambush on
the edge of town and so the column was greeted with
short-range small-arms fire. Fortunately, the enemy's
opening rounds missed. The lead ~lements, headed
by the Regimental Commander, qwckly deployed to
knock out the delaying position.
To Capt Floyd C. Spurlock's Company "C" Lt Col
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Williamson assigned the mission of clearing Llfingen
of enemy, and in the evening that company advanced
against it from the west. In the houses were many
snipers and around the buildings were some heavy
direct-fire weapans. The infantrymen gained ground
slowly but surely, and with few casualties. Far into
the night they fought. At 2345 a radio message from
the 1st Battalion to Regiment reported that the town
was half taken. Shortly thereafter the town fell; the
I st Battalion remained in position for the night.
Early the next morning the enemy began harassing
the troops in the town with 88mm antiaircraft and
20mm fire which came from across an unnamed canal
on the outskirts of the village to the east. Lt Chester
J. Churns with his operator, Cpl I Ioward L. Meyers.
sleepy from steady work late the night before, climbed
to an upper story and called fire directions to the
cannon company battery for which they observed .
Finally the enemy was silenced.
Meanwhile the Regimental Command Post had
been established in Vallstcd west of Alvessc and the
2d Battalion had moved into Lengede by 2200 of the
I 0th. Still without trucks, the 3d Battalion remained
at Levedagsen.
BHUNS\\'ICK ENCIHCLED
The fighting in Ufingen had just died down when
Lt Col Williamson received a Hegimental order to
establish a bridgehead over the canal on the eastern
outskirts of the village near a suburb called Nortcnhof. In the dark at 0430 on the 11th of April, two
platoons from Company "C" paddled in rubber assault boats to the opposite banks without meeting op
position. They dispersed to designated areas and re
maine<l in positions most of the day to protect the

The 3d Botto/ion on the way to encircle Brunswick (Brounschweig)

crossing site. With the tank and TD companies, Company "B" moved into LI fingen and occupied defensive
positions along the west banks of the canal.
Original plans called for the construction of a
bridge across the water early in the morning so that
the 1st Battalion could continue the attack northeastward, to sweep up on the east side of the city of Brunswick ( Braunschweig), at that time under attack by
the I 17th Infantry. Corps engineers brought up
rrcadway bridge equipment and started construction.
\\'hile the span was being completed the 3d Battalion was speeding from Lcvedagsen in Service Company trucks, and its units were grouped in the early
afternoon on the outskirts of Vallsted. The troops did
not remain inactive long at the detrucking area; when
a lock installation near Nortenhof was found suitable
for foot crossing, the battalion was ordered to move to
the next objective.
The next objective was "Mae," a goose-egg on the
map which included the settlement of Rauthcim
southeast of Brunswick. In that vicinity, at the
\Vabe Stream, was a bridge over which ran the main
highway to the east. It was a spot where Nazis Aeeing
toward Berlin might probably be trapped.

As quickly as possible on foot, the 3d Battalion
headed for Rautheim. The troops pushed over the
locks and on through Steterburg in extended files,
encountering only stragglers. By 1400 the battalion
had advanced 3000 yards and received instructions to
continue. The Oker River running south from Brunswick presented some problems since all bridges but one
in the sector had been blovvn. The one exception was
a railroad bridge near Leiferde.
We began a minor conscription program. Men of
the 3d Battalion called in an army of Germans,
Czechs, Poles and Russians, who grabbed up poles,
logs, doors, ladders and odd timber, and constructed
within a few minutes a bridge which carried the entire battalion across the Oker. Although Company "I"
had tried crossing by wading, it had drawn back with
wet feet, realizing the impossibility. At last Company
"L" crossed the homemade hridge, followed· by Com . "K ," "1\"'1," an d "I ."
pames
The battalion commander took his troops into Klein
Stockheim, and here began the final phase of the
sneak seizure of the objective, a maneuver to surprise
and trap the enemy. The movement toward Rautheim
began at 1855, with Company "L" in the lead. By
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1

Brunswick (Braunschweig)

2105 it had passed through Mascherode and reached heroism was not willing to surrender the city. "We
Rautheim. An hour and a half later the vital bridge wish to fight soldier against soldier." General Hobbs
was seized without a struggle. The main road east was made it clear that he was not going to hold up the
cut by a Company "L" block. It had been a long day's advance for the evacuation of civilians who should
push of ten miles and though the men were dog tired, have been removed before, particularly when the
time would allow soldiers to strengthen their defense.
the sweep was a triumph as the night was to prove.
Maj Gen Leland S. Hobbs had, previous to the The two separated and hostilities recommenced.
Observed by men at the bridge held by Company
I 17th Infantry attack, discussed surrender with the
"L"
not long after its seizure, a total of twelve vehicles
commander of the Brunswick garrison, a Lt Gen Karl
Veith, reportedly the second highest potentate in the in separate groups sped from the city heading straight
German antiaircraft corps. A temporary truce had for the block. When the sentry's call to halt was igbeen arranged because Lt Gen Veith had requested nored, machine-gun and riHe fire sprayed and
the parley. Lt John R. Henderson, of the Ninth halted the cars. Company "I" men hurried the ocArmy Historical Section, who was at the meeting, cupants out of the vehicles; all were German milisaid that General Veith, a small wiry Teuton, was tary men, and many were wounded. In all, about
neither military prodigy nor veteran tactician, but forty-five prisoners were rounded up. One had a slight
that because of his rank, had to take charge of the neck wound; he was dark, small, wiry. Though few
Brunswick defenses. He demanded a truce, to have of the doughboys knew him, he was the hero of
time to evacuate civilians, but with stolid German Brunswick, General Veith. His entire staff had been
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captured. Later Colonel Purdue interviewed him.
The streaks of dawn were in the sky when the last
excitement of the General's visit had died down. Lt
Frederick A. Shiefcrstein, Cannon Company observer
with Company "L," had been working most of the
night, even to adjusting fire on some vehicles which
had not wanted to stop at the roadblock. He knew
that the 1st Battalion was scheduled to pass the 3d
and move north. But he knew it was no 1st Battalion
vehicle which screeched to a halt just east of the
bridge. Fifteen German soldiers descended from the
truck and, apparently having seen some Americans,
ran to a woods close by. Scurrying about there, they
seemed to be organizing some kind of delaying defense. Realizing the danger to the 1st Battalion scheduled to pass through, Lt Schieferstein called cannon
fire upon the woods. The Germans must have felt at
some disadvantage, for they left their positions in all
haste.
Actually it was the 2d Battalion, not the 1st Battalion, which had been originally scheduled to pass the
3d Battalion and moved into roadblock positions cutting all the eastern roads from Brunswick. The previous day's events had forced some changes in plan.
Brought from its assembly area at Lengede on the
morning of the 11th April by the Service Company
trucks just released by the 3d Battalion, the 2d Battalion had then mounted the attached tanks and TDs
in an area near Alvesse, waiting until the completion
of the engineer bridge to cross and supplement the 3d
Battalion's effort.
By 1827 the bridge was ready. By 1925 the battalion was rolling eastward as scheduled. Because the
railroad bridge used by the 3d Battalion was reported
unnegotiable by vehicles, the acting battalion commander, Capt Phillip M. Chandler, took a different
route from that followed by the 3d. The armored column carrying infantry headed southeast through
Thiede and Wolfenbuttel. A few miles beyond that
town it crossed a bridge over the Oker in the sector of
the 2d Armored Division. Then the column sped
northeast toward Salzdahlum.
Two jeeps were in the lead. At the main road junction in town, where a road to the right (east) led toward Obersickte, direct-fire weapons blasted the jeeps
and aimed at the troops who had to dismount at once.
Four dug-in enemy tanks along the road to the right
were emplaced so as to command approaches from the
west. When the lead company, Company "F," tried
to use the tanks at its disposal, the vehicles became so
mired down that they were useless. Struggling alone
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the infantrymen made attempts at flanking attack
which failed because the enemy machine guns grazed
the ground all around them. No artillery was available.
On either side of the road the men of Company "F"
had advanced less than 150 yards when half an hour
after midnight Capt Jacobsen ordered the advance
halted until daylight.
The next morning all evidence of the enemy had
disappeared. The battalion then moved north as
ordered over the road to Rautheim.
When it became obvious that the 2d Battalion
would not reach Rautheim during the night, the Regimental commander ordered the 1st Battalion to entruck and proceed by Quartermaster vehicle to Rautheim, and on to Riddaggshen two miles east of Brunswick. The battalion was ordered to assist the 3d Battalion in cutting all roads into the town from the east,
thus further isolating the Brunswick garrison.
At 0225 in the morning at the 3d Battalion rear
CP west of the Oker River, Lt Col Williamson
learned that Lt Ervin Bruner and one of his squads
from Company "I" had found a railroad bridge across
the Oker 2000 yards downstream from where the 3d
Battalion had crossed. Half the squad was still there,
protecting it from the enemy. But the bridge was
believed to be unsuitable for trucks. Later, engineer
squads sent to improve the bridge for vehicular traffic
said it could be used at once, however. Accordingly the
battalion trucks were jolting over the tracks by 0310.
The mile of railroad ties cost the battalion twentyfour tires. Soon after, the troops were in Riddaggshen,
and Company "B" was sent to the neighboring town
of Guesmarade. Before dawn all roads in the network
east of Brunswick were effectively blocked.
A hospital containing about a hundred Allied soldiers was discovered. A Scottish soldier said that he
had been a prisoner since 1940. One of our men said,
"You've been waiting a long while, haven't you?" only
to receive the answer, "Yes, we expected you last
night."
LAST BLITZ: TO THE ELBE
On the morning of the 12th of April came the order
to continue eastward. The "final push," so long
spoken of, so long dreamed of, had at last arrived. The
2d Battalion on tanks left Salzdahlum at 0615, and
turning right (east) at Rautheim headed toward
Cremlingen where at 0630 the 1st Battalion on its
Quartermaster trucks joined the column.
Long without Company "A," the 1st Battalion became complete for the first time since Detmold. The

The German civilians didn't like Hitler's order to fight to the last man

company was trucked forward in the morning
and was assigned to clean out the Forst Konigslutter,
a few miles east of Cremlingen. When the two
battalions in column reached the city of Konigslutter,
Company "A," having completed its forest mission,
tied on to the end.
Leading the 2d Battalion over the main route were
two platoons of the 30th Reconnaissance Troop and
the Reconnaissance Platoon of Company "B," 823d
TD Battalion. At the head of the column, breaking
the way, were two jeeps and an M-8, followed by
another jeep.
The objective was Uthmoden (Phase-line "John"),
within twenty-five miles of the Elbe River. Hence,
as rapidly as possible, the column moved through
Abbenrode, Bornum and Konigslutter. The route of
advance did not lead through Gross Steinum a mile
north of the road, but when a column of enemy was
seen heading into it, some members of Company "G"
with five tanks were sent to capture them. With forty
prisoners taken, the Americans were told by the civilians that there were absolutely no more German soldiers in town.
Pfc Cloyd Moore was leading the prisoners out of
town when he heard the ping of a rifle, and looking
around he saw that the man guarding the rear of the
prisoner column had been killed. The prisoners ran
for cover, fearing that they might be hit too. Moore
saw another group of prisoners being led toward him
by a Company "G" soldier, and as he was about to
explain the situation to him another shot killed the
newcomer. Angrily, Moore brought the prisoners together, and mingling among them so as to be shielded
from further fire, he guided them across the open terrain to the remainder of the company on the main
road.
When the Regimental commander heard of the
civilians' false tale and the insidious sniper, he gave

the order for the TDs along the road to fire into the
buildings. The 3-inch guns left their mark of disapproval on the town of sharp-eyed snipers.
The force continued through the town of Sup
plingenburg to Marienthal. The route on the map
led straight through this town to the east, but when the
lead vehicle reached the easternmost outskirts, the
road was found rutted and unnegotiable. While some
jeeps went ahead to investigate the condition of the
road, three officers of the 2d Battalion, Capt Slager,
artillery liaison officer, Lt Barenkamp, S-2, and Lt
Terry, S-3, saw at a distance of some 500 yards a
group of antiaircraft installations and Germans moving about them. They took matters into their own
hands, and with an interpreter and a white Rag advanced to demand a surrender. The area was actually
an airfield; one plane was observed abandoned in a
bunker. Without attempting to fire the antiaircraft
guns, thirty-five Germans gave themselves up.
The road ahead was impassable. The column
turned south, crossed an autobahn, reached the
outskirts of f lelmstedt, and then headed northeast
to Walbeck, J-lodingen and Flechtingen. It was late
(2345) when the 2d Battalion reached Hasselburg and halted for the night. The Regimental Headquarters Group and the lst Battalion remained mobile
on the road near Flechtingen while men slept in the
fields close by.
The next day, the 13th of April, saw the 2d Battalion push forward again with Company "E" in the •
lead behind the reconnaissance elements. The 1st
Battalion followed on trucks. According to original
plan, the route led northeast from Flechtingen, but
again road conditions made it expedient to map a new
way. The vehicles rolled through the woods east of
Hasselburg, over the Ohre River, into Uthmcxlen and
past Dorst.
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Through Bornum as rapidly as possible

Just beyond Dorst, where the woodline of the Forst
Calvorde recedes from the road to leave an open
area, the men in the lead vehicles almost humped into
an enemy column moving along the iorest edge. Sensing that it was a convoy heading northeast to escape,
the leading elements swung off the road in an arc to
face the enemy, and as they did so, sprayed the column with automatic fire. Among those in the lead
were Capt Thomas F. Hooper, commander of Company "E"; one of his platoon leaders, Lt Raymond E.
LeVan, and the Regimental Assistant S-3, Lt John G.
Gerl. It was a scene of rout, and for the Germans
one of total confusion. Some tried to run away but
jeeps caught up and shot them with mounted machine guns. Capt f looper hastened to lead some
tanks forward which blasted" enemy trucks Heeing
over a back road to the northeast. In less than an
hour the fight was over, and the lead platoon of Company "E" had destroyed three cars and twelve trucks.
Later an enemy mortar was also overrun.
Through the Forst Calvorde, the column reached a
town in a small clearing, Born. When automatic fire
began clattering from the village edge, 1\1-4 tanks came
forward and advanced firing. Shortly thereafter troops
passed through the silent town toward Dolle. While
in the vicinity of the latter town, Division headquarters notified the Regimental Commander that its sector had been changed; the 120th Infantry was to move
into an area north of Magdeburg, twenty-five miles to
the south. The column turned southward, passed
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through the Forst Colbitz into the town of Colbitz.
At the city entrance were 2000 allied prisoners
of war- American, English, French, Pole, Serb and
Russian - some raucously overjoyed, some dumb with
amazement, some quiet but smiling. Evacuated from a
prison camp in Magdeburg, they told their varied experiences; some had been taken as recently as the
Ardennes, others captured as long ago as Dunkirk.
\Nith tears in his eyes, one gaunt, pale Frenchman
said, "It is the day we have been waiting for all these
years. "
The next town was Wolmirstedt. Speeding into
the city outskirts, members of the 2d Battalion ran
almost head-on into a German halftrack, apparently
attempting to escape. The Germans deserted the vehicle and ran for cover; .50-caliber fire halted them,
but also hit the haHtrack and wounded two of three
American 2d Armored Division soldiers inside who
had been captured by the Germans. Medical attention
was summoned for them at once.
At Barleben, between Wolmirstedt and Magdeburg, the column received mortar and artillery barrages; one driver was killed by the second round.
\Vhile still mounted on trucks, the column was attacked from the left ( east) by approximately one platoon of Germans armed with riHes and panzerfaust.
The dough boys turned their firepower upon the enemy
and in a quick shuffle enveloped both flanks of the
enemy force. Some of the fourteen prisoners taken admitted that their mission had been to destroy as many
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American tanks in the town of Barleben as possible.
Realizing that Magdeburg was still held in force by
the enemy, the Regimental commander ordered the
troops into assembly in Barleben. After being on the
road constantly for the preceeding two days, except for
a four-hour stop at Flectingen which it left at 1130
the 13th, the Command Post was established in a
mansion at 1630. The 1st and 2d Battalions moved
their companies into billets in the same town. Company "A" was dispatched to Wolmirstedt to establish
roadblocks around the city to which Division I leadquarters had moved.
During the three preceding days (11th, 12th and
13th of April) the unbelievable total of 3, 407 prisoners had been taken by the regiment; 236 had been
taken on the 12th near Brunswick by the 3d Battalion which was still in the Rautheim area. All were
as usual of makeshift outfits. During the movement
the regiment had driven sixty-five miles.
PREFACE TO MAGDEBURG: GLINDENBERG
Though Wolmirstedt and Barleben, within a few
miles of the Elbe River, were free of enemy the
Germans had by no means deserted the west banks.
One place which had to be cleared of enemy was the
strung-out town of Glindenberg, two miles due east of
\i\lolmirstedt and of the Staatsforst Colbitz. Others
were the high embankments of the Ems-Weser-Elbe
Canal, cutting the Barleben-Wolmirstedt road at right
angles halfway between the towns and the marshland
around it south of Glindenberg. The canal itself was
a remarkable feat of engineering, constructed entirely
above the ground, permitting 80-foot barges to navigate upon it and tunnels to pass underneath.
In the early evening the 1st Battalion sent a patrol
to the northern tip of Glindenbcrg and found it held
by the enemy. Another patrol from Company "C,"
investigating the southern extension of the town, received machine-gun fire from the canal embankments.
Lt \Varren I I. Charleston of Company "B" was
ordered to lead his platoon into Glindenberg from the
south. Since the town appeared small and the enemy
was expected to have withdrawn, it was not deemed
necessary to send tanks or TDs in support. At dusk,
Lt Charleston with his platoon was heading from the
canal overpass on the main l\1agdehurg road south of
Elbcu, suburb of Wolmirstedt, toward the Staatsforst
Colbitz, when he encountered the Company "C" patrol; it had suffered two casualties and explained that
the enemy was strongly entrenched around the canal.
After seeing that the wounded were evacuated, Lt
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Charleston dispersed his platoon in skirmish line formation and forged through the Staatsforst Colbitz.
On the east edge of the woods the platoon faced Glindenberg and began an advance with marching fire
against the numerous houses which Lt Charleston at
once realized were in greater number than the map
indicated.
In the twilight haze he noted all at once that puffs
of dust were rising around his platoon members and
realized that they were not shooting low but rather
were being shot at from the right by machine guns on
the canal embankments. Suddenly shouting at the
men to fire their riAe grenades at the bank, he led
them to a silo and haystack group close by where they
had some cover from the fire, fortunately not of grazing but of plunging nature. Then, without wasting
a minute he asked the artillery observer for fire upon
the enemy positions, even though it was risky to call
a shelling at so close range. Before the artillery began
falling he dashed from the silo toward the cover of
buildings in town and, closely followed by deadly
tracers, reached it to observe some of the town defenses.
Once the artillery in neat concentrations had
stopped the canal fire, the remainder of the platoon
rushed across the open area and concentrated its efforts against Glindenberg. The town was well prepared in its defenses, with doors barricaded and a
heavy roadblock of massive beams near the south end.
LI nwilling to commit his platoon over the barricade
into a town where Poles and Russians in the vicinity
said there were 500 Germans, he called his company
by radio, and requested Capt Pulver to bring the other
platoons with tanks and TDs in a strike from the
north so as to "pincer" the town. "Roger, and out!"
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Charleston deployed his
men in a defensive circle around the south extremity,
thus holding the "nip" he had already taken in the
town. For three hours Lt Charleston's platoon held
its ground. Then in the distance tanks could be heard
rolling over the road from Wolmirstedt. The enemy
heard it too. PvVs later said that 500 Germans in
Glindenburg were trying to escape over the Elbe,
covered all the while by the automatic fire from
the canal. The arrival of the tanks hastened their
departure; by 0200 on the 14th of April when
Company "B" had moved into the village, the Germans had vanished to the east and northeast. Only
one man in Lt Charleston's platoon had been wounded
in the seizure of Glindenberg.
The morning of the 14th of April the 1st Battalion
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was given an unusual mission; it was the first unit
of the 120th Infantry to clear out a principal route
advancing east to west. At 0900 a task force consisting of one squad of Company "C" and a platoon of
Tl>s rolled from the canal crossing on the BarlebcnWolmirstedt road toward Paris, this time, rather than
Berlin. By-passed enemy troops had been ambushing
supply vehicles along this road during the previous
two days. The force went only as far as Erxleben. At
1515 it returned, reporting no resistance or obstacles.
During the 14th, the enemy across the Elbe and in
Magdeburg shelled Barleben and the area around it
sporadically. Cannon Company in position in exposed fields between Barleben and Wolmirstedt, received many concentrations, during one of which
an ammunition truck and trailer were hit. Gasoline which spilled from its "Jerricans" threatened to
set afire other trucks near it. Lt Merill D. Dan with
Lt Harold Solomon, Pfc Walter K. Stowell, Pfc
Charles V. Green, T / 4 I larold D. Crabtree, and T / 5
James C. Maxey, went about saving the equipment
and were quick enough in driving the trucks away so
that all eight were saved.
The area south and southeast of Glindenberg was
still populated with enemy; from that direction came
occasional small-arms fire. At 1530 elements of Company "C" skirmished from the south tip of Glindenberg toward the marshy ground around the canal.
From the time they exposed themselves on the bare
field 500 yards from the embankments, the men were
fired at so strongly that they were ordered to withdraw. Plans were made for a night attack over the
same route.
The night was cloudy and suitable to conceal the
movement across the open ground. At 2220 two platoons of Company "C" moved out southeast from
Glindenberg. The enemy heard the initial stir and
in the dark of night let loose with what firepower
was at their disposal. From the canal embankments
came machine-gun and 20mm antiaircraft ground
fire. From the second railroad embankment in the
company zone, one running north-south 700 yards
southeast of Glindenberg. came rapid riAe and panzerfaust fire. S/Sgt Norman E. Skiver pushed to the
fore and set his light machine gun in place. Then he
traversed it over the railroad tracks ahead and let his
finger play on the trigger. The enemy to the front
retreated one by one. It was later discovered that
S/Sgt Skiver had killed two men and wounded an
officer.
But the fight was not over. The exchange of fire

lasted for close to four hours. Along the canal embankment the enemy could not be budged. Led by Lt Frank
W. Parent, one platoon was advancing against the
embankment defenses which had to be destroyed before the objectives could be reached. From close b)a machine gun spotted the attackers and fired at them .
After hitting the ground they laid still for five min
utes. Then, determined to carry the action forward
and sensing the machine-gun position, S/ Sgt Eugene
R. Maag, one of the lead squad leaders, threw a grenade at the emplacement and, yelling at his men to
follow, rushed at it. He had to run up the bank and
when he gained the top he saw a man, apparently the
gunner, Heeing to the east; lowering his M 1, Sgt Maag
fired from the hip, but the German disappeared into
the darkness. Lt Parent was close behind. f le ordered
one squad to set up a base of fire at the embankment.
v;hile he led another forward along the canal, cleaning
out the area to the east. When the advancing squad
reached a railroad tunnel, it heard men inside and.
after a white phosphorus grenade had been thrown
into it from above, the Germans shouted they wanted
to surrender. Then, before anyone could fire further,
they disappeared into the dark, escaping through the
other, far end of the tunnel. The squad captured many
as it continued however. Twenty-six were taken and
three killed, and in the early morning seven more gave
themselves up.
A medic proved that the tongue was mightier than
the sword when, during the course of the evening, he
captured two fully armed enemy. Last in an extended
column of riflemen moving over the field southeast of
Glindenberg, he heard someone call "Halt!" in the
dark and, peering through the black, recognized two
armed Germans insisting that he stop. Able to speak a
little German, Pfc Gerard A. Emmons started to explain why his captors were stupid to continue the fight.
f le told them they were hopelessly surrounded and
should give up at once. When he heard his squad calling for him he did not answer because he was afraid the
enemy would fire on his comrades. Instead he talked
faster and, what was more important, the Germans
listened. They consented to follow him. As he led
them proudly to his squad, he must have remarked
to himself that even in war it pays to have a ready
tongue.
One enemy machine-gun nest in a well barricaded
underpass along the canal was eradicated when, just
prior to the attack, direct fire landed squarely in its
midst. If the Germans had asked how it had been
so accurately spotted at night, they might have been
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told that the nest had been noted during th~ afternoon skirmish; that a tanker had sighted and clamped
his primary weapon on the location and at a designated time before the jump-off had slammed fifteen
rounds into the piece!
By 0330 after suffering only one casualty the two
platoons of Company "C" had driven 1000 yards to
the Elbe banks opposite Hohenwarthen. Fifty-six
prisoners were taken.
A third platoon from Company "C" had driven
From the canal crossing on the Barleben-Wolmirstcdt
road along the southern embankment in an easterly
direction at 2030. Without meeting opposition it
crossed railroad tracks and skirted north of the Barlebcr See, an artificial lake within 200 yards of the
canal. Where the canal branches and one arm turns
southeast, on the opPosite banks from where the other
two platoons were having difficulty, numerous dug-in
positions were the source of heavy small-arms fire
which delayed the platoon's advance. Moving up by
short rushes, the platoon finally succeeded in driving
the enemy across the canal-arm into a former shipyard area, lying in the crotch of the canal extt?nsions.
After holding the ground all night, the platoon crossed
the canal into the shipyards the next morning and discovered the enemy had Aed across the river.
With trucks free at last to transport the 3d Battalion, the Regimental Commander had it brought forward from Rautheim to an assembly area in Wolmirstedt at 1515 on the 14th of April. After Company
"K" had taken over its roadblocks, Company "A" assembled in Barlebcn.
Regimental OPs were established during the day
( the 14th), one in the attic of the mansion which
housed the CP, another in a church in Glindenberg.
Members of the l&R Platoon could observe the inner
streets of Magdeburg and lowlands across the Elbe,
where any action was reported from the OP.
Though the 3d Battalion rehearsed river crossings
on the Ohre near Wolmirstedt on the 15th, indications pointed more to a future attack upon Magdeburg rather than an Elbe crossing by the 30th Division. In preparation, all areas up to the city had to
be cleaned out. On the I 5th of April, Company "F"
attacked northeast from Barleben at 1600 and crossed
the Aat fields to the shipyards occupied by the Company "C" platoon that morning. One Company "F"
platoon was chosen to establish four outposts along
the Elbe: two along the river opposite I Iohenwarthe,
one at the railroad canal crossing, and one on a side
road.
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The next day (16th of April) at 0600 Company
"E" dispatched a patrol to investigate Rothensee, a
community 1500 yards north of Magdeburg, and
across the autobahn from Barleben. Under observation from the Observation Post in Barleben, the village was small but since it commanded the northern
approach into the city it was an obvious outpost for
the forces in Magdeburg.
Made up of S/Sgt Frederick W. Goods, Sgt Donald
F. McClure, Cpl Bill Turanyi, Pfc Joseph M. Cortese
and Pvt Cleon Archer, the patrol maneuvered over
the fields from the autobahn and came close to the
concentration of railroad tracks on the western edge
of Rothensee. There the men were pinned down from
the fire of machine guns blocking the road into the
village. The patrol edged safely away from the block
and headed southwest, coming nearer to the northern
section of Magdeburg, known as Neue Neustadt.
As the men scouted along, trying to observe all evidences of defense, they were again discovered by
automatic weapons near the main road entering
Magdeburg. T uranyi began to give a steady volley
of return fire while the others withdrew to the north
and then in turn covered his retreat. They did not return without information, however, having observed
bridges intact over the ElbP-, barracks, machine guns
and railroad passes. On the return trip they were fired
on by an aut0matic weapon on the railroad embankment near Rothensee.
A Company "F'' patrol had passed the Company
"E" men near the Rothensee roadblock, and had continued south to set up observation posts near Neustadt. But at 1125 word reached it via radio that all
hostile activity was to cease during negotiation for surrender. Later, at 1430, the patrollers returned to Barleben.
THE S-2 NEGOTIATES SURRENDER
From G-2 sources and outward indications, such
as the word of civilians and of straggling soldiers, it
appeared that the enemy was not eager to put up a
death struggle for Magdeburg and that, given encouragement, the Germans would welcome peaceful terms
and even unconditional surrender.
The Regimental S-2, Maj "Zeke" Glazier, was ordered to negotiate surrender and left the CP with his
party in the late morning. The results of his visit he
tells about in an annex to his S-2 report on the 16th
of April.
"At 1140, 16 April 1945, a party left the Regimental CP, 120th Infantry, in the town of Barleben
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for the city of Magdeburg. Party consisted of one
M-20 with loudspeaker mounted thereon, one jeep
with artillery personnel to lift or place artillery fire,
and one jeep from I&R Platoon, I 20th Infantry,
with 610 radio for communication and messenger
service. Party passed last friendly outpost at autobahn
southwest of Barleben at 1142 and arrived on outskirts of Magdeburg . . . at 1150. One enemy Bare
trailing white smoke was fired as vehicles approached
city. All vehicles carried white Bag.
"On reaching coordinates 667035 (first crossroads
in Neue Neustadt) machine-gun fire was received
from machine gun in northwest corner of road junction . . . . Fire was not directed at vehicles but alongside as warning to stop. As soon as burst of fire ended,
a German NCO raced from his hole to the gunner
and reprimanded him for firing upon vehicles carrying a white Bag. The NCO was an SS trooper of an
unidentified unit. Surrender party halted, contact was
made with SS trooper, who though not senior NCO
present, appeared to be in charge of troops in this
area. Trooper sent for company commander, a first
lieutenant, who on finding that we desired to discuss
surrender sent for his commander (battalion or regimental, undecided), a major who arrived at 1210.
Previously a truce had been declared between our
party and the first lieutenant, for one hour to await
the arrival of the commander of the troops in this
sector, to be followed by a truce of one-half hour to
allow the return of our party and the return of all
enemy troops to their positions. The major upon his
arrival informed us that a general, the commander
of all troops in this sector, desired us to come to his
command post. Transportation would limit the party
to two persons. Lt Gerl, assistant Regimental S-3, and
I went forward to discuss terms with the general.
"We were blindfolded and led to a staff car, a small
sedan, which took us to the general's command post.
We stopped several times en route apparently to
check in with command posts or to exchange credentials at roadblocks and arrived at the command post
at approximately 1230. We were informed that we
would have to wait before the general was ready to
see us. It was my opinion that the general was calling higher headquarters to request instructions as to
the surrender of the town.
"While waiting for an audience with the general
an English-speaking person who identified himself as
an officer came up to us and asked that should the
general not surrender we might expect two German
officers to enter our lines in the vicinity of Barleben

at 2300 the 16th of April, and that our outposts be
requested not to fire so that they might surrender.
Request was granted. At 1300 we were guided, still
blindfolded, into a building, downstairs, and after
devious turnings, into a room. Our blindfold:> were
removed. We were in a cellar lighted by candles,
with one table in the center of the room. On the table
apparently was a map covered by waxed paper. There
was a semicircle of chairs arranged in front of the
table behind which sat Colonel Cobalt, Chief of Staff
of the organization. On his left was a blonde to act
as interpreter, but who acted more as distraction than
interpreter. She wore a red wool knit sweater, close
fit. What appeared to be a divisional staff, or a responsible facsimile thereof, was assembled for the
meeting. Colonel Cobalt asked our mission. We explained that we had come to ask unconditional surrender of the city and troops to prevent further casualties and damage to property. Colonel Cobalt said that
his commander, the general, could not discuss the
case. We, misunderstanding, said that if the General
did not care to discuss the matter with us, that our
General would be willing to come forward and discuss the matter with his Commanding General. Colonel Cobalt said that his commander was not empowered to discuss the matter at all. We turned and left.
"We were again blindfolded and proceeded to our
starting place. A major who had first escorted us met
us again on our return and apparently was sorry surrender had not been arranged. He said that he must
obey orders as a soldier, that his opinion as a private
individual was of no importance, and that he must
do his duty as a soldier. The first lieutenant in our
absence had conversed with Lt Schmitz, 30th Division Mil T earn, and had told him that he would see
us again, indicating that his troops would not fight
hard on our approach. The attitude of all soldiers,
with the exception of the Commanding General and
his staff, was that they were willing to surrender and
considered the war over but must resist because of
orders from higher headquarters. Our treatment was
excellent throughout. All officers accorded us the highest respect and apologized for the smallness of the vehicle and bumpiness of the road and the delay occasioned by waits en route. The presence of SS troops
in the front line and a snappily clad SS officer on the
General Staff indicates that an SS outfit is present,
not as a combat formation, but scattered throughout
combat units to strengthen their morale. In the
front line, Hungarian, SS, Wehrmacht, and Volkssturm were noted in the same organization indicat-
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ing a motley collection of odds and ends banded to- three regiments, with the I 19th Infantry on the south
gether into combat teams. The greatest apprehension of the others driving in from the west, the I 17th from
was occasioned the surrender party by friendly artil- the northwest, and the 120th from the north.
lery fire which chose the moment of our presence in
Maj Glazier outlined the plans brieAy at 2310 on
the city to register, and by P-47s which buzzed the the night of the 16th to the liaison officers in the S-2-3
town while we were negotiating. Violation of the truce office at Barleben: "For tomorrow's operations, 3d
would have been an element more dangerous than Battalion will attack for Magdeburg; it will follow an
the warning fire received en route."
air strike. Company 'G' will provide left flank pro(The M-29 with loudspeaker was never used, al- tection and the 1st and 2d Battalions will be grouped
though Lt Gerl had written a speech to induce enemy and be ready to assist the 3d Battalion. The 1st Batsurrender. There was no opportunity to speak.)
talion will be the unit to assist the 3d if necessary.
The commandant of Magdeburg who had "not been The 3d will have one company of TDs, one of tanks,
at liberty to discuss surrender" with Maj Glazier was and one platoon of engineers." (Assignment later reLieutenant General Hegener, a Nazi military bigwig vised.)
who had come recently from the city of Kustrin, where
The Regimental objective, which was the north·
he had directed defenses against the Russian advance; cast section of town, included the sections of: Neue
he had held out for some time at one of the three last Neustadt, Kol Eichenwetter, Alte Neustadt, and
strongholds along the Oder River before the Russians Nordfront. The goose-eggs on the map read "Teen,"
had burst over the harrier and were now beating on "North Stinky" and "South Stinky," and after that,
the gates of Berlin. Regener was as stolid and stubborn from a factory district to the river front, phase-lines
as Prussian generals come, and though the entire city were to be used in measuring the advance. The prinof Magdeburg, and military men including his closest cipal defenses seemed to be on the outskirts in the
officers, realized the senselessness of trying to with- form of roadblocks.
stand the Allied drive, he remained unwilling to surAt 0625 on the 17th of April Colonel Purdue told
Lt Claude F. Curtis, the Division Liaison Officer, that
render.
Some of his subordinates, including his Weapons "we will take an intermediate objective ('Harold')
and Munitions officer, a Capt Gerhardt, said later that approximately 1000 yards southeast of the autobahn
they begged him to reconsider. When 3000 refugee on which we will pause for a few minutes. Purpose
children were brought into the city by order of the is final reconnaissance before the attack. Company
Party, Hegener fumed, but still chose to defend vigor- 'G' had already prepared plans to seize objective
ously, even to attempting a counterattack once, which 'Teen' in order to protect the left flank of our attackwas discouraged when artillery shells damaged some ing troops."
of his vehicles. It was later learned that the officers
At 1510 Company "G" crossed the autobahn embelow him reported they had tried to assassinate him, bankments and headed for Objective "Teen," the
but found him too -.·1ell-guarded. Under his command numerous railroad tracks running north-south on the
were 1100 men, a motley crew ranging from a few western outskirts of Rothensee, location of roadblocks
SS troopers to railroad workers and Heich Service which harassed the Company "E" patrol the day be·
youngsters from 15 to 18 years old; these were organ- fore. There was little resistance; in a half hour the
objective was firmly in hand, the left flank secured.
ized into three battalions under a Col Macholz.
At the same time a platoon from Company "K" had
In spite of the fact that Maj Glazier felt that the
time was ripe for surrender and requested propaganda moved south from the autobahn crossing toward
pamphlets to be used as final persuasion, it was de- Magdeburg and without oppasition continued 1000
cided against wasting time with so stubborn an officer yards toward the city to an area which was to be the
as Hegener, and plans were made for an afternoon Line of Departure. Then there was a brief halt vvhile
the 3d Battalion, with a platoon of tanks and one of
attack on the 17th of April.
TDs, came forward along the exposed road, and leadLAST BATTLE: MAGDEBUHG
ers made their final reconnaissance; they could see alThe "big picture" involved the 2d Armored Divi- most into the center of town down the road from Barsion, whose Combat Command "B" was to contain the leben.
The initial attack for seizing the near edge of
south half of the city, while the 30th Division took
the north half. General I Iobbs planned to use all Magdeburg had to be made across approximately
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. . . and the result

1200 yards of level ground completely devoid of
vegetation other than low grass. In order to cross this
open ground without casualties from machine-gun
and observed artillery fires, it was necessary to screen
the movement with smoke. However, the closest possible mortar positions were not within these weapons'
range of the town. Therefore, 81 mm mortars of the
regiment were divided into two echelons. The first
echelon fired a screen about two-thirds of the way from
the Line of Departure to the near edge of the town.
Under cover of this screen, the riflemen and the second
echelon of mortars moved forward. Upon arriving
within range of the near edge of Magdeburg, this
second echelon quickly emplaced its mortars and
brought down an effective screen upon the objective.
This technique of leapfrogging had been practiced
during one of our brief training periods. The time
spent for this training was invaluable because we were
able to gain a toe hold on the city without the loss of a
man. The enemy blindly shelled the obvious route
of approach but the Regimental plan wisely called for
avoiding the obvious.
Unopposed by antiaircraft units which were hopeless and unwilling to make targets of themselves, an
air strike on the city by medium bombers had been
finished by 1445. The smoke was still curling upwards and a building was Barning against the skyline when the 3d Battalion, with Company "L" on
the right of the road and Company "I" on the left,
headed into Magdeburg. The enemy was initially
quiet, and advance was rapid until the troops approached the first main intersection in Neue Neustadt
on the city outskirts. There small-arms bullets began
to clatter against the buildings next to them, and occasional panzerfaust fire was received. Then, as the
men began rushing from cover to cover, 20mm anti-

aircraft guns and other weapons turned upon them.
Sgt Julian A. Trimeyer, of the 1st Platoon of Com·
pany "M ," attach e(I to Company "L ," (Iodge d mto
a
house and set his heavy machine gun in the windmY
to fire down the street. But a sniper perceived his
action, and he was wounded by riHe fire through the
window. Pfc Louis R. Rangel and Pfc Joseph E.
Gauthier of Sgt Trimeyer's squad had seen him
enter the house, but could not follow him because
heavy fire made the street for some moments a
perilous alley of almost sure casualty. The two men
decided to "mousehole" their way to the wounded
sergeant, and with grenades quickly blasted a hole
in the wall between the houses. They crawled through
the embrasure and while others helped carry Sgt Trimeyer to comparative safety, the two machine gunners
went to work with their weapon and outsniped the
sniper who was subsequently killed by one of their
bursts.
Advance began to slow considerably. Another roadblock at the next intersection took considerable time
to destroy. Looking down the street, forward troops
could sec 88mm antiaircraft guns located at key street
corners and even observed crews and civilians stirring
around them. The tanks and TDs near the front tried
to edge into alleyways and side streets; some hugging
as close as possible to buildings were hit by ricocheting
rounds from enemy 88s, and before the day was finished, one TD had been disahlecl and one tank had
lost a track.
Company "L" was held up for some time when its
lst Platoon, under Lt Alvin I I. Gordon, forged ahead
and was separated by enemy fire and infiltration from
the remainder of the company behind. The 2d Platoon endeavored to break through to the I st, hut even
with a section of the TDs was halted by an over-
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whelming volume of fire from small arms and 50mm
vuns, strategically located. One s(1uad leader of the
ld Platoon was killed. and two wounded in the fray;
Sgt Brigman also had to be evacuated. A great loss
was Lt Gordon D. flicks, who had been with Company "L" since July 18th, long one of the oldest veterans among riHe platoon leaders in the regiment; he
was wounded and died the following day.
:\loncoms had to be (JUickly drawn from the 3d Platoon, and Lt Jack T. Storm, executive officer, took
command of the 2d Platoon, which struck again to
regain contact with the 1st. Following behind, the
Weapons Platoon stormed a house at a cost of one
killed, one wounded. ,\TD was disabled by a panzerfaust, hut all the crew except one were saved. By 2100,
however, the 2d Platoon had driven through to the
1st. The 3d Platoon had contacted Company "I."
Ready for quick support, the 1st Battalion followed
the 3d, with Company "A" mounted on the tanks of
Company "B," 743d Tank Battalion, while Company
"B" (!st Battalion) was abreast on the left of the road,
and Company "('" in rear. With the 3d Battalion
241

slowed down and resistance heavier than expected,
the Hegimental commander ordered the 1st Battalion
to move up on the right (west) in the regimental sector and come parallel to the 3d, which as Maj McCullough said later was "pretty well canalized and had to
blow its way through buildings." Accordingly Company "A" dismounted from tanks and at the 3d Battalion Line of Departure moved southeast in two columns along different roads about 500 yards apart, the
Klein Kannen Steig and the Lerchen Wuhne. Behind
each Company "A" column came a reinforced company-Company "C" with two platoons of tanks on
the right, Company "B" with one platoon of tanks
on the left.
The 2d Platoon of Company "A" was leading the
1st Battalion advance. Lt \\'alter T. Johnson was at
the head of the troops, and about dusk was approaching the Fiehitz \\' uhne, which the 3d Battalion farther east had already reached. 3d Battalion men
had seen a block there protected by machine gun and
panzerfamt. Lt Col \\1illiamson found upon investigation that the block consisted of approximately
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a dozen wagons piled one on top of the other, obstructing the rood from building to building. Lt Johnson took his platoon around the block and returned to
report the enemy clear of the area. Two tanks were
sent forward to break through the block. But the
enemy had played a ruse.
Suddenly a panzerfaust explosion rent the air and
immediately a second was heard. The lead tank
was disabled and Lt Johnson was wounded at the
same time. Sgt Harold P. Driscoll, an assistant squad
leader, was close behind and having seen what occurred started for the wounded lieutenant. Johnson
crawled to a near-by sentrybox and called to the second tank to fire on the point of resistance. Even
though a flare was fired, expasing the movement,
Driscoll ran forward and reached Lt Johnson. lie
helped him back to a spot behind a more substantial
house where a wounded tanker was also lying.
T / Sgt Rex Edmonds, platoon sergeant, and S/ Sgt
Edwin R. \Velis, squad leader, were with the second
squad behind the tanks. After the explosions they
came forward to contact their platoon leader, and after
finding him wounded, Edmonds returned to bring up
some medics. He was on his way back to the wounded
officer with two aid men, and Wells had just met him
to lead them the rest of the way, when a volley of
panzerfaust fire landed close to them and enemy soldiers began to throw hand grenades at them. They
hit the ground; S/Sgt Wells was wounded.
Two medics, Pfc Herman Gershon and Pfc Herbert F. Schain, realized the difficulty of getting to
Johnson through the heavy fire but they had an
idea; with a convenient Red Cross flag which they
held aloft, they headed across the danger area where
\Vells had been wounded, all the time shouting in
German for the enemy to hold fire. And they made it.
The wounded were safely evacuated.
The roadblock was well-positioned, however, and
the battalion was still fighting there after 2100. By
2115 an east-west line along the road had been established by both the 1st and 3d Battalions (on Phaseline "Pork"). The two battalions took defensive positions for the night.
Desirous of knowing more about the roadblock facing the battalion Lt Col Williamson sent a patrol from
Company "B" to investigate the area around the intersection, to learn where the enemy defenders were
stationed or if they had withdrawn. Lt Warren I I.
Charleston led a ten-man patrol around the right
(west) Rank some 200 yards from the intersection and
crossed the road which was, for that night, no-man's

land. On the other side he came into a long factory
and traversed the length of it toward the door which
faced south into town. Stealthily the men were
emerging into a courtyard when suddenly three panzerfaust shots rang out and hit squarely in the middle
of the group, four of the resultant nine wounded being litter cases.
Though wounded slightly in the face himself, Lt
Charleston grouped those unable to walk inside the
factory and posted some of the less-seriously hurt at
each door. Then he sent his runner, Pfc Norman J.
Jordan, and his platoon sergeant, also wounded in the
face, to the rear to procure another squad either to
protect the evacuation of casualties or, if necessary, to
continue the mission. In a series of four separate trips,
Jordan brought eight more men for protection, led forward the medics, told his lieutenant that tanks were
coming to blast the house where the panzerfaust had
originated, and then directed the tanks. When he
finally headed back to the Company CP with his platoon leader, he had almost worn a path over the route.
Before he left to report his information to higher
headquarters, Lt Charleston stationed two men at
each of the four factory doors, to guard the evacuation
of the wounded by the medics. Sgt Don K. Seymour
::vid Pfc Leron A Murphy were posted at the door
closest to the house where the panzerfaust men had
fired, and while the aid men were laboring to adjust
and handle the wounded, they kept an eagle eye on
the courtyard. Suddenly a new volley of panzerfaust
was fired at them; it clattered at the window and they
fell to the floor. Apparently in an attempt to infiltrate
into the factory, Germans were approaching the door.
By this time the medics were carrying out the last
of the wounded and had to lift them over a high wall
at the other end of the building. Murphy and Seymour with eyes still watching the door began to withdraw toward the exit which led back to friendly lines.
In the dark close to them they heard a voice call in a
whisper, "Comrade-Paul-Comrade," but rather than
start a fire fight which would endanger the wounded,
they remained silent and slipped away unobserved.
As the medics were lowering the last man down the
wall, the two guards close by saw the Germans evacuating one of their men from the house next to the
factory.
The roadblock was organized in several houses
which like pillboxes were mutually protective and
covered most of the streets and yards around them.
The tanks were unable to eliminate the roadblock during the night. Meanwhile the enemy tried to infiltrate
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through the 3d Battalion lines at 0200, but was repulsed.
TI IE FALL OF MAGDEBURG
During the evening at higher headquarters changes
were made in the Regimental sector, which became
200 yards wider to the west. Because of this, Colonel Purdue decided to commit the 2d Battalion
in the eastern zone around the railroad area close
to the Elbe, while the 3d and 1st Battalions continued their advance south, pivoting around the 2d
Battalion to the east and to the river. Phase lines were
to he used to denote the advance.
I I-hour was set at 0630. The 2d Battalion's Line
of Departure extended northeast in a line from the
road held by the 3d Battalion; Companies "E" on the
right and "F" on the left had to move past Company
"G" on the outskirts of Rothensee to a built-up area
called Kol Eichenwetter whose southern boundary
was Phase-line "I lam," the LD. Company "E" moved
straight to the line the morning of the 18th of April;
at 0615 Company "F" hit an enemy strongpoint and
was delayed.
In a house one hundred yards to his right front,
Cpl Elmer B. Sniff, agent corporal of the 2d Platoon of
Company "'I"
r , attac hed to C ompany "F"
, saw a machine gun spraying the company. Armed with two
hand grenades and a carbine, he started forward, half
rushing, half creeping and crawling, and gained an
area twenty yards from the house. So close he could
see the enemy, to the number of seven inside, he
heaved his first grenade at the men by the gun. Almost
petrified by the surprise explosion, the Germans started
to escape. Sniff threw his second and last grenade,
which wounded six and killed one. In a few minutes
Company "F' had swept through the house and
pushed forward to the Line of Departure.
Company "F" was a quarter of an hour late beginning its attack but it moved ahead fast and was soon
abreast of Company "E." By 0922 both were 1500
yards in front of the Line of Departure with twentythree prisoners and no casualties. The 2d Battalion's
zone of advance continued south to a junction of many
rails; there its boundary turned southeast to the river.
Forward in this zone the two companies swept.
The 3d Battalion had begun its attack at 0630.
There was a brief period when the enemy seemed
to he making as much noise as possible to harass
the advance; a few second-story machine guns and
Schmeisser "burp" guns were sprayed wildly. Then
the resistance seemed to give way and having pushed
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through Company "L's" night defenses, Company
"K," abreast with Company "I," forged quickly up to
the 88mm guns which had been used the day before.
They had been deserted by crews which had either
Red across the river or which had to be used in another sector. The battalion reached the Alte Neustadt
section and crossed over the railroad tracks; here pivoting around the 2d Battafion, it headed southeast toward the river. Company "I" on the left Hank made
contact with Company "E" advancing on a parallel
line, and using joint CPs the two companies swept
over the bomb-Battened city-midsection and at 1130
reached the banks of the Elbe. Company "K" alongside reached the river simultaneously. In all, the battalion had seized 280 prisoners in the easy morning
attack.
A railroad bridge led east from Alte Neustadt toward Biederitz and was a possible route of enemy
escape. A 2d Battalion patrol reported to the Command Post at 1215 that the Germans had already
blown the span.
In the meantime the 1st Battalion had met more
resistance. The same roadblock which had disabled
a tank and wounded nine patrollers clipped the opening movement of the attack at 0630. Company "B"
had moved up on the left and struggled for the first
half hour of attack with the group of houses wherein
enemy picked at its squads with panzerfaust and
sniper fire. After gradually strangling off the blockdefenders, Company "B" managed to gain a mass surrender from the entire group of Germans and was
able to push forward. Responsible for the right half
of the battalion zone, Company "A" overran a motor
pool on its extreme right (west) and from it captured fifteen trucks and seventy-four prisoners.
Both companies advanced south quickly, past the
scattered factories and storehouses, Company "A"
reaching an apartment-house district, Company "B"
touching finally upon the north-south railroad through
town. I Jere the battalion pivoted east and pulled up
on line with the tracks. Along the rails the enemy
attempted a feeble defense line which crumbled when
the two companies surrounded and overran the few
automatic weapons there. East of the tracks was the
once stylish Exerzierplatz; from around the small shelters and low walls the troops received a few rounds,
but after some exchange of fire 144 Germans surrendered. It was about 1100 at that time, and the
Elbe was only !000 yards away.
Searching the houses and attentive for any last-
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stand roadblocks, the battalion moved over the last
section of the regimental objective-Nordfront. Shortly after 1230 a Polish prisoner recently liberated with·
in the city by the American forces told Company "B"
men he could lead them to the last surviving bridge
over the Elbe and could point out the cable leading
to the explosive planted by the Germans. Fifteen men
volunteered and ran forward of the advancing battalion following the eager Pole. Over a devious route
which the Pole must have known well, since thirty
enemy were later discovered to have been protecting
the area, he led them to houses within one hundred
yards of the river. There he signaled that only a few
could follow.
·
S/Sgt William D. Cloud, a platoon guide, Pk
Esta! B. Dalton, a BAR man, and Pfc Paul Gravenstein followed him. As they moved forward more
cautiously now, the Pole warned them about a German machine gun protecting the bridge twenty yards
to the north. Close to the banks he pointed to the
cable. Cloud was stepping down to cut it when as if
he had stepped on the detonator an explosion blasted
and sent remnants of the bridge in different directions;
debris, pieces of cement and steel, flew through the
air. The men hit the ground; as he lay still, Cloud
noted a dugout about thirty yards behind him. When
the air cleared he beckoned to his men and they moved
toward it. They found inside eighty German soldiers,
six machine guns, ten automatic rifles and numerous
panzerfaust. All were captured.
Meanwhile Company "B" was almost to the river;
near by it took a large group of 150 willing prisoners.
Near a large church elements of Company "A" came
to a halt for a few moments during a quiet advance.
Suddenly some shots were fired from a house across
the street; one man was wounded seriously and fell
to the ground. Four men close by realized that the
enemy sniper was located a short distance from them
and in an effort to gain cover they headed for an
open garage twenty feet away. The man in the lead
was too slow and was hit in the nose by the sniper's
next bullet. The other three, Sgt Wayne F. Perdue,
an assistant squad leader, Pfc Daniel T. Cseak, BAR
man, and Pfc William F. f landberg, reached the
garage safely and from convenient embrasures took
return shots at the enemy riflemen. With no target
but the wounded man in the street below them, the
snipers took awkward positions to fire at him, but
found he had fallen at a point they could not reach.
From the garage the three men caused tl1em considerable trouble by harassing their every movement.

In a few minutes a tank was summoned and when
within range of the house blasted it and caused the
snipers to surrender. After searching the houses, Company "A" soon moved through the area. It found an
air-raid shelter close by; at the bottom of the dark stairs
were huddled 1,800 terrified civilians. In a few minutes the company reached the river bank. The battalion had taken 433 prisoners, including a regimental
commander. By 1400 it was consolidated in a defen·
sive area along the riverfront in its zone.
Rothensee was the only town remaining in the regimental sector which had not been taken. While Company "G" mopped up the open area between Rothensee and Magdeburg's northernmost railroad bridge
in the Shutzhafen industrial district, the 2d Battalion
Antitank Platoon with a platoon from the Regimental Antitank Company moved through Rothensee and
though many military trophies were seized, there was
no opposition reported. By I 700 this mission had been
completed.
The 1st and 3d Battalions were now holding a line
along the Elbe River in the north section of the city.
At 1800 the 2d Battalion was ordered to complement
this river-defense by outposting the open area from
the city north to the waterline east of Glindenberg.
Company "G" took the north portion of the battalion
sector, from Glindenberg to a point where the EmsWeser-Elbe Canal forks; the line from there south to
the built-up area at the edge of the city proper fell
to Company "E." By shortly after dark these movements were completed, and Company "F" had assembled in Barleben.
From the IPW office came the word that prisoners
captured that day totalled 790, from miscellaneous
units. Also seized was an airplane parts factory and
storehouses containing liquor, foodstuffs, and candy.
With that good-sized score to its credit, the I 20th
Regiment completed its last attack in the European
Theater of Operations.
Though Magdeburg had fallen, enemy movement
could still be heard in the areas across the river. On
the night of the 18th-I 9th of April German patrols
were still circulating through the Ist Battalion lines.
In Company "A's" area T / 5 Joseph A. Saccon saw
some figures which he recognized as German darting
around the corner of a building. l le fired rapidly but
too late to have effect on the retreating figures. S/ Sgt
William R. Trembley, a squad leader, and Pfc George
A. Johnson appeared at the house door to investigate
the shots. The enemy tried to fire on the three men
from around the corner and threw hand grenades, one
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a miss and another a dud. Yelling for Saccon to fire
at the enemy from a new position he had taken, T rembley and Johnson rushed around the corner of the
building but found the enemy patrollers in Right.
In Company "B's" area, a similar patrol of eight
men who were headed east, apparently to escape across
the Elbe, was spotted by Sgt James G. Graham,
assistant squad leader, and later by Sgt Stanley Kurek,
light machine-gun squad leader, who from a CP door
staged a fire fight with the enemy. Shortly after the
firing, all became quiet; the enemy disappeared. The
next morning one German soldier was found wounded
and another killed in the area.
So ended the Regiment's first taste of large-city
fighting, of advance over automatic-weapon -swept
streets and of striking roadblock after roadblock of
panzerfaust or 88mm fire. In it the men learned never
to advance upon an intersection frontally; they learned
to feel out and Aank each possible strongpoint with
caution; they learned that tanks should where possible
use side streets and protected alleyways, but that they
were slow and could not always be had when desired.
"Yes, it was our first taste of city fighting, " said Lt
Col Williamson, and with a chuckle he added, "and
I don't like it."
Lt Gen Regener was ne\'er found in the city. It
was later discovered he had Heel at 0200 on the 18th
when the 30th Division troops were halfway to the
Elbe. By 0700 he was in Konigsborn over twenty
miles to the east and was to be awarded the Eichenlaub ( Oak Leaf Cluster) to wear on his Rittenkreuz
(Iron Cross) . On the 20th Regener made a radio address congratulating his troops for the magnificent
defense of Magdeburg and lauding the Fuhrer. In a
few days his world was to come crashing down about
his ears.
LAST DAYS IN COl\1BAT
The 19th of April, the day following the seizure of
Magdeburg, saw a change in dispositions: the 120th
Hegiment was assigned a sector of defense north from
the Rothensee area to a point l 000 yards south of
1leinrichberg along the riverline; the I 17th was to
rake over the defense of Magdehurg proper. The relief of the 120th's lst and 3d Battalions began at 0800
and they moved to positions in the new sector, then
occupied by the 2d Battalion which was to assemble
in Barlebcn.
East of central J\tagdeburg splitting the Elbe into
two streams was an island called Werder, covered for
the most part by a city park with its auditorium. At
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1040, as men of Company "I " were preparing to leave
their area in Magdeburg, they observed from the river
hank a small boat leaving this island. The crew of five
men, with a white Aag Auttering overhead, paddled
vigorously to the west shore. The Company "I" men
came forward as they landed and took them, all Germans, one an officer, to Capt Charles R. Shaw, Company "I" commander. The Germans explained to him
that Werder was filled with soldiers eager to surrender
and when Capt Shaw told them to produce all their
comrades who wanted to give themselves up, the flve
Germans returned unhesitatingly to the island and
had shortly come back with another group. After
several boatloads, fifty-six PWs were assembled in the
area of Company "I." The I 17th Infantry unit replacing Company "I" had now completed the relief,
and Capt Shaw's men were leaving. At the time thirty
more Germans were on their way across the river to
surrender, and the island was bristling with white
flags.
The soldiers on Werder had been assigned to blow
the hridges and act as a delaying force. The officers
captured said they realized the hopelessness of holding out and were happy to surrender. Besides, three
hours of firing that morning from lst and 3d Battalion mortars had withered some of their patriotism. The commanding officer of the Werder garrison
had been, surprisingly enough a Volkssturm member
and, far different from the worn-out specimens encountered so often previously, he was determined to
hold his ground at all cost. He was irritated with the
spiritless attitude of the officers he commanded, and
on the morning of the 19th went to consult with his
superiors on the east bank of the river. Profiting from
his absence, the officers engineered a mass exodus to
the American lines.
Before Company "I" had left, the Germans brought
over their company commander and his wife and children; he feared they would suffer typical reprisal
measures when the Nazis discovered his treacherous
and cowardly desertion. He said that of the ninety
German soldiers left to hold the island, almost all had
come willingly into American hands.
Meanwhile the lst Battalion had moved into its
new area, with Company "A" in defense of the Rothensee sector, Company "C" on line from a point 200
yards north of Rothensee to the autobahn, and Company "B" assembled in Barleben. The companies relieving the 2d Battalion were in position by 1400;
Company "B's" movement was completed at 1815.
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Minus Company "L," the 3d Battalion reassembled
in Wolmirstedt by 1440; at this time Company "L"
with headquarters in Glindenberg took responsibility of the sector from the autobahn north to a point
1000 yards south of Henrichsberg. Attached to the
120th Infantry on the night of the 18th-19th of April
was the 30th Reconnaissance Troop in positions defending the Heinrichsberg area north to the Division
boundary, extending from Loitche east to a point on
tfie Elbe due east of Zielitz. By 1600 Companies
"E" and "G" had been relieved and were assembled
with Company "F" in Barleben. Orders were for the
2d Battalion to make plans for repelling any enemy
attack and quelling any disturbance or "werewolf"
activity in the rear areas.
Company "K" left Wolmirstedt at 1900 the following day (the 20th) to relieve the 30th Reconnaissance
Troop in the Heinrichsberg area; the troop was relieved of attachments to the I 20th Infantry at the same
time. Two days later elements of the 35th Division
moved into I Ieinrichsberg to take over Company
"K's" outposts an d some o f Company "L's" tot he sout h.
Company "K" returned to Wolmirstedt at 19 50 on the
22d of April.
The line along the Elbe north of Magdeburg was
held in a series of outposts and roadblocks. Remain ing in function until the cessation of hostilities in
May, the Regimental Observation Posts reported
enemy movements, but the exchange of artillery or
even small arms was almost nil and the actual fighting so little that on the 23<l of April training of a
light nature began. Church services started a regular
schedule and movies were shown, even to those men
in the towns close to the river.
The sporadic contact with the enemy, up until the
end of the month, was a form of nervous reaction from
the fast-dying German nation. On the 21st of April
five men in Company "L's" 3d Platoon had a brief
conflict while on all-night duty at an outpost consisting of two machine-gun holes 2000 yards northeast
of Glindenberg. At about 2300 Pfc George W. Westervelt was looking toward the Elbe as it glistened in the
bright moonlight when he discerned three shadowy
figures approaching from the river. Sergeant Abel B.
Colombo beside him observed the same action; Westervelt shook Pfc Larry A. Niswonger, who had been
napping in one end of the hole. In another hole near
by, having also seen the uninvited guests, Pfc Joseph
A. Thomas woke Pfc Arthur G. Nadeau. Keyed for
anything, all five noted among the three men approaching within fifty yards a sudden movement

which appeared to be an attempt to throw a grenade.
Nadeau and Thomas opened fire at once.
Westervelt says, " . . . they continued firing until
they had used about fifty rounds in approximately
six seconds. This created a terrific commotion on the
field in front of us. The Germans shouted and moaned.
One of them kept shouting, 'Come to me, St. Peter!'
five or six times. The others just moaned and groaned.
Pfc Nadeau shouted in German to them to come out,
stand up, and hold their hands in the air as a sign
of surrender. One replied, 'Come here, American
comrades, and help us. We are wounded.' Nadeau
insisted that all those who could should come forward.
In a few minutes three Jerries emerged."
The Company "L" men found that there were six
men in the infiltrating party. Later, Westervelt says,
after three other men had been examined and found
wounded, the prisoners were taken to the platoon CP
and "stated that they were battalion headquarters men
who were out to capture our CP and personnel!" The
German lieutenant in charge later died where he fell
wounded near the emplacements.
Again on rhe 23d of April Company "L" men fired
on another infiltrating group, causing all but one
(who was killed) to withdraw. Two days later twentynine enemy crossed the Elbe and surrendered to Company "A" north of Rothensee. Displaced persons,
Poles, Russians and French laborers imported by the
Germans to work on farms and in factories, crossed
the Elbe in the evening of the 28th and were sent
to the rear by elements of the 3d Battalion opposite
I lohenwarthe.
On the 29th, with a white Aag, some Company
"L" men crossed the river, were shown to a CP near
the banks, and arranged for the surrender of four officers and approximately a comp<rny of men. As scheduled, at I 030 the next day this enemy group crossed
the Elbe with white Hags; as agreed, they were promptly escorted to the PW cage.
NEW M ISSION: OCCUPATION
The civilians had been a nuisance to troops since
the days of the Boer drive. Now, administration of
them filled more and more the daily routine of the
men of the Regiment.
On the 21st of April the Division Commander ordered units of the 120th Combat Team to take responsibility for patrol and control of certain sub-areas
and administration of certain towns. In these places
platoons, companies, or small guard details were stationed :

APRIL
lst Battalion: Hohenwarsleben, Ebendorf, Rothensee.
2d Battalion: Gross Santersleben, Schackensleben,
Kortmeisleben, Denstedt, Ackendorf, and Gatenswegen.
3d Battalion : Wolmirstedt, also Klein and Gross
Ammensleben, after the 29th April.
Antitank Company: Gersdorf, Hernsdorf.
230th Field Artillery Battalion and Cannon Company: Barleben, and Dahlemwarsleben.
Company "B," 823d TD Battalion : Klein Ammenslebcn, until the 26th of April.
Company "B," 743d Tank Battalion: Gross Ammensleben, and from the 26th of April, Klein
Ammensleben, both till the 29th of April.
Company "C," I OS th Engineer Battalion: Meitsendorf.
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Company "I" with 30th Reconnaissance Troop
( both under Division control from 1445 on the
21st of April): Oschersleben.

The areas were carefully surveyed, and a detailed
list of the housing facilities and stored foodstuffs in
each town was submitted. A list of "displaced persons" in each area was also compiled and sent to higher
headquarters. Key installations were guarded; main
roads were patrolled.
So April came to an end. It had been a fast-moving,
victorious month; the end of the war seemed near.
It had brought spring, literally and figuratively, to the
infantrymen of the 120th Regiment, who had been
disappointed so frequently while waiting for victory
and who had fought so well for it. The end was at
last in sight.

l\tlAY AND VICTORY
The story for the month of 1\1ay is comparatively on the hill, while the remainder oF the men, replacebrief. During the early days German prisoners crossed ments since that action, stood in formation behind
the Elbe to surrender in large numbers. A running the older members. The Division Band added to the
account from the After-Action Reports follows:
pomp of the ceremony with march music until all
"The approach of the Russians toward the east bank the ribbons had been presented; then the General
of the river caused a larger inAux to our lines. The addressed the men briefly, foJIO\,ved by a short talk
continuous advance was evidenced by the increasing from Colonel Purdue, who praised the men on the
anxiety of the Aeeing Germans, and their tales of work they had clone throughout the many campaigns.
woe were naturally music to the cars of the infanService units of the I 20th had been conspicuouslv
trymen.
outstanding both before and during combat. In charg~
'"In all areas troops carried out a program of train- of communications were Capt Raymond Welch and
ing and athletics. Schedules included: physical train- WOJG Al Z. I looper, whose crews had done difficult
ing, close-order drill, orientation and discussion, road and often gallant work. Capt James Meadors, l\1otor
marches, and reviews on military discipline and formal Maintenance Officer, and his assistant, WOJG Robert
guard duty.
]. Wilkins, had a well-trained and industrious section.
"While prisoner interrogation work decreased, ci- The supply department, under Maj John J. Eberhardt
vilian and displaced persons administration took the (since August) and WOJG Percy Dempsey, never
spotlight more and more, and a division directive, failed to procure and deliver all the necessities which
dated 28 April, assigned the IPW Team No. 46 (120th keep combat soldiers going, both during the trying
Infantry detachment) to Counter-Intelligence duty months of movement overseas and during the even
with the CIC detachment. Displaced persons had to more rugged months of combat in every kind of
be organized and were evacuated to designated Points weather and terrain. Capt Robert Nichols and WOJG
from whence they would be carried home. Each com- Angus T. Smith were consistently efficient as ammu pany had an assigned area for control and patrol, and nition officers. Ably assisted by CWO James B. Liles,
within these troops were posted as guards on key in- Capt Arthur T. Neumann directed a Personnel Sec·
tion and Post Office crew which were among the most
stallations.
capable
in the ETO. The Special Service and Awards
"No longer installed with Division Rear, the Personnel Section of the I 20th Infantry had moved for- Section was headed by Capt Harry L. Jackson and Lt
ward with Regimental Headquarters in Barleben on Hobert S. Gillette.
the I st May and for the first time the men in the
Both Headquarters and Service Companies, conlines saw the men who had been suprorting and sup- taining the Communications, Transportation, Maintenance, and Supply Sections, followed as closely be
plying them these many months.
"In line with the character of the Regiment's opera- hind the action as was tactically sound. Capt. Edwin
tion, for the most part occupational, the S-3 submitted J. Hardy commanded the former, and Capt Robert
Area Security Periodic Reports, which described the McClain, who succeeded Capt Layton C. Tiner after
location of troops and security measures being taken. Mortain, had the latter. In recognition of their out"The prisoners were surrendering in larger and standing work, the units were awarded the Meritorious
larger numbers so that processing them became a real Service Unit Plaque, for "efficiency, energy and disproblem. Early on the 4th May, battalions were urged cipline in training and overseas movement From I Jan to discourage mass surrenders; later the same day an uary to 29 February, 1944," and a Star for that Plaque
order was issued not to accept any prisoners whatso- because of "efficiency, energy, and devotion to duty
ever. Constantly active, the CIC detachment sub- from I March to 31 August" during movement and
mitted reports on suspicious German civilians and combat. Equally efficient was the Medical Detachment, headed by Maj William E. Knaus, whose unit
prisoners in disguise."
The 4th of May, on the fields near Barleben, Gen- was the recipient of the Plac1ue for the periods from
eral I lohbs presented the Distinguished Unit Citation January to August, 1944.
The Battalion I leadquarters Companies each with
to the defenders of Mortain for their gallant stand on
the hill (314) and at Abbaye Blanche, in August, 1944. their lower-echelon service groups also did outstand
Lt Saul Solow, Regimental Adjutant, read the cita- ing work, and were awarded the Plaque and Stars
tion. General f lobbs then awarded the blue citation for the same periods. First Battalion l leadquartcrs
ribbon to each man who had taken part in the action Commander was Capt Jack W. Starling; those of the
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All now is quiet

2d and 3d Battalions were Capts Willie B. Irby and
Charles E. Pritchard, respectively.
Though it was not the first contact by the American
forces with the Russians, it was an historic occasion
for the Regiment when on the 5th of May Maj McCullough took a 3d Battalion group across the Elbe
to meet the Hussians in that sector. At 0943 that morn ing members of the Red Army had first been sighted
in the area across from Company "L." The first men
in the Division to spat the Russians were S/Sgt Hugh
S. Jones, Sgt Julius P. Smith, Pfc James F. Powers,
and Pfc Clyde E. Eblin. After consulting with Capt
Wilson, the company commander, the men made arrangements for a formal meeting of the respective unit
commanders.
TI 5 Benedict Seidman tells about the meeting he
witnessed as follows:

plained that he and his unit had arrived in the area
at 0500 that morning. . . .
"Quickly dispensing with formalities, the doughs
began to mix with the Russian soldiers, many of whom
had been fighting Nazis since 1943, battling them
from the gates of Stalingrad through central Russia,
Poland and into the Reich itself. A jovial spirit was
in the air as soldiers of the two armies inspected each
other's equipment and weapons and exchanged stories of their experiences in the war.
"As indication of the jocular mood he was in, the
Russian major, a graduate of Moscow's military academy, said when he was asked how long he had waited
for the Americans, 'We waited for you in Stalingrad.'
"'We waited for you in France,' Maj McCullough
replied.
"A little while later a lieutenant colonel of a Russian artillery unit arrived. A short, stocky man with
graying temples, he was overjoyed to meet the American soldiers whom he greeted effusively. He led the
entire group through the near-by town of Hohenwarthe, which had been occupied by Russians. The
lieutenant colonel, who was thirty-seven years old,
told the Americans that the average age of the Russian soldier was thirty.
"The doughboys seemed particularly impressed by
the number of slant-eyed Mongolian troops they met.
Tm glad I never had to be fighting with one of these
boys,' lst Sergeant John R. Walker said admiringly.
"At about 1630, after a round of salutes and handshakings, the Americans started to leave for their assault boats to return to their side of the river. As they
were walking toward the embankment, a Russian full
colonel, who was in command of the sector, drove up
and called to them. . . .
"Using his hands with characteristic Russian demonstrativeness he said, 'Russian soldiers, American soldiers-a long-awaited dream. We are truly a body of

"It was a cloudy day and a light rain was falling
intermittently along the Elbe River, but for the group
of American doughs of the 30th Infantry Division who
were to cross the river to meet Uncle Joe's boys for
the first time, the weather had no dampening effect.
After waiting impatiently for the Russians to reach
the river for the past three weeks, these infantrymen
were in high spirits as they sped to a crossing site near
the blown autobahn bridge.
"Led by Maj McCullough, enlisted men representing every company in the battalion with the exception of one, members of the battalion staff, and two
officers of Company "L," the first company to contact
the Hed Army soldiers earlier in the day, set out in
assault boats from the bridge site to meet the longawaited Russians.
"Arriving at the east bank of the Elbe River that
afternoon at 1500, Maj McCullough and his men
were met by a major from a Russian artillery outfit.
After brief hut hearty introductions, the major ex-
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The 2d Battalion passes in review after being awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation

international soldiers here in this sector of Germany.
We have been told how good the American soldiers
were, but now we know how good they are.'
"At 1655 the Americans again started for their assault boats and, after another round of salutes and
handshakes, took leave for their own side of the Elbe,
satisfied that their Russian allies were all they expected them to be."
In Maj McCullough's group were members of his
staff: the Executive, Capt Delmont K. Byrn; the S-3,
Capt Edward M. Hill; the S-2, Lt Edwin J. Franklin;
and the S-1, Lt Harry R. Peters; also present were
Capt Earl F. Wilson and Lt Alvin I I. Gordon of Company "L," Capt Paul R. Tuttle of Battalion Headquarters Company, T /Sgt David \N. Gray, lst Sgt
Walker, 1st Sgt William G. Presnell, T / Sgt James
McManaman, T /Sgt Marshall Rogers, T / Sgt Thomas
D. Crosby, T / Sgt James W. Porter, and T/Sgt George
Sweeting. Also in the party were two stenographers,
including T / 5 Seidman and T /4 Albert J. Ujcich,
and two interpreters, Cpl Maxmillian Jacubovic and
Pfc Charles Rubenstein.
Elements of the 1st Battalion saw their first Soviet
Union soldiers when a five-man · patrol was observed
across the river at 1428 the same day (5th of May).
At 1725 OPs reported the Russians in large numbers
around Biederitz across the river. Shortly thereafter
the OPs closed down.
The three battalion commanders during the last of
the battles in the European Theater of Operations
were: 1st Battalion, Lt Col Ellis W. Williamson; 2d

Battalion, Lt Col James G. Cantey; and 3d Battalion,
Lt Col Chris McCullough. No regiment ever had a
better trio and few had as good. Furthermore, these
three constituted only one of the several outstanding
teams of battalion commanders formed continuously
from time to time. The life of a battalion commander
was rugged, the ever-present danger established for
him a probability of lasting a few weeks, or at most
months, in battle. The Regimental Commander often
spoke glowingly of his "workhorses: "
"Lt Col WilJiamson always showed true tactical
genius. He has an uncanny ability of arriving at the
best possible tactical solution. Furthermore, the exccution of his plans was always made more nearly perfect
by his great personal bravery and remarkable leadership. Possessing unlimited energy, he never stopped
working. By his skill, will to work, bravery and leadership, he saved many lives that otherwise would have
been lost within his battalion."
"Lt Col Cantey was another unusually strong battalion commander. I le has an uncanny ability to foresee possible enemy actions or reactions which might
cause casualties among his troops. By anticipating the
enemy's capabilities, he always had plans prepared
for meeting all possible contingences. Physically
strong, having great nervous energy, he too, worked
incessantly to save lives- and very successfully. When
the going was tough, there one would find Lt. Col
Cantey, his bravery enabling him to he where he
could best exert his fine leadership regardless of the
dangers involved."
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"Lt Col McCullough well earned command of a
battalion. There was no man in the Regiment more
brave. No one could equal him in physical strength.
Few had his capacity for finding ways to help others.
For example, it was impossible for the 2d Battalion
to evacuate the many wounded of Company "F'' when
that company was hard-hit in its attack on Thirimont.
Then 1st Battalion Executive Officer, Lt Col McCullough searched for and found the means of evacuating the wounded. They were not of his battalion
but, always working for the common good, he was
instrumental in having them carried from the snowcovered ground. Lt Col McCullough's subsequent
leadership of the 3d Battalion was outstanding. For
instance, the breakthrough made by his battalion immediately following the Rhine crossing was the cause
of the Regiment's great success that day. Lt Col McCullough is a soldier."
V-E DAY AND AFTER
The 8th of May was officially declared V-E Day,
and though the Regiment was preparing to move,
celebration was not forgotten, nor were some prayers
of thanks. In company day-rooms "old" veterans recalled the Normandy hedgerows, the blitz through
France, the rainy Thanksgiving near the lnde River,
the snow and cold of the Ardennes, and finally the
crashing successes over the Roer and the Hhine. In
the Regimental journal on the 7th of May appears
the entry:
"Ever since June 14th I have dreamed of the moment when this great entry could be made in the
journal of the I 20th Infantry H.egiment. . . . Lt
Simon, the Assistant S-3, is removing the blackouts
from the office windows. There is a devilish gleam
in his eyes, and a satisfied grin stretches from car to
ear. Our Executive Officer, Lt Col Reynolds; and
Maj Thomas, the S-3; have just left f01;. a stomach
warmer. And so we begin another day, but it had al-

ready begun differently from all others
. the war
has ended over here . . . . That is what is known as
starting the day off right!" The journal clerk was Sgt
Grant Weiler.
If peace brought happiness to the men of the I 20th,
it must have made their Regimental commander supremely proud and joyous. For Colonel Purdue was
a man who rejoiced in his men's good fortune and
whose constant desire was that they should fare well.
He had worked constantly and unselfishly for their
victory, and also for their well being. Their day of
triumph was certainly his happiest.
"NOTHING'S TOO GOOD"
In the university town of Fayett~ville, Arkansas,
Branner P. Purdue was bred in an academic atmosphere. His father was a professor at the University of
Arkansas, and from him the future Colonel learned the
value of steady application and exhausting thoroughness which was to distinguish his later work as regimental commander.
He enlisted in 1918 and served in the United
States. He was discharged after the Armistice, only to
re-enlist in the Regular Army a short time later. After
being sent to the Army of Occupation, he rose to the
rank of sergeant. He took competitive examinations for
West Point, and in 1925 was graduated as a second
lieutenant.
Since his graduation from West Point, Colonel Purdue has served in numerous and varied positions. Like
Brig Gen Birks, he was an athletic coach, and he also
produced winners. During the first part of the war he
was assigned to the Tank Destroyer Board from which
he was sent to Libya and Egypt as an observer with
the British Eighth Army. Upon returning to the
United States he activated and command the 6th
Tank Destroyer Group. A few months later he was
transferred to the Tank Destroyer School where he
was assigned as director of the Department of Tactics.
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In addition to his duties as director, he was instrumental in preparing a series of tank destroyer field
manuals. Upon completion of the one-year tour, he
was assigned as G -3 of the newly activated XXII Corps.
Soon thereafter, he was transferred to the 97th Infantry Division, where he commanded the 303d Infantry Regiment. After a short tour with the 303d, Colonel Purdue was sent overseas as a replacement regimental commander, reporting to the 30th Infantry
Division on the 20th of August, l 944. As an extra
colonel he spent most of his time forward observing
action and sometimes assisting junior officers. Colonel
Purdue took command of the l 20th Infantry Regiment by verbal orders of the Division Commander on
the 6th of October, being placed officially in command
the following day.
Old-timers remembered how hard it must have been
for a commander to take up where Colonel Birks had
left off. Although Colonel Birks had expressed every
confidence in Colonel Purdue, whom he had known
for many years, there were many who felt that no
one could replace the popular "Old Man" who had
brought the regiment through St. Je-c1n and l\1ortain.
But one battalion commander spoke for many of the
men when later he told some reporters visiting the
regiment, "It's impossible to say which of our commanders was the greater. Both, as far as I can see,
are tops. "
From the beginning Colonel Purdue revealed himself a master of tactics. During the assault on the Sieg-

fried Line, when one battalion had failed repeatedly
to take its objective and had lost many of its leaders,
he designed a plan of attack which was miraculously
successful. Later he achieved, during the Roer and
Rhine crossings, masterpieces of preplanning, coordination and smoothness of execution.
It was largely because he believed so wholeheartedly in his men and their welfare that he made sure
nothing would decrease the efficiency of his operations. It was because he wanted more than anything
else to save men's lives that he spent endless hours,
working day-in and day-out, upon the plans for attacks. It was because he was so thoroughly convinced
that "nothing is too good for my men," that he never
spared himself a minute of long, bitter, detailed work,
and made constantly sure that nothing could go wrong
with his projects. And because he spent many sleepless hours before the J-1-hour of some big operation,
he probably saved as many lives as any man in the
Division .
f le had planned tirelessly, but he never considered
his duty done after he had made plans. Always, especially during the rough times, he was where the
action was, up beside his riflemen. Ile watched every
execution intently, and never a detail escaped him.
Unbelievably cool in the heat of battle, he was able
to make vital decisions and still to keep his sense of
humor under the most harrowing circumstances. During the counterattack on "Wald" near St. Vi th, he went
hurriedly forward to see it for himself, and men will re-
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member him ploughing through the snow with Lt Col
Greer, missing not one single point in the action that
had occurred. His "booties" and his Christmas socks
were but small tokens of his thoughtfulness.
"Nothing is too good for my men." V-E Day must
have made Colonel Purdue very happy. Thinking
back, men in the Regiment must have been thankful
on the day of victory that their commander was a
man named Branner Pace Purdue.
On the 9th of May, pamphlets written in four languages and prepared by SHAEF were dropped by
Army planes, and fluttered down upon the sunny fields
around Barleben. They proclaimed to English, French,
Germans and Poles that the War in Europe was over.
Most of the I 20th Infantry had already left the
little town near Mag<leburg. Orders had been received,
and the battalions were headed for a new region, the
beautiful Harz Mountains, renowned in centuries past
for its melodious canaries. \\' hat Chamber of Commerce ads called the "Gateway to the Harz Mountains" was Wernigerode, quaint and picturesque village where the Begiment established its headquarters
on the 9th. The area was refreshingly unscarred by
war, and the weather was for a time summerlike;
both facts were reflected in high optimism on the
part of the troops. While the Regiment moved into

Grand American girls

Warrant Officer James B. Liles

the colorful town, the companies spread out into
different small villages, each establishing itself opulently in houses and enjoying the luxuries of civilian
life- almost. There was still guard duty, military government details, and constant maintenance to do. But,
generally speaking, it was a more pleasant life than
it had been since long before combat.
There was but one incident which recalled to the
men that they were still far from trusted by the conquered civilians. On the I Ith of May, two American
soldiers from a near-by unit were mysteriously killed
and left in the fields near the town of Schierke, where
elements of Company "G" were stationed. Armed with
twenty-two BARs, members of Company "G" scoured
the near-by woods for any trace of "Werewolves."
I lowever the guilty were never found. On the other
hand, prompt and effective reprisal measures demonstrated to the local Germans that it would be unprofitable for them to continue that type of warfare.
By then the much-discussed "point-system" of demobilization was going in to effect, and on the 16th
of May, Colonel Purdue gathered together the men
who were headed home with the highest number of
points in the Regiment and bade them farewell in
the square of Wernigerode.

USS Marine Wolf

Uncertainty as to the future of the Regiment was
uppermost in the minds of those who remained behind. Even after the I 20th headed south on the 29th
of May and settled in the area around Plauen, near
the Czecho-Slovak border, no one could guess what
new assignment awaited us. The duties were of the
occupational order: administration of PW cages,
guard, maintenance. The 1st Battalion guarded, fed,
and finally discharged almost 50,000 German soldiers.
The 3d Battalion had many pleasant experiences as
they were nearest the Russians who were always out
for a good time. And for recreation there were athletics of every type, including horseback riding, swimming, softball; there were movies in some parts of
the Regimental area every night; and educational
tourist trips to Buchenwald and to picturesque castles
in the vicinity.
Then, late in June, came word that the 30th Division was scheduled for redeployment to the Pacific
through the United States. On the 25th of June, a
rainy morning, all men who had 85 points gathered
in the theater near the Regimental CP at Treuen.
After hearing Colonel Purdue's farewell message, they
made their way singly to the trucks which were to
take them to the 76th Division, where they would re254

main until transportation was available to carry them
to the States and discharge. The same day, they were
replaced by low-point men from the 76th Division.
Four days later Colonel Purdue told many officers
who also were leaving for the 76th Division, "It is
hard to see men go whom you've fought beside in
combat, believe me, but I still have every confidence
in the Regiment. I know it will carry on the excellent
tradition which you have left it."
The following day, the 30th of June, saw the Regimental convoy turn west-homeward bound. The first
lap was across most of central Germany, to a small
town near Frankfurt am Main, headquarters of Gen eral Eisenhower. Where two roads cross in the middle of a large field to make four plots, the battalions
pitched their first tents since combat. The men pitched
the canvas rows neat and straight, very different from
the German homes to which they had become accustomed. The Regimental CP was in a schoolhouse in
the neighboring town of Lorsch. Training on a small
scale began; some men took trips to famous Heidelberg. The 4th of July was gloomy and cold.
And so it remained on the 6th, when the riAe troops
boarded trains on which they crossed the Rhine and
the German border into France. The motor elements

We were soon to be home

left a day later, and after being reviewed by General
l Iobbs at the Rhine, passed through the Siegfried
Line and one extension of the Maginot Line. They
stopped overnight in an ample bivouac area near
Montmedy, France. On the 8th of July both elements
reached Camp Oklahoma City, assembly area near
Rheims, France.
Three weeks more allowed the Regiment to prepare for overseas movement; some eguipment was
turned in; much was crated and labeled. Oklahoma
City was no "GI paradise," but the USO shows and
the coffee and doughnuts were plen'tiful. For the more
sophisticated, passes for Paris were always available;
softball was popular.
On the 27th of July, on a grassy field above the
camp, T /Sgt Francis S. Currey was honored in a
Division ceremony, wherein General Hobbs presented
the Company "K" platoon sergeant with the Congressional Medal of I lonor. Following the presentation, officers of the Division were briefed by the General on the job which lay ahead.
Spaced at four-hour intervals during the day, trains
left St. Erme near Oklahoma City on the 31st of
July, carrying the I 20th Regiment, a battalion at a
time, to the coast of France. Some say the Army is
slow, but one battalion of one thousand men was
served hot meals in nineteen minutes. The next day
the units reached Camp Lucky Strike, near St. Valeryen-Caux, and not far from Dieppe, where some members of the Regiment toured to inspect the intricate
pillbox-tunnel network which repelled the British-

Canadian Commando raid during August, 1942.
The Regiment was gathering momentum in its
journey, and two days later, trucks carried the men
to the battered docks of Le Havre, and there they
boarded the Marine Wolf which brought them in
eight hours to the Southampton piers.
The home of the I 20th in England was Tidworth
Barracks, near Salisbury. Here on the night of the 3d
of August all units arrived, and were billeted in lofty
red-brick dormitories. In a few days money had been
converted and pubs were filled with I 20th doughboys. Old-timers recalled the days at Bognor and
Aylesbury; it seemed long ago in many ways.
The 9th- I 0th of August was designated as passday for the whole Regiment, and every man was
granted a pass either to London or to the resort town
of Bournemouth. The l 0th was not only to be an enjoyable day, but also an historic one. Over the wire
came the news of Japan's surrender. London seethed
with excitement, and men of the I 20th rejoiced that
they would not have to face Pacific combat.
Four days later the good news was confirmed, so
that when on the 16th the Regiment boarded the
trains for Southampton, it was in a spirit of high exaltation. Decorated by huge sheets of canvas which
sported the "Old I Iickory" insignia, the Queen Mary
swallowed up some 15,000 troops. It was her first trip
from Southampton since the day she escaped the port
after war with Germany was first declared.
If the trip home was crowded uncomfortably, and
if some men were miserable during their 24-hour
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shift on the upper deck, at least the voyage was not
long. Two meals a day were filling, and there were
movies on deck. After sailing early the morning of
the 17th, the "Mary" reached Pier 99 in New York
at 2300 on the 21st.
Early the morning of the 22d of August the troops
of the 120th were headed across the I-I udson River
to New Jersey where a train was to take them to Camp
Kilmer; then a day of record-checking and telephoning and orienting. Then-home-it seemed impossible
-home for thirty days.
And what's more, it turned out to be forty-five days.
The reassembly of the Regiment occurred about the
I ';th of October at Fort Jackson, S. C., the old home

station. But many, many men were discharged, and
the rest were shipped to other outfits. The 120th Infantry Regiment became inactivated on the 23d of
November.
"With all our minor troubles," Colonel Birks once
said, "we have been successful in everything we have
done." "We have taken every objective, and never
turned one loose," Colonel Purdue told his men. "You
may be proud indeed, for few men can say that of
their outfit." All the men in the 120th did not come
through the ordeal safe and sound, as Colonel Birks
prayed, but those who did return will continue to hold
their heads, as he wished, "high in the pride of vietory. "
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KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, OR DIED OF WOUNDS
Lieutenant Colonel
McCollum, Paul W.
Majors
Bynum, James J.

Lambe, Leland L.
Captains
Bell, Ernest W.
Bunch, Walter A.
Christy, Ralph L.
Hobgood, Robert M.
Lott, James V., Jr.
McKendry, Norman J.
Reines, Herbert S.
Smith, James W.
First Lieutenants
Andrew, Tom F. H.
Angelo, Harry
Brazil, Raymond P.
Brookhart. Paul A.
Byers, Donald E.
Colvin, Donald W.
Cook, John M.
Dewey, Helmer H.
Friesner, Curtis D.
Garner, Thomas R.
Gonder, Fred N.
Grimshaw, Jack S.
Harnden, Carl C.
Hicks, Gordon D.
Kuchenrither, Dan R.
Lambert, Frederick
Lloyd, Edward D.
Murphy, Edward V.
Nelson, Kenneth R.
Osborn, Clifton G.
Pease, Foster S.
Pike, Charles B.
Piscitello, Archie J.
Ponder, Arch R., Jr.
Pullen, Robert L.
Schlemmer, Frederick
Shanks, William P.
Siwek, Saul D.
Smith, Albert
Steiner, Lewis C.
Stewart, John A.
Trippensee, Frank E.
Williams, Clement W.
Ziegler, Leo O.
Second Lieutenants
Ashmore, James L.
Barrett, John H.
Blaufeld. Walter, Jr.
Blowfeld, Walter
Boland, Bernard H.
Duncan, Henry A.
Dupuis, John K.
Dye, Richard S.
Englehart, Thomas C.
Fite, Richard H.
Gerth, Marshall D.
Gores, Leo C.
Greeno, Arthur K.
Hall, Dean F.
Hicks, Karl K.
Huffman, Phillip A.
Kozera, Joseph L.
Lutzkivich, Matthew M.
Malena, Arthur S.
Miller, John M.
Morris, Robert A.
Ose, Keith T.
Shields, Leo W.
Steelman. Leroy H.
Sweeney, Charles E.
Thompson. Peyton W.
Weinstein, Jack

First Ser1reants
Anderson, William A.
Brandon, Hugh P.
Hartness, Robert Z.
Messer, Jappie G.
Ruback, Albert J.
Woody, Hard J.
Master Sergeants
Blouse, Anson L.
Ellis. Clarence F.
Pettigrew, Floyd J.
Technical Sergeants

Bakken, Glenn M.
Beadman, Howard E.
Beamon, Jerry H.

Bullard. Calvin T.
Byers, Wilburn A.
Camancho. Henry K.
Clampit, Claud W.
DiPierro, Scipione D.
Evans, John W.
Finkelstein, Sol
Gillam, Everette

Hollingsworth, Milton
Hovland, Alfred
Hunter, Robert H.
Jones, Aubrey A.
Jones, Herbert C.
Jones, William E.
Kaliff, Sabha A.
Klenn, Newman C.

Goins, Everette
Grimes, Johnnie G.
Grisson, Earnest W.
Hawley, Grady W.
Hoover. Herbert A.
Howard, Bennie F.
Kalinauskas, Bruno J.
Keener, Monte W.
King. John N., Jr.
Knight, James A.
Lewis. Hinton C.
McCullough, Charles E.
Mciver. Thomas M.
Messer, Willie L.
Moore, Hubert A.
Morehead. George C.
Peoples, Allen L.
Phillips. William T.
Rescigno, John
Sletten, Donald H.
Snedgar. William S.
Snoad, Russell N.
Terry, Walter E.
Thompson, Paul M.
Turash, William
Van Buskirk, Fred
Watson, Grover D.
Weavers, Howard F.
Winstead, Ralph L.
Wintier, Antoine E.
Yost, Ernest
Zepeda, Ramon R.
Zuidema, John A.

Kingery, Dennis R.

Kowalski, Leo J.
Lazenby, William L.
Levine, Hyman
Lewis, Joseph C.
Lewis, Robert F.
Lingo, Donald
Loftis, Belton R.
Lucey, Patrick R.
McCurry, Seth
McKelvy, Edward A.
Mastracci, Frioe D.
Matthews, Robert M.
Mena, Lawrence V.
Mew, Charles A.
Moore, Robert L.
Morrison, Robert V.
Murphy, Carl E.
Murphy, John E.
Mannery, Edward J.
Neahr, Robert E.
Niewiedowski, Theodore
O'Connor, Michael P.
Oldham, Robert
Pendleton, Jack J.
Pete, George
Prample, Elroy F.
Price, William H.
Rhanlt, Edmond J.
Rich, Harold E.
Riley, Francis J.
Ripper. Richard L.
Rolf, Lester M.
Rosenberger, Merlin
Russell, Ario A.
Rutman, Albert
Ryan, Thomas J.
Sawyer, Frederick 0.
Schunk, Paul M.
Sellers. Onais A.
Shea, Bart F.
Shelley, Andrew J.
Shields, Lewis W.
Shrout, John E.
Sisk, John E.
Snow, Cecil J.
Soils, Claro
Stagner, Gene
Stallings, Julius
Stepanek, Frank M.
Stewart, Thomas E.
Strobel, Victor E.
Stump, Warren L.
Tate, Charles L.
Terrell, Cletus W.
Thagard, Robert J.

Staff Sergeants
Abbott. Glenn L.
Allen, Willard L.
Anderson, John A. J.
Arent, Lawrence
Ayers, Lawrence H.

Ayers, Lloyd W.
Baird, Robert J.
Baum, Kenneth R.
Bazaras, Adolph E.
Behr, Alexander M.
Binegar, Daniel L.
Blaud, Anson L.
Bosco, Rosario J.
Bourasso, Wilfred F.
Bowersoy. Harry 0.
Bradley, Palmer L.
Bradshaw, Charles
Brown, Kenneth C.
Bruner, William E.
Burkett, Leroy D.
Butler, Harold 0.
Callaway, Howard E.
Carter, Dan W.
Champion, Robert V.
Chilton, Jack M.
Clum, Merrell J.
Cochran, Russell L.
Cody, Jesse J.
Cooper, Fred H.
Crisman, Merton B.

Davant, Shelly H.
Degenhardt, Rallis G.
Didelot, Melvin T.
Dowler, Harold D.
Dunn, John E., Sr.
Edwards, Donald L.
Ellis, Clarence A.
Ellison, Milton
Evans, Charles D.
Feimster, Horace W., Jr.
Fisher, John E.
Gainey, John V.
Gallagher, Daniel T.
Garren, Willis, Jr.
Gates, Wilfred O.
Gilson, John J.
Glosson, Elbert L.
Gluhan. Steve L.
Goff, Donald R.
Graves, Joe P.
Greene, James T.
Guidorizzi, John J.
Hansen, Henry E.
Hargrove, Chester L. M.
Harris, William J.
Hedgepath, Percy L.
Hobday, John W.
Hoffer, Marion E.

Thoma!=I, Clarence D.

Thorson, Thor J.
Tomsey, John J.
True, Willis M.
Van Nort. John
Vinson, John M.
Waite, John W.
Warnock, Clowes V.
Weiss, Frank P.
Welch, Francis E.
Whitcher, Daniel A.
Wiederhold, Charles J.
Wise, John G.
Yonski, Frank G.
York, Edward G.
Sergeants
Albert, Sam M.
Antonelli, Raymond L.
Baker, Donald W.
Baker, Samuel W.
Balaska, John M.
Barnes, John
Beadles, William H.
Benner, Ernest P.
Blaida, Henry
Boker, Raymond J.
Buchanan, Joe
Bulson, John C.
Bustin, Nelson H.
Cahill, Edward R.
Chancellor, Bueford L.
Check, George J.
Clark, Georgia H.
Coleman, Charles G.
Conover, Wilbert W.
Conway, Wilford G.
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Couey, Percy H.
Crum, Roland R., Jr.
Crumley, Broughton B.
Dalton, Berkley P.
Davis, Mortimer

Davis, Richard C.
Davison, Homer E.
Degenhardt, Hollis G.
Donoway. Loyd J.
Dusano, Clifford G.
Eisenberg, Isidore
Ewert, Rudy G.
Frazier, Downey T.
Giandonato. John N.
Green, William L.
Greenwood, Clifford N.
Haga!, Russel W.
Hague, Russell W.
Hairfield. Edward E.
Harris, Albert A.
Hartman, James H.
Hazlett, Arthur
Hirst, William B.
Holland, Clifford W.
Howard, Julian L.
Hurley. William B.
Ianni, Francis J.
Jacob•, Ronald H.
Jones, Charles I.
Keaster, Finis M., Jr.
Kelly, Carl B.
King, James D.
Laycock, Theodore
Locke, Dean D.
Lomseg, John J.
McClenny, Ellis P., Sr.
Mahoney, Joseph J.
Mankiewicz, Stanley A.
Markle, Neals
Miller, Oliver V.
Mobley, Leonard H.
Mosso, John B.
Nelson, Robert L.
Overman. William R.
Penn, William F.
Pentecost, William T.
Peterman, Robert F.
Peterson, John M.
Pollicino, Joseph J.
Presley, Johnnie R.
Preziose, Michael J.
Rahe, Arnold A.
Rhind, Scott A.
Robidoux, Adjutor
Rolland, William E., Jr.
Russomano, Leon
Sargent, James W.
Schulte, Francis J.
Sessions, Andrew J.
Sherba, Michael
Singer, John C.
Smith, Emmitt
Spidaletto, Joseph J.
Stark, Dennis C.
Strobo, John
Thieman. Lloyd W.
Thorp, William
Thurley, Harry D.
True, Willis M.
Vaticonis, Veto S.
Vincent, James M.
Ward, Dale R.
Weedon, Harold D.
Wcyh, Ralph R.
Wise, John C.
Wood, Donald J.
Zimmerman, Alton L.
Zupo, Victor
Technicians Fourth Grade
Edwards, Robert L.
Edwards, Robert T.
Erickson, Ed G.
Fake, Gerald
Lichillo, James
Pettigrew, Samuel G.
Small, Donald J.
Corporals
Arvin, Vernon W.
Behrman, Paul C.
Bunn, Charles E.
Cook, Arnold H.
Dillman, Joseph R.
Eckhoff, Frederick T.
Farlso, James D.
Faulkner, Shelby M.
Foehl, William F.
Giardino, Joseph
Holler, Maxwell L.
Kendall, Daniel M.

Kielbasinski, Thadius I.
Leo, James S.
Lyons, James J.
McGovern, Edward P.
Mcintosh, Warren C.
Mabry, Benjamin F.
Mankin, Frank

Matausch, Constantin
Milber, William
Miller, William
Morgan, Charles E.
Ollenburg, Philip T.
Oswalt, Ralph V.
Pastva, Paul J.
Perza, Joseph A.
Pousont, James A.
Reynolds, Gordon V.
Schoenwetter, Lyle E.
Schubert, Walter H.
Sharp, Ernest G., Jr.
Smith, Thomas R.
Snyder, Albert E.
Ten Cate, Homer E.
Thagard, Robert J.
Thomas, Roger W.
Thompson, Arnold W.
Toperzer, Robert G.
Vavoulis, Theodore
White, Drew B.
Williams. Houston W.
Willoughby, Gordon W.
Wilson, Hayden M.
Witzman, Jerome T.
Worley, Edward J.
Technicians Fifth Grade
Abrahamson, Lyle C.
Barker, Willie
Boggs, Carl T.
Bruner, Fred
Bunn, Charles E.
Buntyn, James W. T.
Burruss, Robert T.
Clark, Bernard W.
Cleland, Virgie
Coulliette, Huston G.
Dotson, John F.
Fitzgerald, William A.
Flanigan, Lewis R.

Good, Irving
Herl, Orville R.
Hingston, Robert T.
Jariett, Marwood A.
Justice, Clyde E.
Knapton, Ross C.
Lowery, William J.
McClurkan, Paul G.
McKeon, James B.
Maginnis, John J.
Medlin, J. C.
Myers, Charles A.
Pearson, Merlyn W.
Perez, John
Perry, Colon G.
Pitts William 0.
PotU:, William 0.
Sauls, John
Snyder, Walter A.
Spivey, Jasper C. ,
Thomas, Herbert IC.
Turner, Harley H .
Weathers, Carlos A.
Wilkin son, John F.
Privates First Class
Abad, Joseph
Acred, Rabon F.
Adam•, Ruben
Albini, Giovanni L.
Alco, Dominick J.
Alcorn, Austin C.
Aliperto, Louis M.
Allen, Joe S.
Alley, Lewis S.
Amis, Vernus
Anderson, Floyd J.
Anderson, Harold L.
Annis, Alfred L.
Avery, Harold E.
Ayers, Emmet M.
Backus, Hazil L. F.
Baer, Aaron
Baker, Roger G.
Balick, Nathan
Ballam, Gordon W.
Barker, Robert J.
BaroCsky, Melvin
Batchelor, William J.
Battistini, Anthony J.
Bam•rnhuber, Isadore
Beall, Howard L.
Beck, Efrid D.
Beckett, James
Bench, Clarence A.

Eisenberger, John P.
Elliott, George R.
Ellis, Dale H.
Erb, William J.
Ezzell, Doy le C.
Fabian, Sheldon B.
Flanning, Glen B.
Faust, Jacob
Fessler, Wayne R.
Fischer, Robert
Foltz, Marvin J.
Friedman, Arnold
Frisco, Gilbert P.
Gal mer, Dude J.
Galuppo, Henry S.
Gammel, Murie
Garcia, John C.
Gardner, Robert W .
Garrett, Howard L.
Gebo, Lyle M.

Bennett, Luther M.
Bennett, Paul M.
Bialobrzeski, Chester J.
Bieber, H erbert W.
Bigotta, John A.
Black, Boyd M.
Blackmer, Clair V.
Blanchfield, John L.
Bobowiec, Paul P.
Hohowski, Bennie
Bohrer, Earl L.
Bonetti, John W.
Book, Earle C.
Bottoms, Edward C.
Bowers, Edward J.
Bradford, Travis L.
Brasel, Allen L.
Bremer, Leslie E.
Brissette, Dollard H .
Britch, George
Brooks, Robert N.
Brown, George R.
Bruce, Hershel V.
Bryant, Charles A.
Bryden, Walter
Bucci, Atigelo R.
Buckey, Earl C.
Bud, Joe M.
Burkeen, Dempsey
Burkhardt, Robert H.
Burns. Kennon C.
Bury, Leonard A.

Geise, Joseph L.

Gerkin, Billy J.
Gerking, Carl E.
Gerry, Chester M.
Gersomovic, John A.
Gerstein, Albert
Gibson, George G.
Gladson, Clyde W.
Glonke, Bruno E.
Glumm, Clyde E.
Goetz, Warren R.
Golden, Robert W.
Golimowski, Aldysius A.
Good, Frederick

Cabral, Manuel

Cagle, Joe H.
Caldwell, Jesse R.
Canavera, John G.
Carito, Patrick J.
Carleton, John R.
Caron, Adelard G.
Carroll, Leonard E.
Carver, Emmett W.
Carver, Edward K.
Cash, James W .
Catlett, James R.
Cennami, Salvatore

Goodmanson, Merlyn

Googe, James R.
Gordon, Harry L.
Gordon, Percy H.
Goshien, Milton H.
Gouin, Howard S.
Gould, Raymond W.
Grahal, Steve S.
Graham, William C.
Graves, Johnnie 0.
Greene, Merwyn H.

Grimaldi, Salvatore M.
Groce, John T.
Grogan, Kenneth J.
Guest, Peter H.
Gulick, George S.
Hagner, Warren L.
Hagney, John J.
Halbrook, George 0.
Hall, Cleatus E.
Hall, Robert J.
Hamilton , Alva D.
Hancock, James E.
Hanks, Roger N.
Hanna, Frank
Hansen, Elmert
Hardy, Leopold
Harper, Norman W.
Haslam, Robert E.
Haupt, Howard W.
Haviland, Barry
Heagy, Carl R.
Henning, Vernie L.
Hermann, Donald H.
Hise, Charles T.
Hockridge, Ralph
Hohn, Charles J.
Hohn, Hilary P.
Hoium, John R.
Honeck, Wilbert
Honeychuck, Bernard A.
Horntred, Arthur L .
Hoover, Charles L.
Horsley, Floyd W.
Hos pit, Peter J.
Howe, Earle S.
Huard, Lawrence J.
Huerta, Ralph C.
Hultien, Roy E.
Hunt, Edward
Hurley, Frank J.
lannuzzo, John
Irwin, Hubert M.
Ivy, Jessie E.
Jakubdzak, Edward J.
James, Walter E.
J amraz, Stanley
Japs, Howard E.
Jernigan, Willis W .
Jones, Jim M.
Jones, Richard H.
Jordan, Johnie E.
Jorgenson, Melvin R.
Juedes, Norman C.
Joseph, Nassia G.
Kandracs, Michael
Kegley, Ray S.
Keith, Jesse J.
Kelly, Simon A.
Kinman , R. J., Jr.

Centers, James

Chadd, Lawrence E.
Chadwick, Cecil J., Jr.
Chapman, Lewis E.
Chapman, Silas S.
Chappell, Ira E.
Cheney, Evans H.
Chittwood, Raymond H.
Christopher, Martin, Jr.
Clark, Edward J.
Cochran, Albert W .
Cobey, Joe C. P.
Colemen, Harry W.
Colson. Lawrence V.
Comastri, Dante A.
Conkin. Earnest
Connolly, Cletus J.
Conroy, Stephen L.
Consiglio, Joseph A.
Consiglio. Nick
Constantine. Biton P.
Coscia. Mario S.
Cox, Henry J .. Jr.
Cox, Joe W.
Cox, Wilber
Cozzens, William I.
Crawford, Earl W.
Cricca, Rocci J.
Crowe, Fred W.
Cullen, Francis
Currie, Donald H.
Cyr, Bernard J.
Daniels, Francisco P.
D'anna, Natoli
Daugherty, Jack B.
Davis, Earl J.
De Berardinis, Robert
Degado, Jose Y.
DeLuca, Giovanna N.
Deluca, John J.
Demar., Alphonse A.
Dobbs, James 0.
Dolan, Harold L.
Dominique, Clebert J.
Doty, John H .
Douglas, Eldon D.
Duck, Henry T.
Duchane, Gustave A.
Duke, Namon C.
Dunavent, Eugene

Dungan, Allen B.
Dunger, George E.
Dunn, Lewis W.
Dupee, Alfred J.
Eaves, Harold E.
Edgeworth, Etheridge F.
Edwards, Henry H.
Edwards, Norris L.
Efferen, Howard B.
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Kimmel, Francis C.
King, Orwell
Kirk, Owens L.
Kirkwood, James G.
Kleczkowski, Stanley J.
Klotz, Sam
Knazynski, Casper
Koperniak, Thaddeus L.
Kuester, Charles S.
Kuhn, Donald E.
Kunkle, Franklin C.
Labelle, Frank J.
Lamb, Carl
Lambe, John H.
Large, Walter F.
Lathbury, Forrest B.
Lawrence, Johnson H .
Lawson, Lucious R.
Lea, Grey L.
Lee, John F.
Lee, Murray
Lemon, James A., Jr.
Levy, John S.
Lindgren, Robert C.
Lizor, William F.
Lockett, William C.
Long, Benjamin F.
Lord, H erbert E.
Loring, Alben W.
Lucas, George E.
Lugo, Cleofas V.
McCall, Mack
McCleary, Gail R.
McDeavitt, Albert C.
McKinney, Jorden J.
McTigue, Robert M.
Marconi, Doninic J.
Markinson , Edward
Martinez, Jesse C.
Martinez, Manuel
Marzano, Frank D.
Matthews, William
Medeiros, Charles
Mercurio, Samuel L.
Messina, Metrus F.
Meyer, Richard M.
Michels, Arthur
Mikesell, Richard J.
Miller, Edward G.
Miller, James D.
Miller, Milace H.
Millhorn, James B.
Mitdrell, Norman L.
Mitten, Robert C.
Mokdenhaur, Herman J.
Molinaro, Vincent J.
Mongeon, Donald A.
Montalione, Girolomo P.
Moore, Clayton G.
Moore, Wayne H.
Mora, Bernard D.
Moran, Raymond F.
Moran, Thomas J.
Morgan, Carl J.
Morgan, Vergil V.
Morris, William H.
Morton, John
Mrowca, Joseph T.
Mrugala, Joseph C.
Mulvey, John P.
Muzereus, John
Neely, Jack
Neil, Darrel M.
Nelson, Nels K.
Ness, Alfred
New, Robert E.
Nichols, Marvin D.
Noel, Roy G.
Noyes, Edward E.
Nyberg, Donald E.
Oba!, Edward S.
Okolo, Joseph J.
Oreahio, Frank C.
Ortiz, Joe P.
Osborn, Albert S.
Osborne, Marvin S.
Oshensky, Anthony W.
Overcasher, William H.
Padilla, Isabel
Paglarallo, John
Paige, Walter H., Jr.
Painton, Howard M.
Palermo, Anthony F.
Palmer, Harry R.
Paschal, Charles H.
Pascik, Charles J.
Pastor, Robert W.
Patrician, George
Pauletto, Gino J.
Pa vusko, Joseph
Peck, Robert J.
Pennington, Harold W.
Peplinski, Raymond V.
Perkes, Theo T.

,

Perry, Joel B.
Pete, Joe
Peters, George A.
Petrucci, Alessandro
Piazza, John
Pieper, Harold A.
Pierce, Hugh S.
Person, Glenn W.
Pilgrim, Floyd H.
Pinheiro, Daniel D.
Pinkstron, Robert L.
Proto, Louis M.
Pruitt, Richard T.
Pszenny, Henry A.
Pula, Joseph G.
Purkey, Clark
Quici, Ralph
Rahrig, Melvin H.
Ramirez, Lucas N.
Ramirez, Ralph
Ramsay, Robert, Jr.
Rapoza, John
Reigel, Eugene C.
Renteria, Martin

Richards, Earl V.
Richmond, Linzy A
Rider, James J.
·
Ridgeway, Carl L.
Risley, Frank
Ritter, James F.
Riw, Santiago
Robinson, Charles J.
Robinson, John F.
Robinson, Leonard M.
Robinson, Manona T.
Robinson, W. A.
Rodriguez, Eldon J.
Roger•. Harold
Rolph, Jack W.
Rosa, Dominic N.
Rosales, Ben
Rose, Robert L.
Rowell, James D.
Rollo, Umberto J.
Russell, Luther E.
Rykala, Frederick
Sajdak, Stanley J.
Santangelo, Joseph J.
Scevola, Richard E.
Schaw, William E.
Schmitz, William R.
Schobl, Leonard C.
Schott, Melvin J.
Schreiber. Kenneth J.
Schultz, Daniel G.
Schulze, Vernon 0.
Scoggins, Gene B.
Scott, Robert D.
Scroggins, Jesse W.
Sedita, Frank T.
Sedlock, Paul
Shafer, Joseph L.
Shaver, Wilber B.
Shaw, Warren S.
Sheldon, Charles D.
Sherwin, Milton A.
Shine, Robert J.
Sickler, Paul J.
Silvestro, August A.
Simmons, John R.
Sims, Glynn
Sinclair, Jewell P.
Slater, Fred L.
Smith, James W.
Smith, Rex A.
Snoody, Norman A.
Sobek, Matthew
Sondel, Henry J.
Speed, Woodrow
Sprague, Sterling F.
Stahnke, Oliver H.
Staples. Ervin C.
Steen. Stanley W.
Sternberg, Clyde F.
Steven•. Donald G.
Stiles, Ray F.
Stimpert, Edward A.
Stirling, James E.
Strom, Ralph C.
St. Peter, Nelson J.
Strait, Ora E.
Strout, George R.
Sullivan, George S.
Sullivan, Lawrence J.
Symington, Emer:mn S.

Taylor, Clofus
Thomas, John S.
Thomas, Julian R.
Thomas, Roy W.
Thompson, George A.
Tincher, John J.
Tindall, Roy P.
Todes, Felix A.
Tracy, James A.

Trentham, Dott
Tripler, Claude W.
Tucker, Richard F.
Turner, Samuel, Jr.
Upright, Clyde R.
Uyhely, Steve C.
Vabolis, Anthony B.
Veleta, Fred J.

lJarroll, Bernard V.
Carroll, Jesse

Carter, Walton L.
Casas, Paul W.
Cassese, Anthony 'f.
Catino, Robert E.
Chandler, Jack E.
Chiappetta, Gennaro J.
Chisolm, William F.
Chrisman, Robert M.
Clark, Donald L.
Claypool, James G.
Coady, Francis X.
Coalburn, James L.
Cohen, Abram R.
Coldicott, Frederick B.
Combs, Richard D.
Cooper, David T.
Copes, Edward W.
Costa, Joseph
Cotterell, John W.
Cox, Charles L.
Cox, James W.
Crabtree, Lenvil
Cross, Kenneth L.
Cynkar, John J.
Czechowicz, Julius P.
Dalaba, Merton J.
Dale, Clarence E.
Daley, Richard E.
Dalton, James M.
Davis, Sterling J.
Delisle, George G.
Del Priore, Lawrence J.
De Matteo, Vincent J.
Denson, David C.
De Vito, Joseph A.
Diehl, Arthur J.
DiPietro, Carmen P.
Dogostino, John J.
Dolph, Thurston T.
Dorfman, Bernard
Douglas, Jesse C.

Vincent, Bennie R.

Walden, William D.
Walker, Earl E.
Walker, Franklin E.
Walsh, Joseph F.
Walters, Don C.
Ward, Maynard E.
Warlick, Clyde F.
Warren, James H.
Watts, Troy
Weber, Earnest R.
Webster, Blaine

Weiner, Melvin
Wellman, Harold
West, Harold D.
Westcott, Earl R.
Wetmore, Robert A.
Wilhoit, James C.
Wilkins, William R.
Wilkolaski, Frank J.
Williams, Malcolm A.
Williams, Orel
Wilson, James H.
Winiecki, Norbert H.
Winstead, John, Jr.
Winters, Lester J.
Withers, Roland G.
Wolfe, James, Jr.
Womack, John R.
Wood, Lyle V.
Wood, William E.
Woods, Horace J.
Wurtz, Very! A.
Yarbrough, Arlie R.
Young, Harry
Young, Lloyd W.
Zaidins, Edward A.

Eastham, Hervert V.

Estevez, Ralph W.
Eversole, Franchi M.

Zaya.nee, William J.

Zepeda, Julio N.
Zilinek, William
Zuckerman, Irving
Zutic, Andrew F.

Farris, Fred C.
Ferris, Melvin H.

Gamble, Robert L.
Gansarski, Adolph B.
Garcia, Tony M.

Privates

Garnice, Daniel A.
Gaydo~. Vincent L.

Adkisson, Robert G.
Alston, Norman P.
Altamari, Michael W.
Anderson, Floyd F.

GcorgeMon, Con1:1tantin

Gibson, James R.
Gilbreath, George L.
Ginder, Henry
Givliani, Michael J.
Gordan, John T.
Graves, Charles C.
Green, Delmar F.
Griffith, Donald V.
Griffith, Harold E.
Gritz, Lawrence W.
Groff'. Benjamin F.

Anderson, France H.

Anderson, Lloyd G.
Andrulewicz, Joseph A.
Appel, Harry E.
Archie, Clyde L.
Arenson, Nathan H.
Austin, Dan
Austin, Junior D.

Banevich, Walter E.
Balk, Henry J.
Baril, Roland A.
Barr, Benny J.
Barton, Arthur P.

Grossman, Martin

Grover, Bion J .. Jr.
Guest, Robert J.
Hagen, Earl
Harris, Emmett L.
Hartman, Elvin E.
Haskins, John M.
Haught, Lawrence J.
Hay, Earl
Heichel, Dewey R.
Helie, Homer L.
Henley, Floyd J.
Hibbard, Walter, Jr.
Hines, Rollis J.
Hoffman, Joseph M.

Bazemore, James W.

Beals, Bruce K.
Beann, Wayne M.
Bednar, John E.
Beidler. Jacob W .. Sr.
Beisler. Theodore G.
Bell, Wayne R.
Benore, Louis W.
Rerniger, Julius

Bertels, Alphonse H.
Beukena, John L.
Binford, Joseph B.
Bingham, John A., Jr.
Blanton, Donald A.
Bledsoe, Charles R.
Boaz, Robert E.
Bosnak, John E.
Bottom, Ray W.
Boughter, Walter L.
Bowling, Carter
Boyd, Cecil W.
Bozzay, Louis S.
Bradley, Alfred R.
Bradley, Ruhel W.
Bragg, Boyd
Brannan, Silas A.
Briggs, Raymond M.
Brock, Norman M.
Brottmiller, Robert F.
Brouillard, Arthur H.
Brousseau, Harry E.
Caligary, John
Calvert, Roy L.
Camp, Elza 0.
Campbell, Kenneth K.
Capetanakis, Tony A.

Hogan, Lawrence W.

Hooker, Charles
Houlihan, Thomas P.
Howell, Amos
Howington, James E.
Huddleston, G Jenn
Hudgins, Curtis L.
Hugh, Walter A.
Irwin, Elden C.
Isaac, Eugene

Jackson, Lewis W.
Jarrett, Ven nor
Jennings, Ernest R.

Jerzembeck, William
Jessmon, Thoma• H.
Johnson, Leonard D.
Jones, Coy G.
Jones, Hugo W.
Jordan, Martin W.
Junga, Harold J.
Kannan, Paul R.
Karriker, Robert L.
Kelley, James L.
Keltner, John R.
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Kemp, Elwyn M.
Kendrick, Forrest L.
Kenyon, Herbert W.

Ketterer, Clarence W.
Kietzman, Joseph R.

Kimmerer, Clair K.
Koehn, Alvin W.
Kroeker, Herbert
Kulp, George I.
La Frenier, Joseph R.
Lander. Harry
La Padulo, John C.
Larocca, Stanley V.
La Rouche, John G.
La Vere, George J.
Lavimodiere, Rene J.
Lemire, George E.

Lemoine, Charles J .. Jr.
Lewis, Paulie J.
Lewis, William R.
Lippard, Roy C.
Lipscomb, Marshal E.
Lopez, Johnny J.
Lorence, Joseph M.
Lunsford, John M.
Luteman, John J.
Lyons, Donald E.
McConnell, Peter S.
McDaniel, Victor V.
McGroart, Charles J.
McKinney, Claude W.
McNamar, Wilfred L.
Madden, Francis J.
Maldonado, Manuel
Marsh, Hubert C.
Martin, Solen H.
Martinez, John R.
Mason, J ease A.
Masterbray, Joe
Mastronardi, Daniel L.
Mathis, Leonard C.
Meils, Marvin D.
Melvin, Harlan
Mendenhall, Stanley F.
Mewborne, Lemuel J.
Meyer, Rolland R.
Middei, Carmaine
Milewski, Stanley

Milh•r, Jim K.
Miller, Paul H.
Monroe, Charles F.
Montiel, Gabino
Moore, Glen D.
Morrison, Roy E.
Mor~e. James J.

Moser, Jack W.
Mosquedo, Mario

Mowery, Jay A.
Mucci, Vincent J.
Mull, Harold E.
Mullinay, Thomas R.
Murphy, Silby
Murray, John A.
Myers, Hugh A.
Nadeau, Henry G.
Nehrkorn, Paul K.
Nelson, Lavern W.
Nelson, Robert W .. Jr.
Newsome, Lamar H.

Nodurft, Claud H.
Nodurft, Ralph F.
Noe, Floyd L.
Noteboom, Case
Oliver, Ollie J.
Ordonez, Florencio V.

Otto, Arthur L.
Painter, Clarence A.
Panicali, Peter C.

Papes, Stephen A., Jr.
Pnrkin•on, Cliff'ord L.
Pauley, Carl H.
Pawlik, ~'rank P.
Peck, Raymond H.
Pence, Kenneth W.
Perkins, Roy 0.
Perkin•, Donald G.
Perrin, John A.
Peters, William L.
Petersen, George J.
Peterson, Allen C.
Poole, Estel
Pilert, Carroll E.
Plocher, Alvin C.
Pociuasek, Albin J.
Polding, Robert C.
Porch, George W., Jr.
Poulton, James
Power!i, James R.

Probst, Arthur C.
Provest, Harold F.
Raczius, Michael F.
Rasmussen, Henry

Rill, Robert A.
Robertson, William A.

Robey, Oliver A.
Rochacewitz, Edward W.
Rohrer. Clarence N.
Rose, Bernard
Rosario, Jorge A.

Ross, Jack E.
Rottar. Raymond
Sakkinen. Urho E.
Sanden, Edgar M.
Sandrowitz, Sam
Schell. A lien I.
Schneider, Richard R.
Schnessel, Leonard
Scott, Beverly B.
Scott. David D.
Seddon, Robert
Shaw. Raymond W.
Shepherd, Eithel A.
Shimko. Joseph B.
Short. Elmer
Simone, Anthony
Sisak, Michael G.

Slair, Raymond W.
Sluga. Ralph R.
Smith. Albert N.
Smith. Carl A.
Smith. Miner R.
Smithson. Robert H.
Snyder. John R.
Soben, Frank
Sorell, Morio
Spayd, Warren P.
Stacy, Robert V.
Stafford. Earl
Steinman, George
Stoen. Gordon M.
Stringer. John E.
Surgenti, Matthew A.
Sutton. Charles W.
Swarm, Kenneth
Taylor, Louis J.
Trotter, Carlton W.
Tuthill, Orville
Unland, Francis F.

Upchurch, Wilburn K.
Walker, Freddie L.
Walthorn, Lawrence M.
Weeley, Warren J.
Weinmeister, Edward
Weisgerber, Edward C.
Wells. Oakley 0.
Weymouth. Erwin L.
White, Gale S.
Wiggin, Everett M.
Wilkie, Robert D.
Wilkison, James B.
Willcat, Clifford A.
Williams, Donald M.
Williams, Earl C.
Williams. Harry J.
Wolf. Robert R.
Wolfe. William L.
Wood, Ben P.
Wozniak, Frank M.
Young, Reber A.
Young, Tom H.
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Zech, Bernard A.
Rank

Unknown (Records
placed or lost in battle)
Barna, John

Campbell, Joseph E.
Carrico, Russell

Cotterell, Joseph
Garner. Fred N.
Johnson. Jack B.
Kelln, Newman C.
Maksim. Michael
Nannery, Edward J.
Parlavecchia, Frank J.
Paulton, James
Perez, John
Phillips, George W.
Putroff, John M.
Scherer, Harold
Scholl, Leonard C., Jr.
Sisk, Craig
Stults, Harold 0.
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THE MEDAL OF HONOR
Staff Sergeant Jack

Awarded in the name of the Congress
to each person who, while an officer,
noncommissioned officer, or private of
the Army, in action involving actual
con~ict with an enemy, distinguishes
himself conspicuously by gallantry and
intrepidity at the risk of his life above
and beyond the call of duty.
In order to justify an award of the
Medal of Honor, the individual must
perform in action a deed of personal
bravery or self-sacri~ce above and beyond the call of duty, so conspicuous as
clearly to distinguish him for gallantry
and intrepidity above his comrades, involving risk of life or the performance of
more than ordinarily haz.ardous service,
the omission of which would not justly
subject him to censure as for shortcoming or failure in the performance of his
duty. The recommendations for the decoration will be judged by this standard of
extraordinary merit and incontestable
proof of the performance of the service
will be exacted.
~ ••

J. Pendleton

Staff Sergeant Jack/. Pendleton (Army serial No. 39179563),
Company "I," !20th Infantry, United States Army. For conspicuous
gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond
the call of duty on 12 October 1944. When Company "I" was advancing on the town of Bardenberg, Germany, they reached a point
approximately two-thirds of the distance through the town when
they were pinned down by lire from a nest of enemy machine guns.
This enemy strongpoint was protected by a Ione machine gun strategically placed at an intersection and firing down a street which of.
fered little or no cover or concealment for the advancing troops. The
elimination of this protecting machine gun was imperative in order
that the stronger position it protected could be neutralized. After
repeated and unsuccessful attempts had been made to knock out this
position, Sergeant Pendleton volunteered to lead his squad in an attempt to neutralize this strongpoint. Sergeant Pendleton started
his squad slowly forward, crawling about 10 yards in front of his
men in the advance toward the enemy gun. After advancing approximately 130 yards under the withering lire, Sergeant Pendleton
was seriously wounded in the leg by a burst from the gun he was
assaulting. Disregarding his grievous wound, he ordered his men to
remain where they were and, with a supply of hand grenades, he
slowly and painfully worked his way forward alone. With no
hope of surviving the veritable hail of machine-gun lire which
he deliberately drew onto himse~f! he succeeded in advancing to
within 10 yards of the enemy pos1t10n when he was instantly killed
by a burst from the enemy gun. By deliberately diverting the attention of the German machine gunners upon himself, a second
squad was able to advance undetected and, with the help of Sergeant
Pendleton's squad, neutralized the lone machine gun while another
platoon of his company advanced up the intersecting street and
knocked out the machine-gun nest which the first gun had been
covering. Sergeant Pendleton's sacrifice enabled the entire company
to continue the advance and complete their mission at a critical
phase of the action. (General Orders No. 24, IPar Department, 6
April 1945.)
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Technical Sergeant Francis S. Currey

Staff Sergeant Paul L. Bolden

Sergeant Francis S. Currey (Army serial No. 12225906), (then
Private First Class), Company .. K," 120th Infantry, Army of the
United States, was an automatic rifleman with the 3d Platoon defending a strongpoint near Malmedy, Belgium, on 21 December
1944, when the enemy launched a powerful attack. Overrunning
tank destroyers and antitank guns located near the strongpoint,
German tanks advanced to the 3d Platoon's position, and after prolonged fighting forced the withdrawal of this group to a near·by
factory. Private Currey found a bazooka in the building and crossed
a street to secure rockets under intense fire from enemy tanks and
hostile infantrymen who had taken up a position at a house a short
distance away. In the face of small-arms, machine.gun, and artillery
fire, he, with a companion, knocked out a tank with one shot. Moving to another position, he observed three German soldiers in the
doorway of an enemy-held house. He killed or wounded all three
with his automatic rifle. He emerged from cover and advanced alone
to within 50 yards of the house, intent on wrecking it with rockets.
Covered by friendly fire, he stood erect and fired a shot which
knocked down half of one wall . While in this forward position,
he observed five Americans who had been pinned down for hours by
lire from the house and three tanks. Realizing that they could not
escape until the enemy tank and infantry guns had been silenced,
Private Currey crossed the street to a vehicle where he procured an
armful of antitank grenades. He launched these while under heavy
enemy fire, driving the tankmen from their vehicles into the house.
He then climbed onto a half-track in full view of the Germans and
fired a machine gun at the house. Once again changing his position,
he manned another machine gun whose crew had been killed .
Under his covering fire the live soldiers were able to retire to safety.
Deprived of tank~ and with heavy inf.antry casualties, the enemy
was forced to w1t~draw .. Through his extensive knowledge of
weapons and by his heroic and repeated braving of murderous
enemy fire, Private Currey was greatly responsible for inflicting
heavy losses in men and materiel on the enemy, for rescuing five
comrades, two of whom were wounded, and for stemming an attack which threatened to flank his battalion's position . (General
Orders No. 69, War Department, 17 August 1945.)

Staff Sergeant Paul L, Bolden (Army serial No. 34396135),
Company .. E," 120th Infantry, Army of the United States, voluntarily attacked a formidable enemy strongpoint in Petit-Coo, Belgium, on 23 December 1944, when his company was pinned down
by extremely heavy automatic and small.arms fire coming from a
house 200 yards to the front. Mortar and tank-artillery shells
pounded the unit when Sergeant Bolden and a comrade, on their
own initiative, moved forward into a hail of bullets to eliminate the
ever-inc!easing fire from the German position. Crawling ahead to
close with what they knew was a powerfully armed, vastly superior
force, the pair reached the house and took up assault positions, Sergeant Bolden under a window and his comrade across the street
where he could deliver covering fire. In rapid succession, Sergeant
Bolden hurled a fragmentation grenade and a white phosphorus
grenade into the building, and then, fully realizing that he faced
tremendous odds, rushed to the door, threw it open, and fired into
35 SS troopers who were trying to reorganize themselves after the
havoc wrought by the grenade. Twenty Germans died under the
fire of his submachine gun before he was struck in the shoulder,
chest, and stomach by part of a burst which killed his comrade
across the street. He withdrew from the house and waited for the
surviving Germans to come out and surrender. When none appeared in the doorway, he summoned his ebbing strength, overcame
the extreme pain he suffered, and boldly walked back into the house,
firing as he went. He had killed the remaining 15 enemy soldiers
when his ammunition ran out. Sergeant Bo/den's heroic advance
against great odds, his fearless assault, and his magnificent display
of courage in reentering the building where he had been severely
wounded cleared the path for his company and insured the success
of its mission. (General Orders No. 73, War Department, 30
August 1945.)
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DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATIONS
The 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in armed conHict with
the enemy. On 6 August 1944 the 2d Battalion, I 20th
Infantry Regiment, occupied defensive positions on
Hill 314 which commanded major routes of approach
and supply. The success of the Allied breakthrough
battles in Normandy depended upon retention of this
vital terrain feature. Orders directed the battalion to
hold the hill at all costs. On 7 August 1944 the ~rmans launched the first of a series of vicious counterattacks in which they committed large forces of infantry and armor in a desperate and fanatical attempt to
split the Allied forces driving into Brittany from those
in Normandy. In the initial attack enemy troops
reached Mortain and completely surrounded Hill 314,
isolating the 2d Battalion, I 20th Infantry Regiment.
Repeated attacks on the hill were repulsed in bitter
fighting. During the siege that followed, enemy pressure was unrelenting, food and ammunition were low,
and medical supplies were rapidly exhausted because
of the many casualties sustained. Two attempts by
aircraft to supply the isolated men resulted in partial
success, with the bulk of the supplies falling in
enemy-held territory. A desperate attempt was made
to provide medical supplies fired from friendly artillery, part of which reached the battalion. Appeals to
surrender were rejected. Threatening annihilation,
the enemy launched another bitter attack with a large
force of tanks, which was successfully repulsed by this
heroic battalion but at the cost of numerous casualties.
At night, infiltrating enemy attacking under cover of
darkness were driven back. During the day, the battalion repulsed numerous enemy penetrations and
withstood terrific aerial bombardments, strafing, and
intense artillery concentrations. Although the battalion suffered heavy losses and faced an acute shortage
of water, food, and medical supplies, it remained steadfast in the defense of Hill 314. The personnel of this
battalion held their ground tenaciously and in the face
of bitter oppasition courageously denied the strategic
hill to the enemy. The battalion's losses in this action
included 277 killed, wounded, and missing, but numerous casualties and heavy loss of equipment were
inflicted upon the enemy. During the entire seven-day
period the gallant fighting men of the 2d Battalion,
I 20th Infantry Regiment, exhibited unwavering fortitude and an indomitable fighting spirit, repulsing one
of the most severe and determined counterattacks
launched by the Germans in France. By its brave and
heroic stand it prevented the enemy from splitting
our forces in Normandy from those in Brittany. The
unflinching devotion to duty and superb courage displayed by each man of the battalion reflect the highest

traditions of the armed forces. [General Orders No. 3,
War Department, 8 January 1945.]

Company "K," I 20th Infantry Hegiment, is cited
for outstanding performance of duty in armed conHict
with the enemy. On 6 August 1944 Company "K,"
while attached to the 2d Battalion, I 20th Infantry
Regiment, occupied defensive positions on Hill 314
which commanded major routes of approach and supply. Possession of this terrain feature was vital to the
success of the Allied breakthrough battles out of Normandy. Orders directed the company to hold its defensive position at all costs. On 7 August 1944 the
Germans launched the first of a series of vicious counterattacks in which they committed large forces of
infantry and armor in a desperate and fanatical attempt to split the Allied forces driving into Brittany
from those in Normandy. In the initial attack enemy
troops reached Mortain and completely surrounded
Hill 314. Repeated attacks on the Company "K" sector were repulsed in bitter fighting. ' During the siege
that followed, enemy pressure was unrelenting, food
and ammunition were low, and medical supplies were
rapidly exhausted because of the many casualties sustained. Two attempts by aircraft to supply the isolated
men resulted in partial success, with the bulk of the
supplies falling in enemy-held territory. A desperate
attempt was made to provide medical supplies fired
from friendly artillery, part of which reached the company. Appeals to surrender were rejected. Threatening annihilation, the enemy launched another bitter
attack with a large force of tanks, which was successfully repulsed. At night, infiltrating enemy attacking
under cover of darkness were driven back. During
the day, the company repulsed numerous enemy pcnetrations in its sector and withstood terrific aerial bomhardmcnts, strafing, and intense artillery concentrations, but remained steadfast in its defense. The personnel of this company held their ground tenaciously
and in the face of bitter opposition courageously denied its position to the enemy. During the entire
seven-day period the gallant fighting men of Company
"K," I 20th Infantry Regiment, exhibited unwavering
fortitude and an indomitable fighting spirit, repulsing
one of the most severe and determined counterattacks
launched by the Germans in France. By its brave and
heroic stand it prevented the enemy from splitting our
forces in Normandy and those in Brittany. The un·
Hinching devotion to duty and superb courage displayed by each man of the company reHect the highest
traditions of the armed forces. [General Orders No. 3,
\Var Department, 8 January 1945. ]
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The I st Platoon, Antitank Company, l 20tlz Infantry Regiment, is cited for outstanding performance of
duty in armed conAict with the enemy. On 6 August
1944 the 1st Platoon, Antitank Company, 120th Infantry Regiment, was assigned the mission of placing
and defending a roadblock at the convergence of five
roads near Abbaye-Blanche, northwest of Martain, in
support of the 2d Battalion which was occupying Hill
314. The mission of this platoon was to deny heavy
enemv armor the use of these roads to attack Hill 314.
This 'hill commanded major routes of approach and
supply, the possession of which was vital to the success
of the Allied breakthrough battles in Normandy. On
7 August 1944 the Germans launched the first of a
series of vicious counterattacks in which they committed large forces of infantry and armor in a desperate
and fanatical attempt to split the Allied forces driving
through Normandy from those in Brittany. In the
initial attack enemy troops reached Martain and completely surrounded Hill 314. During the siege that
followed, the I st Platoon vigorously repulsed repeated
enemy attempts to break through the roadblock with
heavy armor. Throughout the entire seven-day period
the Germans subjected this stubborn group to devas·
tating attacks in a futile attempt to neutralize the position which was holding up the advance of their armor.
I leroically, the platoon assisted in destroying more
than 60 tanks and vehicles and effectively blocked the
enemy's advance. The personnel of this platoon held
their ground tenaciously and, in the face of bitter opposition, courageously denied the use of the strategic
road to the enemy. During the entire engagement the
gallant men of the platoon exhibited unwavering fortitude and an indomitable fighting spirit in assisting to
repulse one of the most severe and determined counterattacks launched by the Germans in France. By their
brave and heroic stand the men of this platoon materially assisted in preventing the enemy from splitting
our forces in Normandy from those in Brittany. The
unAinching devotion to duty and courage displayed
by each man of the 1st Platoon, Antitank Company,
I20th Infantry Regiment, reAect the highest traditiom
of the armed forces. [General Orders No. 3, \Var De-

partment, 8 January 1945.]
The 2d Platoon, Antitank Company, 120th lnfantry Regiment, is cited for outstanding performance of
duty in armed conAict with the enemy. On 6 August
1944 the 2d Platoon, Antitank Company, I 20th lnfan
try Hegiment, was assigned the mission of placing and
defending a roadblock at the convergence of five roads
near Ahbaye-Blanche, northwest of !\ lortain, in suppart of the 2d Battalion which was occupying l lill
314. The mission of this platoon was to deny heavy
enemy armor the use of these roads to attack Hill 314.
This hill commanded major routes of approach and
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supply, the possession of which was vital to the success
of the Allied breakthrough battles in Normandy. On 7
August 1944 the Germans launched the first of a series
of vicious counterattacks in which they committed
large forces of infantry and armor in a desperate and
fanatical attempt to split the Allied forces driving
through Normandy from those in Brittany. In the
initial attack, enemy troops reached Martain and completely surrounded Hill 314. During the siege that
followed, the 2d Platoon vigorously repulsed repeated
enemy attempts to break through the roadblock with
heavy armor. Throughout the entire seven-day period
the Germans subjected this stubborn group to devastating attacks in a futile attempt to neutralize the position which was holding up the advance of their armor.
Heroically, the platoon assisted in destroying more
than 60 tanks and vehicles and effectively blocked the
enemy's advance. The personnel of this platoon held
their ground tenaciously and in the face of bitter opposition courageously denied the use of the strategic
road to the enemy. During the entire engagement, the
gallant men of the platoon exhibited unwavering fortitude and an indomitable fighting spirit in assisting to
repulse one of the most severe and determined counterattacks launched by the Germans in France. By
their brave and heroic stand the men of this platoon
materially assisted in preventing the enemy from splitting our forces in Normandy from those in Brittany.
The unAinching devotion to duty and courage displayed by each man of the 2d Platoon, Antitank Company, 120th Infantry Hegiment, reAect the highest traditions of the armed forces. [General Orders No. 3,

War Department, 8 January 1945.]
The I st Battalion, I 20th Infantry Regiment, is cited
for outstand~ng performance of duty in action against
the enemy from 8 to 12 October 1944, in Germany.
This battalion was given the mission of capturing and
holding an important enemy-held town located on
vitally strategic terrain. Due to the nature of this terrain, the attack was made across an unprotected area
within full view of cnemv defenses, so that when the
objective was reached, th~ enemy was still able to deliver accurate fire. Despite violent opposition and
heavy casualties, the troops fought tenaciously and
seized the town. Four counterattacks were launched
by the foe in the days following, and numerically superior infantry and armored thrusts were repulsed in
hitter fighting. The enemy lost 38 tanks, and 125
troops were captured, in addition to an unknown
number of killed and wounded personnel. The heroism exhibited by all members of the I st Battalion,
/20th Infantry J{egiment, reAects great credit on themscl\'es and is in keeping with the highest traditions of
the military service. lGeneral Orders No. 11, War Department, 30 January 1946.]

GLOSSARY
AAA
AF
AP
AT
BAR
Bn
Burp gun

Antiaircraft artillery
Landing craft, tank
LCT
Landing craft, vehicle and personnel
Air Force
LCVP
Line of Departure, which is line designated
Antipersonnel
LD
Antitank
on the ground, such as a road, railroad,
etc., which attacking troops cross at a
Browning automatic riRe
specified time.
Battalion
Med
Medical
German machine pistol; a type of light
MII
Military intelligence interpreter
machine gun
MLR
Main line of resistance
CIC
Counterintelligence Corps
mm
Millimeter, 0.0937 of an inch. A 75mm
CO
Commanding officer
gun is of the approximate size of a 3Co
Company
inch gun
CP
Command post
M-4
Medium tank
Div
Division
Armored car
M-8
Eng
Engineer
3-inch self-propelled tank destroyer
M-10
FA
Field artillery
M-18
90mm self-propelled tank destroyer
G-1 (S-1) Personnel officer or adjutant
M-24
G-2 (S-2) Intelligence officer
Light tank
M-29
G-3 (S-3) Operations officer
Light, tracked cargo vehicle known as a
G-4 (S-4) Supply officer
"Weasel"
(The above are staff officers. If "G" they
Officer candidate school
are on a division or higher staff; if "S" on a PW
Prisoner of war
battalion or regimental staff.)
Regiment
Regt
GI
Government issue, or slang for enlisted man SA or SS German storm troops
IP
Initial point. A designated point on the TD
Tank destroyer
ground which marching units cross at TOT
Time-on-target, which is method of firing
prescribed times for the purpose of comany artillery guns at slightly different
ordi na ting the movement.
times in order that the various projecIPW
lnt~rrogation of prisoners of war
tiles land on the target simultaneously.
I&R
Intelligence and reconnaissance
T
cchnician,
4th grade, etc.
T /4, etc.
K ration Packaged food which can be conveniently USO
United Service Organizations
carried. Monotonous to eat, but far bet- SCR-300 A radio. Army radios are designated by
ter than easily carried rations issued by
numbers for identifying types.
any other army.
SCR-536 A small radio, the "walkie-talkie"
LCI
8:00 P.M. in the 24-hour time system.
Landing craft, infantry
2000
LCM
Landing craft, medium
0800 is 8:00 A.M.

ocs
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